Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-02T20:57:36.526Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Internal Legal Order of the European Union as a Complementary Framework for its Obligations under IHL

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2012

Valentina Falco
Get access

Abstract

When exploring the sources of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) obligations of multinational peacekeeping forces, legal scholars have thus far focused mainly on the UN (and, to a lesser extent, NATO), whilst other organizations have remained largely in the shadows. Whereas the UN Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by UN Forces of International Humanitarian Law has been widely debated and extensively investigated, little or no attention has been paid to self-regulatory solutions adopted by other international and regional organizations.

This Article focuses on the European Union (EU), holding that this regional organization—by virtue of its sui generis nature and of its increasing engagement in the field of crisis management—can be regarded as one of the most interesting newcomers to the realm of jus in bello. More specifically, it looks at the EU's internal legal order with a view to verifying whether and to what extent it may complement customary IHL in regulating the conduct of the EU as a military actor. The Article surveys the primary and secondary sources of EU legislation which may prima facie spell out obligations for the EU-led troops engaged in European Security and Defence Policy military operations. Finally, the Article seeks to draw some broader conclusions on the nature of the relationship between EU law and IHL, as well as on the complementarity and inherent normative value of their sources.

Type
Symposium on Complementing International Humanitarian Law: Exploring the Need for Additional Norms to Govern Contemporary Conflict Situations
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , 2009 , pp. 168 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Sassòli, Marco, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 401 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Klabbers, Jan, (I Can't Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors, Nordic Cosmopolitanism: Essays in International Law for Martti Koskenniemi 351, 355–57 (Petman, Jarna & Klabbers, J. eds., 2003)Google Scholar.

3 Id. at 357.

4 But see Klabbers, Jan, Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law, 14 Eur. J. Int'l L. 299, 311 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (holding that “it is difficult to think of a good reason to deny terrorists the protection offered by humanitarian law.”).

5 For purposes of this Article, the term “non-State actor” is intended as any actor other than a sovereign State, see Heintze, Hans-Joachim, Do Non-State Actors Challenge International Humanitarian Law?, in International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: Symposium in Honour of Knut Ipsen 163, 163 (Von Heinegg, Wolff Heintschel & Epping, Volker eds., 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Bassiouni, M. Cherif, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 711, 715–17 (2008)Google Scholar (adopting a narrower definition of the term (i.e., “non-governmental groups who directly or indirectly engage in support of non-governmental combatants in non-international and purely internal conflicts”)).

6 Sassòli, supra note 1, at 433.

7 The argument applies a fortiori to APII to the Geneva Conventions. Yet, it has been noted that in fact, the Protocol does not specifically provide the possibility for non-State entities to express their consent or commitment see Klabbers, supra note 2, at 360.

8 Zwanenburg, Marten, Accountability of Peace-Support Operations 157–58 (2005)Google Scholar.

9 However, Article 96 (3) of the API to the Geneva Conventions offers non-State actors the possibility to undertake to apply the Conventions and the Protocol in relation to a specific conflict by means of a unilateral declaration.

10 See infra pp. 20-24 ##.

11 Literature on the issue is overwhelming. A valuable bibliographic overview is provided in Porretto, Gabriele & Vité, Sylvain, The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law to Internatzonal Organizations (CUDIH, Research Paper Series, No. 1 2006)Google Scholar.

12 See, e.g., Zwanenburg, supra note 8; Kolb, Robert, Porretto, Gabriele, Vité, Sylvain. L'Application du Droit International Humanitaire et des Droits de l'Homme aux Organisation Internationales (2005)Google Scholar; Condorelli, Luigi, Pertinence du Droit international humanitaire pour les organisations internationales et les alliances, 25 Collegium 25, 25–36 (2002)Google Scholar; Weckel, Philippe, Les droit des conflits armés et les organisations internationales, in Les Organisations Internationales et les Conflits Armés 95, 109 (Benchikh, Madjid ed., 2001)Google Scholar; Porretto & Vité, supra note 11, at 29-31.

13 The Secretary General. Secretary General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999)Google Scholar.

14 See, e.g., Benvenuti, Paolo, Le respect du droit international humanitaire par les forces des Nations Unies: la circulaire du Secrétaire Général, 105 RGDIP 355, 372 (2001)Google Scholar; Condorelli, Luigi, Le azioni dell'ONU e l'applicazione del diritto internazionale umanitario: il bollettino del Segretario Generale del 6 agosto 1999, RDI, 1049, 1049–1053 (1999)Google Scholar; Condorelli, L., Les progrès du droit international humanitaire et la circulaire du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies du 6 Août 1999, in The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality—Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab 495–505 (de Chazournes, Laurence Boisson & Gowlland-Debbas, V. eds., 2001)Google Scholar; Sanchez, Y. Cacho, Boletìn del Secretario General relativo a la observancia del Derecho internacional humanitario por las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas, 52 Rev. Esp. Der. Int'l. 229, 234 (2000)Google Scholar; Ryniker, Anne, Respect du droit international humanitaire par les forces des Nations Unies, 81 Int.'l Rev. Red Cross 795, 795–805 (1999)Google Scholar; Shraga, Daphna, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damages, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 406 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bothe, Michael & Dörschel, Thomas, The UN Peacekeeping Experience, in The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces 487 (Fleck, Dieter ed., 2001)Google Scholar.

