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The Irish railway strike of 1920: industrial action and civil resistance in the struggle for independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 July 2017

Charles Townshend
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Extract

There must still be room for argument over whether Ireland's ‘war of independence’ was a spontaneous movement of the mass of the people, as Republicans hold, or whether, as the British government liked to suggest, it was essentially the work of a handful of fanatical terrorists. In attempting to resolve this argument, considerable weight must be placed on instances of what would now be called civil resistance—where the government is opposed by ordinary members of the public. Foremost amongst these are politically-motivated industrial actions. It is a curious feature of Irish historiography that very little attention has in fact been paid to the industrial actions which occurred during the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1916-1921, most notably the embargo on the transportation of government forces and munitions implemented by Irish railway workers between May and December 1920.

Type
Research Article
Information
Irish Historical Studies , Volume 21 , Issue 83 , March 1979 , pp. 265 - 282
Copyright
Copyright © Irish Historical Studies Publications Ltd 1979

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References

1 See, e.g., Greaves, C. D., Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution (London, 1971), p. 190.Google Scholar The classic account by Clarkson, J. D., Labour and Irish Nationalism (New York, 1925)Google Scholar is sketchy in this area; Arthur Mitchell's recent Labour in Irish Politics (Dublin, 1974), allocates two pages to the railwaymen's action and is not clear about its effects.

2 Macardle, D., The Irish Republic 1911-1925 (London, 1937)Google Scholar.

3 William O'Brien papers, National Library of Ireland (NLI) MS 13972. Wherein this uniqueness consisted he did not specify.

4 Pace Mitchell, Labour in Irish Politics, 117-122.

5 Of the three major Irish daily newspapers, the Freeman's Journal and the Irish Independent were strongly nationalist; the Irish Times was more official and conservative in tone. Of the provincial papers the Cork Examiner was particularly impressive.

6 Freeman's Journal, 21, 22 May 1920.

7 Irish Times, Freeman's Journal, 24 May 1920.

8 Irish Times, 27 May 1920; ‘I.O.’ (CJ.C. Street), The Administration of Ireland 1920 (London, 1921), p. 90.

9 Irish Times, 31 May, 7 June 1920.

10 Irish Labour Party and Trades Union Congress, Annual Report (henceforth ILP/TUC Report), 1921. Appendix: ‘Munitions of War’, Report of the Special Conference held at the Mansion House, Dublin, 16 November 1920, pp 50, 52, 54.

11 Westminster Gazette, 29 May 1920. For Polish embargo see Macfarlane, L. J., ‘Hands off Russia. British Labour and the Russo-Polish War, 1920’, Past and Present No. 38, 1967 Google Scholar.

12 Reported in Irish Times, .1, 5 June 1920. Thomas appears to have been trying to treat the embargo as an ordinary strike.

13 Home Office, Reports on Revolutionary Organisations in the U.K., No. 60, 24 June, and No. 64, 15 July 1920. Cabinet papers, Public Record Office (PRO), CAB. 24 /107, 109.

14 Advertisement in Irish Independent, 3 June 1920.

15 Freeman's Journal, 10 June 1920.

16 Statement reported in Irish Times, 28 May 1920.

17 ILP/TUC Report, 1921. Appendix: ‘Munitions of War Fund’, Auditor's Report, 5 May 1921, pp 67-71.

18 Irish Times, 28 June 1920.

19 ILP/TUC Report, 1921, p. 7; General Staff, 5th Division, History of the 5th Division in Ireland 1919-1922, typescript in Jeudwine papers, Imperial War Museum (IWM), 72/82/2.

20 E. g., on 17 July, men of the Cork, Bandon and South Coast Railway refused to take more than 20 unarmed troops of the Essex Regiment; on 17 August a driver at Waterford (Dublin and South Eastern Railway) refused to take more than 25 out of a leave party of 120 men of the Devonshire Regiment. Telegrams, Major R. T. to Q,. (Chief Secretary's Office), Colonial Office papers, PRO, C.O.904/157.

21 ILP/TUC Report, 1921, p. 10.

22 Commander-in-Chief's Conference, GHQ,, Dublin 4 July 1920. Note in Dublin District War Diary, War Office papers, PRO W.O. 35/ 90 (I).

23 Sylvain Briollay (pseudonym of Roger Chauviré), L'Irlande insurgée, translated as Ireland in Rebellion (Dublin, 1922), pp 67-8.

24 Irish Times, Freeman's Journal, Irish Independent, 16 July 1920.

25 Daily Graphic, 23 June 1920.

26 GOC 5th Division to G.O.C.-in-C Ireland, 23 July 1920. Jeudwine papers, IWM 72/82/2. Cf. ‘Summary of Ordnance Services in Dublin District and 5th Division Areas 1919-1921’, W.O.35/182 (I) / I.

27 General Staff, Irish Command, Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21, i, 16. IWM 72/82/2; Townshend, Charles, The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921 (Oxford, 1975), pp 57, 107Google Scholar.

28 Announcement, Irish Independent, 29 July; countermand, Irish Times, 2 August; Chief Secretary for Ireland, Weekly Survey, 4 August 1920. Cabinet S.I.C.25, CAB. 27/108.

29 Irish Times, 28 May 1920 (referring to Leinster and North Western Railway).

30 Staff Capt. 6th Division to Brigades, 12 July 1920: (captured document in Michael Collins papers, NLI Pos. 918). This order concerned hold-ups anticipated from the provision of escorts for military stores; the same policy had been in effect since May as far as parties of armed troops and police were concerned.

