Families often have particular vulnerabilities following armed conflict. As international humanitarian law focuses primarily on regulating the conduct of hostilities, its scope for addressing the vulnerability of families and other victims of armed conflict is, at present, conceptually and practically limited. A human security approach invites consideration of the shortcomings of existing legal frameworks in addressing vulnerability, and the development of such frameworks, in a manner that helps to build resilience and address threats. For families harmed during armed conflict, this means identifying features of the existing legal regime that operate in a manner that entrenches or fails to address their vulnerabilities, as well as structural challenges that hinder access to legal opportunities such as reparations. The article identifies several structural issues and features of the legal framework that overlook or entrench the vulnerability of families. Drawing on a human security approach, it suggests that supplementing the existing legal regime with a victim assistance framework could help to address the vulnerability of families and others harmed by armed conflict.

There are two key limitations to the literature that explores the relationship between truth and closure in post-violence societies. The first is that this relationship has been assessed mostly as part of a larger debate focusing on the links between the truth and the seemingly related concept of reconciliation. The second is that to the extent that the literature has addressed the connections between truth and closure as such, it has focused almost exclusively on the operations and effects of courts and truth commissions. The article addresses both limitations by examining the relationship between truth and closure through the prism of a different institution, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. Relying on 34 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, including relatives of missing persons on the island, it argues that the Committee's delivery of the truth has promoted closure in three distinct ways. At the same time it acknowledges that the type of truth and the way in which it is delivered can have detrimental consequences for the promotion of closure. A short video summarising the findings of this article is available here.

This article analyses attempts by the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the sovereign wealth fund of Libya, to challenge the domestic implementation of asset-freezing measures requested by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy. The UNSC requested that states freeze LIA assets in early 2011 before partially easing the restrictions imposed in September of the same year, while the ICC requested the freezing of assets belonging to the then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and two further accused persons shortly thereafter. The article scrutinises how these measures were incorporated into the legal orders of the UK and Italy before analysing how the LIA has challenged these actions in the Italian courts and those of England and Wales. In so doing, it aims to demonstrate that domestic courts offer additional fora in which individuals (and entities) might seek to enforce the legal protection to which they are entitled when faced with their assets having been frozen by states at the request of the UNSC and/or the ICC.

This article considers the recent recognition by the United States of Morocco's territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara. After a review of certain aspects of the history of the dispute over Western Sahara, it focuses on the interaction of arguments based on the recognition and non-recognition of territorial sovereignty with those prioritising the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people. It concludes that, in as much as the population of Western Sahara has a right to decide its own future, US recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara has undermined key principles of international law.

The main aim of the article is to test how states implement international humanitarian law (IHL) with regard to the families of missing persons. The article shows relevant IHL shortcomings and compares them with rules applicable in cases of enforced disappearance. The national legislation collected in the section titled ‘The Missing and Their Families’ of the National Implementation Database of the International Committee of the Red Cross is then examined. The analysis addresses three core questions that are particularly relevant for families of missing persons: (1) Who is considered a missing person under each law? Approaching this question allows the testing of whether states follow the understanding of ‘missing persons’ under IHL treaty law. The second and third questions address two issues that are crucial for families of missing persons that are not addressed in IHL: (2) How is the legal status of the missing person regulated? (3) Are family members provided with measures of reparation and/or assistance? This approach reveals that states rarely apply the IHL understanding of ‘missing persons’ and predominantly exceed IHL by addressing some of the identified shortcomings. It further shows that states provide families of missing persons either with reparation measures – in cases of human rights violations – or, less often, with measures of assistance in post-conflict situations.

Drawing a line between victims and non-victims in the context of gross violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law is not an easy task. On the one hand, mass atrocities lead to widespread victimisation of individuals, groups and communities who suffer from various types of harm and damage incurred in the process of their commission. On the other hand, clearly not every person affected by an ongoing conflict and mass criminality should be considered an injured party. This article addresses such conceptual dilemmas by casting light on the function of family relations as grounds of indirect victimhood. To this end, it identifies two theoretical models of victimhood and showcases how they have been put into practice by international and hybrid courts and tribunals in their respective reparative and punitive regimes.