15 For notable exceptions see Desgagné, Richard, European Union Practice in the Field of International Humanitarian Law: an Overview, in The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? 455 (Kronenberger, Vincent ed., 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Naert, Frederik, An EU Perspective, in International Peace Operations and International Humanitarian Law 61 (2008)Google Scholar; Ronzitti, Natalino, L'applicabilità del diritto internazionale umanitario, in le forze di pace dell'unione Europea 165 (Ronzitti, N. ed., 2005)Google Scholar; Zwanenburg, Marten, Toward a More Mature ESDP: Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law by EU Crisis Management Operations, in The European Union and Crisis Management—Policy And Legal Aspects 395 (Blockmans, Steven ed., 2008)Google Scholar; Ferraro, Tristan, Le droit international humanitaire dans la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union européenne, 84 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 435 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Van Hegelsom, Gert-Jan, The Relevance of the Law of Armed Conflict for the Conduct of Petersberg Tasks, 25 Collegium 109 (2002)Google Scholar.

16 Porretto & Vité, supra note 11, at 19-20. See also Sicilianos, Linos-Alexandre, Preface, R. Kolb, droit humanitaire et opérations de paix internationales vii, viii (2nd ed. 2006)Google Scholar (“On voit mal, en effet, sur la base de quel l'argument [sic] le droit applicable serait différent en fonction de l'identité de l'organisation internationale - universelle ou régionale - dont le forces sont mandatées pour recourir aux armes sur le terrain”).

17 As Rosas points out, these peculiarities include being endowed with a concept of citizenship and an own currency, possessing jurisdiction over a given territory and having an own defense policy, prone to lead to a common defense, see Rosas, Allan, The European Court of Justice and Public International Law, in The Europeanisation of International Law 71, 71 (Wouters, Jan, Nollkaemper, André, & de Wet, Erika eds. 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 For an insightful, thought-provoking analysis of the challenges posed by the EU to the doctrine of subjects of international law see De Witte, Bruno, The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law: The EU and its Member States as Strange Subjects, in The Europeanisation of International Law, supra note 17, at 39–41Google Scholar. The author also highlights Mer special characteristics of the EU compared to “standard” international organizations, namely the conspicuous treaty-making activity and the de facto possession of international legal personality, id.

19 Zwanenburg, supra note 8, at 4.

20 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel European Communities, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (expired on Jul. 23, 2002); Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169.

21 Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Maastricht], see especially Article A (now Article 1).

22 White, Nigel D., The Ties that Bind: the EU, the UN and International Law, 37 Neth. Y.B. Int. L. 57, 64 (2006)Google Scholar.

23 Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, 13 Bull. Eur. Communities 14, 14–15 (1980)Google Scholar, also available at http://www.robert-schuman.org/declaration_9mai.php.

24 Trybus, Martin, European Union Law and Defence Integration 19–20 (2005)Google Scholar.

25 Marauhn, Thilo, Building a European Security and Defence Identity 8 (1996)Google Scholar.

26 For up-to-date accounts of the recent progress of the European security and defence integration see, e.g., Koutrakos, Panos, Eu International Relations Law 452–77 (2006)Google Scholar; Trybus, supra note 24; Trybus, Martin, With or Without the EU Constitutional Treaty: towards a Common Security and Defence Policy?, 31 Eur L. Rev. 145 (2006)Google Scholar.

27 Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 21, art J.4(1) (emphasis added V.F.).

28 During the Franco-British summit of 3-4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo, the British and French governments agreed on a Joint Declaration on European Defence. The declaration stated, inter alia, that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises,” see Joint Declaration issued at the Saint-Malo British-French Summit (Dec. 3-4, 1998), para. 2, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf. Trybus argues that, by suggesting the establishment of a permanent European military organizational structure, the Declaration marked “the transition from the limited defence component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy … to a European Security and Defence Policy,” see Trybus, supra note 24, at 93-95.

29 At the European Council held in Cologne on June 3-4, 1999, the Heads of the then fifteen Member States of the EU and the President of the European Commission solemnly reaffirmed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises …” see European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Cologne European Council Meeting (June 3-4, 1999), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Cologne%20European%20Council-Presidency%20conclusions.pdf (Annex III, at 33).

30 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Mar. 10, 2001, O.J. (C 80) 1.

31 See Wessel, Ramses A., The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: the Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice, 8 J. Confl. & Sec. L. 265, 274 (2003)Google Scholar et seq.

32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 29, 2006, O.J. (C 321) 5.

33 Petersberg Declaration of the Western European Union Council of Ministers, para. II.4, June 19, 1992, available at www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.

34 von Kielmansegg, Sebastian G., The Meaning of Petersberg: Some Considerations on the Legal Scope of ESDP Operations, 44 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 629, 642 (2007)Google Scholar. See also Bono, Ricardo Gosalbo, Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order, 43 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 337, 349 n.28 (2006)Google Scholar (arguing that “it follows from the terms ‘including peacekeeping’ in Article 17(2) TEU, that all types of military and civilian crisis management actions fall within the scope of the TEU”).

35 See Kielmansegg, supra note 34, at 648; Naert, An EU Perspective, supra note 15, at 61.

36 For more details on the tasks and functions of the different structures, see, e.g., Trybus, supra note 24, at 108-12 Van Hegelsom, supra note 15, at 110-13.

37 Each Battlegroup is about 1,500 personnel strong; see Factsheet from the EU Council Secretariat on the EU Battlegroups, at 2, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups_February_07-factsheet.pdf.

38 Koutrakos, supra note 26 at 459; Van Hegelsom, supra note 15, at 113.

39 Trybus, supra note 24, at 146.

40 Wallace, William, Is there a European Approach to War?, in The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century 37, 50 (Reed, Charles & Ryall, David eds., 2007)Google Scholar.

41 White, Nigel D., The Law of International Organisations 66 (2nd ed. 2005)Google Scholar.

42 Koopmans, Bjorn, Developing the European Foreign Security and Defence Police Without the Constitution?, 59 Studia Diplomatica 129, 129 (2006)Google Scholar.

