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Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–75

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

James F. Goode
James F. Goode*
Affiliation:
Grand Valley State University, Michigan
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Abstract

The Iranian military intervention in Oman (1972–75) proved to be one of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's most successful foreign policy initiatives. He entered at the request of Sultan Qabus to help quell the Marxist rebellion of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in Dhufar province. The shah took this action without any prior consultation with either Britain or the United States, acting for reasons wholly related to Iran's regional security. In so doing, he angered most of his Arab neighbors, who protested vigorously. He persisted. His troops tipped the balance in favor of the sultan's forces, contributing to a speedy end to the insurrection, for which Iran earned the lasting gratitude of the sultan.

Type
Research Article
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 3: Iran and the Cold War , May 2014 , pp. 441 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2014

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Footnotes

He wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for Iranian Studies, and also Roham Alvandi, Malcolm Byrne, John Limbert and Asher Orkaby for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

References

1 Most of the scholarship on the Dhufar war has focused on the British role, with special attention on the nature of the military campaign. These accounts provide some detail of the Iranian contribution to the war effort, but very little regarding Tehran's diplomatic efforts. Participant soldiers wrote some of the earliest accounts, such as those by Jeapes, Tony, SAS: Operation Oman (Nashville, TN, 1980)Google Scholar, and Akehurst, John, We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965–1975 (Wilton, Salisbury, 1982)Google Scholar. Recently, a number of publications have appeared, continuing the military focus. These include Clive Jones, “Military Intelligence, Tribes, and Britain's War in Dhofar, 1970–1976,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 557–74; Hughes, Geraint, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 1965–1975,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (2009): 271–305CrossRefGoogle Scholar; DeVore, Marc, “The United Kingdom's Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963–75,” Cold War History 11, no. 3 (2011): 441–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The works by Peterson, J.E. are more comprehensive than most on this subject. These include especially his “Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar,” World Affairs 139, no. 4 (1977): 278–95Google Scholar, and, more recently, Oman's Insurgencies: The Sultanate's Struggle for Supremacy (San Francisco, CA, 2007).

2 We might consider from this perspective, also, the shah's policies in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen and his seizure of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs in the Gulf.

3 Alam, Asadollah, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1968–1977 (New York, 1991), 261Google Scholar; Hart-Davis, Duff, The War That Never Was (London, 2011), 273Google Scholar.

4 However, the shah did not encourage the British to abandon points east of the Strait of Hormuz. Ramsbotham (Tehran) to Foreign Office, April 26, 1972, FCO8/1858, London: National Archives; Alam, The Shah and I, 67–8.

5 Secretary of State for Defence Lord Carrington and the Shah, June 23, 1972, FCO8/2067.

6 Helms (Tehran) to Secretary of State, April 12, 1973, CF-ME, Box 602, Folder: Iran [2 of 3], NSC files, Nixon Papers, College Park, MD, National Archives; Parsons (Tehran) to FO, September 15, 1975, FCO8/2501.

7 Lord Carrington and the Shah, June 23, 1972, FCO8/2067; Secretary of Defence Sir Alec Douglas-Home and the Shah, June 8–9, 1973, FCO8/2061. The Americans considered it unlikely that a strongly independent Iraq would allow the Soviets to establish a naval base on its territory. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976 (Washington, DC, 2012), 617, 826, 890.

8 Helms to Knight (Tehran), September 22, 1973, A Life in Intelligence—The Richard Helms Collection, Ibex Program, Central Intelligence Agency.

9 Tehran to Secretary of State, May 15, 1971, Country files—Middle East, Box 602, NSC files, NP, NA; Tyler, Patrick, A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East—From the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York, 2009), 125Google Scholar. The reference here was to the 1969 Libyan coup led by Muammar Qaddafi, which ousted King Idris. Alvandi, Roham, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 2 (2012): 358CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Tehran to Secretary of State, April 20–21, 1970, Country Files—Middle East, Box 601, NSC files, NP; Harold Saunders to HAK, June 3, 1970, Kissinger office files, Box 16, NSC files, NP; Tehran to Secretary of State, June 11, 1970, Country Files—Middle East, Box 601, NSC files, NP.

