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Review Essay of International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors (edited by Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D Kotlik and Manuel J Ventura, 2020)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2020
There seems to have been a shift in the state-centric vision of international relations, following the increasing role of non-state actors (NSAs) on the international scene, particularly in the context of armed conflicts. Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos Kotlik and Manuel Ventura, editors of International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors, present through this collection of contributions an overview of legal issues arising from this new reality. The editors draw on their personal experience to explain how NSAs contribute to the development of international humanitarian law (IHL) and to suggest that in order to promote respect for IHL by all parties involved in an armed conflict, this new role should be given due consideration from a legal standpoint. The review aims to confront critically the position taken in the volume, assessing the pros and cons of an increased recognition (and potential legitimisation) of NSAs, with a particular focus on non-state armed groups. It discusses, in particular, the implications of this process for the exercise of sovereign rights and respect for fundamental guarantees, especially in relation to the powers to detain and to adjudicate.
1 Morris Mottale is Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics, Franklin University, Lugano (Switzerland).
2 For an overview see Gavrilova, Maria, ‘Administrative Detention by Non-State Armed Groups: Legal Basis and Procedural Safeguards’ (2020) 53 Israel Law Review 35CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Niyo, Joshua Joseph, ‘Non-State Armed Groups and the Power to Detain in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2020) 53 Israel Law Review 3, 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Niyo observes that the idea of the existence of an inherent power to detain by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) comes with ‘extensive controversy and critique’, which ‘broadly reflect a strictly formalist approach to the law’. Among these he cites Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande. Such an approach is acceptable, but in his view, it ‘does not purely reflect the nature and trajectory of the law’ in the reality of IHL and international law: see Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, ‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?’, EJIL: Talk!, 7 May 2014, https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts.
3 Heffes, Ezequiel, Kotlik, Marcos D and Ventura, Manuel J, ‘Preface’ in Heffes, Ezequiel, Kotlik, Marcos D and Ventura, Manuel J (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice (Springer/Asser Press 2020) viiCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 Annyssa Bellal, ‘What Are Armed Non-State Actors? A Legal and Semantic Approach’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 21.
7 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.
8 See Arnold, Roberta, ‘Terrorism, War Crimes and the International Criminal Court’ in Saul, Ben (ed), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2020) 271, 272Google Scholar.
9 Bellal (n 6) 24.
10 Martina Gasser and Mareva Malzacher, ‘Beyond Banning Mercenaries: The Use of Private Military and Security Companies under IHL’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 47.
11 Both are from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
12 The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict is an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for IHL and IHRL whenever PMSCs are present in armed conflicts. It was finalised by consensus on 17 September 2008 by 17 states.
13 Gasser and Malzacher (n 10) 49.
14 ibid.
15 ibid 51.
16 ibid 53.
17 ibid 54.
18 ibid 56.
19 ibid 57.
20 ibid 57.
21 ibid 58.
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I), art 47(2).
23 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (entered into force 20 October 2001) 2163 UNTS 75.
24 Gasser and Malzacher (n 10) 68. The ICoCA was signed in November 2010. As observed by the authors, ‘[i]n 2006, Switzerland and the ICRC launched an initiative to promote … respect for IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) by PMSCs operating in situations of armed conflict. This eventually resulted in the Montreux Document (2008)’: ibid 69. This ‘was the result of a multi-stakeholder initiative by representatives of governments, of the PMSC industry and of civil society’: ibid 70.
25 ibid 74.
26 ibid 74.
27 Keiichiro Okimoto, ‘The Legal Protection of Personnel of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Times of NIAC’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 79.
28 Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations.
29 Okimoto (n 27) 82.
30 NATO has been a leading peace-support operation in Kosovo – the Kosovo Force (KFOR) – since June 1999. It was established when NATO launched an air campaign against the Milosevic regime with the aim of putting an end to the violence in Kosovo. Its mandate is based on UNSC Res 1244, The Situation relating to Kosovo (10 June 1999), UN Doc S/RES/1244, and the Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (9 June 1999), UN Doc S/1999/682.
