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The making of an imperial slum: Nyasaland and its railways, 1895–1935*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2009

Leroy Vail
Leroy Vail
Affiliation:
University of Zambia
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Extract

This paper is meant to be a contribution towards assessing the impact of the colonial experience upon Nyasaland, concentrating upon the decision-making processes involved in building the railways that served Nyasaland and the impact that they had upon Nyasaland's economy. In the early 1890s British metropolitan interests became alive to the strategic and commercial importance of Portuguese East Africa south of the Zambezi. To further British interests in the area, imperial decisions were taken to protect the British proxy there, the Mozambique Company. This protection included support for the Trans Zambesia Railway project. This support was calculated to protect British interests from American commercial threats, but the cost of the railway was placed upon the Nyasaland administration. Lumbered with the burden of the railway guarantees, Nyasaland's economy stagnated in the 1920s and African agricultural development was impeded. As a result, by the end of the twenties Nyasaland was being described as ‘the Cinderella of Africa’.

In the late 1920s a second major project was approved. This was the construction of the Zambezi bridge. Again, the decision to build this was not taken with the interests of Nyasaland in mind, but rather in order to provide steel orders for a stagnating British steel industry in 1929. The one possible moneymaker for the bridge and railway system, coal from Moatize, was prevented from being developed lest it compete with Welsh coal. And when the decision to build the bridge was made, it was decided that Nyasaland should pay.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of African History , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , January 1975 , pp. 89 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1975

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References

1 As, for example, Rodney, Walter, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam, 1972).Google ScholarBrett, E. A., Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: the Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939 (London, 1973)Google Scholar, has discussed the effects of railway financing in East Africa in a most stimulating fashion; see also O'Connor, A. M., Railways and Development in Uganda (Nairobi, 1965).Google Scholar

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12 F.O. 2/689, Memorandum of H. H. Johnston, 20 Nov. 1896; Ommanney (Crown Agents) to Stanmore, 15 Dec. 1896; Stanmore to Johnston, 20 Jan. 1897. It should be noted that with the sole exceptions of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, all railways in British colonial Africa were owned and operated by the government concerned (Frankel, , Capital Investment in Africa, 377).Google Scholar That the Foreign Office, not the Colonial Office, formulated early railway policy for Nyasaland is important in understanding this anomaly.

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35 C.O. 525/40, Harcourt to the Secretary of the British Central Africa Company, 5 Dec. 1911.

36 C.O. 525/45, Maugham to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 28 Nov. 1911.

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45 C.O. 525/88, Bottomley (C.O.) to Buckley (Treasury), 19 Apr. 1919. The leading proponents of this new forward attitude were Smuts, Milner and Leopold Amery, all of whom took an active part in formulating imperial policies towards Portuguese East Africa. Smuts saw the move as one that would ensure that German commercial activity would not revive in the area and as highly advantageous to South Africa. Milner and Amery agreed with Smuts and pressed for British governmental intervention to extend British interests in the area. C.O. 525/77, Memorandum of J. C. Smuts, 15 Jan. 1918; C.O. 525/81, Philips to Read, , 11 09 1918Google Scholar; C.O. 525/88, Milner to Balfour, , 18 07 1918Google Scholar; Minute of Amery, L. S., 19 04 1919.Google Scholar

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54 The Colonial Office explained the position thus: ‘In view of the suspicions and susceptibilities of the Portuguese Government, it was recognized that any proposal for a direct guarantee by the Imperial Government would wreck the whole project, and it was in these circumstances decided, without preliminary consultation with the Government of Nyasaland, to arrange for a guarantee in the name of that Government as being likely to be less distasteful to the Government of Portugal.’ C.O. 525/85, Read to Barstow, , 18 08 1919.Google Scholar

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61 MNA. S1/1644/23, Treasury to Colonial Office, 5 Mar. 1923, enclosed in C.O. to Governor, 19 Apr. 1923.

62 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the railways upon Nyasaland's domestic economy, see Leroy Vail, ‘Railway Development and Colonial Underdevelopment: the Nyasaland Case’, in Ann Seidman, Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty: essays on the development of Underdevelopment in southern central Africa (forthcoming).

63 MNA. GOA 2/4/29, Fiddes to Smith, , 28 12 1915.Google Scholar In 1915 Oury estimated the cost of a bridge over the Zambezi at £150,000. When it was finally completed, its cost exceeded £3,000,000.

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67 C.O. 525/110, Barstow to Read, 27 May 1924.

68 A committee appointed to study railway development in Nyasaland saw the bridge was a possible way of freeing the Protectorate from the TZR guarantee responsibilities by its allowing the profitable shipment of coal from Moatize over the TZR; Governor Bowring agreed. MNA. S1/874/24, ‘Report of the Stevenson Committee’, in Thomas to Bowring, 25 Oct. 1924, and Bowring to Amery, 21 Jan. 1925.

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73 General Hammond had had considerable experience in similar work in Nigeria, East Africa and Rhodesia and was considered the best man available for such a task.

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77 Ibid. 13. This assumed that the imperial authorities would allow cheap exports, such as maize, to be produced in Nyasaland. In fact, when the opportunity arose, Whitehall refused to countenance such exports.

78 Ibid. 46/56.

79 A critical point left untouched, because it was explicitly excluded from the Commission's terms of reference, was the potential of the Moatize coal-fields, which were generally accepted as the only thing that could make the bridge a financially feasible proposition. Although nothing was published about these, General Hammond wrote a ‘secret’ report to Amery to make the point that the Moatize coal-fields were highly speculative, that Natal coal would almost surely undercut Moatize coal, and that the British South Africa Company, with its very large influence in the Port of Beira, would surely use its influence there to block the improvements that would help Nyasaland at the expense of the coal industry at Wankie. By this time, Rhodesian Railways, controlled by the British South Africa Company, was a dominant influence in the Beira Works Company, which now held the port development concessions in Beira. C.O. 525/117, Hammond to Amery, 17 June 1927; C.O. 525/122, Paterson (Vice Consul at Beira) to Consul, Lourenço Marques, 22 Nov. 1927; d'Erlanger, , Construction, 49.Google Scholar

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88 C.O. 525/131, Memorandum of SirWilson, Horace, 19 03 1929.Google Scholar

89 C.O. 525/135, Bottomley to Treasury, , 11 04 1930.Google Scholar

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91 Speech of SirMosley, Oswald, Hansard, fifth series, ccxxx, col. 694, 18 07 1929.Google Scholar

92 C.O. 525/147, Minute of Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 2 Mar. 1933.

93 C.O. 525/162, Kittermaster to Ormsby-Gore, 8 Oct. 1936. In 1936 Nyasaland tobacco cost o·97d per pound to transport from Limbe to Beira by rail, while Rhodesian tobacco cost only o·17d per pound over the same distance to Beira.

94 C.O. 525/152, Calder (C.O.) to Grieve (Treasury), 1 Oct. 1935.

95 T 161/8.28440/08, Memorandum of Grieve, 1935.

96 C.O. 525/155, Calder to the Treasury, , 10 04 1935.Google Scholar

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100 C.O. 525/158, Kittermaster to Cunliffe-Lister, 1 Feb. 1935. See also The Report of the Committee Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to Enquire into Emigrant Labour, 1935 (Zomba, 1936)Google Scholar [Lacey Report].