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The unification of Sinn Fein in 1917

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 July 2017

Michael Laffan
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Extract

The Easter rising inaugurated a period of violence in Irish history, but its immediate consequence was to spark off a political rather than a military upheaval. The most important development in the next few years was the emergence of a united and organized separatist party which was capable of winning and holding the loyalties of most Irishmen; between 1916 and 1919 the achievements of the Sinn Fein party outweighed in importance those of the Irish Volunteers. This article will examine how the different Sinn Fein elements combined to form a single party, and how they overcame problems which nearly undermined its unity.

For some time before the Volunteers resorted to their protest in arms the nationalist party of John Redmond had been in a state of crisis, and its roots had begun to wither even though few traces of decay were yet visible above ground. Its supporters were dismayed by Carson's successful defiance of the Asquith government and by the postponement of home rule until after the end of the war. The party's extremist rivals were growing in strength and influence, encouraged by Griffith's propaganda and by the formation of the Volunteers. The nationalists had become vulnerable to an onslaught from outside their ranks or to erosion from within. Yet until after the turning-point of May 1916 Redmond still retained the grudging and unenthusiastic support of the great majority of the population.

Type
Research Article
Information
Irish Historical Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 67 , March 1971 , pp. 353 - 379
Copyright
Copyright © Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd 1971

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References

1 Throughout the article the words Sinn Féin are used as a synonym for advanced nationalism or separatism, for the extremist movement in general and for its political wing in particular. This was also the contemporary usage. The terms Griffith's Sinn Féin or the old Sinn Féin refer to the party, founded in 1905, which gave its name to the whole movement but which long remained merely a small section of it. With the expansion and transformation of this party in mid 1917 the two meanings became identified and the need for the distinction disappears. The words nationalists or nationalist party represent the Redmondite Irish party.

2 About 800 of these had been freed by mid-May while other arrests were still being made, and more than half were allowed to return home within a month. Nevertheless, this drastic over-reaction can have had little effect other than to consolidate opinion behind the extremists.

3 T. P. Gill to Robert Donald, 7 May 1916 (copy T. P. Gill papers, N.L.I., MS 13478–526 (1916–19)).

4 P.R.O., CO 904/99–100. Such comments were typical of police reports at this time. Newspapers also confirm that the public hostility towards the rebels was quickly and decisively modified. E.g., on 9 May a leader in the Freeman's Journal complained that ‘ the result on popular sentiment is wholly disastrous. Sympathy is being aroused where nothing but indignant condemnation of their criminal enterprise previously existed.’ Maurice Moore, then a Redmondite and the commander of the National Volunteers, claimed with some exaggeration that ‘ a few unknown men shot in a barrack yard has embittered a whole nation ’ (New Ireland, June 1916, p. 310).

5 Hansard 5, lxxxii, 2311, 25 May 1916.

6 It was over this question of temporary versus permanent exclusion that the final breakdown occurred.

7 P.R.O., CO 904/100–01.

8 E.g., the Irish Citizen Army was suspicious of the Irish Volunteers who in turn were wary of Griffith's Sinn Fein.

9 An article in Griffith's newspaper in August 1909 revealed, among other disconcerting facts, that 45 of these branches had fulfilled none of their obligations for the previous year, that the number of party members who had paid the annual subscription of one shilling was a mere 581, leaving an average of less than six paid-up members per club, and that its membership outside Dublin was largely nominal (Sinn Fein, 28 Aug. 1909. p. 3.).

10 Its indirect influence, through newspapers and propaganda, was considerable, and it is probable that many who were later to oppose Griffith because of his moderation acquired their separatist beliefs from him in the years before 1916.

11 Lawrence Ginnell, the rebellious nationalist M.P. who later joined Sinn Fein, claimed that the nomenclature had been ‘ adopted and applied solely for the purpose of opprobrium ’ (Hansard 5, lxxxii, 966, 11 May 1916).

12 Eoin MacNeill expressed the official attitude when he wrote of the Volunteers ‘ they have never proposed to trespass on the proper sphere of the Irish Party or to put themselves forward as a party organization ’ and ‘ those who are in earnest about Volunteer organization had better keep altogether clear of the electioneering business … party management and Volunteer organization go badly together ’ (Irish Volunteer, 28 Aug. 1915, p. 1, 4 Sept. 1915, p. 2). Not all Volunteers shared these views, but see below, pp 373–4.