31 Charter of the United Nations (entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
32 See Ferraro, Tristan, ‘The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces’ (2013) 95 International Review of the Red Cross 561, 589CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 See International Law Association, ‘Final Report of the Committee on Non State Actors’, 77th Conference of the ILA, Johannesburg (South Africa), 7–11 August 2016 (ILA Final Report), paras 136–37.
34 Okimoto (n 27) 86, fn 33 (citing ICTR, Prosecutor v Bagosora and Others, Trial Judgment, 18 December 2008, Case No ICTR-98-41-T, para 783).
35 ibid 86, fn 39 (citing ICTR, Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana and Others, Trial Judgment, 17 May 2011, Case No ICTR-00-56-T, paras 2149, 2154, 2156, 2162). The Appeals Chamber later reversed the findings with regard to Nzuwonemeye and part of the findings with regard to Sagahutu: ICTR, Ndindiliyimana and Others v Prosecutor, Appeals Judgment, 11 February 2014, Case No ICTR-00-56-A, para 449.
36 Okimoto (n 27) fn 40 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v Karadžić, Trial Judgment, 24 March 2016, Case No IT-95-5/18-T, para 5852).
37 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (entered into force 15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363; UN Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (entered into force 19 August 2010) 2689 UNTS 59, UN Doc A/60/518.
38 Yasmine Naqvi and Olufemi Elias, ‘Chemical Weapons and Non-State Actors’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 115.
39 UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.
40 Formerly Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
41 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (entered into force 29 April 1997) 1975 UNTS 45.
42 Manuel J Ventura, ‘Automatic Criminal Liability for Unlawful Confinement (Imprisonment) as a War Crime? A Potential Consequence of Denying Non-State Armed Groups the Power to Detain in NIACs’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 149.
43 McGill University.
44 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Detention by Non-State Armed Groups in NIACs: IHL, International Human Rights Law and the Question of the Right Authority’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 169.
45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (AP II).
46 Mégret (n 44) 169.
47 ibid.
48 ibid 170.
49 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Cornelius Wiesener, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups: An Assessment Based on Recent Practice’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 195.
50 ICRC Legal Division.
51 University of Copenhagen (Denmark).
52 Henckaerts and Wiesener (n 49) 196.
53 International Federation for Human Rights.
54 Ilya Nuzov, ‘Post-Conflict Justice: Extending International Criminal Responsibility to Non-State Entities’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 229.
55 ibid 230.
56 Brian E Frenkel, Sebastián A Green Martínez and Nahuel Maisley, ‘Uses of IHL by the International Court of Justice: A Critical Approach Towards Its Role in the International Legal Arena’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 265.
57 University of Buenos Aires.
58 Frenkel, Green Martínez and Maisley (n 56) 266.
59 For the list and references see Frenkel, Green Martínez and Maisley (n 56) 267.
60 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (ICC Statute).
61 Frenkel, Green Martínez and Maisley (n 56) 288.
62 ibid 292.
63 Gerd Oberleitner, ‘The Development of IHL by Human Rights Bodies’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 297.
64 University of Graz.
65 Oberleitner (n 63) 298.
66 ibid 301.
67 ibid 303. Convention on the Rights of the Child (entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.
68 Oberleitner (n 63) 303–04.
69 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
70 Oberleitner (n 63) 304, fn 46 (citing Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Israel (21 August 2003), UN Doc CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para 11).
71 ibid 305.
72 ibid 306.
73 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotà (Colombia), 2 May 1948.
74 Oberleitner (n 63) 307–08, fn 73 (citing Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures 2002, para 80, http://www.cidh.org/medidas/2002.eng.htm).
75 ibid 308, fn 74 (citing the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, 22 October 2002, OAS Doc EA/SerL/V/II.116, Doc 5 rev 1 corr, para 62, http://www.cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm).
76 ibid.
77 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221.
78 Oberleitner (n 63) 309.
79 ibid 311, fn 100 (citing ECtHR, Korbely v Hungary, Judgment, 19 September 2008, App no 9174/02, paras 86–94).
80 ibid 310, fn 92 (citing ECtHR, Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, Judgment, 24 February 2005, App no 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00 (Isayeva), para 3).
81 ibid 311, fn 101 (citing ECtHR, Al-Jedda v UK, Judgment, 7 July 2011, App no 27021/08, paras 42–43).