11 Alvandi, Roham, “Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970,” British Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 2 (2010): 159–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; HAK to Nixon, June 25, 1970, Country Files—Middle East, Box 601, NSC files, NP; Conversation No. 475–22, April 7, 1971, Tape Subject Log, NP.

12 Hashim Behbehani, S.H., China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955–1975: Three Case Studies (Boston, 1981), 379Google Scholar

13 Ibid., 140.

14 Alam, The Shah and I, 74; Denis Wright (Tehran) to A.A. Acland, March 11, 1970, FCO8/1428.

15 Landon Biography, 1976, FCO8/2403.

16 UK Embassy (Muscat) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1971, FCO8/1695.

17 Hawley (Muscat) to Foreign Office, October 25, 1971, FCO8/1677.

18 Record of Meeting between Joseph Godber and Colonel Oldman, June 12, 1972, FCO8/1864; Alam, Asadollah, Yad'dashtha-yi `Alam [The Alam diaries], ed. Alikhani, Alinaghi, vol. 2 (Tehran, 2000), 409Google Scholar.

19 Chamankar, Mohammad Jafar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi [The Dhufar crisis and the Pahlavi regime] (Tehran, 2005), 200Google Scholar; Tehran to Secretary of State, December 10, 1970, Country files—Middle East, Box 601, NSC files, NP.

20 Briefing Book, Visit of President Nixon to Iran, May 1972, President's Trip Files, Box 479, NSC Files, NP, NA; Tehran to Secretary of State, May 6, 1972, President's Trip Files, Box 481, NSC Files, NP, NA.

21 Helms interview, July 1985, Oral History of Iran Collection, Foundation for Iranian Studies, Bethesda, MD.

22 The only exception, perhaps, concerned the decision to intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan, 1972–75, at the behest of the shah. This was, however, a secret operation and involved only a handful of US personnel. Sykes (Washington) to FO, February 5, 1974, FCO8/2218.

23 Ransom (Washington) to Lee (Dhahran), September 20, 1971, Records Relating to Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula (RRPG), 1952–75, Box 9, RG 59, NA.

24 Goulding (Cairo) to FCO, October 13, 1971, FCO8/1676.

25 Alam, The Shah and I, 233.

26 Hawley (Muscat) to London, May 3, July 2, 1972, Phillips (Amman) to London, March 6, 1972, Memorandum Patrick Wright, May 16, 1972, FCO8/1858.

27 Discussions with Colonel Oldman in London, August 7, 1972, FCO8/1859.

28 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, 792. Stoltzfus (Muscat) to Secretary of State, June 3, 1973, Political-Iran, Box 2517, General Records, RG 59, NA; Brief for Visit of Sultan Qaboos, September 15, 1973, FCO8/2013.

29 Hawley (Muscat) to FO, August 30, Henderson (Qatar) to FO, October 24, Hawley to FO, October 9, P. Wright to Parsons (Tehran), August 7, Melhuish (Washington) to FO, November 28, Denis Wright (Tehran) to FO, October 13, 1972, FCO8/1859. A recent study by Abdel Razzaq Takriti refers to the movement in Dhufar as a revolution and to members of PFLOAG, not as rebels or insurgents, but as revolutionaries. See Monsoon Revolution (New York, 2013), 1–9.

30 Wolle (Muscat) to Secretary of State, October 27, December 3, 4, 1974, Miklos (Tehran) to SS, January 30, 1975, RG 59, CFPF 1973–76, Access to Archival Databases (AAD), NA. Interestingly, in the early days of the Iran–Iraq war, the Islamic Republic called on veterans of the Dhufar campaign to take up arms again (Personal communication from an Iranian scholar).

31 Helms (Tehran) to SS, October 22, 1975, AAD, NA.

32 Washington Post, December 16, 1974; Chamankar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi, 304–6.

33 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, 12.