13 Only two of them, the Volunteers and Griffith's Sinn Fein, played an important and direct role in the main political events of 1917. Members of the other groups worked through these bodies, or through the I.N.L. or the Liberty League (see below).

14 The Volunteers who had been most prominent in Easter week remained in prison for another six months.

15 The mere fact that these men had not been considered worthy of longer detention lessened their prestige in later years.

16 Of the twenty-one outdoor meetings of the United Irish League noted by the police between May and December 1916 no less than eight were held in Roscommon (P.R.O., CO. 904/21/4). (To counterbalance this, however, the number of arrests after the rising had also been unusually high; Roscommon ranked fifth among the Irish counties, after Dublin, Galway, Wexford and Cork.) The Irish Independent remarked before the election that the nationalists had never been so well organized in the constituency (5 Jan. 1917, p. 3).

17 Two of them were imprisoned while the third, Joseph Mary Plunkett, the signatory of the 1916 proclamation, had been executed.

18 The Volunteers were the most important of these, and there was some justice in the comment of the Irish Times after the result had been announced: ‘Count Plunkett's election is Mr Dillon's reward for the release of the Frongoch prisoners’ (7 Feb. 1917, leader).

19 An independent candidate also contested the seat, but even the Redmondite Roscommon Messenger admitted before the election that he would probably take more votes from Plunkett than from the nationalist candidate (27 Jan., p. 5).

20 After the Roscommon men had taken the initiative in proposing a candidate everyone who was able to do so came along to help; there was no planning or organization as in subsequent elections. The Nation League played an important part simply because it was strongest in nearby Fermanagh and Tyrone.

21 F. J. O'Connor to George Gavan Dully, 7 Mar. 1917 (Gavan Duffy Papers, N.L.I., MS 5581 (hereafter referred to as G.D.P., followed by the number of the letter cited), 94).

22 Its members were Griffith, Plunkett, William O'Brien, Seumas O'Doherty and J. J. O'Kelly (or Sceilg), the editor of the Catholic Bulletin and a leading figure in the I.N.L.

23 Plunkett always spoke first when he addressed gatherings along with other speakers. As late as 21 May 1917, at a public meeting summoned to discuss the conditions of the Irish prisoners in Lewes jail, Plunkett and Brugha, the Volunteer leader, spoke first and second, Milroy and Griffith of the old Sinn Fein, fifth and sixth.

24 Round Table, vii (Mar. 1917), p. 375-

25 Griffith was probably the most important single figure in the Sinn Fein movement, but at this time he was primarily concerned with editing his newspaper Nationality and made no attempt to challenge Plunkett in his role of popular idol. When de Valera was released in June he proved to be a more attractive hero-figure and the count's supporters dwindled away. For the extent of the decline in his position by October, see p. 375.

26 However much the count may have relished his new career, it is most improbable that he had any serious long-term political ambitions.

27 The difference between their approach and that of the count is illustrated by an exchange which took place at the separatist convention in April 1917. Plunkett asked rhetorically of his hearers whether they thought ‘ they would have the young men of Ireland behind them if they were to be hail-fellow-well-met and give authority to [sic] societies that were not committed to the advanced programme ’. Gavan Duffy in reply pleaded that the movement must consider ‘ the views of those who might not be so advanced as he [Count Plunkett]’, that ‘ there were men of middle age to be considered. There were men who hitherto had followed Redmond and had found the humbug of it. But it was not fair to expect them to go the whole hog at once ’ (Freeman's Journal, 20 Apr. 1917, p. 6).

28 Plunkett did not make his decision until he had met other Sinn Fein leaders after the result of the election had been announced, and the Nation Leaguers claimed indignantly that he had been elected under false pretences and had disfranchised his constituents. Gavan Duffy wrote shortly afterwards that his action would seriously handicap any future Sinn Fein candidate (Gavan Duffy to Henry Dixon, 9 Feb. 1917 (copy, G.D.P, 89)).

