Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T15:24:21.801Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

How to measure interest group influence: Italy’s professional orders and liberalization policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2015

Andrea Pritoni
Andrea Pritoni*
Affiliation:
Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna, Italy
*
*E-mail: [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

The question of who wins or loses in the policy process lies at the heart of recent research into both interest groups and public policy. However, one of the most difficult challenges when empirically analysing interest groups consists in knowing exactly how to measure their influence: despite the fact that this question has been addressed by political scientists for decades, significant problems remain regarding both the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of influence. In order to develop a better understanding of interest group influence, I recommend as follows: (a) that such influence be conceptualized as a degree of preference attainment; (b) that the degree of generality of the concept be downgraded, by breaking it up on the basis of two fundamental dimensions: the lobbying direction (pro-status quo or anti-status quo) and the policy-making stage (agenda setting; decision making; implementation); (c) to proceed with a manual hand-coding in order to obtain a list of the policy issues around which interest groups lobby; (d) to resort to an expert survey in order to evaluate these issues. This methodological approach is used to empirically measure the influence that Italy’s professional orders had on the liberalization process championed by the second Prodi government in 2006.

Keywords

interest groupsinfluencepublic policyItalyprofessional ordersmethods
Type
Research Article
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 183 - 202
Copyright
© Societá Italiana di Scienza Politica 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adcock, R. and Collier, D. (2001), ‘Measurement validity: a shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research’, American Political Science Review 95(3): 529–546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arts, B. and Verschurent, P. (1999), ‘Assessing political influence in complex decision-making: an instrument based on triangulation’, International Political Science Review 20(4): 411–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (2009), Indagini conoscitive: Il settore deg li ordini professionali, AGCM, Roma, 21 March.Google Scholar
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1962), ‘Two faces of power’, American Political Science Review 56(4): 947–952.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumgartner, F. and Leech, B.L. (1998), Basic Interests. The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, F.R., Green-Pedersen, C. and Jones, B.D. (2006), ‘Comparative studies of policy agendas’, Journal of European Public Policy 13(7): 959–974.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumgartner, F.R., Berry, J.M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D.C. and Leech, B.L. (2009), Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becker, G.S. (1983), ‘A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006), Party Policy in Modern Democracies, London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benoit, K. and McElroy, G. (2012), ‘Policy positioning in the European parliament’, European Union Politics 13(2): 194–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berlinguer, A. (2009), ‘La liberalizzazione delle professioni legali’, in F. Pammolli, C. Cambini and A. Giannaccari (eds), Politiche di liberalizzazione e concorrenza in Italia, Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 351–376.Google Scholar
Bernhagen, P., Dür, A. and Marshall, D. (2014), ‘Measuring lobbying success spatially’, Interest Groups & Advocacy 3(2): 202–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beyers, J., Eising, R. and Maloney, W. (2008), ‘Researching interest group politics in Europe and elsewhere: much we study, little we know?’, West European Politics 31(6): 1103–1128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boitani, A. (2007), ‘Liberalization interrupted’, in M. Donovan and P. Onofri (eds), Italian Politics: Frustrated Aspirations for Change, New York: Oxford, Berghahn Books, pp. 157–176.Google Scholar
Budge, I. (2000), ‘Expert judgements of party policy positions: uses and limitations in political research’, European Journal of Political Research 37(1): 103–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (2001), Mapping Policy Preferences, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bunea, A. (2013), ‘Issues, preferences and ties: determinants of interest groups’ preference attainment in the EU environmental policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 20(4): 552–570.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bunea, A. and Ibenskas, R. (2015), ‘Quantitative text analysis and the study of EU lobbying and interest groups’, European Union Politics 16(3), doi:1465116515577821.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Capano, G. (2009), ‘Understanding policy change as an epistemological and theoretical problem’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 11(1): 7–31.Google Scholar
Cappello, R. (2010), Il cappio: perché gli ordini professionali soffocano l’economia italiana, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.Google Scholar
