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The War Crimes of Denying Judicial Guarantees and the Uncertainties Surrounding Their Material Elements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2021

Diletta Marchesi*
Affiliation:
PhD Fellow of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO) (fundamental research grant, fellowship no 11G152ON) at KU Leuven (Belgium); [email protected]. This article is in part based on a draft article presented at the 14th Annual Minerva/ICRC Conference on International Humanitarian Law on ‘Military Justice and Armed Conflict: Old Problems, New Challenges’ at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 11–13 November 2019. The author is grateful to the participants at the Minerva Conference and to the anonymous reviewer(s) of the Israel Law Review for their insightful comments. Many thanks go to my PhD supervisor, Professor Michele Panzavolta, for always finding the time to read my drafts and give me constructive comments. Thank you also to Fabiana Maraffa and Ashlee Beazley for their support and for having gone through early drafts of this work.
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Abstract

In July 2020 the International Criminal Court opened the trial in the Al Hassan case. For the first time in the history of international criminal justice a defendant is being tried with the charge of the war crime of sentencing or execution without due process in the context of a non-international armed conflict. Together with its equivalent in international armed conflicts – the war crime of denying a fair trial – this offence falls within the category of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees. Although there are differences in their constitutive elements, both offences prohibit states and armed non-state actors from depriving prisoners of war and civilians of certain minimum judicial guarantees. The provisions that regulate these two crimes, however, present interpretative and practical issues which, so far, have not received sufficient consideration. Most notably, the material elements of the offences raise a range of interpretative doubts and are of cumbersome application. The objectives of the article are (i) to identify the issues posed by the material elements of the war crimes of denying judicial guarantees, (ii) to warn of the pitfalls hidden by the interpretation of the offences, and (iii) to trigger the debate on the issues that the crimes raise.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press in association with the Faculty of Law, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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References

1 United Nations (UN), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 February to 15 May 2019 (13 June 2019), UN Doc A/HRC/41/CRP.2, paras 10, 56–65.

2 UN, Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (21 February 2018), UN Doc No A/HRC/37/42, paras 27–32.

3 ICC, Elements of Crimes, ICC Assembly of States Parties, 1st session, 3–10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Elements of Crimes), art 8(2)(a)(vi).

4 ibid art 8(2)(c)(iv).

5 ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Transcript, ICC-01/12-01/18, Pre-Trial Chamber, 9 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Transcript, Confirmation of Charges Hearing), 25–26 (with reference to the interpretation of the notion of ‘regularly constituted court’).

6 Francis Lieber, ‘General Orders No 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code), art 148.

7 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (entered into force 26 January 1910) Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser 3) 461, art 30.

8 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 19 June 1931) 118 LNTS 343, Ch 3, s V, pt III.

9 UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol V (UNWCC 1948) viii (UNWCC Law Reports V).

10 ibid.

11 Ghadiri, Shannon, ‘Criminalising the Denial of a Fair Trial as a Crime against Humanity’ in Ambach, Philipp and others (eds), The Protection of Non-Combatants during Armed Conflicts and Safeguarding the Rights of Victims in Post-Conflict Society: Essays in Honour of the Life and Work of Joakin Dungel (Martinus Nijhoff 2015) 201Google Scholar (also recognising this distinction, but the classification of the cases within the two categories is not identical).

12 Trials in the first group are: US Military Commission, Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others, 27 February–15 April 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 1; Australian Military Court, Trial of Captain Eitaro Shinohara and Two Others, 30 March–1 April 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 32; US Military Commission, Trial of General Tanaka Hisakasu and Five Others, 13 August–3 September 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 66; US Military Commission, Trial of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayama and Seven Others, 1–25 July 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 60; Eidsivating Lagmannsrett (Court of Appeal) and Supreme Court of Norway, Trial of Hans Paul Helmuth Latza and Two Others, 18 February 1947–3 December 1948, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol XIV (UNWCC 1949) 49 (UNWCC Law Reports XIV); Frostating Lagmannsrett and Supreme Court of Norway, Trial of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst Flesch, SS Obe Sturmbannführer, Oberregierungsratm, November–December 1946 and February 1948, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol VI (UNWCC 1948) 111 (UNWCC Law Reports VI).

