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The Limits of Turkish–Iranian Cooperation, 1974–80

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Barın Kayaoğlu
Barın Kayaoğlu*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Abstract

Why did Turkey and Iran fail to become close partners in the 1970s even though they had compelling reasons to do so? This article argues that mutual distrust between Turkish and Iranian leaders, domestic turmoil in the two countries, and diverging geostrategic priorities undermined Ankara and Tehran's efforts to deepen their relations. While the shah of Iran saw his country as the policeman of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, successive governments in Turkey continued to look west for their security. As economic and political turmoil engulfed the two countries, leading to a revolution in Iran in 1979 and a coup in Turkey in 1980, Iranian and Turkish leaders could not forge a lasting partnership.

Type
Research Article
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 3: Iran and the Cold War , May 2014 , pp. 463 - 478
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2014

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Footnotes

Barın Kayaoğlu would like to thank the Gerald Ford Presidential Foundation and the Lynne and Harry Bradley Foundation for their generous grants that made the research for this article possible. He would also like to thank the archivists at the Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries for their assistance. Finally, he is indebted to Roham Alvandi, Malcolm Byrne, Jim Goode, John Limbert, and Iranian Studies' two anonymous referees for their comments on previous drafts of this article.

References

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11 The shah made that promise in Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, 173. By “Great Civilization,” the shah meant for Iran to become one of the top five industrial powers in the world by 2000. He explains this idea in his book, Besouye Tamaddon-e Bozorg [Towards the great civilization] (Tehran, 1356/1977), 248–345.

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13 There were only 1.8 million residential dwellings for approximately 2.6 million urban households in 1973. Figure from Amuzegar, Jahangir, Iran: An Economic Profile (Washington, DC, 1977), 106Google Scholar.

14 Compared to Turkey's 60 percent, Iran's literacy rate hovered around 40 percent in the mid-1970s. While Turkey boasted one physician per 1,773 people, Iran had one physician for 2,615 people. Average life expectancy was 52 in Iran but 60 in Turkey by 1975. The transition to a single-party regime worsened public discontent. These statistics come from Ladjevardi, Habib, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran (Syracuse, NY, 1985), 246Google Scholar; Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ, 1982), 427Google Scholar; Alam, Asadollah, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969–1977, ed. Alikhani, Alinaghi (New York, 1992), 21Google Scholar.

15 The London–Zurich Accords of 1959 had established Britain, Greece, and Turkey as Cyprus's “guarantor” powers. Ankara interpreted its status as a guarantor of Cyprus's independence to carry out the military operation.

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20 Helms to Washington, July 22 and 25, 1974, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–76, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59), Access to Archival Databases (AAD), [electronic document], National Archives and Record Administration (NARA). The shah's “disapproval” was mentioned in Helms to Washington, September 15, 1974, Box 14, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia (hereafter Presidential Country Files), Gerald R. Ford Library (hereafter Ford Library).

21 Helms to Washington, September 15, 1974, Box 14, Presidential Country Files, Ford Library; Asadollah Alam, Yaddashtaha-ye Alam: Virastar Alinaghi Alikhani [The Alam diaries: Editor Alinaghi Alikhani] (Tehran, 1387/2008), 4: 294. The passage appears in English in Alam, The Shah and I, 397.

22 Figure quoted by the shah in Alam, Yaddashtaha-ye Alam, 6: 346; and Alam, The Shah and I, 525.

23 Correspondence and discussions relating to these projects are available in Boxes 41–3, US National Security Council Institutional Files, 1974–77, Ford Library.

24 On Iran's policy toward the Dhofar rebellion, see the article by James Goode in this issue of Iranian Studies. According to one US government report, Iran had a brigade of 3,000 soldiers as well as transport aircraft, helicopters, and fighter-jets in Oman. See “Background Paper: The Dhofar Rebellion,” January 9, 1974, Box 14, Presidential Country Files, Ford Library.

25 Alam, The Shah and I, 374, 468–9.

26 Ibid., 465, 477.

27 Memoranda of Conversation, May 15 and 16, 1975, Box 11, Nat. Sec. Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library.

28 Kissinger informed Ford on April 18 that “Iran is now supplying spares to the Turkish Air Force.” See Memorandum of Conversation, April 18, 1975, Box 11, National Security Advisor—Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–77 (hereafter Nat. Sec. Adv.—Memcons), Ford Library.

29 Memoranda of Conversation, May 15 and 16, 1975, Box 11, Nat. Sec. Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library.

