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Agricultural Development Planning under the Islamic Republic of Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Mehrdad Haghayeghi*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Southwest Missouri State University

Extract

On 31 January 1990 the Council of Guardians of the Islamic Republic of Iran ratified an amended version of a five-year economic, social and cultural development plan set forth by the Majlis for the 1989-93 period. In its economic dimension, the proposed plan represents a major departure from the development policies preached, and to some extent practiced, under the leadership of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. One of the most noteworthy aspects of this departure is a significant decline in the role of agriculture, hitherto the “major axis” of economic development. The plan instead designates a “high priority” status to the sector. This, according to some Majlis deputies and government officials, has placed the nation back on the pre-revolutionary development path so heavily criticized by the revolutionaries in the 1970s. The post-Khomeini government, however, considers its new policy orientation a practical step, motivated by technocratic realism, to remedy decades-old economic problems.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 1990

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References

1. Kayhān, 26 Murdad 1362 (17 August 1983).

2. Kayhān, 15 Day 1368 (5 December 1989).

3. Mohammad Salamati, the former minister of agriculture and a member of the Majlis commission on financial and economic matters, is one such individual. See Kayhān, 15 and 16 Day 1368 (5 & 6 December 1989).

4. For an overview of the Islamic Republic's economic problems see Clawson, Patrick, “Islamic Iran: Economic Politics and Prospects,” Middle East Journal 42.3 (Summer 1988)Google Scholar.

5. Iran: Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit (1990-1991), 16.

6. imām, Khaṭṭ-i, kalām-i imām (Tehran, 1981), 1: 76Google Scholar.

7. Zeitūn (the Scientific-Technical Publication of the Ministry of Agriculture) 7 (Mihr 1360/October 1981): 5.

8. Only twenty Koranic verses discuss the utilitarian aspects of livestock production and ownership. Fewer than ten deal with land matters, particularly in the context of conquered land. For some examples see the Koran, sūrah al-an' ām, verses 38 and 143, sūrah yāsīn, verses 71-73.

9. For a reference to land-related ḥadīth see Maulana, Muhammad Ali ,A Manual of Hadith(Lahore, 1944), 302-7Google Scholar.

10. For more information see Biazar Shirazi, Abdol Karim, Resālih-ye novīnGoogle Scholar. With Translated Excerpts From Khomeini, Imam, TaḤrīr al-wasīla, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1985), 2: 49-50Google Scholar.

11. Ibid., 70. Also seeimām, Kalām-i: mustaẓ'afīn va mustakberīn [The Imam's Words: The Disinherited and the Exploiters], vol. 1 (Tehran, 1985)Google Scholar.

12. This belief was expressed frequently by both Ministers Salamati and Zali in their interviews, speeches and inter-governmental meetings. For more information see Zeitūn 7 (Mihr 1360/October 1981): 16, and Zeitūn 38 (Tir 1363/July 1984): 9.

13. McLachlan, Keith S., The Neglected Garden: The Politics and Ecology of Agriculture in Iran (London, 1988), 199Google Scholar.

14. Zeitūn 6 (Shahrivar 1360/September 1981): 11. The original plan was made up of fourteen points. Five more points were added to the proposal by Javad Bahonar who became prime minister on 3 August 1981. The additional points dealt with the development of fisheries, forests and pasture, and pastoral-nomadic livestock.

15. For background on post-revolutionary land reform policies see Ashraf, Ahmad, “Dihqānān, zamīn, va inqilāb,” [Peasants, Land, and Revolution], in Masā'il-i arẓī va dihqānī [Agrarian and Peasant Problems] (Tehran, 1982)Google Scholar; Schirazi, Asghar, The Problem of Land Reform in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Complications and Consequences of an Islamic Reform Policy (Berlin, 1987)Google Scholar; Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, “Agrarian Reform Problems in Post Revolutionary Iran,”; Middle Eastern Studies 26.1 (January 1990): 35-51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bakhash, Shaul, The Reign of Ayatollahs, (London, 1985), ch. 8Google Scholar.

16. Haghayeghi, “Agrarian Reform Problems,” 38-9.

17. Bakhash, Reign, 205.

18. Zeitūn 6 (Shahrivar 1360/September 1981): 17.

19. Haghayeghi, “Agrarian Reform Problems,” 40-41. It has also been pointed out that the partial suspension of the land reform law was due in part to the fear that the religious endowment lands, awqāf, could also have qualified for distribution, thus threatening the economic livelihood of the clergy.

20. Refahiyat, Hushang et al., Gozārish-i iqtiṣād-i keshāvarzī-yi keshvar dar sāl-i 1364 [Agricultural Economic Report For 1985] (Tehran, 1986), 18Google Scholar.