Cashore, B. and Howlett, M. (2007), ‘Punctuating which equilibrium? Understanding thermostatic policy dynamics in pacific northwest forestry’, American Journal of Political Science 51(3): 532–551.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collier, D. and Mahon, J.E. (1993), ‘Conceptual “stretching” revisited: adapting categories in comparative analysis’, American Political Science Review 87(4): 845–855.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dahl, R. (1961), Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Dür, A. (2008), ‘Measuring interest group influence in the EU’, European Union Politics 9(4): 559–576.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dür, A. and de Bièvre, D. (2007), ‘The question of interest group influence’, Journal of Public Policy 27(1): 1–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dür, A., Bernhagen, P. and Marshall, D. (2015), ‘Interest group success in the European Union: when (and why) does business Lose?’, Comparative Political Studies, published online, doi: 10.1177/0010414014565890.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerring, J. (2004), ‘What is a case study and what is it good for’, American Political Science Review 98(2): 341–354.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerring, J. (2007), Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gerring, J. (2012), Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Goertz, G. (2005), Social Science Concepts, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Goertz, G. (2006), Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goertz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2012), A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grimmer, J. and Stewart, B.M. (2013), ‘Text as data: the promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political texts’, Political Analysis 21(3): 267–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, P.A. (1993), ‘Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state’, Comparative Politics 25(3): 275–296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R.L. and Deardorff, A.V. (2006), ‘Lobbying as legislative subsidy’, American Political Science Review 100(1): 69–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, J. (1976), ‘Three approaches for the measurement of power in international relations’, International Organization 30(2): 289–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heaney, M. and Lorenz, G.M. (2013), ‘Coalition portfolios and interest group influence over the policy process’, Interest Groups & Advocacy 2(3): 251–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, J.D. and Shipan, C.R. (2002), Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I. and McDonald, M. (2006), Mapping Policy Preferences II, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klüver, H. (2009), ‘Measuring interest group influence using quantitative text analysis’, European Union Politics 10(4): 535–549.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klüver, H. (2013), Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions and Policy Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klüver, H. (2015), ‘The promises of quantitative text analysis in interest group research: a reply to Bunea and Ibenskas’, European Union Politics, online publication first (May), doi: 10.1177/1465116515581669.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lasswell, H.D. (1956), The Decision Process, College Park, MD: University of Maryland Press.Google Scholar
Laver, M. and Hunt, W.B. (1992), Policy and Party Competition, New York, NY: Routledge.Google Scholar
Laver, M., Benoit, K. and Garry, J. (2003), ‘Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data’, American Political Science Review 97(2): 311–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lirosi, A. and Cinotti, E. (2009), L’assedio. Il difficile cammino delle liberalizzazioni a favore del cittadino-consumatore, Roma: Aliberti Editore.Google Scholar
Lowery, D. (2013), ‘Lobbying influence: meaning, measurement and missing’, Interest Groups & Advocacy 2(1): 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mahoney, C. (2007), ‘Lobbying success in the United States and the European Union’, Journal of Public Policy 27(1): 35–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
March, J.G. (1955), ‘An introduction to the theory and measurement of influence’, American Political Science Review 49(2): 431–451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKay, A. (2011), ‘Buying policy? The effects of lobbyists’ resources on their policy success’, Political Research Quarterly 65(4): 908–923.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pedersen, H.H. (2013), ‘Is measuring interest group influence a mission impossible? The case of interest group influence in the Danish parliament’, Interest Groups & Advocacy 2(1): 27–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritoni, A. (2015), ‘Decision-making potential and “detailed” legislation of Western European parliamentary governments (1990–2013)’, Comparative European Politics, online publication first (February), doi: 10.1057/cep.2014.55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Proksch, S.O. and Slapin, J.B. (2009), Wordfish: scaling software for estimating political positions from texts. Version 1.3. Retrieved 22 January 2009 from http://www.wordfish.orgGoogle Scholar
Riker (1996), Liberalismo contro populismo: confronto tra teoria della democrazia e teoria della scelta sociale, Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.Google Scholar
Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (eds) (1993), Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Salisbury, R.H. (1984), ‘Interest representation: the dominance of institutions’, American Political Science Review 78(1): 64–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, G. (1970), ‘Concept misformation in comparative politics’, American Political Science Review 64(4): 1033–1053.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008), ‘Case selection techniques in case study research: a menu of qualitative and quantitative options’, Political Research Quarterly 61(2): 294–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slapin, J.B. and Proksch, S.O. (2008), ‘A scaling model for estimating time-series party positions from texts’, American Journal of Political Science 52(3): 705–722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, M.A. (2000), American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stefanoni, F. (2011), I veri intoccabili: commercialisti, avvocati, medici, notai, farmacisti: le lobby del privilegio?, Milano: Chiarelettere.Google Scholar
Truman, D. (1955), The Governmental Process: Political Interest and Public Opinion, New York, NY: Knopf.Google Scholar
Verschuren, P. and Arts, B. (2004), ‘Quantifying influence in complex decision making by means of paired comparisons’, Quality & Quantity 38(5): 495–516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ward, H. (2004), ‘Pressure politics: a game-theoretical investigation of lobbying and the measurement of power’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 16(1): 31–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Witko, C. (2006), ‘PACs, issue context, and congressional decision making’, Political Research Quarterly 59(2): 283–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Pritoni Dataset

Dataset

http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/DMDGA1
Link