30 Quoted in Oakley to Scowcroft, May 16, 1975, Box 12, Presidential Country Files, Ford Library.

31 Birand, Diyet, 127–36.

32 Memorandum of Conversation, July 10, 1975, Box 12, Nat. Sec. Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library.

33 Kissinger to Helms, July 5, 1975, Box 13, Presidential Country Files, Ford Library.

34 There are two numbers regarding closed US bases: “Kapalı 31 Amerikan üssü kararı bekliyor” [31 closed American bases await decision], Hürriyet, April 8, 1978. Another source cites 25 US bases that operated in Turkey outside the NATO framework: Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 165.

35 Quoted in Birand, Diyet, 113.

36 Alam, The Shah and I, 552.

37 Memorandum of Conversation, May 5, 1975, Box 11, Nat. Sec. Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library; Memorandum of Conversation, August 3, 1976, Box 20, Nat. Sec. Adv.—Memcons, Ford Library.

38 “Interview with Paul F. Gardner, Mutual Security Affairs Counselor, Turkey (1974–1976),” in American Diplomats in Turkey. Oral History Transcripts (1928–1997), ed. Rıfat N. Bali (İstanbul, 2011), 2: 886.

39 “Türkiye–İran ortak silah ve savunma sanayii kurulacak” [Turkey–Iran joint arms and defense industry to be established], Hürriyet, June 7, 1975; Altan Öymen, “Türkiye ile İran, Ortak Silah Endüstrisi Kurmak İçin İlke Olarak Anlaştılar” [Turkey and Iran agree in principle to establish joint arms ındustry], Cumhuriyet, June 7, 1975.

40 “İran Usulü” [Iranian style] Hürriyet, January 10, 1976.

41 With $1 equaling TL15 in 1975 and TL16.5 in 1976, 40 kuruş was about 2.5 cents.

42 “TIR'lamak” [Getting TRUCKed], Hürriyet, June 20, 1976; “TIR rezaleti” [Truck scandal], Hürriyet, October 12, 1976.

43 While Iran's trade with the Common Market, the United States, and Japan was worth billions of dollars in 1974, its combined trade with Turkey and Pakistan was less than $85 million that year. See Tables 12 and 13 in Ganji, Manuochehr and Milani, Abbas, “Iran: Developments During the Last 50 Years,” in Iran: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Jacqz, Jane W. (New York, 1976), 51–2Google Scholar.

44 Yener Süsoy, “Rıza Pehlevi, aklını Türkiye ile bozmuştu” [Reza Pahlavi was obsessed with Turkey], Hürriyet, April 20, 2004.

45 Alam, The Shah and I, 552.

46 Works that waxed poetic about the Shah are Lenczowski, George, ed., Iran Under the Pahlavis (Stanford, CA, 1978)Google Scholar; Sanghvi, Ramesh, The Shah of Iran (New York, 1969)Google Scholar; Bayne, E.A., Persian Kingship in Transition (New York, 1968)Google Scholar. A similar flattering account in Turkish is Akkan Suver, İran Mucizesi: Şehinşah Aryamehr [The Iranian miracle: Shahanshah Aryamehr] (İstanbul, 1975). Sanghvi's The Shah of Iran was also translated into Turkish as Rameş Sanghvi, Aryamehr: İran Şahı. Siyasi Bir Biyografi [Aryamehr: the shah of Iran. A political biography] (İstanbul, 1971).

47 “İran 150 milyar liralık modern silah aldı” [Iran bought 150 billion liras' worth of arms], Hürriyet, January 8, 1976.

48 Tülümen, İran Devrimi Hatıraları, 7–8; Bleda, Maskeli Balo, 97–147. “İran Atom Çağına Geçiyor” [Iran moving into the atomic age], Hürriyet, January 13, 1975; “Şah CIA'ya Para Veriyor!” [The shah is giving money to the CIA!], Hürriyet, January 21, 1975; “İran, Umman Sultanlığına Göz Dikti” [Iran has set its eyes on the sultanate of Oman], Hürriyet, February 1, 1975; “İran, Türkiye'ye Para Akıtmaya Hazır” [Iran ready to pour money into Turkey] and “Şah, Ortadoğu Liderliği Yolunda” [Shah on the way to become leader of the Middle East], Hürriyet, March 10, 1975.

