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‘THIS HORRID HOLE’: ROYAL AUTHORITY, COMMERCE AND CREDIT AT BONNY, 1690–1840

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2004

PAUL E. LOVEJOY  and
DAVID RICHARDSON
PAUL E. LOVEJOY
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto
DAVID RICHARDSON
Affiliation:
University of Hull
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Abstract

This article suggests that differences in local political structures and credit protection regimes largely account for Bonny's displacement of Old Calabar as the principal slave port of the Bight of Biafra in the eighteenth century, despite Bonny's reputation for being particularly unhealthy for Europeans. We argue that this displacement occurred in the 1730s, several decades earlier than previously thought. We suggest that this was made possible by the early growth and consolidation of royal authority at Bonny. The use of state authority to enforce credit arrangements in Bonny proved more effective than the mechanisms adopted at its closest rival, Old Calabar, where, in the absence of a centralized political authority similar to the monarchy at Bonny, credit protection before 1807 was based on pawnship.

Keywords

Pre-colonialNigeriacreditslave tradestate
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of African History , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , November 2004 , pp. 363 - 392
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the conference, ‘Repercussions of the Atlantic slave trade: the Bight of Biafra and the African diaspora’, Nike Lake, Nigeria, July 2000, and the Harriet Tubman Seminar, York University, March 2004. We are grateful for the comments of those who attended the conference and the seminar. We also wish to thank Olatunji Ojo and David Eltis for their comments. We are pleased to acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the York/UNESCO ‘Nigerian Hinterland Project’ at York University, Canada, and the University of Hull Research Support Fund, which allowed us to undertake the research for this paper as part of a wider study of the Atlantic slave trade and the Bight of Biafra.