21. Bakhash, Shaul, “The Politics of Land, Law, and Social Justice,” Middle East Journal 43. 2 (Spring 1989): 188Google Scholar.

22. Zeitūn 11 (Isfand 1360/February 1981): 8.

23. For a brief comparison of the 1980 and 1981 laws see Haghayeghi, op. cit., 43-4. For the full text of the 1983 law see Kayhān, 13 Day 1362 (2 January1983).

24. For the full text of the 1986 legislation see Majmū'ih-yi qavānīn-i dawri-yi dovvom-i majlis-i shūrā-yi lslāmī [Collection of Laws Pertaining to the Second Legislative Session of the Majlis] (Tehran, n.d.), 334-5.

25. Kayhān, 28 Shahrivar 1368 (19 September 1989).

26. Kayhān, 22 Isfand 1366 (12 March 1987). Land estimates vary from source to source. Citing the Majlis deputies’ estimates, Professor Bakhash has reported the numbers at 700,000 to 750,000 hectares or 1,750,000 to 1,875,000 acres. Figures used in this study are predominantly from the ministry of agriculture. For more information see Bakhash, “Politics of Land,” 186. See also Refahiyat.

27. Zeitūn 97 (Shahrivar-Mihr 1369/September-October 1990): 22.

28. Kayhān, 28 Shahrivar 1368 (19 September 1989). Altogether the land under temporary cultivation amounts to 20 percent of total irrigated land in Iran.

29. For more information see “Current Political Attitudes in an Iranian Village,” Iranian Studies 16.1 and 16.2 (1983): 3-29; “Current Political Attitudes in an Iranian Village: A Follow-up,” Iranian Studies 17.4 (1984): 453-65.

30. The other person was Seyyed Mohammad Asghari, the justice minister.

31. Zeitūn 9 (Day 1360/December 1981): 5.

32. Zeitūn 11 (Tir 1360/February 1981): 54.

33. Zeitūn 71 (Tir 1366/July 1987): 4. McLachlan (op. cit., p. 201) has indicated that an estimated 600 centers were established prior to Salamati's departure in August 1983.

34. Plan and Budget Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Center, Yearbooks (2535 Shahanshahi/1976), 252/12, and 1980, 367.

35. Zeitūn 11 (Isfand 1360/February 1981): 56.

36. Ibid.

37. The bank's generosity seems to have caused it severe financial problems. See Iran Times, 26 July 1991.

38. Seyyedzadih, Shahin et al., Gozārish-i iqtiṣād-i keshāvarzī-yi keshvar dar sāl-i 1366 [Agricultural Economic Report for 1987] (Tehran, 1989), 46Google Scholar.

39. Zeitūn 8 (Aban 1360/November 1981): 18-19.

40. Moshā, Setad-i markazi-i hay'atha-yi haft-nafarih-yi vagozari va ihya'-i arazi [Central Staff of the Seven-Man Councils For Distribution and Revitalization of Land] (Tehran, 1989), 28-9.

41. For more information on traditional methods of production see Safinejad, Javad, Boneh (Tehran, 1972)Google Scholar.

42. Moshā (1989), 32-3.

43. Refahiyat, 17-18.

44. Ibid., 19-20.

45. Zeitūn 74 (Mihr-Azar 1366/October-December 1987): 11-12.

46. Yearbooks, 1982 and 1991.

47. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss items 8, 13, and 14 of the plan, which dealt with agricultural research and livestock production.

48. Schirazi, Problem of Land Reform, 18.

49. Beibordi, Mohammad, Barkhī az imkānāt va barkhī az tangnāhā-yi tawsi'ih-yi keshāvarzī dar Irān [Some Possibilities and Some Difficulties of Agricultural Development in Iran], Plan and Budget Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran, 1988), 9Google Scholar.

50. In a radio interview in 1987 (Hamrāh bā mardom, hamgām bā mas'ūlān [With the People, In Stride With the Officials], The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, 11 November 1987), then Minister of Agriculture Abbas Zali provided no concrete answer to a question on the regionalization of agriculture.

51. Yearbooks, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1991, and Refahiyat et al., Agricultural Economic Report 1986, 1989.

52. Seyyedzadih,Gozārish-i iqtiṣād, 92-3.

53. Barzegar 461 and 462 (Farvardin 1368/March 1989).

54. Kayhān, 22 Azar 1368 (13 December 1989).

55. Majmū'ih-yi qavānīn-i dawri-yi avval-i majlis-i shūrā-yi lslāmī [Collection of Laws Pertaining to the First Legislative Session of the Majlis], 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1987), 443-4.