43 Due to space constraints, an overall assessment of the factual background of each of the ESDP military operations cannot be provided here. For an up-to-date overview of the military missions conducted by the EU see the relevant documents and factsheets in the ESDP section of the Council of the EU website: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ESDP (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). See also Naert, Frederik, ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious EU Security and Defence Operations, in European Security Law 61 (Trybus, Martin & White, N. D. eds., 2007)Google Scholar; Nickel, D. & Quille, G., In the Shadow of the Constitution: Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy Adapting to a Changing External Environment (Jean Monnet Working Paper, Feb. 2007), at 13–19Google Scholar; Tsagourias, Nicholas, EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues, in European Security Law, supra, at 107–10Google Scholar.

44 See Council Joint Action No. 2003/92/CFSP of Jan. 27, 2003 on the European Union Military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2003 O.J. (L 34) 26.

45 See Council Joint Action No. 2003/423/CFSP of June 5, 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2003 O.J. (L 143) 50.

46 See Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of Apr. 27, 2006 on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) during the election process, 2006 O.J. (L 116) 98.

47 See Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of July 12, 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia Herzegovina, 2004 O.J. (L 252) 10; Council Decision 2004/803/CFSP of Nov. 25, 2004 on the launching of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004 O.J. (L 353) 21.

48 See Council Decision 2008/101/CFSP of Jan. 28, 2008 on the launching of the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA), 2008 O.J. (L 34) 39.

49 See Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of Nov. 10, 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, 2008 O.J. (L 301) 33; Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of Dec. 8, 2008 on the launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta), 2008 O.J. (L 330) 19.

50 This has led Wessel to qualify such missions as “second-hand” operations in the “low end” of security, see Wessel, supra note 31, at 265, 285 n.31.

51 See Naert, , An EU Perspective supra note 15, at 97Google Scholar (“([a]lmost) all ESDP operations so far did not include active participation in hostilities”).

52 Naert, , ESDP in Practice, supra note 43, at 75 n.103Google Scholar.

53 After approval by the Council of the EU, the operation was officially launched on January 28, 2008. On March 15, 2008 the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the operation was declared, marking the beginning of its one year's mandate (pursuant to S.C. Res. 1778 para. 6(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 25, 2007)). On March 15, 2009 the authority of the operation was transferred to MINURCAT (the UN mission in Chad and the Central-African Republic), pursuant to S.C. Res. 1861, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1861 (Jan. 14, 2009).

54 For an overview of the geo-political and factual background of the operation, see Romain Yakemtchouk, , La force européenne au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine, 5 Rev. Marché Comm. UE, 365, 365–69 (2008)Google Scholar.

55 See EU Presidency Statement on the Republic of Chad (Brussels, Feb. 3, 2008), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cfsp/98543.pdf; Press Release, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the situation in Chad and Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Feb. 4, 2008); Press Release EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, Le deployment de l'EUFOR reprend, (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08_02_12Reprisedeploiement.pdf.

56 See Preamble of S.C. Res. 1778, supra note 53, para. 16.

57 See Chad Rebels Consider Irish Troops a Hostile Force, The Irish Times, Feb. 2, 2008Google Scholar. See also Kirby, Paul, EU Force on Risky Africa Mission, BBC News, Jan 28, 2008Google Scholar, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7213551.stm.

58 Press Release, EUFOR Action under Fire Protect IDP's Refugees (June 14, 2008), available at http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/RezzouGozBeida.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).

59 Press Release, EUFOR Troops Challenge and Disperse Ambushers (Aug. 19, 2008) available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Press_Release_19_august_2008.pdf.

60 Press Release, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, EUFOR Suffers its First Fatality, March 10, 2008, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080310EUFORsuffersfirstfatality.pdf. A reliable account of the incident is provided in “The European Union Mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA,” Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee of the Western European Union by René Rouquet, Rapporteur (France, Socialist Group) and Ruhi Aciköz, co-Rapporteur (Turkey), Document A/2007, paras. 92-95 (June 4, 2008), available at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2007.php.

61 Press Release, Javier Solana, Haut Représentant de l'Union Européenne pour la PESC aux obsèques de l'Adjudant Gilles Polin, membre d'EUFOR Tchad/RCA, tué en action (Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080303-OHQMontValarien.pdf.

62 Bailes, Alyson J.K., The EU and “A Better World”: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?, 84 Int'l L. Aff. 115, 124 (2008)Google Scholar. See also Shraga, Daphna, The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law, in Les Nations Unies et le Droit International Humanitaire 330, 337 (Condorelli, Luigi, La Rosa, Anne-Marie, & Scherrer, Sylvie eds., 1996)Google Scholar (holding that however peaceful and consensual an operation may be in theory, the possibility that multinational troops may become engaged in situations of armed conflict can never be ruled out. This would be true for peacekeeping operations and even more so in case of peace-enforcement operations).

63 S.C. Res. 1778, supra note 53, para. 6(a) sets out the following tasks to be fulfilled by the EU operation:

(i) to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;

(ii) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations”; (iii) “to contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel.

64 The expression “international legal personality” will be used here to identify the capacity to hold rights and obligations under international law. For an in-depth analysis of the different doctrinal interpretations of the concept, see Dupuy, Pierre-Marie, L'unité de L'Ordre Juridique International 106–18 (2003)Google Scholar.

65 The matter was debated during the negotiations of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam. However, it is only in Article I-7 of the Constitutional Treaty—and now in Article 47 TEU as inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon—that provision is made for the conferral of legal personality on the EU, see Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, and Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, see infra note 126.