31 Note by Walter Long, 16 July 1920. C.P.1636, CAB.24/109.

32 Memorandum by Sir Hamar Greenwood, 20 July 1920. C.P.1657, CAB.24/109.

33 Memorandum by Sir Hardman Lever (Treasury), 22 July. C.P. 1671, CAB.24/109. Cf. Cabinet, 14 October 1920. C.55(20).7, CAB. 23/23.

34 This point ought, one would think, to have been obvious. The ‘sitting-tight’ policy was to say the least an odd way of employing valuable armed forces.

35 Cabinet, 26 July 1920. Jones, T., Whitehall Diary (ed. Middlemas, K.) (London, 1971), iii, 32–3Google Scholar.

36 Cabinet Conclusion, C.51(20) App.IV, CAB.23/22.

37 History of the 5th Division, p. 51.

38 The peak figure of stoppages recorded by the military authorities in the second week of July (21) was not reached again until the week ending 23 October. GOC-inC Ireland, Weekly Situation Reports, Cabinet S.I.C. papers, CAB.27/108.

39 History of the 5th Division, p. 51.

40 Cabinet, II August 1920. C.47(20), CAB.23/22.

41 Memorandum by Sir Hamar Greenwood, 25 September 1920. C.P.1891, CAB.24/111.

42 Cabinet, 14 October 1920. C.55(20).7. CAB.23/23.

43 Sturgis diary, II October 1920. PRO 30 59/1. For remarks on Sturgis, see Townshend, , British Campaign in Ireland, p. 80 Google Scholar. Here, as so often, Sturgis takes the common-sense view which must strike a sympathetic chord with later users of government records.

44 Irish Independent, 4 November; Freeman's Journal, 15, 16 November 1920.

45 Sturgis diary, 18, 22 October 1920. PRO 30 59/2.

46 Street, , Administration of Ireland, p.249 Google Scholar. The documentary basis of this work is, I think, unchallengeable; it is the interpretation which has to be disputed.

47 Ibid, pp 249-250. This production was widely disseminated by British publicity in Europe and America.

48 Memorandum by Sir Hamar Greenwood, 20 July 1920. C.P.1657, CAB.24/109. The ILP/TUC admitted that GNR strikers acted ‘in opposition to the sentiment of the majority of their fellow-workers in the employment of that Company’. Annual Report 1921, p. 12.

49 ILP/TUC Report 1821, p. 7.

50 The figures for stoppages in October and November were: Great Southern and Western Railway—35, 92: Dublin and South-Eastern Railway—12, 25: Midland Great Western Railway—20, 54: Great Northern Railway—1, 1. Maj. R.T. to Q,., C.O.904/157. (These figures are somewhat smaller than military records suggest, but there is a disparity in the classification of incidents. The regional variations are consistent).

51 Irish Independent, 15 July ; Maj. R . T . to Q,., 21 July 1920, C.O . 904/157. The title Irish Republican Army (IRA) was adopted informally by many Volunteers in 1919-20; the two titles are here used interchangeably.

52 Cavan Brigade, Irish Volunteers: History of the Anglo-Irish Conflict, Michael Collins papers A/0453, NLI Pos.915.

53 Ibid. The three were sentenced to ten years' penal servitude.

54 Mitchell, , Labour in Irish Politics, p. 121 Google Scholar, frankly accepts t h e role of IRA intimidation in ‘dealing with’ blacklegs.

55 The weekly totals recorded by the army range from 18 (week ending 16 October) through 34 (6 November) to 84 (20 November), falling to 14 (11 December), 7 (18 December), 2 (25 December) and 0 (1 January 1921). GOC-in-C Weekly Situation Reports, CAB.27/108.

56 Sturgis' diary, 9, 11 November 1920. PRO 30 59/2.

57 ILP/TUG Report, 1921. Appendix: Report of Mansion House Conference, p. 54.

58 Ibid., pp 55, 56, 59.

59 Ibid., p. 53.

60 Irish Times report, 17 November 1920.

61 Freeman's Journal, 17 November 1920.

62 At the Mansion House meeting, the remark of an Engineers' representative, that ‘if the time had arrived that the railwaymen should surrender the National Executive would be the first to tell them to do so’ was greeted with cries of ‘hear, hear’. ILP/TUC Report, 1921, p. 62.

63 Sturgis diary, 9 December 1920. PRO 30 59/3.

64 ILP/TUC Report, 1921, p. 9.

65 Street, , Administration of Ireland, p. 267 Google Scholar.

66 Sturgis diary, 18 December 1920. PRO 30/59/3.

67 ILP/TUC Report, 1921, p. 12.

68 Memorandum by Sir Hamar Greenwood, 25 September 1920. C.P.1981, CAB.24/111.

69 SirMacready, Nevil, Annals of an active life (London, 1924), ii, 472 Google Scholar.

70 The embargo was then, as has been said (note 55 above), at its height, though its intensity fell away markedly after Bloody Sunday. The British position in terms of motor transport was of course improving continually, though this was more effective in towns than in the countryside, where roads were ofter poor—and increasingly tended to be dug up or blocked by the IRA.

71 ILP/TUC Report, 1921: Report of Mansion House Conference, p. 61.