13 Trials in the second group are: Australian Military Court, Trial of Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi and Six Others, 20–23 March 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 25; Australian Military Court, Trial of Captain Eikichi Kato, 7 May 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 37; British Military Court, Trial of Karl Buck and Ten Others, 6–10 May 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 39; British Military Court, Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others, 15–21 May 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 45; British Military Court, Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, 29 May–1 June 1946, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 54; Eidsivating Lagmannstrett and Supreme Court of Norway, Trial of Hauptsturmführer Oscar Hans, January and August 1947, UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) 82; Permanent Military Tribunal at Strasbourg and Court of Appeal, Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Head of the Civil Government of Alsace during the Occupation, and Six Others, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol III (1948) 23 (UNWCC Law Reports III); Canadian Military Court, The Abbaye Ardenne Case – Trial of SS Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, 10–28 December 1945, in UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol IV (UNWCC 1948) 97 (UNWCC Law Reports IV).

14 UNWCC, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol XV (UNWCC 1949) 99.

15 ibid.

16 ibid ix–x. Also UNWCC Law Reports V (n 9) viii (refers to ‘war crime’).

17 ibid x–xi.

18 Trial of Sergeant-Major Shigeru Ohashi and Six Others (n 13) 30. See also the same case (ibid 31) where it is stated that ‘the executioners would be entitled to the defence of justifiable homicide if it had been shown that each was a “proper officer executing a criminal in conformity with his sentence”’.

19 In Trial of Captain Eikichi Kato ((n 13) 38) Captain Kato was found guilty of the murder of civilians; the victims were not granted the right to a fair trial before being shot as ‘[a] mere discussion between officers as to the merits of a case, based upon reports of interrogations, would not in fact constitute a trial’. In Trial of Karl Adam Golkel and Thirteen Others ((n 13) 51) the defendants were convicted of the killing of prisoners of war without any legal justification or trial; the defence did not even claim that a trial of the victims was held.

20 UNWCC Law Reports VI (n 12) 102 (emphasis removed).

21 US Military Tribunal, The Justice Trial – Trial of Josef Altstötter and Others (17 February–4 December 1947) in ibid (Justice case).

22 ibid 3. Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) was the code name of a decree issued by Adolf Hitler in 1941, which enabled German authorities to abduct those suspected of having endangered German security and made them ‘disappear’.

23 ibid 4.

24 ibid 3.

25 ibid v.

26 ibid 102. Ghadiri ((n 11) 201, 206) considers the Justice case among the ‘second group’ of cases but then argues that it ‘suggests that by 1949 the denial of a fair trial was recognised as a crime in and of itself’.

27 DePiazza, Jennifer, ‘Denial of Fair Trial as an International Crime: Precedent for Pleading and Proving It under the Rome Statute’ (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 257, 259CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la confirmation des charges portées contre Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud – Version publique expurgée, ICC-01/12-01/18, Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 November 2019 (Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision), paras 372–73.

29 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GC III), art 130; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287, art 147.

30 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I), art 85(5).

31 Common art 3(1)(d) in Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (GC I); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces at Sea (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (GC II); GC III (n 29); GC IV (n 29).

32 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol 1: Rules (International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press 2005, revised 2009) (ICRC Study) rr 100, 352. The rule applies in both IACs and NIACs.

33 Jean Pictet (ed), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (ICRC 1958) (Commentary GC IV (1958)) 39.

34 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (adopted 27 October 2004) NS/RKM/1004/006 (ECCC Law), art 6; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (adopted by UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) as amended), UN Doc S/25704, 36, Annex and UN Doc S/25704/Add.1 (ICTY Statute), art 2(f).

35 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (entered into force 12 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 139, art 3(1)(g); Statute of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda, annexed to UNSC Res 955 (8 November 1994), UN Doc S/RES/955 (ICTR Statute), art 4(1)(g).