66 Article 281 of the Treaty establishing the European Community explicitly provides that “[t]he Community shall have legal personality,” see Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter TEC].

67 See David, Eric, Le droit international humanitaire et les acteurs non étatiques, 27 Collegium 27, 40 (2003)Google Scholar:

[I]t is true that more and more international organizations are engaged in armed conflicts. In the specific case of the EU, however, it is not yet an international organization. Rather it remains, at this stage, an association regrouping several States and deprived of legal personality. At some point in the future, when the EU has a legal personality, one could imagine that perhaps, within the framework of the growing European federalization process, the EU would accede to the instruments of international humanitarian law.

68 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 17, at 174-220 (April 11) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries case]. As noted by Eeckhout, “most recent legal literature accepts that the EU has international legal personality see Eeckhout, Piet, External Relations of the EU 155, n.67 (2004)Google Scholar. See also, inter alia, Gosalbo Bono, supra note 34, at 393 (“The European Union has become an international organization and a global international actor with its own international legal personality”).

69 Eeckhout, supra note 68, at 157-160; McGoldrick, Dominic, International Relations Law of the European Union 37 (1997)Google Scholar.

70 Article 24(1) TEU provides that “[w]hen it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organisations in implementation of this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency.”

71 See infra notes 77, 84, 166, and 171.

72 Some authors consider the mere objective of asserting the EU's identity on the international scene (as set forth in Article 2 TEU) to be a sufficient indication for allowing an explicit recognition of its international legal personality, see Dupuy, supra note 64, at 443.

73 See Grard, Loïc, L'Union européenne, sujet de droit international, RGDP 337, 350–354 (2006)Google Scholar.

74 Gosalbo Bono, supra note 34, at 357.

75 See Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 625 (Sept. 2, 1998).

76 See Pilloud, Claude et al. , Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 at 1353 (1987)Google Scholar.

77 See, e.g., Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the participation of the Kingdom of Morocco in the European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Feb. 1, 2005), 2005 O.J. (L 34) 49.

78 According to Article 14(1) TEU, “[j]oint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.”

79 See infra note 163.

80 See supra note 48.

81 See Council Decision No. 2001/78/CFSP of Jan. 22, 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee, 2001 O.J. (L 27) 1, now reflected in Article 25 TEU.

82 Emphasis added V.F.

83 Council Joint Action No. 2004/570/CFSP of July 12, 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia Herzegovina 2004, O.J. (L 252) 10.

84 Council Decision No. 2003/222/CFSP of Mar. 21, 2003 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the FYROM on the status of the European Union-led Forces (EUF) in the FYROM, 2003 O.J. (L 82) 45.

85 Emphasis added V.F.

86 The same view is taken by Tsagourias, supra note 43, at 122.

87 See, e.g., Porretto & Vité, supra note 11, at 27-29.

88 More precisely, pursuant to the standard accession clause included in the four Genève Conventions (Articles 60, 59, 139, and 155 respectively), accession to the Conventions shall be open to “any Power,” but, the term “Power” has traditionally been interpreted as encompassing States only. See Commentaire à la I Convention de Geneve 459 (Pictet, Jean S. ed., 1952–1959)Google Scholar.

89 According to the EU Military C2 Concept, “interoperability is defined within the EU as the ability of Member State HQs and forces and, when appropriate, HQs and forces of other Nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks,” EU Military C2 Concept 11096/03 Restreint UE (partial declassification), (July 26, 2006).

90 See, e.g., Boyer, Y. & Lindley-French, Julian, Euro-Interoperability: The Effective Military Interoperability of European Armed Forces (Nov. 2007)Google Scholar.

91 See Ronzitti, supra note 15, at 169, 192.

92 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. Reportedly, Finland has nevertheless agreed with the EU not to use antipersonnel landmines when engaged in ESDP operations (see van Hegelsom, G.-J., speech delivered at the XXXI Round Table on International Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, Sept. 4-6, 2008Google Scholar, on file with author).

93 The Concordia operation, for instance, included troops from Canada and Turkey; the latter has also participated in EUFOR-RD Congo. Non-EU troop contributing nations to Artemis included Brazil, Canada and South-Africa, while the following third countries have participated in the Althea Operation: Albania, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. As far as EUFOR-TCHAD/RCA is concerned, contributions by Albania (see Political and Security Committee Decision on the acceptance of third States' contributions to the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, Brussels, 7 February 2008, 5983/08), Russia (Political and Security Committee Decision, Brussels, 8 May 2008, 9006/08) and Croatia (Political and Security Committee Decision, Brussels, 28 August 2008, 1419/08) were accepted.

94 Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, often referred to as a catalogue of the sources of international law, defines international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Within the framework of the European Union, a similar definition is provided in the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with intenational humanitarian law of 2005, according to which “[c]ustomary intenational law is formed by the practice of States which they accept as binding upon them,” 2005 O.J. (C 327) 4, para. 7.

95 See, e.g., Cassese, Antonio, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 Pac. Basin L. J. 55, 55–118 (1984)Google Scholar; Greenwood, Christopher, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law 63–88 (Rowe, P. ed., 1993)Google Scholar; Meron, Theodor, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Am. J. Int' L. 348, 348–70 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pocar, Fausto, Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Customary International Law, 31 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 144 (2001)Google Scholar.

96 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986, I.C.J. 14, para. 177 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. U.S.]; Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Command Responsibility, para. 13 (July 6, 2003).

97 See, e.g., the Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000); Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151; the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 (1999).

98 See Fostering a European Approach to Accountability for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and Torture—Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the European Union, Final report on a joint project run by Redress and FIDH (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.redress.org/publications/Fostering%20an%20EU%20Approach.pdf.