This article is a lightly revised version of the Lionel Cohen Lecture 2021 given by the author in October 2021. It looks at the relationship between legal academics and judges. The title of the article derives from one of the judgments of the great Lord Goff. The article has three main parts. First, it explores the increased influence of legal academics on judges in England and Wales towards the end of the twentieth century. Secondly, it examines how academic work can assist judges and makes a plea for recognition of the importance of ‘practical legal scholarship’. Finally, drawing on the author's own recent experience, the article examines how being a judge of the United Kingdom Supreme Court differs from being an academic.

In 2020 the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland held that the legislation that permitted abortion in cases of ‘fatal foetal anomaly’ was an unconstitutional interference with the right to life of the foetus. This article examines the recent decision, which prohibits abortion on the grounds of foetal anomaly, arguing that this decision is part of a broader scheme of Polish and transnational anti-abortion lawfare. This lawfare seeks both to (re)shape Polish law in an anti-abortion mould, and to take advantage of ‘gaps’ in European and international human rights law standards on abortion in order to claim rights compliance for law and policy that, in reality, restricts access to abortion in a manner that is incompatible with international human rights law.

This article discusses the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in the 2021 case of Georgia v Russia (II) in relation to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to the conduct of hostilities. The article describes the arguments advanced by the Court to support the idea that the Convention does not apply to extraterritorial hostilities in an international armed conflict. In the light of past decisions, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the law of the treaties, it is argued that the Court's conclusion is unconvincing and the arguments seem to be based on extralegal considerations, rather than on a sound interpretation of the notion of state jurisdiction under the Convention.

To Professor Martin Shapiro, With friendship, gratitude, and admiration

The ruling of 22 October 2020 concerning termination of pregnancy in Case K 1/20, handed down by the body once known as the Polish Constitutional Court, has devastated the legal and social landscape in Poland. The decision ruled as unconstitutional the provision that allowed medically assisted termination in cases where prenatal screening or other medical considerations indicated a high probability of a severe and irreversible abnormality or an incurable disease of the fetus. This analysis argues that the ruling is the most serious attempt to discredit and humiliate the Polish Constitution of 1997, and stands as the ultimate proof of weaponising judicial review. The argument will be made that if one wishes to understand the extent of the capture of independent institutions by the ruling majority, the ruling under consideration must be read and considered in the light of a more general context. Only by going beyond and contextualising it, can one grasp the extent to which the constitutional profile of a state has been altered by methods of unconstitutional capture. The analysis argues that once we contextualise the ruling and view it in a more systemic light, there are important systemic signposts that will help to explain how we arrived here and, more importantly, what is next. These signposts, in turn, contain a cautionary tale of the institutional fragility that is relevant for liberal democracies.

International humanitarian law (IHL) categorically prohibits all types of collective punishment. However, neither treaty nor customary sources provide a clear definition of what should be deemed a collective punishment. Given this lack of clarity, it is no surprise that little attention has been paid to the way in which resorting to different forms of collective punishment during a belligerent occupation might lead to additional violations of international law, including IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). This article explores the notion of collective punishment under the law of occupation and connects it with other relevant rules of international law. Based on this analysis, and using the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a case study, the article argues that violating the prohibition of collective punishment in a situation of belligerent occupation in all likelihood will trigger the breach of other concomitant rules of IHL and IHRL, thus shedding light on the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The article draws on scholarships in the areas of international law, inequality and energy justice to engage in a dialogue with the business and human rights literature, from the perspective of the global south and Latin America, in particular. It engages with Gwynne Skinner's monograph about overcoming barriers to judicial remedy for corporate abuses of human rights. Skinner argues that if victims of these abuses cannot secure remedy in the countries in which the abuses occur – because of weak or corrupt institutions, among other factors – then the victims have a right to remedy in the home countries of the corporations and in countries in which they may conduct business – specifically, the United States, Canada and Europe. Skinner recommends that new legislation be introduced in these countries to ensure that their courts have jurisdiction to hear cases, under international human rights law, even when the cases have little or no links with the forum countries. I argue that a more robust international law and interdisciplinary approach shows that international human rights law alone provides a weak basis for the recommendations. I also reflect on part of the narrative that supports Skinner's argument, which builds a negative image of the courts in developing countries, to argue that this is unnecessary and that expansions of the bases of jurisdiction should be implemented on specific and stronger reasons.

It is an honour to have been asked to give this Lionel Cohen Lecture deferred from 2020 when the covid pandemic was sweeping the world. It is a great pleasure to be with you at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.