29 F. J. O'Connor to Gavan Duffy, 4 Apr. 1917 (G.D.P., 115).

30 Gavan Duffy to F. J. O'Connor, 10 Apr. (ibid., 117).

31 Patrick MacCartan to Gavan Duffy, 30 Mar. (ibid., 106).

32 A. J. Nicolls to Gavan Duffy, 14 Apr. (ibid., 125).

33 This was a pamphlet, supposedly from the ‘ Socialist Party of Ireland ’, which listed a number of motions, many of them anti-clerical, which it said were to be proposed at the convention. An example is the quotation from James Larkin which asserted that ‘ to-day the church is as commercial in its organization as any limited company ’ (copy, Plunkett Papers, N.L.I., MS 11,383 (hereafter cited as P.P. followed hy the file number), 4).

34 F. J. O'Connor to Gavan Duffy, 25 Mar. 1917 (G.D.P., 101).

35 A. J. Nicolls to Gavan Duffy, 4 & 11 Apr. (ibid., 114 & 121).

36 Darrell Figgis to Gavan Duffy, 1 Apr. (G.D.P., 113). Some of the Nation League verdicts on the count are carping and petulant but it was not only they and Griffith who deplored his behaviour. County police inspectors’ reports indicated that embarrassment was felt at the local level as well; his grandiose statements led to no positive plans or results, he was all bark and no bite.

37 This is referred to in several letters in G.D.P. Frank O'Connor (The Big Fellow (Dublin, 1937), p. 58) and G. A. Lyons (Forum, vi, no. 2 (Feb. 1950), p. 8) assert this of Collins in particular.

38 F. J. O'Connor wrote of him to Gavan Duffy on 4 April that the I.N.L. council ‘ would have been extremely glad to have had him present at the meeting … but Griffith told me afterwards that he would not have come. I suppose he is anxious to avoid doing anything that might appear to compromise him ’ (G.D.P., 115).

39 E.g., one account ran ‘ in spite of the many calls Ireland makes upon his time the count has kindly reserved next Sunday for the Gaelic League ’ (31 Mar. 1917, p. 6). The Griffithite Irishman referred to him as ‘ the new leader of the Irish race ’ (31 Mar. 1917, p. 1).

40 O'Connor to Gavan Duffy, 7 Mar. 1917 (G.D.P., 94).

41 An I.N.L. resolution, reported in Irish Independent, 10 Mar., p. 2.

42 Sean T. O'Kelly commented ‘ I am told some wiser heads did their level best to dissuade him from circulating it ’ (to Gavan Duffy, 27 Mar. (G.D.P., 103)), and Fr Curran, secretary to the archbishop of Dublin, remarked that ‘ the sooner some of Sinn Fein or Nation League get a colleague for Plunkett the better … he is proving an awkward figure-head ’ (to Gavan Duffy, 25 Mar. (copy, ibid., 100)). But he was far too prominent to be discarded, and however tactless and incompetent he proved to be the Sinn Feiners still had to live with him; though Sceilg was exaggerating when he complained that ‘ the count being the best man we were able to put up we cannot think of turning him down now without the certainty of the new movement being practically stillborn ’ (to Gavan Duffy, 30 Mar. (G.D.P., 105)).

43 The count even sent out a circular, headed ‘ Dear Rev. Sir ’ and with a stamped signature at the end, which concluded: ‘ I should be very glad if you would take part in the assembly at the Mansion House, and you would do a great service to the cause if you would ask your fellow priests of independent opinion to join us ’ (P.P., 3).

44 Thomas Dillon, Arthur Griffith and the re-organization of Sinn Fein, igiy (unpublished typescript article, Sept. 1953 (T.G.D., Misc. box IX)). The result of this doorway canvassing was that, quite, unwittingly, he gave the old Sinn Fein a strong representation on the platform; he did not even recognize Sean Milroy, Griffith's chief assistant and a well-known orator.

45 Gavan Duffy to Griffith, 30 Mar. 1917 (copy, G.D.P., 107).

46 Apart from all his other ideas and actions, the count demonstrated his lack of political commonsense by his willingness to abandon the name Sinn Féin when it was being used as a blanket term to describe all advanced nationalists, including the Plunkettites themselves.

47 Plunkett had adumbrated this idea some time before. On 7 March O'Connor mentioned that the count ‘ wants to start a new organisation ’, adding for good measure, ‘ he seems to want to be the leader of this new movement ’ (to Gavan Duffy (G.D.P., 94)).