36 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office (adopted 3 August 2005), Law No 05/L-053 (Kosovo's Law), arts 14(1)(a)(vi) and 14(1)(c)(iv); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (ICC Statute), arts 8(2)(a)(vi) and8(2)(c)(iv). Only the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not criminalise the offence, as it applies the Lebanese Criminal Code.

37 See ICRC Study (n 32) 353 fn 333 for a non-exhaustive list of states.

38 ECCC, Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Judgment, ECCC 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010 (ECCC, Case 001).

39 ECCC, Prosecutor v Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Judgement, ECCC 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 16 November 2018 (ECCC, Case 002/02).

40 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28).

41 ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Version publique expurgée de la ‘Version amendée et corrigée du document contenant les charges contre M Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud’, ICC-01/12-01/18-335-Conf-Corr, 11 mai 2019, ICC-01/12-01/18, 2 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan), paras 421, 426–28.

42 ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2020, 14 December 2020, paras 221, 278.

43 ICC Statute (n 36) arts 8(2)(a)(vi), 8(2)(c)(iv).

44 GC III (n 29) art 130; GC IV (n 29) art 147.

45 Kosovo's Law (n 36) arts 14(1)(a)(vi), 14(1)(c)(iv).

46 ICC Statute (n 36) art 9(1); Elements of Crimes (n 3) General Introduction, r 1.

47 ICC Statute (n 36) art 9(3). According to art 21(1)(a), they are a primary source of law. On the discussion of the nature of the Elements of Crimes see, eg, William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Vol I (Oxford University Press 2016) 258ff, 516.

48 Julia Gebhard, Necessity or Nuisance? Recourse to Human Rights in Substantive International Criminal Law, Vol 9 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG 2018) 60.

49 GC III (n 29) art 130; GC IV (n 29) art 147.

50 While the English version refers to ‘the rights of fair and regular trial’, the French version refers to the ‘droit d’être jugé régulièrement et impartialement’ (the right to be regularly and impartially tried).

51 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi) Elements 1, 2. Although the ICC Elements of Crimes are not expressly referred to, the ECCC mentions these elements and lists some of the guarantees safeguarded by the GCs in Case 001 (n 38) para 459 and Case 002/02 (n 39) para 770.

52 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2003) 105.

53 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi) Element 2 (emphasis added).

54 See, inter alia, Dörmann (n 52) 100.

55 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi), Elements 1, 2.

56 This is one of the possible meanings that the Merriam-Webster Dictionary gives to the adjective: Merriam-Webster, ‘judicial’, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/judicial?src=search-dict-box. The same definition is endorsed by the Oxford Dictionary: ‘of, by, or appropriate to a law court or judge; relating to the administration of justice’: ‘judicial, adj. and n.’, OED Online, September 2020, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/101916?redirectedFrom=judicial.

57 What is intended here with ‘trial’ is that part of the criminal proceedings consisting of hearings where issues of fact and law are disputed by the parties in front of the deciding authority to assess the guilt of the accused.

58 eg, Shah Sangeeta, ‘Detention and Trial’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 252, 263–64 (includes rights related to judicial proceedings and their organisation).

59 AP I (n 30) art 75(4).

60 GC III (n 29) arts 82, 84–88, 99–107; GC IV (n 29) arts 31, 33, 54, 64–75.

61 GC III (n 29) art 7; GC IV (n 29) art 8.

62 The customary character of GCs is confirmed by the ICJ and the majority of scholars; see, eg, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 1996, [79]; and Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary International Law’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 683, 686–89.

63 See GC III (n 29) art 4 for the full list.

64 ICRC, Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2021 forthcoming), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCIII-commentary (Commentary GC III (2020)), art 4, para 948. On the definition of ‘wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons’, see GC I (n 31) art 13 and GC II (n 31) art 13.

65 GC III (n 29) art 85.

66 GC IV (n 29) art 4; see also arts 13 and 20.

67 Commentary GC IV (1958) (n 33) 353.

68 GC IV (n 29) art 126 (referring to the guarantees provided by arts 71–76).

69 ibid art 5(3); see art 4(2)–(3) for the exclusions.