34 Ramsbotham (Tehran) to FO, May 22, 1973, FCO8/2051; Gen. Creasey's report of Azhari Visit to Muscat, August 28–29, 1974, FCO8/2242; S.A. Green (Muscat) to Ministry of Defence (MOD), November 7, 1975, DEFE11/902; brief biography of General Azhari, September 14, 1973, FCO8/2067. The shah had already personally approved the temporary deployment of a naval support vessel to Rakhyut, a relatively minor decision.

35 Alam, Yad'dashtha-yi `Alam, vol. 4 (Tehran, 2001), 279; vol. 5 (Tehran, 2003), 109.

36 Ibid., 4: 320–21.

37 See, for example, Peterson, J.E., “Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar,” World Affairs 139, no. 4 (1977): 284, 286Google Scholar; and DeVore, Marc, “The United Kingdom's Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963–75,” Cold War History 11, no. 3 (2011): 457, 460CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As Tehran's commitment deepened, Iranian student groups in Europe and the United States quickly added Dhufar to a long list of accusations against the shah's regime. They organized protests against the Iranian intervention, claiming that the shah acted as a puppet of the United States. UK Consulate (San Francisco) to FO, March 1974, FCO8/2011, British Consulate (Miami) to FO, June 11, 1975, FCO8/2458. (Thanks to Matthew Shannon for these two sources.)

38 Colonel Maloney's Report, June 24, 1974, FCO8/2218.

39 Ibid.

40 Arbuthnot (Tehran) to FO, November 15, Memorandum of Conversation, Lord Carrington and the Shah (Tehran), December 10, 1973, FCO8/2011; Memcon, Lord Carrington and General Azhari (Tehran), October 5, A.D. Parsons (MOD) to FO, December 10, 1973, FCO8/2067. According to a report from the East German Stasi, the PDRY was also concerned about widening the war and wanted to avoid direct conflict with Omani forces at the border. Report no. 844/75, December 26, 1975, Bundesbeauftragter fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR, Berlin (BStU) [Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives], Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit (MfS) [Ministry for State Security], HVA 119, Bl. 83–5. (Thanks to Roland Popp for DDR sources.)

41 Wolle (Muscat) to SS, February 15, 1975, AAD, NA; Maloney (Kuwait) to Porter, January 11, 1974, RRPG, Box 4, NA.

42 Wolle (Muscat) to SS, February 9, 1975, AAD, NA; Wolle (Muscat) to SS, April 16, 1975, AAD, NA; UK Embassy (Amman) to FO, March 14, 1975, FCO8/2459.

43 UK Embassy (Amman) to FO, April–May 1975, FCO8/2459.

44 Chamankar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi, 351. On the rioting, he cites a telegram to Tehran from the Iranian ambassador in Amman.

45 Parsons (Tehran) to London, September 8, 1975, FCO8/2458.

46 Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy, 220–23.

47 Tehran to SS, June 16, 1973, Tehran to SS, June 20, 1973, Tehran to SS, June 28, 1973, Washington to Cairo, June 12, 1974, AAD, NA.

48 Tehran to SS, June 20, 1973, AAD, NA; HAK, Ford, and Shah, May 15, 1975, Box 11, NSA Memcon, Gerald R. Ford Library (GRFL), Ann Arbor, MI.

49 Alam, Yad'dashtha-yi `Alam, 5: 298, 328, 520.

50 Chamankar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi, 324. At a general congress in July 1974, the Front voted to restrict its activities to Oman and changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). The editor was referring to Cuban assistance to the MPLA in the Angolan civil war. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy, 159; Soviet broadcasts, June 12 and 29, 1976, FCO8/2689. The East Germans, in particular, took an active interest in the conflict. Their representatives in Aden met frequently with leaders of the PFLO, who asked for weapons, radio sets, medicines, money, and training, in Germany as well as in Aden. See, for example, GDR Embassy Aden, July 10, 1969, Wildau Memo of Conversation with PFLOAG representatives, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, C1221/71, Bd. 1, Bl. 66–8.

51 Memorandum of Conversation Lord Carrington and the Shah (London), June 21, 1972, PREM15/991; Tehran to SS, April 9, 1976, RAC program, GRFL.

