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INDIVIDUALISMO METODOLOGICO E AUTORITÀ NELLE ORGANIZZAZIONI

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 June 2016

Paolo Martelli
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Introduzione

Tra gli scienziati sociali che operano oggi in Italia l'espressione «teorie razionali della politica» può far pensare a Max Weber e alla sua concezione del carattere razionale del potere legale con apparato amministrativo burocratico.

Type
Saggi
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , August 1992 , pp. 269 - 292
Copyright
Copyright © Società Italiana di Scienza Politica 

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References

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