70 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, paras 164–66, 168.

71 In the scholarship see, eg, Payam Akhavan, ‘Judicial Guarantees’ in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 1217. In the case law see, most notably, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (29 June 2006), Opinion of Justice Stevens, 70 (arguing that ‘[m]any of [the trial protections that have been recognised by customary international law] are described in Article 75 of Protocol I’ and that, even though the US had not ratified AP I, the US government had no objections to art 75, which establishes minimum requirements).

72 Akhavan (n 71) 1215, 1216. Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (Commentary Additional Protocols (1987)), paras 3006, 3092 (emphasising that AP I is ‘an important step forward in humanitarian law by laying down several minimum rules of protection, … whereas in such circumstances provisions of human rights law are subject to possible derogations’).

73 The non-exhaustive character is suggested by the wording of AP I (n 30) art 75(4) (‘the generally recognized principles … include the following’ (emphasis added)).

74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 14.

75 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3005.

76 AP I (n 30) art 75(4)(a).

77 ibid art 75(4)(d).

78 Akhavan (n 71) 1217, fn 13. See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3001 (‘When it presented the draft article, the ICRC expressed its concern that a minimum of protection should be granted in time of armed conflict to any person who was, for one reason or another, unable to claim a particular status, such as that of prisoner of war, civilian internee in accordance with the fourth Convention, wounded, sick or shipwrecked’).

79 AP I (n 30) art 75(1).

80 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3007.

81 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi), Element 2.

82 Protecting Power's (and prisoners’ representative) assistance-related rights mainly translate into obligations on the Detaining or Occupying Power to disclose certain information to the Protecting Power and allow it to monitor proceedings.

83 This approach is followed by Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 130, paras 5281–82, and Dörmann (n 52) 101–02. The latter also clarifies that there are ‘further procedural and legal requirements in relation to judicial proceedings’.

84 ECCC Case 002/02 (n 39) para 770.

85 Both ECCC Case 001 (n 38) paras 462–63 and ECCC Case 002/02 (n 39) para 2630 fall within this category.

86 See Section 2.

87 Akhavan (n 71) 1225.

88 AP I (n 30) art 75(4)(a).

89 GC III (n 29) art 84.

90 Jelena Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 189, 213.

91 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3092.

92 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), 31 August 2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 3 and, for the right to fair trial specifically, para 16.

93 The literature on the issue is abundant; see, eg, Andrew Clapham, ‘The Complex Relationship Between the Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights Law’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 71) 731; and Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Pas de Deux (Oxford University Press 2011).

94 Dörmann (n 52) 101–02; DePiazza (n 27) 278 (who has also argued that the ICC OTP ‘will … find rich guidance in the ECtHR's jurisprudence on the content and scope of individual judicial guarantees’ in the prosecution of the war crime of denying a fair trial).

95 On this see Section 3.2.

96 According to GC IV (n 29) art 5, regulating derogations, also persons detained in occupied territories as spies, saboteurs or otherwise suspected of conducting activities that are hostile to the security of the Occupying Power ‘shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial’. On AP I, art 75, see Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 3092: ‘Article 75 is not subject to any possibility of derogation or suspension and consequently it is these provisions which will play a decisive role in the case of armed conflict’. See also Akhavan (n 71) 1219.

97 Akhavan (n 71) 1235.

98 eg, ICRC Study on Customary IHL (n 32) rr 156, 568. ICC Statute (n 36) art 8(2)(b) also defines war crimes as ‘serious violations’ of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts.

99 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4, fn 59.

100 UNWCC Law Reports XV (n 14) x–xi.

101 ibid 165, fn 3.

102 Trial of Lieutenant-General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others (n 12) 12.

103 Trial of Hans Paul Helmuth Latza and Two Others (n 12) 63 (Supreme Court judgment).

104 ibid 82.

105 ibid.

106 ibid 84–85; UNWCC Law Reports XV (n 14) 165. This conclusion is also confirmed by Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 130, para 5284.

107 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(a)(vi), Element 1 (emphasis added).

