This article analyses attempts by the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), the sovereign wealth fund of Libya, to challenge the domestic implementation of asset-freezing measures requested by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy. The UNSC requested that states freeze LIA assets in early 2011 before partially easing the restrictions imposed in September of the same year, while the ICC requested the freezing of assets belonging to the then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and two further accused persons shortly thereafter. The article scrutinises how these measures were incorporated into the legal orders of the UK and Italy before analysing how the LIA has challenged these actions in the Italian courts and those of England and Wales. In so doing, it aims to demonstrate that domestic courts offer additional fora in which individuals (and entities) might seek to enforce the legal protection to which they are entitled when faced with their assets having been frozen by states at the request of the UNSC and/or the ICC.

This article considers the recent recognition by the United States of Morocco's territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara. After a review of certain aspects of the history of the dispute over Western Sahara, it focuses on the interaction of arguments based on the recognition and non-recognition of territorial sovereignty with those prioritising the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people. It concludes that, in as much as the population of Western Sahara has a right to decide its own future, US recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara has undermined key principles of international law.

This article discusses the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in the 2021 case of Georgia v Russia (II) in relation to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to the conduct of hostilities. The article describes the arguments advanced by the Court to support the idea that the Convention does not apply to extraterritorial hostilities in an international armed conflict. In the light of past decisions, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the law of the treaties, it is argued that the Court's conclusion is unconvincing and the arguments seem to be based on extralegal considerations, rather than on a sound interpretation of the notion of state jurisdiction under the Convention.

International humanitarian law (IHL) categorically prohibits all types of collective punishment. However, neither treaty nor customary sources provide a clear definition of what should be deemed a collective punishment. Given this lack of clarity, it is no surprise that little attention has been paid to the way in which resorting to different forms of collective punishment during a belligerent occupation might lead to additional violations of international law, including IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). This article explores the notion of collective punishment under the law of occupation and connects it with other relevant rules of international law. Based on this analysis, and using the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a case study, the article argues that violating the prohibition of collective punishment in a situation of belligerent occupation in all likelihood will trigger the breach of other concomitant rules of IHL and IHRL, thus shedding light on the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.