52 Tehran to SS, July 19, 1976, RAC program, GRFL; HAK, Ford, and Shah, May 15, 1975, Box 11, NSA Memcon, GRFL.

53 Hawley (Muscat) to London, October 25, 1971, FCO8/1677. The reference was to the fact that most Omanis were Ibadhi Muslims, a sect closely related to Shia and considered unorthodox by Saudis. Horan (Riyadh) to SS, September 27, 1973, AAD, NA; Beowne (Tehran) to FO, July 25, 1973, FCO8/2011.

54 Ellingsworth (Tehran) to FO, July 26, 1973, FCO8/2011.

55 Helms (Tehran) to SS, April 12, 1973, Country files—Middle East, Box 602, NSC files, NP, NA.

56 US Embassy (London) to SS, February 3, 1975, AAD, NA; Memorandum, P. Wright, April 22, 1974, FCO8/2241.

57 Stoltzfus (Muscat) to SS, March 11, 1974, AAD, NA; Pagnelli (Muscat) to SS, January 29, 1975, AAD, NA.

58 Memcon, Mason and King Khalid, Mason and Prince Abdullah (Riyadh), April 29, 1975, FCO8/2402.

59 Abu Dhabi to SS, March 20, 1974, AAD, NA; Abu Dhabi to SS, February 23, 1974, AAD, NA; UK embassy (UAE) to FO, July 31, 1974, FCO8/2242.

60 This was a body linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its mission was to build schools, hospitals, clinics and colleges in some Gulf states. Stoltzfus (Kuwait) to SS, January 31, 1974, Stoltzfus (Kuwait) to SS, July 25, 1974, AAD, NA, UK Embassy (UAE) to FO, January 19, 1974, FCO8/2241; Stoltzfus (Kuwait) to SS, September 24, 1974, AAD, NA.

61 Hinchcliffe (Kuwait) to FO, December 16, 1974, Prem15/991.

62 McCarthy (UAE) to FO, July 31, 1974, FCO8/2242; Briefing for Secretary of State for Defence Mason, April 1975, FCO8/2401.

63 Tripoli to SS, June 16, 1975, AAD, NA.

64 UK Embassy (Amman) to FO, January 17, 1975, FCO8/2051; Baghdad to SS, June 21, 1975, Jidda to SS, July 17, 1975, AAD, NA; UK Embassy (Cairo) to FO, May 31, 1975, FCO8/2451. Diplomatic relations were established in 1976. Treadwell (MOD), DEFE11/901.

65 Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy, 154–5.

66 Ibid., 154.

67 Parsons (Tehran) to FO, September 8, 1975, FCO8/2458.

68 Secretary of State Callaghan to Parsons, September 12, 1975, Parsons (Tehran) to FO, November 16, 1975, FCO8/2458; Briefs for Secretary of State's visit to Iran, March 1976, FCO8/2737, Memorandum of Secretary of State's talks with Shah, March 19, 1976, FCO8/2739. The sultan kept his word. After the war his government spent as much as 40 percent of its budget in Dhufar, despite the fact that Dhufaris made up less than a quarter of the country's total indigenous population. J.E. Peterson, “Oman's Diverse Society: Southern Oman,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 2 (2004): 267–8.

69 Chamankar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi, 346.

70 Alam, Yad'dashtha-yi `Alam, vol. 6 (Bethesda, MD, 2008), 167; Chamankar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi, 259, 324.

71 Chamankar, Bahran-i Dhufar va rejhim-i Pahlavi, 263, 470–71. Qabus kept to his word. In the early years of the Islamic Republic, Oman refused to join the other Arab states in ostracizing Iran, nor did it join in their support of Baghdad during the Iran–Iraq war, which began in September 1980.

72 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, 202. By the end of 1975, as a result of declining oil revenues, the shah warned the Americans that he would have to abandon earlier plans for a major role in the Indian Ocean and some other “shiny goals.” Ambassador Helms concluded that the shah was applying pressure to get the oil companies to lift more oil. The ambassador was not certain what the shah would do, but cautioned Washington not to conclude that he was bluffing. He would continue, however, to pursue his foreign policy interests in neighboring countries and in the Gulf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973–1976, 457–9.