This article theorizes Waltz's ‘third image,’ international system structure, through feminist lenses. After briefly reviewing International Relations (IR) analysis of the relationship between anarchy, structure, and war, it introduces gender analysis in IR with a focus on its theorizing of war(s). From this work, it sketches an approach to theorizing international structure through gendered lenses and provides an initial plausibility case for the argument that the international system structure is gender-hierarchical, focusing on its influence on unit (state) function, the distribution of capabilities among units, and the political processes which consistently govern unit interaction. It outlines the implications of an account of the international system as gender-hierarchical for theorizing the causes of war generally and wars specifically, with a focus on potentially testable hypotheses. The article concludes with some ideas about the potential significance of a theorizing gender from a structural perspective and of theorizing structure from through gendered lenses.

This article proposes an anthropological extension of the so-called Copenhagen School theory of securitization in International Relations. In contrast to existing attempts to show how, suitably elaborated, this model can be ‘applied’ to various non-Western contexts, our anthropological strategy is to use the contingency of empirical materials (namely the Cuban Revolution and the political forms it instantiates) as a means for transforming the basic coordinates of the model itself. The argument involves two main steps. First we relativize the Copenhagen School model, showing the contingency of its premises. In its paradigmatic form, we argue, the model is liberal in that its abiding concern with states of emergency turns on an ontological distinction between political subjects (e.g. people) and political structures (e.g. state). By contrast, revolutionary politics in Cuba concertedly rescinds just this distinction, to bring about an alternative, non-liberal political ontology. We then go on to use the Cuban case to construct an alternative model of securitization, which we call revolutionary. On this model, the move of securitization pertains, not to a passage from ordinary politics into a realm of emergency, but to a deliberate ontological fusion of the two, such that rule and exception also become coterminous.

The Democratic Peace research programme explicitly and implicitly presents its claims in terms of their potential to underpin a universal world peace. Yet whilst the Democratic Peace appears robust in its geographical heartlands it appears weaker at the edges of the democratic world, where the spread of democracy and the depth of democratic political development is often limited and where historically many of the purported exceptions to the Democratic Peace are found. Whereas Democratic Peace scholarship has tended to overlook or downplay these phenomena, from a critical materialist perspective they are indicative of a fundamental contradiction within the Democratic Peace whereby its universalistic aspirations are thwarted by its material grounding in a hierarchical capitalist world economy. This, in turn, raises the question of whether liberal arguments for a universal Democratic Peace are in fact hollow promises. The article explores these concerns and argues that those interested in democracy and peace should pay more attention to the critical materialist tradition, which in the discussion below is represented principally by the world-system approach.

This paper reflects on the ethical possibilities and limitations of cosmopolitanism as practice, with particular reference to the contemporary European project. It begins with an exploration of the relationship between what I term a ‘market’ and a ‘legal’ cosmopolitics in the European context. Inspired by Foucault's recently published work on liberal government, the paper argues that these cosmopolitics and the subjectivities that they seek to produce variously overlap, reinforce one another, and conflict in practices of contemporary post-national government: in short, they co-exist in an inherently ambiguous relationship. Animating this argument, the paper considers the politics of European citizenship; it highlights what is at stake, ethically and politically, in the recognition of an ambiguous cosmopolitics. It focuses in particular on the European Union (EU)'s 2004 Directive on the free movement of EU citizens and its relevance in the context of the high-profile deportations of Roma from France in summer 2010. The paper makes the case that the recognition and ongoing identification of an ambiguous cosmopolitics – and, essentially, an ambiguous European identity or ‘us’ – offers the prospect for ongoing resistance by and with those who find themselves designated as the ‘other’ of the European project in particular or of a cosmopolitics in general.

Democracy is rule by the demos, but by what criteria is the demos constituted? Theorists of democracy have tended to assume that the demos is properly defined by national boundaries or by the territorial boundaries of the modern state. In a recent turn, many democratic theorists have advanced the principles of affected interests and coercion as the basis for defining the boundaries of democracy. According to these principles, it is not co-nationals or fellow citizens but all affected or all subjected to coercion who constitute the demos. In this paper, I argue that these recent approaches to the boundary problem are insufficiently attentive to the conditions of democracy. Democracy is not merely a set of procedures; it also consists of substantive values and principles. Political equality is a constitutive condition of democracy, and solidarity is an instrumental condition of democracy. The affected interests and coercion principles create serious problems for the realization of these conditions – problems of size and stability. Building on this critique, this paper presents democratic considerations for why the demos should be bounded by the territorial boundaries of the state, grounded in the state's role in (1) securing the constitutive conditions of democracy, (2) serving as the primary site of solidarity conducive to democratic participation, and (3) establishing clear links between representatives and their constituents. I examine and reject a third alternative, a global demos bounded by a world state, and conclude by considering some practical implications of my argument.

Emerging scholarship on global governance offers ever-more detailed analyses of private regulatory regimes. These regimes aim to regulate some area of social activity without a mandate from, or participation of, states or international organizations. While there are numerous empirical studies of these regimes, the normative theoretical literature has arguably struggled to keep pace with such developments. This is unfortunate, as the proliferation of private regulatory regimes raises important issues about legitimacy in global governance. The aim of this paper is to address some of these issues by elaborating a theoretical framework that can orientate normative investigation of these schemes. It does this through turning to the idea of experimentalist governance. It is argued that experimentalism can provide an important and provocative set of insights about the processes and logics of emerging governance schemes. The critical purchase of this theory is illustrated through an application to the case of primary commodities roundtables, part of ongoing attempts by non-governmental organizations, producers, and buyers to set sustainability criteria for commodity production across a range of sectors. The idea of experimentalist governance, we argue, can lend much needed theoretical structure to debates about the normative legitimacy of private regulatory regimes.

