Horses in themselves have little or no necessary military significance: in Part I of this article we saw how various quite unwarlike peoples possessed them. of fundamental significance, in transforming horses into war-horses, was good harness and equipment, and to carry this larger animals were preferable. Even against well-equipped cavalry, mainly infantry forces might prevail, if they were, like the Almoravids and the adherents of Usuman dan Fodio, sufficiently inspired. An important advantage of a horse, or better still several horses, was in providing a means of speedy escape. Horses were also valuable in slaving, a profitable occupation not only in the economic terms of human booty, some of whom might be sold for more horses, but also in demographic terms, a sort of compulsory immigration scheme. The use of horses in communications, as packanimals, in hunting, and for food, is discussed, though none was of outstanding significance in the Central Sudan. The employment of horses in agriculture seems to have been entirely lacking. Perhaps the most widespread use of horses was in festivals and celebrations; these displays of horsemanship, whether intentionally or not, helped train horses and riders. Good equipment was again vital, and sumptuary restrictions seem to have been directed more against overweening ostentation in this, than in the possession of horses. While horses were very widely esteemed, the most scrupulous among Muslims felt a certain hesitation about the propriety of riding a horse. Horses were found as a form of tribute, alms, bribes, and gifts of various kinds. In conclusion, the horse per se was more common, and less remarkable, in the Central Sudan than is sometimes suggested; it was the equipment of horses which made them effective weapons of war and statecraft.

Few African scholars have had such an impact on both North and West Africa as al-Maghīlī (d. 1503/4 or 1505/6). This biographical sketch begins by assessing his part in the theological debate preceding the persecution of the Jewish community at Touat (conventionally dated to 1492), which was largely instigated by him, and relates it to his unsuccessful campaign against the Banū-Waṭṭāş whom he opposed because of their incapacity to check the growth of Christian power and Jewish influence in Morocco. After his failure against the Banū-Waṭṭāş, al-Maghīlī went to the western Sudan, where in Air, Takidda, Kano, Katsina and Gao he exerted a more peaceful and scholastic influence as a great renovator of Islam. The death of his son at Touat led him to return there C. 1503, and to resume his active campaigning against the Jews and their influence until his death a year or two later.

This study seeks to redefine the ritual significance of the madzi-manga through the use of Barue oral traditions. It goes beyond a redefinition of the ritual to study the entire process of investiture, the role of the senior mhondoro in Barue society, and the exact nature of the relationship between the Barue and the Portuguese. It concludes that the madzi-manga represented neither a Catholic baptism nor a syncretic religious practice, as has been previously argued. Rather, it was the traditional medium through which the sacred qualities of kingship were transrnitted.

The Kat River Settlement was established in the eastern Cape Colony in 1829 as a measure of frontier defence. In 1851 many of its coloured inhabitants rebelled against the colonial government. The rebels' motives were beyond the comprehension of contemporary officials, and no thorough investigation of them has since been made. All accounts agree that the Settlement initially thrived, despite the harmful effects of a frontier war in 1835. In later years, however, the government used the Settlement as a dumping ground for coloureds and tribesmen dispossessed elsewhere. The coloureds' system of economic clientship was simultaneously challenged by the extension of commercial farming techniques in the eastern Cape. Coloured people failed to obtain credit to enable them to adapt. Overcrowding and insecurity bred discontent, particularly among certain coloureds of Gonaqua (Khoi) origin, who remembered suffering earlier injustices at the hands of the whites. Unsympathetic colonial officials and the declining military importance of the Settlement compounded these basic grievances. In 1851, under cover of another frontier war, numbers of Settlement coloureds rebelled. The rebellion failed and the government appropriated the land belonging to the rebels, thus dispersing the last concentration of Gonaqua Khoi.

Gumbu du Sahel (Mali) est un gros village (environ 5.000 habitants) d'agriculteurs sédentaires, situé à la limite Nord de la zone de culture sèche du mil, au contact des Maures pasteurs nomades du Sahara. Il occupe le centre d'une cuvette sablonneuse relativement fertile qui permet, sur des terres fumées par les troupeaux des éleveurs, une production excédentaire de mil et de coton destinée traditionnellement à l'échange avec les nomades.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss a number of aspects relating to the client and captive labour force in the Bida emirate in the immediate pre-colonial period. Using data collected in surveys of 1611 captive and client villages in the 1930s, it has been possible to estimate the origins of a large part of this force and to establish the different periods of its recruitment. Comments are made regarding the role of this labour force in the pre-colonial economy of Nupe, on the position of slaves and clients in the society of the emirate, and on the effects of the extensive population transfer on the ethnic demography of Nupeland. It is hoped that this essay will contribute to the contemporary discussion regarding indigenous slavery in Africa, and will lead to an accelerated abandonment of simplistic notions concerning the nature of African economy and society in the late nineteenth century.

From the point of view of both practical administration and Indirect Rule theory, non-centralized peoples posed acute problems for British administrators in Africa. The Lango people of Uganda were an especially difficult case, since their social organization was highly fragmented and lacked even the cohesiveness of a segmentary lineage system. The first government chiefs, appointed from 1912 onwards, represented a measure of continuity with the pre-colonial order, since they were nearly all drawn from the ranks of the clan leaders. But a chief's territory seldom corresponded to any pre-colonial entity, while his wide-ranging executive and judicial powers were a complete novelty. During the period 1920–33 the majority of chiefs in all except the most senior county grade ceased even to be natives of their chiefdoms; this was due partly to the European preoccupation with bureaucratic standards, and partly to the success of the county chiefs in establishing patronage networks of their own placemen. As a result, abuse of chiefly power increased, while the ordinary population became more estranged from the colonial administrative structure. An exposé of maladministration in 2933 highlighted the contradictions of British policy in Lango, but it was not until the 1950s that radical reform along democratic lines was attempted.

By the end of 1955, territorial politics in Dahomey were dominated by three parties, the P.R.D. of S. M. Apithy, the M.D.D. of Hubert Maga, and the U.D.D. of Justin Ahomadegbe and others. Each party relied upon electoral support in clearly defined regions: the P.R.D. depended on the south-east, the M.D.D. on the north, and the U.D.D. on the residual areas of central and south-western Dahomey. The U.D.D. claimed, however, to be a new kind of party, transcending the narrow regionalism of its rivals and commanding ‘mass’ support rather than the uncertain and conditional support provided by ‘vote contractors’.

The loi-cadre reforms of 1956—7 led to an intensification of party activity, since they provided for the creation of territorial executives founded on electoral majorities and at the same time introduced universal suffrage. The 1957 Territorial Assembly elections were therefore a testing-ground for the tactics and strength of the three parties. Under pressure from the P.R.D., the U.D.D. adopted selection procedures like those of its rival. Outside the main towns, its campaigning was similar, concentrating on local issues to the exclusion of the wider questions on which the U.D.D. had hoped to take its stand.