48 Freeman's Journal, 20 Apr. 1917, p. 6. In this speech Griffith obviously used the words Sinn Féin in reference to his own party, and not the movement as a whole.

49 The meeting was haunted by this fear, and its mood i-s summed up by a piece of paper which was handed to the chairman. It read, in Irish, ‘ Michael, it is said there is a “split” between the organizers of the convention and Arthur Griffith. I heard it from two priests. Would it not be better to ask Griffith to take a place on the platform? … In the name of Ireland don't let there be a split ’ (P.P., 3). Griffith was invited to the platform, but that did not avert a bitter and nearly disastrous quarrel.

50 It was fairly evenly divided between the two elements. Its members were the count and his wife, Cathal Brugha and Fr O'Flanagan on one side, Griffith, Milroy, Tom Kelly of the old Sinn Fein and Stephen O'Mara of the I.N.L. on the other. William O'Brien, the trade unionist, was in between, but inclined more towards Plunkett.

51 Nationality described the assembly as ‘ the most important held in Ireland since November, 1905, when Sinn Fein was established ’ (28 Apr. 1917, p. 5).

52 Irishman, 5 May 1917, p. I. Over half of these clubs were from Dublin.

53 Nationality, 28 Apr., p. 5.

54 P.R.O., GO 904/103. British intelligence was poor, and these figures are almost certainly wrong in detail, but they give nevertheless a revealing indication of the spread of Sinn Fein.

55 Dr Thomas Dillon's speech at the Sinn Fein October convention. This is probably not exaggerated—provincial newspaper accounts of Sinn Fein clubs' activities indicate that the average membership of a branch was about 300,

55a Some, though not many, of the clubs were dead or dormant branches of the old Sinn Fein party, which acquired a new life in the more favourable conditions of 1917.

56 Fr D. Riordan (Abbeyfeale), 1 June 1917 (P.P., 11). Later the extremist Irish Nation wrote of Sinn Fein ‘its exponents are making headway in the country because they are supposed to stand for the principles of the men who died at Easter, otherwise they would not win a solitary constituency. This is the real Sinn Fein, the Hungarian policy is merely a parody ’ (20 Oct. I9I7, p. 1).

57 Nearly a third of the extensive Liberty League correspondence (in P.P.) deals with these two counties.

58 Seamus Breathnach (Kinsale) to Plunkett, n.d. (P.P., 6).

59 J. L. Conaughton (Limerick) to Plunkett, 18 May 1917 (P.P., 11).

60 D. Collins (Newcastle West) to Plunkett, 12 May (P.P. 11).

61 Piaras Mac Cana (Cashel) to Plunkett, 25 May (P.P., 12).

62 E. O'Connor (Tralee) to Plunkett, i June (P.P., 9).

63 E. Comerford (Kilkenny) to Plunkett, 1 June (P.P., 10).

64 2 June 1917 (ibid., 6). This letter enclosed a copy of a resolution passed by the club on 22 April and sent to Griffith and Plunkett. This urged the Mansion House Committee to regard itself as a provisional executive and ‘ to consider that it is not societies, leagues, associations or organizations Ireland now wants so much as a national directing and governing body. Such a body we believe can now be more easily provided than, perhaps, at any previous time since the days of Grattan's parliament,’

65 30 May 1917 (P.P., 6).

66 At the beginning of June the R.I.C. inspector thought it was ‘ not improbable that the movement may divide into two sections, a revolutionary party under the leadership of Count Plunkett, and another and perhaps more numerous party … who will try to achieve their aims by more passive measures’ (P.R.O., CO. 904/103). It is revealing of the quality of British intelligence that this remark was made nearly a week after the two sections had joined forces and the main likelihood of a split disappeared.

67 MacCartan, Patrick, With De Valera in America (Dublin, 1932), p. 3 Google Scholar.

68 Thomas Dillon, University Rev., iii, no. 8, p. 83, and Capuchin Annual, 1967, pp 395–6. These accounts do not necessarily conflict as Plunkett may have decided privately to abandon his clubs before agreeing to it publicly. The only contemporary reference to the negotiations is a letter to the Irish Independent in which Plunkett wrote that ‘ the workers at the head of the advanced movement are at this moment considering the means of welding the strong national bodies into one organization, with one administration ’ (4 June 1917, p. 2).

