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The Accountability of Para-governmental Organizations (bonyads): The Case of Iranian Foundations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Ali A. Saeidi
Ali A. Saeidi*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Social Science in Tehran University
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Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the emergence and development of para-governmental organizations (bonyads) in Iran and demonstrate their contradictory position in the Iranian political economy. These organizations represent the dual power structure in Iran which reinforces the financial authority of religious leaders without accountability. By analyzing the functions of these organizations, the paper sets out to probe their economic policies in line with the government's populist macroeconomic policies. The paper demonstrates the adverse effects of these organizations on political development and economic reforms in the post-Khomeini era when the struggle for accountability soared.

Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , September 2004 , pp. 479 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 The International Society for Iranian Studies

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Footnotes

I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft of this paper by Abbas Vali. I also wish to thank Bijan Riazi-Farzad, who kindly read through my analysis and pointed out inaccuracies, and Nematollah Fazeli for reading the manuscript and providing excellent advice. I am also indebted to the Journal's anonymous reviewers who made valuable suggestions for strengthening the paper's thesis and improving its structure. But I alone am responsible for the views expressed here.

References

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83 RFE/RL Iran Report 2, no.35 (September 6, 1999).

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