108 This is explicitly stated in, eg, ICTY, Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković, Judgment, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber, 22 February 2001, para 467. On this topic see also, eg, Alexandre Skander Galand, ‘The Systemic Effect of International Human Rights Law on International Criminal Law’ in Martin Scheinin (ed), Human Rights Norms in ‘Other’ International Courts (Cambridge University Press 2019) 87.

109 The scholarship is abundant; see, eg, Collins Mbuayang, The Right to a Fair Trial in International Criminal Proceedings (Eleven International 2018); Yvonne McDermott Rees, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (Oxford University Press 2016); Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press 2003).

110 This is the case, eg, of the crimes of torture and rape. On torture see, eg, Elena Maculan, ‘Judicial Definition of Torture as a Paradigm of Cross-Fertilisation: Combining Harmonisation and Expansion’ (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 456. On rape see, eg, Galand (n 108) 129 (referring to ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-A, 23 November 2001). On the phenomenon in general see Gebhard (n 48).

111 See, eg, Gebhard (n 48) 20.

112 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982) 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order 193, 193.

113 eg, Gebhard (n 48) 29, 46; Juan Pablo Pérez-León Acevedo, ‘The Close Relationship between Serious Human Rights Violations and Crimes Against Humanity: International Criminalization of Serious Abuses’ (2017) XVII Aquaria Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 145, 151.

114 ICC Statute (n 36) art 8(2)(c)(iv). See also Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 1.

115 ICC Statute (n 36) art 8(2)(c).

116 GCs I and II (n 31) common art 3 refers to ‘the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’.

117 Kosovo's Law (n 36) art 14(1)(c)(iv).

118 DePiazza (n 27) 261.

119 ibid fn 10.

120 In the French text, ‘les condamnations prononcées et les exécutions effectuées’.

121 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 1 (emphasis added).

122 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 712 (quoting Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (11th edn, Thomson Reuters 2019) 1636).

123 Merriam-Webster, definition of pass/pronounce sentence, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pass%2Fpronounce%20sentence.

124 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 364–65. The same approach was supported by the Prosecutor in Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) paras 480–81.

125 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 366–67.

126 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 1.

127 ICRC, Commentary on the Second Geneva Convention: Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2017) (Commentary GC II (2017)), para 699.

128 See, eg, ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Public Redacted Version of the Defence's Final Submissions regarding the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/12-01/18, 31 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Defence Final Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges), paras 96–100.

129 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or Summary Justice?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 489, 496 (referring to the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (Federal Political Department 1951) vol 1, 113; vol III, 97; and vol II-A, 779).

130 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (AP II), art 6.

131 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 359–60.

132 ibid para 360.

133 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4.

134 In French ‘condamnation directe’. Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 358–59; for the PTC-I analysis of direct convictions see ibid paras 362–68.

135 ibid paras 358–59.

136 Geneva Call, ‘Administration of Justice by Armed Non-State Actors: Report from the 2017 Garance Talks’, The Garance Series: Issue 2, August 2018, 7.

137 Jonathan Somer, ‘Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 655, 682–83.

138 eg, ibid 660, 667–68; UN, OHCHR-Nepal, Human Rights Abuses by the CPN-M: Summary of Concerns (September 2006), 8 (trials by ANSAs even against members of the group ‘cannot substitute for … prosecutions carried out in a state court’).

139 See, eg, Sivakumaran (n 129) 498 (also quoting Anne-Marie La Rosa, ‘Sanctions as a Means of Obtaining Greater Respect for Humanitarian Law: A Review of their Effectiveness’ (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 221, 236), and Somer (n 137) 670. The argument is also recalled by the ICC, Prosecutor v Al Hassan, Public Redacted Version of ‘Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges’, ICC-01/12-01/18, 4 July 2019 (Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges), para 254.

140 Most recently, see, inter alia, Alessandra Spadaro, ‘Punish and Be Punished? The Paradox of Command Responsibility in Armed Groups’ (2020) 18 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1, 2, 4ff.