69 Thomas Dillon to A. J. Nicolls, 10 June 1917 (G.D.P., 161).

70 The count still continued along his flamboyant path. He addressed a proclaimed meeting on 10 June, and the scuffle which followed his subsequent detention resulted in the death of the only government official to be killed in Ireland between April 1916 and January 1919.

71 Beaslai, Piaras, Michael Collins and Ids making of the new Ireland (Dublin, 1926), i, 152 Google Scholar; Tomás Ó Néill and Pádraig Ó Fiannachta, De Valera (Dublin, 1968), i, 79–80).

72 Although at this time the issue of republicanism did provide a real and significant division between ‘ moderates ’ and ‘ extremists ’, once again the distinction refers more to attitudes and personalities than to policies.

73 The Volunteers were absorbed into the party without much difficulty. Each side had a beneficial influence on the other; the Volunteers provided leadership and discipline, but they acquired their tactics and many of their ideas from the party. William O'Brien (of the All-For-Ireland League) wrote somewhat later to T. M. Healy that ‘ de Valera is a personally charming as well as honest man, but he is too good for this rough world of old parliamentary hands ’ (2 May 1918 (copy, William O'Brien papers, N.L.I., MS 8556/19)).

74 On 21 July Griffith wrote in a leader in Nationality : ‘ in choosing Éamonn [sic] de Valera as its representative, cast Clare lias not only chosen a true and gallant Irishman—it has chosen a man with the mind and capacity that Ireland will need at the peace conference—the mind and capacity of the statesman ’.

75 Sean Ó Lúing, Art Ó Griofa (Dublin, 1953), pp 294–5; Pádraig Ó Caoirahj evidence given in the Sinn Fein Funds case, 29 Apr. 1948, afternoon session (P.R.O.L, 2B, 82, 118(40), p. 20). As before Plunkett's convention in April, the British authorities expected a split within the Sinn Fein ranks.

76 In the contest for the two offices of vice-president Griffith and Fr O'Flanagan were elected with 1,197 a nd 780 votes respectively, while Plunkett received only 386 votes. Already his influence had all but vanished.

77 While the evidence concerning Griffith's own views is conflicting, most accounts agree that he was a monarchist and that he felt that a royal family provided an element of stability absent from republics. But he never propagated such views after 1916.

78 One extremist admitted much later that at least in 1917 ‘the republic’ was a battle cry, not a definite programme (Eoin Ó Caoimh, evidence given in the Sinn Fein funds case, 7 May 1948, afternoon session (P.R.O.I., 2B, 8a, 118(42), p. 72). In September the army intelligence officer for the midlands and Connaught reported, probably with some justification, that the people sought a republic as an ideal, but would be satisfied with a generous home rule act (P.R.O., CO 904/157/1).

79 The I.R.B. and the igi6 insurrection (Cork, 1957), pp 33–4

80 Thomas Dillon, University Rev., iii, 8, p . 84.

81 In a speech in Rathfarnham a month before the convention de Valera outlined a policy almost identical with that which reconciled both sections to the new constitution. Saying that in order to avoid misinterpretation of their objectives ‘ they would have to proclaim themselves as Irish republicans—words that would be understood in America, Russia and France as no others could be ’, he went on ‘ once freedom was attained the Irish people could choose a monarchy or republic ’ (Irish Independent, 24 Sept. 1917, p . 2 ) .

82 At the end of the agenda for the convention a notice read: ‘ it may be well to explain for the guidance of delegates that resolutions proposed by the executive are all resolutions that the executive, after the fullest deliberation, have agreed to unanimously’. The party's new constitution and scheme of organization were accepted by the convention without much difficulty.

83 In early 1918 the parliamentary party won three by-elections in a row—though under exceptionally favourable circumstances—and the British authorities arrested almost all the Sinn Fein leaders and deported them once more to England. But this counter-attack had come too late.

84 Round Table, vii (Mar. 1917), p. 374. F. J. O'Connor echoed this a month later when he wrote ‘ there is no national party, no leader, or leaders, no settled programme …’ (to Gavan Duffy, 4 Apr. (G.D.P., 115)).

85 Other groups still survived, among them the Irish-American Alliance, Cumann na mBan and the Irish Citizens' Army, but they were in effect merely adjuncts of one or other of the major sections.