99 France ratified the ICC Statute on June 9, 2000.

100 Actually, the declaration was explicitly made bearing these kinds of situations in mind— see the extract of the letter addressed by the then French President, Chirac, Jacques, to the Coalition Française pour la Cour Pénale Internationale, Feb. 15, 1999Google Scholar:

Des plaintes sans fondement et teintées d'arrière-pensées politiques pourraient donc plus aisément être dirigées contre les personnels de pays qui, comme le nôtre, sont engagés sur des théâtres extérieurs, notamment dans le cadre d'opérations de maintien de la paix. L'expérience permettra de vérifier l'efficacité des garanties intégrées au Statut afin d'éviter de tels dysfonctionnements.

Id., available at http://www.cfcpi.fr/spip.php?article100 (last visited Jan.15, 2009).

101 The expression is owed to Roulot, Jean-François, Le recours à la force dans le cadre d'une mission de maintien de la paix sous l'égide de l'ONU, 6 Revue du Droit Public 1617, 1619 et seq. (2006)Google Scholar

102 See Trybus, supra note 24, at 397 (2005) (emphasizing that “[u]nity is paramount for efficiency in defence … The coherence of a military alliance is of equal importance. Without unity there will be no neither successful deterrence nor consistent responses to security challenges. No aggressor will take a disunited army or alliance seriously”).

103 See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, at 89-90, para. 37 (Dec. 20) (“[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law …”). See also, e.g., Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law 690 (15th ed. 1998)Google Scholar;David, Eric, Le droit international applicable aux organizations internationales, in 1 Mélanges en Hommage á Michel Waelbroeck 3, 22 (1999)Google Scholar.

104 See, e.g., Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219; Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v. Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., 1992 E.C.R. I-6019; Case T-115/94, Ope1 Austria v. Council, 1997 E.C.R. II-39; Case C–162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollant Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I–3655 [hereinafter Racke case].

105 Rosas, supra note 17, at 71, 79-80. See also Kuijper, Pieter Jan, Customary International Law, Decisions of International Organizations and Other Techniques for Ensuring Respect for International Legal Rules in European Community Law, in Europeanisation of International Law, supra note 17, at 87, 87–106Google Scholar; Wouters, Jan & Van Eeckhoutte, Dries, Giving Effect to Customary International Law Through European Community Law 3, 3–49 (K.U. Leuven, Faculty of Law, Institute for International Law, Working Paper No. 25, 2002)Google Scholar.

106 Racke case, supra note 104, para. 45.

107 Case C-308/06, The Queen v. Secr'y of State for Transp., 2008 E.C.R., para. 51 [hereinafter Intertanko case] (emphasis added V.F.).

108 A similar, though not identical, conclusion could be reached by following Lenaerts and De Smijter's line of reasoning. These authors go so far as to suggest that, although, in principle, the Community is not bound by the international agreements concluded by its Member States, this rule does not apply when the law enshrined in the intenational agreement is considered to be a codification of customary law. To the extent that the customary nature of the main IHL treaties has been widely recognized—and the EU Member States are all parties to these treaties—following Lenaerts and De Smijter's approach may lead to the conclusion that the Community/Union is bound by IHL by virtue of the treaty obligations of its Member States, see Lenaerts, Koen & De Smijter, Eddy, The European Union as an Actor under International Law, 19 Y.B. Eur. L. 95, 122 (1999–2000)Google Scholar.

109 The separation between the EU and the EC would be removed under the Treaty of Lisbon, even though the ECJ would continue (with limited exceptions) to lack jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the CFSP (Treaty of Lisbon, art. 275(2), see infra note 212).

110 In this sense see the recent ECJ judgment on Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council, 2008, E.C.R., para. 202 [hereinafter Kadi case]:

the coexistence of the Union and the Community as integrated but separate legal orders, and the constitutional architecture of the pillars … constitute considerations of an institutional kind militating against any extension of the bridge to articles of the EC Treaty other than those with which it explicitly creates a link.

111 See Rosas, supra note 17, at 80. See also Craig, P. & de Burca, G., Eu Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 191 (4th ed. 2008)Google Scholar (arguing that “a clear separation of the Union legal system from the Community legal system is not possible”).

112 This is a settled principle with regard to the United Nations, see, e.g., Zwanenburg, supra note 8, at 15 1-56; Saura, Jaime, Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 58 Hastings L.J. 479, 500, 511 (2006–2007)Google Scholar.

113 Zwanenburg, supra note 15, at 401. For the clearest articulation of the principle of functionality, see Reparation for Injuries, supra note 68, at 180.

114 Shraga, Daphna, The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law, 5 Int. Peacekeeping 64, 65 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis added V.F.).

115 Kolb, supra note 16, at 27.

116 Ferraro, supra note 15, at 460-61.

117 For an overview of the pool of instruments at the Council's disposal in the domain of Common Foreign and Security Policy see Eeckhout, supra note 68, at 398-408.

118 As the discussion below will show, it may well be that primary and secondary rules of EU law concerned with human rights were conceived (or can subsequently be interpreted) so as to encompass IHL. Obligations under IHL would thus enter the EU's legal order by way of human rights law see infra, pp. 190-96.

119 Alvarez, José E., International Organizations as Law-Makers 65 (2005)Google Scholar.

120 See White, supra note 41, at 18.

121 See, e.g., Dupuy, supra note 64, at 440.

122 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastigen 1963 E.C.R. 1., para. 3.