56. Seyyedzadih, Gozārish-i iqtiṣād, 75-6.

57. Plan and Budget Organization of Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Center, Yearbook (1991), 226.

58. Refahiyat, 66.

59. Iran Times, 23 November 1990.

60. Iran Times, 14 June 1991.

61. Payvast-i qānūn-i barnāmeh-yi avval-i tawsi'ih-yi iqtiṣādī, ijtimā'ī, va farhangī-yi jomhūrī-yi Islāmī-yi Irān, 1368-1372 [Supplement to Law for the First Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989-93] (Tehran, 1990), 4.4.

62. Iran Times, 24 May 1991.

63. Refahiyat et al. (1991), 161-2.

64. For a brief account of the roots of factional fighting before 1983 see Mansoor Moaddel, “Class Struggle in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 23.3 (August 1991): 331-4.

65. Mofid, Kamran, Development Planning in Iran: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Kent, 1987), ch. 6Google Scholar.

66. Kayhān, 15 Murdad 1362 (6 August 1983).

67. Kayhān, 26 Murdad 1362 (17 August 1983).

68. Majmū'ih-yi qavānīn (Tehran, n.d.), 271.

69. Zeitūn 78 (Farvardin-Urdibihisht 1367/March-Apiil 1988): 7. The item was included presumably to quiet the religiously conservative members of the Majlis who considered Mousavi's economic policies interventionist.

70. Ibid., 40. The reported figure for 1987 was preliminary. The actual production was later reported at 7.5 million tons.

71. Kayhān, 12 Mihr 1368 (4 October 1989).

72. Agricultural Economic Report (1983), 40, and (1991), 92.

73. Ibid., 189.

74. Yearbooks, 1982, 1985, and 1991.

75. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Summary of World Broadcasts (4 September 1989), ME/0552 A/1.

76. A Summarized Version of the First Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1989-1993), Plan and Budget Organization of the Islamic Republic (1990), 1-2.

77. Ibid., 65-70.

78. Ibid., 76.

79. Iran Times, 1 December 1989. The reported figure was $30 billion, of which the $3 billion that was to be obtained from Japan (Mitsui compensation for the refinery), the United States, and France (settlements of various financial cases) was not considered borrowing.

80. Payvast-i qānūn, 20.2.

81. Ibid., 12.2.

82. Kayhān, 14 Azar 1368 (5 December 1989).

83. Kayhān, 15 Azar 1368 (6 December 1989).

84. Zeitūn 83 (Mihr 1367/October 1988): 6-7. Although Kalantari has refrained from publicly criticizing his predecessors, he has implicitly done so on numerous occasions.

85. Ibid.

86. For a summary of the 19-point proposal see Zeitūn 89 (Urdibihisht 1368/April 1989): 4-6.

87. Payvast-i qānūn, 11.4.

88. Kayhān, 14 Aban 1368 (7 November 1989).

89. Payvast-i qānūn, 19A.

90. Iran Times, 23 November 1990.

91. Payvast-i qānūn, 15.4.

92. Zeitūn 96 (Urdibihisht-Murdad 1369/April-July 1990): 42.

93. Payvast-i qānūn, 13.4.

94. Kayhān, 30 Aban 1369 (21 November 1990).

95. Payvast-i qānūn, 17.4.

96. Kayhān, 22 Mihr 1369 (14 October 1990).

97. Article 194 of the constitution requires that the Council of Guardians provide a response to the legislation forwarded by the Majlis within ten days of submission. This time frame has been frequently violated by the Council, causing friction between the two institutions. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (13 December 1990), ME/0946 A/7.

98. BBC (24 December 1990), ME/0995 A/14.

99. The Egyptian experience in this regard has been a difficult one, while Turkey has made satisfactory progress. Other countries in the region have been less fortunate. Turkey's success may be attributed, among other things, to two major factors. First, capitalist farmers are a powerful faction within the ruling coalition whose economic interests have been better served by lifting interventionist state price and trade restrictions. This presence has produced a more sympathetic economic response on the part of the government. Algeria and Egypt, on the other hand, lack a strong capitalist farming component in their ruling coalition. Second, relative to Egypt, more funds were made available to Turkey, which helped ease the burden of economic adjustment. For more information see Springborg, Robert, “Agrarian Bourgeoisie, Semiproletarians, and the Egyptian State: Lessons for Liberalization,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 22.4 (November 1990): 447-72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roe, Alan, Roy, Jayanta, and Sengupta, Jayshree, Economic Adjustment in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey (Washington, D.C., 1989)Google Scholar.

100. Iran Times, 30 March 1990.