49 İlhan Selçuk, “Çağdaşlaşma” [Modernization], Cumhuriyet, February 24, 1974; Altan Öymen, “Petrolcüler Meydan mı Okuyor?” [Are oil producers in defiance?], Cumhuriyet, June 3, 1974; İlhan Selçuk, Sovyetler–İran–Amerika İzlenimleri [Soviet–İran–America observations] (İstanbul, 1976), 13.

50 İran Halkının Fedaileri [People's Fedayin of Iran], İran'da Silahlı Propaganda [Armed propaganda in Iran] (İstanbul, 1976); Djazani, Bijan, İran'da Silahlı Mücadele: Kitlelerin Devrim Yoluna Çekilmesi [Armed struggle in Iran: drawing the masses to the way of the revolution] (İstanbul, 1978)Google Scholar.

51 “Tehran, Iran Toasts of the President and the Shah at a State Dinner,” The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7080.

52 “MİT, SAVAK'la ilişkiyi kesti” [MİT ends relations with SAVAK], Hürriyet, June 11, 1978; “İran 400 yıllık barışı bozmak istiyor” [Iran wants to disrupt 400 years of peace], and Oktay Ekşi, “SAVAK'a selam!” [Salutations to SAVAK!], Hürriyet, June 12, 1978; “KAWA'yı SAVAK kurdu” [SAVAK founded KAWA] Hürriyet, June 13, 1978; “KAWA'ya silah getiren TIR yakalandı” [Truck bringing weapons to KAWA caught], Hürriyet, June 15, 1978.

53 Oktay Ekşi, “Demokrasinin Nimeti” [The blessing of democracy], Hürriyet, November 19, 1978.

54 Metin Toker, “Şah tahtından feragat etmeyi de düşünüyor” [Shah also considering abdication], Hürriyet, December 2, 1978; Tülümen, İran Devrimi Hatıraları, 36.

55 Zaring to Henze, “Memorandum on Turkey,” December 22, 1978, Electronic Declassification Project, NLC-18-7-9-2-4, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (hereafter Carter Library).

56 Underlines from original document: Larrabee to Brzezinski, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey and Greece,” December 3, 1979, Electronic Declassification Project, NLC-17-131-9-1-8, Carter Library.

57 Carter to Vice President et al., “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” [undated], Electronic Declassification Project, NLC-17-141-8-2-7, Carter Library.

58 Tülümen, İran Devrimi Hatıraları, 182–3.

59 Figures from Evren Altınkaş, “The Iran–Iraq War and Its Effects on Turkey,” Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika 1, no. 4 (2005): 142–3; and Mustafa Aydın and Damla Aras, “Political Conditionality of Economic Relations Between Paternalist States: Turkey's Interactions with Iran, Iraq, and Syria,” Arab Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1–2 (2005): 31.

60 Thomas L. Friedman, “Letter from Istanbul,” New York Times, June 15, 2010; Michael C. Desch, “Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On,” The National Interest, October 26, 2010, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/without-fez-4299.

61 Most observers argue that Turkey sets a better example for Arab countries: Mustafa Akyol, “Turkey vs. Iran: The Regional Battle for Hearts and Minds,” Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137343/mustafa-akyol/turkey-vs-iran?page=show; Mona Moussavi, “Iran and the Arab Awakening,” LSE Middle East Centre Blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/files/2012/04/Iran-and-the-Arab-Awakening-FULL-VERSION.pdf; “Turkey Sole Example for Region, Iran a Failed Model, Says Expert,” Today's Zaman, March 19, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-274788-turkey-sole-example-for-region-iran-a-failed-model-says-expert.html. In 2011, a majority of Egyptians stated that they wanted their country to resemble Turkey: “2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/11/21%20arab%20public%20opinion%20telhami/1121_arab_public_opinion.pdf. (All links accessed January 2, 2013.) The idea of Turkey and Iran serving as different models for the Middle East seems to be an old one: Ambassador Tülümen relates in his memoirs that, in his farewell dinner in Tehran in 1983, the ambassadors of several Arab countries wished for Turkey to succeed. Otherwise, they said, they would all “become Iran.” Tülümen, İran Devrimi Hatıraları, 250.

62 For a comprehensive study on Turkish–Iranian relations in the post-1979 period, see Elliot Hentov, Asymmetry of Interest: Turkish–Iranian Relations Since 1979 (Saarbrücken, 2012).

63 F. Stephen Larrabee, “The Turkish–Iranian Alliance That Wasn't,” Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137773/f-stephen-larrabee/the-turkish-iranian-alliance-that-wasnt.