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Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

Dieter Grimm
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Extract

Constitutional adjudication is as old as democratic constitutionalism. But for a long period of time, the United States of America remained alone in subjecting democratic decision-making to judicial review. While constitutions had become widely accepted already in the 19th century, it took almost two hundred years until constitutional adjudication has gained world-wide recognition. In the 19th century, only Switzerland entrusted its Supreme Court with competencies in the field of constitutional law, yet, not including review of federal legislation. All other attempts to introduce constitutional adjudication failed. This is also true for Germany where the constitution of 1849 had provided for judicial review in an ample manner. But the constitution adopted by the revolutionary Paulskirchen Assembly did not enter into force because the monarchs refused their consent after the revolution had been put down.

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Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , Spring 1999 , pp. 193 - 215
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1999

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References

1 See Tate, C.N. and Vallinder, T., eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Review (New York, London, 1995)Google Scholar.

2 Kelsen, H., Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 5 (1929), 5Google Scholar; Kelsen, H., “Wer soil Hüter der Verfassung sein?”, Die Justiz 1930/1931, 576Google Scholar; Schmitt, C., “Das Reichsgericht als Hüter der Verfassung”, in Die Reichsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben (Berlin, Leipzig, vol. I, 1929) 154Google Scholar; Schmitt, C., Der Hüter der Verfassung, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 55 (1929) 161Google Scholar; Schmitt, C., Der Hüter der Verfassung (Berlin, Leipzig, 1931)Google Scholar. For a discussion, see Wendenburg, H., Die Debatte um die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und der Methodenstreit der Staatsrechtslehre in der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen, 1984)Google Scholar.

3 The older surveys on the dissemination and organisation of judicial review are outdated by the developments of the last decade. For a more recent general account, see Zierlein, K.G., Die Bedeutung der Verfassungsrechtsprechung für die Bewahrung und Durchsetzung der Staatsverfassung (Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, 1991) 301Google Scholar; limited to certain regions: Starck, C. and Weber, A., eds., Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Westeuropa (Baden-Baden vol. 2, 1986)Google Scholar; Horn, H.-R. and Weber, A., eds., Richterliche Verfassungskontrolle in Lateinamerika (Spanien und Portugal, Baden-Baden, 1989)Google Scholar; Brünneck, A. v., Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in westlichen Demokratien (Baden-Baden, 1992)Google Scholar; Greenberg, D. and others, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York, Oxford, 1993)Google Scholar; Frowein, J.A. and Marauhn, T., eds., Grundfragen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel- und Osteuropa (Berlin, 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Beginning with Bickel, A.M., The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven, 1962)Google Scholar.

5 Compare, e.g., Elster, J. and Slagstad, R., eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haltern, U.R., Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Demokratie und Misstrauen (Berlin, 1998)Google Scholar.

6 For the function of the constitution, see Grimm, D., Die Zukunft der Verfassung (Frankfurt, 2nd ed.(1994)Google Scholar.

7 This is the way the Supreme Court of Israel took, beginning with the Kol Ha'am decision, Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel, vol. 1, 90. Compare Kretzmer, D., “Democracy in the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Israel”, (1987) 26 Isr. Yrbk Human Rights 267Google Scholar.

8 H. Kelsen, Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, supra n. 2, 78. Compare D. Grimm, Zum Verhältnis von Interpretationslehre, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Demokratieprinzip bei Kelsen, Rechtstheorie Beiheft 4, 1982, 149.

9 Compare Jacob, H. and others, eds., Courts, Law and Politics in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, London, 1996)Google Scholar.

10 For the problems created by the election of judges, see Croley, S.P., “The Majoritarian Difficulty”, (1995) 62 Univ. Chicago L.R. 689CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 This expression is borrowed from Luhmann, N., Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik (Frankfurt, vol. 4, 1995) 114Google Scholar.

12 For the latter compare Hesse, K., Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Heidelberg, 20th ed., 1995) 24 ss.Google Scholar; critical Böckenförde, E.-W., Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1976) 2089Google Scholar.

13 Currie, D.P., The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago, 1994) 319Google Scholar. For the civil rights jurisprudence see Grimm, G., “Human Rights and Judicial Review in German”, in Beatty, D.M., ed., Human Rights and Judicial Review. A Comparative Perspective (Dordrecht, 1994) 267Google Scholar; D. Grimm, “Rückkehr zum liberalen Grundrechtsverständnis”, in Zukunft, supra n. 6, 221: Grimm, D., “Schutzrecht und Schutzpflicht”, in Festschrift für E.G. Mahrenholz (Baden-Baden, 1994) 529Google Scholar.

14 Compare Grimm, D., “Methode als Machtfaktor”, in Festschrift für H. Coing (München, vol. I. 1982) 469Google Scholar.

15 Compare, e.g., Scalia, A., A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, 1997)Google Scholar; Heun, W., “Original Intent und Wille des historischen Verfassungsgebers”, (1991) 116 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 185Google Scholar.

16 For examples from the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, see Philippi, K. J., Tatsachenfeststellungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Köln, 1971)Google Scholar.

17 For a comparison, see Cappelletti, M., Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis, 1971)Google Scholar; from a practical point of view, Grimm, D., “Probleme einer eigenständigen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland”, in Schweizer, R.J., ed., Reform der Bundesgerichtsbarkeit (Zürich, 1995) 161Google Scholar.

18 A more comprehensive analysis of the downside of democratic accountability can be found in March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P., Democratic Governance (New York, 1995) 144 ss.Google Scholar; Haltern, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra n. 5, 398 ss.

19 Compare Grimm, D., “Die politischen Parteien”, in Benda, E., Maihofer, W. and Vogel, H.-J., eds., Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts (Berlin, New York, 2nd ed., 1994) 599, 644Google Scholar ss.