This is a long-overdue study of the succession of senior officers who served in the crucial role of ‘commander-in-chief’ of forces in Ireland during this period. In total, thirty-six officers of general or field-marshal rank served in this appointment, overseeing all military business during periods of political turmoil and rebellion in Ireland, and also international conflicts that involved Britain and its empire. This volume confirms Ireland's growing military importance during this period as both a location for the recruitment and training of soldiers, and as a logistical hub during a succession of wars from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars up to the outbreak of the First World War. The key decision-making responsibilities throughout these phases rested with the commander-in-chief, who was usually based at the Royal Hospital Kilmainham.
During the course of this volume, Gaynor refers to all of these senior officers and some are better known to us than others. They include significant figures such as the marquis of Cornwallis (commander-in-chief, 1798–1801), General Sir George Brown (1860–65) and Field-Marshal, the Duke of Connaught, the son of Queen Victoria (1900–04). Gaynor dispels some of the myths that have become associated with this office. For example, it has been suggested that Ireland was a military backwater and that those chosen for the role of commander-in-chief here were somehow second rate. However, to take just two examples, Field-Marshals Lord Wolseley (1890–95) and Lord Roberts (1895–1900) were considered among the best senior officers in the British Army during the late nineteenth century. Indeed Wolseley, known for his mental abilities and organisational skill, became a byword for military effectiveness; he was Gilbert & Sullivan's inspiration for the ‘the very model of a modern major-general’ in the Pirates of Penzance. Interestingly, both Roberts and Wolseley had Irish family connections and were seen not only as being competent, but also conciliatory figures during a period of increasing political tension. Both would go on to serve as commander-in-chief of the British Army. Having Irish family connections was, on occasion, sometimes an important qualification for the role. Lt-Gen. Sir Bryan Mahon, from County Galway and the former commander of the 10th (Irish) Division, was seen as a less contentious candidate to take on the appointment in 1916.
This is not a straightforward series of biographical studies, however, and the volume is divided up into a series of chapters on thematic subjects. These include chapters on relations with the civil power, society, culture and trade, and religion, among others. This is an intelligent approach and, by adopting a broader ‘war and society’ methodology, this study offers much to those researching or interested in wider aspects of Irish history during this period. There has been a long-established and general tendency to compartmentalise military history within the wider historical discipline, which entirely misses its importance in the context of wider political, social, and economic activity. Gaynor's book illustrates the extent of the wider connections and emphasises how the considerable level of military activity on the island impacted on all aspects of society, economy and politics. The successive incumbents to the role of commander-in-chief in Ireland, therefore, exercised a level of influence across Irish society that would be totally unfamiliar to us today. Indeed, the modern Irish Defence Forces have effectively no political influence or wider social impact.
The volume raises some interesting questions that are worthy of further research. For example, Gaynor refers to a series of pre-First World War military exercises that were conducted successfully and included the use of aircraft for reconnaissance. The effectiveness of these manoeuvres are in marked contrast to the performance of the British Expeditionary Force in Belgium in 1914 during the opening phase of the First World War. This was a campaign marked by the incredible tenacity and resilience of the common solider but also the less than certain command of Field-Marshal Lord French. This is worth, I would argue, some further consideration — why could pre-war military effectiveness not be transferred to a live operational situation in 1914? There has been much discussion in recent years on the British Army as a learning organisation during the First World War, largely led by the research of Dr Aimée Fox. Ireland as a location for military experimentation, and the role of the commander-in-chief in that process, could well be explored further in this context.
A constant theme for any prospective commander-in-chief in Ireland was the possibility for rebellion and revolution, a point noted by Gaynor and addressed in this book. In the context of United Irishmen, Fenian and Irish Republican Brotherhood activity, some commanders rose to these challenges better than others. The last commander-in-chief of Ireland, General Sir Nevil Macready (1920–22), faced a very modern form of revolutionary war that was ultimately beyond the military resources at his disposal and the level of political backing that he enjoyed.
This is a useful and timely volume. It will be of use to those interested in British military administration in Ireland and also those who wish to understand how this military activity had an impact across Irish society.