82 ibid 311.
83 ibid 311 (with reference to ECtHR, Hassan v UK, Judgment, 16 September 2014, App no 29750/09).
84 ibid 312, fn 116 (citing the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Statement by the African Commission on the Situation in Mali, 18 January 2013, http://www.achpr.org/press/2013/01/d140).
85 ibid 313; AP I (n 22).
86 Oberleitner (n 63) 313.
87 Nader I Diab, ‘Targeting Members of Non-State Armed Groups in NIACs: An Attempt to Reconcile International Human Rights Law with IHL's (De Facto) Status-Based Targeting’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 321.
88 ibid 323.
89 Ibid 321, 322.
90 ibid 337, fn 69 (citing ECtHR, Finogenov and Others v Russia, Judgment, 20 December 2011, App no 18299/03 and 27311/03, para 220).
91 ibid 336.
92 ibid 335.
93 ibid 345.
94 ibid.
95 ibid.
96 ibid 346.
97 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), Judgment [2015] ICJ Rep 3, [474] (referred to by the author at Diab (n 87) 346, fn 110.
98 Anne Quintin and Marie-Louise Tougas, ‘Generating Respect for the Law by Non-State Armed Groups: The ICRC's Role and Activities’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 353.
99 ICRC.
100 UN Security Council, Montevideo (Uruguay).
101 Quintin and Tougas (n 98) 356.
102 ibid 357.
103 ibid 360.
104 ibid 363, fn 40 (citing Marco Sassòli, Antoine A Bouvier and Anne Quintin in Former Yugoslavia, Special Agreements between the Parties to the Conflicts, Section A. Yugoslavia/Croatia, Memorandum of Understanding of 27 November 1991, paras (5)–(7), https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/former-yugoslavia-special-agreements-between-parties-conflicts).
105 ibid 363, fn 41 (citing Sassòli, Bouvier and Quintin, ibid, Section B. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Agreement No 1 of 22 May 1992).
106 ibid 363.
107 ibid 364.
108 ibid 366.
109 ibid.
110 ibid 380.
111 ibid 381–82.
112 ibid 383.
113 Marcos D Kotlik, ‘Compliance with Humanitarian Rules on the Protection of Children by Non-State Armed Groups: The UN's Managerial Approach’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 387.
114 ibid 388.
115 ibid 388–89.
116 ibid 389.
117 ibid 390.
118 Ezequiel Heffes, ‘Non-State Actors Engaging Non-State Actors: The Experience of Geneva Call in NIACs’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) 427.
119 ibid 447.
120 ibid 448.
121 ILA Committee on NSA, Working Session Report, 9 August 2016, 1.
122 ILA Final Report (n 33) paras 136–37, 143.
123 See Oberleitner (n 63) 314.
124 AP II (n 45). Therefore, the application of AP II and CA 3 does not confer international recognition of the insurgent party: see Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC and Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (Commentary Additional Protocols (1987)), paras 4407 and 4440; Gavrilova (n 2) 43, 49.
125 Gavrilova (n 2) 49.
126 Federal Attorney General's Office, ‘Indictments Filed in Presumed Tamil Terrorist Financing Case’, Federal Attorney General's Office Press Releases, 20 July 2016, https://www.bundesanwaltschaft.ch/mpc/en/home/medien/archiv-medienmitteilungen/news-seite.msg-id-62777.html. See also Swiss Federal Court, Judgment of 8 November 2019 [Tribunal fédéral, Arrêt du 8 novembre 2019], Joined Cases 6B_383/2019 and 6B_394/2019, para 4.2, https://www.bger.ch/ext/eurospider/live/de/php/aza/http/index.php?highlight_docid=aza%3A%2F%2F08-11-2019-6B_383-2019&lang=de&type=show_document&zoom=YES&).
127 Federal Criminal Court, Judgment of 14 June 2018 and Amendments of 22 February 2019 [TPF, Cour des affaires pánales, Jugement du 14 juin 2018 et modifications du 22 février 2019], Case no SK.2016.30, https://bstger.weblaw.ch/pdf/20180614_SK_2016_30.pdf.
