Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
Data collected by comparative legal scholars show that legal transplants usually take place from more complex societies to less complex ones. By contrast, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement that has recently developed in modern societies has been described as a return to a simple model of dispute settlement used in the past and in modern non-Western societies. Does this mean that we are experiencing a new kind of legal transplant, a transplant from less complex to more complex societies? In this article I will argue that this is not the case. Far from being a transplant from the southern to the northern hemisphere, ADR seems indeed to be a modern legal institution born from the retreat of the state from some of its traditional functions. A different question thus needs exploring: is ADR, at least, an institution that can easily be transplanted to Africa where the original transplant of the Western state has failed? In other words, is conciliatory ADR more similar to the African way of dealing with conflicts and consequently to be recommended as the dispute resolution mechanism for modern African states? The question appears to be appropriate in situations such as the one in the Horn of Africa—particularly Eritrea—where the new political leadership is confronting the difficult task of building a new legal system.
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6 There is no one single tradition in Africa. I am therefore speaking in general terms to give a very basic picture of what is a common African phenomenon.
7 Compare, among others, Gulliver, “Disputes settlements without courts: the Ndendeuli of southern Tanzania”, in Nader, L. (ed.), Law in Culture and Society, Chicago, 1969;Google ScholarColson, E., The Social Organisation of the Gwembe Tonga, Manchester, 1960.Google Scholar
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9 On this, see Iyob, op. cit., n. 5, 39.
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14 In the sense indicated by Nils Christie’s seminal article: “Conflict as property”, (1977) British Journal of Criminology 1.Google Scholar
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21 On legal pluralism in contemporary Western societies cf., most recently, Benda-Beckmann, op. cit, n. 19.
22 See Mattei, “Socialist and non socialist approaches to land law: continuity and change in Somalia and other African states”, (1990) 16 Rev. Socialist L. 17.
23 The protection afforded by the group to women in the traditional Ashanti land tenure system has been recently compared with the individual and disadvantaged position of women in modern Ghana: see Seth Opuni Asiama, “Crossing the barrier of time. The Asante woman in urban land development”, (1997) 2 Africa 212.
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