123 Kadi case, supra note 110, para. 317. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro, Jan. 16, 2008, para. 21 (“the Treaty has created a municipal legal order of transnational dimensions, of which it forms the “basic constitutional character”). For a comprehensive analysis of the judgment, see Griller, Stefan, International Law, Human Rights and the European Community's Autonomous Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi, 4 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 528, 528–53Google Scholar (qualifying the ECJ pronouncement on the case as a “landmark decision[s] on the relationship between Community law and international law [and] on fundamental rights protection under international law”).

124 I am grateful to Marise Cremona for sharing her thoughts on this point.

125 Quoted in Doswald-Beck, Louise, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Future Wars, in The Law of Armed Conflict: into the Next Millennium 39, 61–62 (Schmitt, Michael ed, 1998)Google Scholar.

126 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1. In the present Article, the numbering of TEU articles as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon refers to the consolidated version of the TEU published by the Council of the EU, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13 [hereinafter TEU Lisbon]. The negative outcome of the referendum held in Ireland on June 13, 2008 has put into question the entry into force of the Treaty.

127 AS set forth Articles 11(1) TEU, 177(2) TEC, 181a TEC subsuming respect for human rights under the objectives of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, development co-operation policy, and economic, financial and technical co-operation with third countries respectively. A comprehensive survey of relevant literature is found in Ahmed, Tawhida & Butler, Israel de Jésus, The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 Eur. J Int'l L. 771, 773 n.3 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

128 See, e.g., Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491 [hereinafter Nold case]; Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-01759, para. 33; Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur general de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la repression des frauds, and Commission of the European Communities, 2002 E.C.R. I-09011, para. 23; Kadi case, supra note 110, para. 304 (reaffirming that the protection of fundamental rights forms “part of the very foundations of the Community legal order”). For a valuable, up-to-date overview of the ECJ jurisprudence in the field of human rights, see Callewaert, Johan, ‘Unionisation’ and ‘Conventionisation’ of Fundamental Rights in Europe: The Interplay Between Union and Convention Law and Its Impact on the Domestic Legal Systems of the Member States, in The Europeanisation of International Law, supra note 17, at 110–16Google Scholar; Defeis, Elizabeth, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An Appraisal, 31 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1104, 1104–17Google Scholar.

129 In this sense, see Naert, , ESDP in Practice, supra note 43, at 61, 97Google Scholar; Nicolas Tsagourias, EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues, in id. 102 & 117.

130 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 78.

131 Confirming the EU Member States' “attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law.”

132 Neither the TEU nor the TEC, in their present form, contain any provision on the relationship between the EU/EC and international law, see Kuijper, supra note 105, at 87-88.

133 TEU Lisbon, supra note 126, art. 21(1) (emphasis added V.F.).

134 Id.

135 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Hazim Delić And Esad Landžo (“Čelebići Case”), Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, para.143 (Feb. 20, 2001)

[fundamental humanitarian principles which underlie IHL], the object of which is the respect for the dignity of the human person, developed as a result of centuries of warfare and had already become customary law at the time of the adoption of the Geneva Conventions because they reflect the most universally recognised humanitarian principles.

136 Article 11 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the TEC “shall become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” [hereinafter TFEU]. In the present Article, the numbering of TFEU articles refers to the consolidated version of the TFEU published by the Council of the EU, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.

137 EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 2005/C327/04, 2005 O.J. (C 327) 4 [hereinafter EU Guidelines on IHL]. For an in-depth analysis of the Guidelines see infra, pp. 198-200.

138 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 975/1999 of Apr. 29, 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of development co-operation operations which contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, 1999 O.J. (L 120) 1; Council Regulation (EC) No. 976/1999 of Apr. 29, 1999 laying down the requirements for the implementation of Community operations, other than those of development cooperation, which, within the framework of Community cooperation policy, contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries, 1999 O.J. (L 120) 8.

139 See Article 249, preamble 2 TEU (“[a] regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”).

140 Emphasis added V.F.

141 See infra, pp. 198-200.

142 EU Guidelines on IHL, supra note 137, para. 2.

143 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, para. 4 [hereinafter Internationale Handelsgesellschaft].

144 For a comprehensive analysis of the concept see, e.g., Tridimas, Takis., The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed. 2006)Google Scholar.

145 See Case 29-69 Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419 (the first case in which the ECJ recognized that fundamental rights form part of the Community legal order, without further elaboration, though).

146 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 143.

147 Id.

148 Nold case, supra note 128, para. 13.

149 See Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur general, supra note 128, para. 23.

150 Jacobs, Francis, Between Luxembourg and Strasbourg: Dialogue between the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, in Die Herausforderung Von Grenzen: Festschrift Für Roland Bieber 205, 206 (Epiney, Astrid, Haag, Marcel & Heinemann, Andrea eds. 2007)Google Scholar; Tizzano, Antonio, The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Fundamental Rights, in Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs 125, 128 (Arnull, Anthony, Eeckhout, Piet & Tridimas, Takis eds., 2008)Google Scholar.

151 See Tizzano, supra note 150, at 31.

152 For recent examples, see Kadi, supra note 110, para. 283; Case C-349/07, Sopropé—Organizações de Calçado Lda v. Fazenda Pública, Dec. 2008.

153 See Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh, A tale of two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis, 43 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 629, 631 (2006)Google Scholar.

154 Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the Control System of the Convention, art. 17, (May 13, 2004), 194 E.T.S 247 (providing that the European Union may accede to the Convention) (not yet enforce).