128 Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937, SR 311.0, art 260ter.
129 Swiss Federal Court, Judgment of 8 November 2019 (n 126) paras 4.7.1 and 4.7.2.
130 ibid para 4.8.
131 ibid para. 4.4.
132 For details see Arnold, Roberta, ‘The Criminal Law Implications of the “War on Terror” and the Status of “Foreign Fighters” – A Swiss Perspective’ in Juss, Satvinder, Beyond Human Rights and the War on Terror (Routledge 2019) 124–93Google Scholar; Arnold, Roberta, ‘I risvolti penali della “guerra al terrorismo”’ (2018) 3 Forumpoenale 199Google Scholar.
133 Gavrilova (n 2) 46–47.
134 See Niyo (n 2) 11. Critically, Hill-Cawthorne and Akande maintain ‘[t]hat the legal basis for detention in NIACs does not lie in IHL, whether as an implied right or a customary right, is supported by state practice’: Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 2). On the increased recognition of NSAGs and the associated problems see also Sivakumaran, Sandesh, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2012) 549Google Scholar.
135 Mégret (n 44) 170.
136 See Niyo (n 2) 7; Gavrilova (n 2) 53; ICRC, ‘Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty: Concluding Report’, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 32IC/15/19.1, 8–10 December 2015, 8.
137 the least evil.
138 Mégret (n 44) 187.
139 See Niyo (n 2) 11. For an analysis of the objections thereto see Niyo (n 2) 12.
140 Hill-Cawthorne and Akande (n 2).
141 Niyo (n 2) 15–16.
142 ibid 12.
143 Gavrilova (n 2) 49.
144 Niyo (n 2) 31–32. However, Sivakumaran observes that this may lead to a normative gap, as ‘it is unlikely that armed groups would exercise territorial control in situations of low intensity violence’: see Sivakumaran (n 134) 565.
145 Mégret (n 44) 191.
146 Gavrilova (n 2) 42–43.
147 Niyo (n 2) 18; Gavrilova (n 2) 43.
148 Gavrilova (n 2) 42 (‘This principle, which implies equality of obligations, is applicable in both IAC and NIAC and is reflected in conventional provisions’); Niyo (n 2) 17–18.
149 Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 124) para 4444.
150 Gavrilova (n 2) 42–43.
151 ibid 46–47.
152 ibid 43. Gavrilova observes that the UK High Court of Justice in Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) (UK), [232]–[268], ruled against a power to intern: ibid 37.
153 Gavrilova (n 2) 70.
154 See Sivakumaran (n 134) 566.
155 See Gavrilova (n 2) 47–48, 70 (according to whom the absence of an express authorisation to detain under IHL should be interpreted neutrally).
156 HCJ 2605/05 The Academic Center for Law and Business v Minister of Finance (19 November 2009) (Isr), English translation at: https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/academic-center-law-and-business-v-minister-finance. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that private prisons are a violation of human rights. For an analysis see Henry, Brandy F, ‘Private Prisons & Human Rights: Examining Israel's Ban on Private Prisons in a US Context’ (2019) 4 Concordia Law Review 198Google Scholar, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6781874/#FN9; Barak Medina, ‘Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme Court Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 690.
157 Sivakumaran (n 134) 558–59.
158 (n 60).
159 For an overview see Spadaro, Alessandra, ‘Punish and Be Punished? The Paradox of Command Responsibility in Armed Groups’ (2020) 18 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1Google Scholar; Sivakumaran (n 134) 559.
160 On the legitimacy concerns see Sivakumaran (n 134) 546ff; Commentary Additional Protocols (1987) (n 124) para 87; and Crawford, Emily, ‘Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I (1977)’ in Lachenmann, Frauke and Wolfrum, Rüdiger (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force – The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 385, 389, para 15Google Scholar.
161 Jonathan Cuénod, ‘40th Anniversary of the Additional Protocols of 1977 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’, EJIL: Talk!, 8 June 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/40th-anniversary-of-the-additional-protocols-of-1977-of-the-geneva-conventions-of-1949.
162 Andrew Clapham, ‘Foreword’ in Heffes, Kotlik and Ventura (n 3) v.
163 ibid v.
164 ibid v.