The problem of democracy and judicial review is a problem engendered by successful constitutional courts. For where courts are not successful in establishing veto powers over legislation, no problem or only a very limited problem occurs. Of course any court interpreting statutes in the process of applying them does some law making. How much this law making interferes with democracy depends on how easy it is for the legislature to legislate. Where legislatures can amend statutes easily, they can easily correct “errors” of judicial statutory interpretation. Judicial review of the lawfulness of administrative action essentially involves the same power of statutory interpretation with the same potential for legislative correction.

Most of the nations of the world that do not have successful constitutional courts are not democracies. Indeed, no state without considerable claims to democracy has successful judicial review. These facts are clues to the obvious. Constitutional government is limited government. In the real world we do not encounter nondemocratic limited governments although we encounter many shades of more or less democratic, more or less constitutional governments. So there is some affinity between democracy and constitutionalism.

The second half of the 20th century has been a period of innovation in medical technology, with much significance for the social relations of reproduction. The invention of the contraceptive pill changed our attitudes towards the control and prevention of pregnancy, and allowed us to differentiate between female sexual and reproductive activities. The development of blood-typing and genetic tests radically altered the legal procedures for proving paternity, and deeply influenced our understanding of the uncertainty of biological fatherhood. The innovation of various methods of medical imaging gave concrete and human shape to the image of the fetus in its mother's womb. The very moment of conception was transformed, by means of in vitro fertilisation, from a mysterious event taking place in the hidden spaces of a woman's body to an overt and exposed occurrence in a laboratory petri-dish.

Dumping is defined, basically, as the sale of goods to an export market at a price below that charged for comparable goods in the exporter's home market. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not forbid such action, not even when injurious to the competing domestic industry. However, it has taken the view that dumping constitutes an unfair trade practice. Under GATT, Article VI Contracting Parties (or Members, as they are now termed in the GATT 1994 Agreements) are authorized, as an exception to other GATT obligations, to unilaterally impose antidumping (hereinafter: AD) duties to counteract the effects of dumping. The duties should create a level playing field in which producers all over the world will be able to compete fairly with each other. The principles sound simple and straightforward, yet their application is one of the most contentious topics in international trade law.

The economic coherence of AD rules is controversial. In international trade, price discrimination between national markets is typically made possible when the exporter has a powerful position in the home market and re-exportation to that market is not feasible. In the domestic arena price discrimination is countered by the laws of competition and antitrust. International trade law offers states a very different remedy, that first and foremost protects the competing local industry, regardless of the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of dumping on the market as a whole.

Israel Women's Network v. The Government of Israel (1994) 48(v) P.D. 501

The petitioner, the Israel Women's Network, petitioned the Supreme Court of Justice against the appointment of a new member to the Ports and Railways Council and against the appointment of two new directors on behalf of the State to the board of directors of the State-controlled Oil Refinery. All three of the new appointees were men, such that neither of the two councils included a single woman in their composition. The petitioner disputed the constitutionality of these appointments arguing that in the particular circumstances and in line with sec. 18A of the Government Companies Law, the appointees ought to have been women. By a majority decision the Supreme Court held that the respondent did not fulfill the duty of affirmative action required by sec. 18A of the Law, and that the cancellation of the appointments made was justified.