155 See, e.g., Russia, Isayeva v., 41 Eur. Ct. H. R. 38 (2005)Google Scholar; Isayeva, , Yusupova, & Russia, Basayeva v., 41 Eur. Ct. H. R. 39 (2005)Google Scholar; Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04; Korbely v. Hungary, App. 9174/02, Sept. 19, 2008, paras. 74-94; Varnava and others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 & 16073/90, Jan. 10 2008, para. 130. See also Leach, Philip, The Chechen Conflict; Analysing the Oversight of the European Court of Human Rights, 6 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 732, 734, 760 (2008)Google Scholar.

156 Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01, and Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No. 78166/01, Grand Chamber decision of May 2, 2007 [hereinafter Behrami/Saramati]. For a thorough examination of the Court's decision, see, e.g., Larsen, Kjetil Mujezinović, 19 Eur. J Int'l L. 509, 509–31 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Palchetti, Paolo, Azioni di Forze Istituite o Autorizzate dalle Nazioni Unite Davanti alla Corte Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo: I Casi Behrami e Saramati, 3 Riv. Italiana Dir. Int. 681, 681–704 (2007)Google Scholar; Sari, Aurel, Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 151, 151–70 (2008)Google Scholar.

157 See supra, pp. 178-80.

158 As far as the troop-contributing nations are concerned, one should bear in mind that—consistently with the general practice in multinational operations—national commanders retain disciplinary authority and military jurisdiction over their own contingents, see Rowe, Peter J., The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces 225 (2006)Google Scholar.

159 Behrami/Saramati, supra note 156, paras. 133 et seq.

160 Id. para. 149.

161 Cf. Farrior, Stephanie, Introductory Note to Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 46 I.L.M. 743, 744 (2007)Google Scholar.

162 See infra note 164.

163 Council “decisions” are mentioned in Article 13(3) and 23(2) TEU, but, the Treaty provides no definition of such instrument. Denza takes the view that they are “subordinate instruments … [whose] purpose is usually to implement details of common positions or of joint actions … [and which] are also used to amend, extend, or repeal other CFSP instruments” see Denza, Eileen, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union 149–50 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As for their normative scope, Eeckhout concludes that “in so far as Council decisions relate to joint actions and common positions … one should think the legal effects are identical” to those of such instruments, see Eeckhout, supra note 68, at 407-08. See also Dashwood, Alan, The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions, in EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals 53, 58–60 (Cremona, Marise & De Witte, Bruno eds., 2008)Google Scholar.

164 See Eeckhout, supra note 68, at 400. However, the same author also points out that “it is not clear … whether joint actions can have some type of legislative scope, or whether they can have a normative function,” id. Similarly, Dashwood denies joint actions having a normative character, although acknowledging that “they have been used … for certain legislative purposes,” Dashwood, supra note 163, at 54.

165 As Naert notes, “[i]t is remarkable that respect for international humanitarian law is never mentioned, except in the case of the AMIS Supporting Mission via the AU SOMA,” Naert, ESDP in Practice, supra note 43, at 97.

166 See, i.e., Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union-led Forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Sept. 4, 2003), 2003 O.J. (L234) 23; Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the participation of the Kingdom of Morocco in the European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see supra note 77. It should be recalled that in all the military operations undertaken by the EU, personnel have also been contributed by non-EU Member States. Among them, Turkey—which participated in the Concordia, Althea and EUFOR RD CONGO operations—and Morocco—which took part in the Althea operation—are not parties to the two Additional Protocols of 1977.

167 Council Decision No. 2003/222/CFSP of 21 March 2003 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the FYROM on the status of the European Union-led Forces (EUF) in the FYROM, supra note 84. See also Sari, Aurel, Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: the EU's Evolving Practice, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 67 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (providing an exhaustive analysis of the EU's Status of Forces Agreements).

168 Concordia SOFA, supra note 84, art. 9, para. 1.

169 Id. art. 9, para. 2.

170 See, e.g., Article 53 of API and Article 16 of APII (on the protection of cultural objects and places of worship); Article 55 of API (laying down the prohibition to use of methods or means of warfare that are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment).

171 See, e.g., Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chad on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Republic of Chad (Mar. 6, 2008), 2008 O.J. (L 83) 40; Agreement between the European Union and the Central African Republic on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Central African Republic (Apr. 16, 2008), 2008 O.J. (L 136) 46, Article 2 (1).

172 Agreement between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context (Nov. 17, 2003) [hereinafter EU SOFA], 2003 O.J. (C 321) 6, Article 3.

173 See Desgagné, supra note, 15, at 455.

174 Hoffmeister, Frank, The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law, in Developments in EU External Relations Law 37, 100 (Cremona, Marise ed., 2008)Google Scholar.

175 Id. at 51.

176 EU Guidelines on IHL, supra note 137, para. 1.

177 Id. para. 2.

178 Hoffmeister, supra note 174, at 37.

179 See EU Guidelines on IHL, supra note 137, para. 2 (“[t]hese Guidelines … aim to address compliance with IHL by third States, and, as appropriate, non-State actors operating in third States”).

180 Id. para. 15.

181 Id. para. 16(h).

182 Id. (emphasis added V.F.). Arguably, the term sits uncomfortably with the soft-law nature of the Guidelines.

183 (Emphases added V.F.)

184 As is well-known, the principle has found explicit recognition by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 96.

[T]he Court considers that there's an obligation on the United States Government, in terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to “respect” the Conventions and even ‘to ensure respect’ for them ‘in all circumstances’, since such an obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.

Id. para. 220.

185 See ICRC Opinion Paper, Support of the ICRC to the Implementation of the EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, at 1 (Nov. 23, 2006) (on file with author).

186 See Draft Guidelines on Protection of Civilians in EU-Led Crisis Management Operations, Council Doc. No.14805/03 (Nov. 14, 2003).