141 This is what is provided by the ICC Statute (n 36) art 28(a). On the issue see, eg, Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 726 (referring to ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Pre-Trial Chamber, 15 June 2009, para 501, and ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Trial Chamber, 21 March 2016 (Bemba Trial Judgment), paras 205–09). See also Stockholm District Court, Prosecutor v Haisam Omar Sakhanh, Judgment, Case B 3787-16, 16 February 2017, paras 29 and 31, in ‘On the Establishment of Courts in Non-International Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors: Stockholm District Court Judgment of 16 February 2017’ (2018) 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice 403 (which states that non-state actors ‘can establish tribunals to (1) maintain discipline among the group's own armed units and (2) to maintain law and order in a given territory which the group controls’). The argument is also recalled in Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) para 254.

142 For further details on the issue see, eg, Sivakumaran (n 129) 498, 510ff. Also, the solutions suggested by Amnesty International (in ICC, Prosecutor v Bemba, Amicus Curiae Observations on Superior Responsibility submitted pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01-/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 April 2009, para 20) to refer the case to the authorities of other states or to international authorities are deemed ‘unpracticable’ by part of the scholarship: see Spadaro (n 140).

143 See, eg, Bemba, Trial Judgment (n 141) paras 205–09.

144 Somer (n 137) 677.

145 ICRC Study (n 32) 355.

146 Hamdan v Rumsfeld (n 71) 7.

147 See, eg, Sivakumaran (n 129) 498–99; Somer (n 137) 687–89.

148 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4600; Akhavan (n 71) 1223, 1235.

149 Somer (n 137) 657, 686.

150 Sivakumaran (n 129) 498; Somer (n 137) 689; James E Bond, ‘Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflicts’ (1973) 3 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 345, 372.

151 At times the requirement is considered equivalent to ‘competent’, meaning that ‘the tribunal has been established by law to decide cases relating to certain subject matters’: Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Judicial Guarantees under Common Article 3’ in Clapham, Gaeta and Sassòli (n 71) 469, 470.

152 Sivakumaran (n 129) 499–500; Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 714; Somer (n 137) 687–90. This line of interpretation is supported in Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) para 254.

153 See, eg, Michael Bothe, Karl Joseph Partsch and Waldemara A Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 746. There is no legal basis to argue that when ANSAs exercise factual power they are forbidden to change the existing legal order.

154 See also FMLN Secretariat for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘The Legitimacy of Our Methods of Struggle’ (Inkworth Press on behalf of FMLN 1988).

155 Prosecutor v Haisam Omar Sakhanh (n 141). Hannes Jöbstl, ‘Bridging the Accountability Gap: Armed Non-state Actors and the Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes’ (2020) 18 Journal of International Criminal Justice 567, 572 (referring to this case as the only domestic case ‘where an ANSA court was explicitly measured against the criteria of [Common Article 3]’).

156 In French, ‘en ce sens que’.

157 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4 (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Stevens in the Hamdan case observed that the requirement is ‘[i]nextricably intertwined’ with the indispensable judicial guarantees: Hamdan v Rumsfeld (n 71) Opinion of Justice Stevens, 70.

158 Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Working Group on Elements of Crimes, Proposal by Belgium concerning Article 8, paragraph 2(c)(iv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.13, 28 July 1999.

159 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 376.

160 AP II (n 130) art 6(2).

161 See, eg, Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714.

162 Somer (n 137) 655, 670–71. On the relationship between common art 3 GCs and art 6 AP II see the detailed analysis of Jöbstl (n 155) 572–75.

163 eg, Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 729.

164 Akhavan (n 71) 1223. See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4600.

165 Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 700; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714; Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 376.

166 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 376. See also Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 700; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714.

167 Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 700; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 714.

168 DePiazza (n 27) 275.

169 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 378, fns 1029–34.

170 Somer (n 137) 688 (rightly observing that ‘human rights law was scripted only with states in mind’).

171 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 715 (emphasis added).

172 Geneva Call (n 136) 9.

173 Doswald-Beck (n 151) 490–91.

174 Geneva Call (n 136) 9. As underlined by Jöbstl (n 155) 578, ‘[i]t is likely that only a well-established group would be able to provide such a clear-cut separation of powers’. See this last source for examples of how the structures of ANSA courts differ from each other.

