More than any other Factor, The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 and its aftermath have contributed to the growth of the Iranian diaspora population worldwide. The revolution precipitated the exodus of Iranian exiles or political refugees, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran further discouraged the return of many Iranians already abroad. As a result, by about 1990, 637,500 Iranians were enumerated in official national censuses of the following ten countries on four continents: U.S., Canada, West Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, Israel, and Japan.

With an Iranian population—defined as persons either born in Iran or of Iranian ancestry—of 285,000 in 1990, the U.S. contained nearly half (45%) of the Iranians living in the above-mentioned Western and Asian countries. This overwhelming concentration, an availability of good data on immigrants (including Iranians), and a number of Iranian students who have become social scientists in the U.S., have encouraged research on this group.

In 1990, The U.S. Census Reported that 226,123 Iranian immigrants were living in the U.S., a growth of slightly under 100,000 in a tenyear period. These were individuals who either were born in Iran, or were of Iranian ancestry but born outside Iran in a country other than the U.S. The almost doubling of this population over a short period of time, combined with the group's variety of socioeconomic backgrounds, has created some of the most diverse ethnic geographies in the U.S.

Traditionally, academic theories have focused on issues regarding chain migration, port of entry, the assimilation process, ethnic economy, and labor market participation to explain the geographic distribution of various ethnic groups and their shifts over time.

All Cultures are Located in Place and Time. Exile culture is located at the intersection and in the interstices of other cultures. Physically placed outside its original homeland, it is mentally and emotionally both here and there, and, as a result, it is both local and global. Exile culture is not just physically, mentally, and emotionally [dis]located; it is also discursively and sociopolitically situated in a foreign land. Exile discourse, therefore, must be able to deal not only with the problem of location but also with the continuing problematic of multiple locations. Traditionally, mass media are considered as homogenizing agents that inculcate the dominant values. One of the key themes of my work in recent years, however, has been to describe and theorize about the manner in which these very media may also serve the opposite purpose by consolidating alternative values–which may be driven by differences in ethnicity, race, gender, class, nationality, religion, or politics.

As in Many other Countries Around the World, A Gender based double standard (one set of social and moral norms governing the male and another governing the female) has always existed in Iran. In modern Iran, prior to the 1978-79 revolution, the traditional Iranian family was patriarchal and patrilineal. From early childhood, members of each gender were initiated into their respective roles and were socialized to a double standard of sexual morality. For instance, women who sought and experienced the same privileges of sexual freedom as men were not respected, but rather became victims of social ostracism. Women suffered from many social disadvantages, and their position, in most cases, was far from equal to men's.

Because pre-revolutionary Iran was a traditional society, the issues of dating and intimate relationships, especially for young women, were sensitive. Some of the sharpest contrasts between Western values and traditional Iranian values existed in these areas.

For Second-Generation Iranians in the Untied States the question of identity is not as easily settled as it is for their parents. Their parents claim they are genuine Iranians because they were born and raised in Iran, they relate to Iranian culture more than to American culture, they were active members of the Iranian society for decades, they might still have immediate family members in Iran, and they still hope to go back there someday. Are second-generation Iranian youths able to make these claims? Do they think of themselves as Iranians? Apart from the fact that some were born in Iran, might still know the Persian language, and are familiar with some aspects of Iranian culture, what else about these young people makes them distinctly Iranian?

Sociological studies of immigrants indicate that the first generation's pattern of adaptation is quite different from that of the second and third.'