187 See Generic Standards of Behaviour for the ESDP Operations, Council Secretariat Doc. No. 8373/3/05 REV 3 Annex, (May 18, 2005).

188 See EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict, Council Doc. No. 10019/08 (June 5, 2008).

189 Council Decision No. 2000/354/CFSP of May 22, 2000 setting up Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, 2000 O.J. (L 127) 1.

190 Emphasis added V.F.

191 Emphasis added V.F.

192 According to TEC, supra note 66, art. 207(2): “[t]he Council shall be assisted by a General Secretariat, under the responsibility of a Secretary General, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.”

193 See supra note 187, at 2.

194 Id. para. 4 (“[t]he standards of behaviour are complementary to the legal obligations of personnel. Personnel must apply the provisions of international law, including, when applicable, the law of armed conflict, and the laws of the contributing state”).

195 Generic Standards of Behaviour for the ESDP Operations, supra note 187, at 4-5 (“Predeployment training of personnel, carried out nationally as well as by the EU, should include training and education on prescribed standards of behaviour. Particular attention should be given to international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights issues, gender issues and child rights issues”). Cf., GCIV, art. 144.

196 Generic Standards of Behaviour for the ESDP Operations, supra note 187, para. 6 (“Personnel should report any alleged violations by personnel of human rights and international humanitarian or international criminal law. An investigation of each complaint and where relevant subsequent prosecution should be ensured by the competent authority”). Cf. Articles 49, 50, 129, 146 Common to the Geneva Conventions, as well as in Article 85 of API. Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, ex multis, also construe such a duty as a corollary of the obligation to “ensure respect” for international humanitarian law “in all circumstances” (as laid down in Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions), further arguing that “this obligation … is applicable wherever a State's armed forces might be operating, and not merely in that State's territory,” see de Chazournes, Laurence Boisson & Condorelli, Luigi, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 837 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 67, 67–87Google Scholar.

197 Generic Standards of Behaviour for the ESDP Operations, supra note 187, at 1.

198 Id., at 3 (“[n]ot adhering to the required standards of behaviour is misconduct and may result in disciplinary measures”).

199 See Statement by H. E. Ambassador João Salgueiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations, on behalf of the European Union, United Nations 62nd Session of the General Assembly—Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, New York (Oct.23, 2007) (“In the EU context [the preventive dimension with regard to gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations] includes the development of rules of conduct as the Generic Standards of Behaviour, which are binding on ESDP staff …” (emphasis added V.F.), available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7443_en.htm.

200 See EU Guidelines on Violence against Women and Girls and Combating all Forms of Discrimination against them, Council Doc.16173/08 (Nov.24, 2008); Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP, Council Secretariat Doc. No. 15782/08 (Dec.3, 2008).

201 EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, Council Doc. No. 10056/1/04 REV 1 (June 14-15, 2004).

202 Partial declassification of Doc No.11359/07 Restreint UE of 29 June 2007 on Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into European Security and Defence Policy—Compilation of Relevant Documents (June 29, 2007), 11359/07 EXT 1 (Oct.9, 2007).

203 Council Joint Action No. 2007/369/CFSP of May 30, 2007 on establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGANISTAN), 2007 O.J. (L 139) 33.

204 OPLAN for the EUPOL Afghanistan Police Mission, Council Doc. No. 10132/07, at 185.

205 See, e.g., OPLAN for the ESDP SSR Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Council Doc. No. 9770/07, para. 61; CONOPS for the EUPOL Afghanistan Police Mission, Council Doc. No. 8199/07, para. 145; OPLAN for the EUPOL Afghanistan Police Mission, supra note 204, at 291.

206 See, e.g., Gossiaux, Christian, Les règles d'engagement norme juridique nouvelle?, 40 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 159, 172–173 (2001)Google Scholar (“[l]es règles d'engagement sont des directives générales émanant de l'autorité compétente, destinées à indiquer aux forces armées, qui sont sous l'ordre de cette autorité, le plus précisément possible, dans quelles conditions elles peuvent, dans un conflit, employer toutes formes de violence lors de l'exécution de leur mission”).

207 Despite their non-binding character, however, the role of soft law instruments in the EU legal order should not be underestimated. See, e.g., Beveridge, Fiona & Nott, Sue, A Hard Look at Soft Law, in Lawmaking in the European Union 285–309 (Craig, P. & Harlow, C. eds., 1998)Google Scholar; Snyder, Francis, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Communiiy, in The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noël, 197–225 (Martin, Stephen ed., 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

208 Eeckhout, supra note 68, at 420.

209 See Garbagnati-Ketvel, Maria Gisella, The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 55 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 77, 77–120 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

210 The domain of human rights offers a prime example of such evolutionary interpretation. As Defeis and Tizzano have noted, over the years the ECJ has “discovered” a rich and diversified body of rights even when the founding treaties did not contain any specific provision affecting the human rights of individuals. Such rights include, inter alia, freedom of expression and association, right to manifest one's religion, protection of privacy, respect for family life, the principle of retroactivity of penal provisions, equality and non-discrimination, between men and women, see Defeis, supra note 128, at 1106-114; Tizzano, supra note 150, at 129.

211 TFEU, supra note 136, art. 275(2).

212 See Cremona, Marise, The Union's External Action: Constitutional Perspectives, in Genèse et Destinée de la Constitution Européenne/Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution 1173, 1191 (Amato, Giuliano, Bribosia, Hervé & De Witte, Bruno eds., 2007)Google Scholar (wondering whether the jurisdiction of the ECJ under the Treaty of Lisbon would include, for example, a Council decision authorising an ESDP operation on the ground which may involve “restrictive measures” against individuals, or the activities of a police or border mission).