Under common law and in other legal systems, including our own, which have in whole or in part adopted English tort law, each tort possesses its own special physiognomy. Yet, the very term “tort” in its generality attests to the existence of certain elements, in addition to those which distinguish one tort from another, common both to the constituent facts—the situations giving rise to tortious liability, as hypothesized by law—and to the normative provisions—the general body of rules which in Israel is set out in various sections of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1944–1947. We may, therefore, speak of a law of torts, with every tort having its own characteristic features, as well as of a law of tort, with one concept embracing the totality of torts. By attributing to these expressions a meaning other than that ascribed to them by the two schools of thought which have considered them antithetical, we indicate a state of co-existence.

Continental systems generally permit a possessor to acquire rights against the signatories of a bill or note despite a forged indorsement, it being sufficient that the sequence of indorsement on the instrument leads to the possessor. On general principles, the Anglo-American law differs in this respect. As early as the eighteenth century, it was held, in Mead v. Young (1790) that the possessor of a bill to order containing a forged indorsement has no right to the bill and is not entitled to demand payment from the parties whose signatures preceded the forgery. This approach was followed by the English Act and the N.I.L. The U.C.C. follows this principle in laying down that a forged signature is inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed. A person who acquires a bill to order on which there is a forged indorsement is therefore not a holder of the bill nor in legal possession of it, nor an owner. He consequently has no right under the bill against parties whose signatures preceded the forgery.

The following are some reflections on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abu Khadrah v. Attorney-General. The facts of the case, albeit very simple, enable a number of primary legal problems regarding the offence of “covering-up” a criminal act to be considered.

a. The facts. The appellant was aware from what someone had told him that his informant along with the appellant's brother and other persons had sailed in his brother's boat to Gaza—obviously before the Six Day War—had there met Egyptian intelligence personnel, had handed over a sack and received from them a not inconsiderable sum of Israel money. The appellant was charged under sec. 5 of the Penal Law Revision (State Security—Foreign Relations and Official Secrets) Law, 1957 (hereinafter called the State Security Law) with “covering-up” of an offence committed by his brother and the others contrary to sec. 22 (b) of that Law.

It is certainly difficult to assess whether, and to what degree, international anti-slavery legislation has been successful. The facts are that in the nineteenth century, legal and religious motivations were conjoined with technical developments creating a situation in which the manpower problem came to differ in essentials from that which had sustained slavery, both in “exporter” and “importer” countries. In the result slavery was abolished west of the Atlantic, and with it slave trade on the western shores of Africa. It soon transpired, however, that the disintegration of the westward-bound trade only reinforced its eastward branch. Although attempts were made at an international level to extend to the East the western experience in abolition of the slave trade, they did not meet with full success, and, apart from the protection of women and minorities, abolition of slavery remains today the main problem of group protection confronting the United Nations Organization. At present, the U.N. is negotiating for its third set of “teeth” with which to confront this problem.

The standing of the United Nations in this matter, is that of an Agent of Protection—a function which has in the last two hundred years or so developed in each case where international legislation related to groups of beneficiaries (such as slaves, minorities, prisoners-of-war, etc.) which have no independent standing as subjects of International Law, and therefore are incapable of negotiating for themselves (or through representatives appointed by them) the conditions of their protection in respect to sovereign States as obligatees, and even less of providing for a control of such protection and the obtention of remedial action. The range of effectiveness of such Agents of Protection is obviously indicated with the effective influence which such agencies may exercise in the orbit of Order (and Protection) through Authority—as an Order subsidiary and supplementary to the Order (and Protection) through Consent.

Introduction: With the increasing tendency in Israel to replace the old Ottoman civil law, thefamiliar question of the reception of Jewish (talmudic) law has once again become the subject of lively discussion. In his policy speech in the Knesset the then new Minister of Justice, Mr. Y. S. Shapiro, declared as his objective the gradual severance of Israel law from the present pervasive influence of the English legal system. He was too cautious to take a definite stand on the question of the reception of Jewish law (or any other specific system) to replace the present law, but aspirations towards this goal have recently been expressed on various occasions by representatives of different parties. The forceful demand “to base the laws of the State on the Halacha” comes especially from die religious parties. But representatives of the non-religious parties also recommend the reception of Jewish law in those areas of private law where no decisions on ideological grounds need to be made.

In point of fact, the unanimity with regard to the reception of Jewish law is based on two outlooks differing in origin. Non-religious circles view Jewish law as a cultural creation of national significance, comparable to the revival of the Hebrew language. The firm establishment of Israel law on Jewish legal principles is advocated as an expression of spiritual independence, stressing the historical continuity of the people residing in Zion.

Two recent decisions handed down by the Hebron magistrate, Mr. Hussein El-Shajuchi, and by the Bethlehem magistrate, Mr. Tawfik El-Sakka, on February 5, 1968 and on February 27, 1968, respectively, have brought to the fore some interesting legal problems arising from the Six Day War of June, 1967 as a result of which Judea and Samaria (formerly known as the “West Bank” of the Kingdom of Jordan) have come under Israeli control.

The immediate cause that has given rise to the elaboration by the two learned magistrates of the problems to be dealt with in this paper was the promulgation by the Officer Commanding, Israel Defence Forces in Judea and Samaria, on October 23, 1967, of Order No. 145, concerning the status of Israeli advocates in the courts of Judea and Samaria. Article 2 of the said Order provides that “notwithstanding any existing provisions to the contrary, any party to civil proceedings and any defendant in criminal proceedings may authorise an Israeli advocate to represent him in such proceedings.” Article 4 of the same Order stipulates that the Order shall be in force for a period of six months from the date of its entry into force (i.e. October 23, 1967) unless it is terminated at an earlier date by the Officer Commanding, Israel Defence Forces in Judea and Samaria. In the preamble to the Order the reasons given for its promulgation are “to ensure the efficient maintenance of the law, to enable the uninterrupted functioning of the Courts in the District [of Judea and Samaria] and to make available the services of advocates to the local population.” As will be more fully explained later, the reason for promulgating this Order was the strike of Arab lawyers in Judea and Samaria, which threatened to deprive courts and clients there of legal services.