175 Al Hassan, Transcript, Confirmation of Charges Hearing (n 5) 42; ibid 43.

176 ibid 42; Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) para 486.

177 Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) para 486 (referring, eg, to ECtHR, Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para 460, and ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey, App no 25781/94, 10 May 2001, paras 231, 236–37).

178 ibid fn 1190.

179 Elements of Crimes (n 3) art 8(2)(c)(iv), Element 4, fn 59.

180 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 382, 385.

181 ibid; Dörmann (n 52) 409.

182 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) paras 382, 385.

183 See Section 3.1.

184 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 381.

185 ibid.

186 Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland on Article 8, paragraph 2(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, PCNICC/1999/WGEC/Dp.10, 19 July 1999, 3. The list was more substantial than the list provided by AP II (n 130).

187 Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Proposal submitted by Colombia: Comments on the Proposal submitted by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland on Article 8, paragraph 2(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.10), PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.15, 29 July 1999. Colombia anticipated ‘future progress’, which could lead to the ‘development of additional guarantees’.

188 Dörmann (n 52) 409.

189 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 719. See, eg, Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference (n 129) vol II-B78, 84 (delegate of France); 49 and 84 (delegate of Italy); 83 (delegate of the United States); these delegates were in favour of adding a list.

190 ibid (referring to the Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference (n 129) vol II-B, 83–84).

191 Sivakumaran (n 129) 503ff.

192 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 720.

193 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (1974–1977) (Federal Political Department 1978) vol 8, 357 (delegate of the ICRC). See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4597.

194 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 710. See also Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) para 4601 (which states that it enumerates only ‘universally recognized standards’).

195 ibid (referring to ICRC Study (n 32)).

196 AP II (n 130) art 1(1); Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) paras 4457, 4464–67.

197 Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2002) 69 (stating that common art 3 ‘does not make clear what specifically is expected from armed opposition groups’).

198 See, eg, Marco Sassòli, ‘Introducing a Sliding-Scale of Obligations to Address the Fundamental Inequality between Armed Groups and States?’ in Sassòli, Marco and Shany, Yuval, ‘Debate: Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law Really be Equal?’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 425, 426, 430CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sassòli, Marco, ‘Taking Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 5, 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

199 Hamdan v Rumsfeld (n 71) Opinion of Justice Stevens, 70; Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 722.

200 Doswald-Beck (n 151) 474.

201 Commentary GC III (2020) (n 64) art 3, para 722.

202 ibid para 723 (referring to Bothe, Partsch and Solf (n 153) 745).

203 ibid.

204 ibid. Similarly, Commentary GC II (2017) (n 127) para 709.

205 ibid.

206 See, eg, Dörmann (n 52) 409–38.

207 Sivakumaran (n 129) 503.

208 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 383.

209 ibid.

210 See Section 3.2.

211 Dörmann (n 52) 409–38.

212 ibid 412 (referring to ICTY cases).

213 Sivakumaran (n 129) 503.

214 On the issue see, eg, ibid 666ff; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Cornelius Wiesener, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: An Assessment Based on Recent Practice’ in Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D Kotlik and Manuel J Ventura (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice (TMC Asser Press 2020); Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006).

215 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 72) paras 4457, 4464–67; Doswald-Beck (n 151) 489.

216 See Section 3.1.

217 ICC OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, at the Opening of the Trial in the Case against Mr Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, 14 July 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=200714-otp-statement-al-hassan.

218 Al Hassan, Document including the Charges against Al Hassan (n 41) para 446.

219 For further details see Gallant, Kenneth S, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

220 ibid 378–79, 383–89.

221 Al Hassan, Confirmation of Charges Decision (n 28) para 340, fn 994 (referring to Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) para 201).

222 Al Hassan, Defence Submissions for the Confirmation of Charges (n 139) paras 4–5, 32.

223 ibid para 5.

224 Mettraux, Guénaël, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2006) 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.