Causal inquiry has been a controversial matter in International Relations scholarship in recent years. While many new ‘non-positivist’ stances on causal analysis have been developed in recent years, many post-positivist and critical theorists in the discipline have remained unconvinced of the virtues of causal inquiry. Crucially, the political consequences of causal analysis seem to be a sticking point for many such critics. Yet, the politics of causal analysis are, we argue, complex and relatively poorly engaged with at present. Indeed, the arguments against causal analysis, which rely on warnings concerning the political nature of causal analysis, are inadequate and incomplete. We contend here that causal analysis is, indeed, political but that this does not mean that we should not engage in causal inquiry. On the contrary, we argue that this is what makes causal inquiry interesting and important in social science. A more nuanced and reflective approach to dealings with the politics of causal analysis is needed, and it is such a response that we provoke critics of causal analysis to consider.

The article focuses on the politicization of international authority as a thus far little understood development in world politics. We first define the concept and show that there is an empirical trend towards politicization of international institutions. We then argue that the increasing authority of international institutions has led to their politicization and we relate this hypothesis to alternative explanations. The validity of the authority–politicization nexus is illustrated by the rise of international authority in parallel to politicization. We go on to distinguish different policy functions such as rule definition, monitoring, interpretation, and enforcement in order to show that especially those international institutions with a high level of authority meet with strong contestation of their competencies. We conclude the article by exploring various avenues for future politicization research.

Assigning responsibility is increasingly common in world politics, from the United Nation's assertion that sovereignty entails a ‘responsibility to protect’ to the International Criminal Court's attempts to hold individuals responsible for international crimes. This development is welcome but problematic as the model of moral agency that our contemporary practices of responsibility are based on leads to a number of problematic consequences that impede efforts to make world politics more just. In particular, our contemporary practices of responsibility are excessively focused on the obligations of individual and collective actors, at the expense of enabling conditions, and on holding specific perpetrators accountable, neglecting the need for wider social transformations in response to mass violence and suffering. Alternative understandings of moral agency, which better serve international/global practices of responsibility, are possible and here I defend an understanding of moral agency based on the philosophy of John Dewey. The critical insights and practical possibilities of this alternative understanding of moral agency are explored with reference to international interventions in Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Is the demand for justice likelier to cause or to prevent war? Hobbes expresses sympathy for the former view and Locke for the latter. However, they both reason their way toward an intermediate position, symbolized by the impartial judge in Locke's theory and the arbitrator in Hobbes's theory. Peace is possible when we create a process that resolves disputes according to widely intuitive principles of equality and reciprocity. This requires, however, that we refrain from imposing our particular interpretations of justice, and that we tolerate the possibility of unjust outcomes. Hobbes and Locke's reasoning shows us why international institutions are needed to serve as an impartial judge for the resolution of civil and international conflicts. They rebut persistent skepticism about the fitness of international institutions to promote peace and justice. Recent scholarship on ethno-political conflict confirms the wisdom of their analysis.

In a dialogue discussing issues of the relation between empirical and normative theory, four contributors comment upon the edited volume by Richard Price, Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics, and Richard Price responds. The contributions principally revolve around the following themes: (1) whether a division of labor between normative and empirical theory can or should be overcome, which in turn presupposes notions of (2) just what constitutes normative and empirical international relations as such; and (3) the ethics of constructivism itself, including what if anything is distinctive about how constructivism might respond to the question of ‘how we should act’.

The European Union (EU) and the antebellum US represent attempts to overcome anarchy without substituting hierarchy. Understood as ‘states unions’, these two systems are shown here to share foundational indeterminacy over sovereignty and the constitution of the people (i.e. the boundaries of the political community). Existing scholarship appreciates the EU's resulting democratic deficit but fails to problematize how dual ambiguity is sustained. The contrast between both states unions is used to probe this mutually constitutive relationship between sovereignty and democracy in an anti-hierarchical order. Defining the boundaries of the people by invoking popular sovereignty led in the antebellum, the paper argues, to a bifurcated debate over where the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy resided, destroying ambiguity. The contrast further shows that the EU has avoided the development of such rival, mutually exclusive constitutional visions that seek to make the people and sovereignty congruent at either the unit or union level. Instead, the EU has sustained dual constitutional ambiguity by allowing for multiple accountability claims reliant on overlapping notions of the people. Democratizing international cooperation thus should focus on the form democratic accountability can take rather than seeking to use popular sovereignty to establish some decision-making level where sovereignty and the people are congruent.

International cooperation often requires costly policy adjustments. States may worry, however, that such adjustments weaken their outside options, and thus reduce their bargaining power. How does uncertainty about the effects of policy adjustments on outside options influence the depth of cooperation that states can achieve? My game-theoretic analysis shows that uncertainty about outside options is an obstacle to deep cooperation. If states agree on deep cooperation, they have to compensate vulnerable states with weak outside options for their losses. Under uncertainty, states that are not vulnerable have an incentive to falsely claim that they are vulnerable (i) to avoid a side payment or (ii) to obtain compensation for being vulnerable. The result holds even if the added value of deep cooperation would be large enough to fully compensate the losers. In equilibrium, the more vulnerable state sometimes offers a side payment to the less vulnerable one. More broadly, the analysis reveals a new international cooperation problem and provides a new rationale for costly signaling mechanisms and delegation to international organizations.

This article focuses on the normative problem of establishing how the burdens associated with implementing policies designed to prevent, or manage, climate change should be shared amongst states involved in ongoing international climate change negotiations. This problem has three key features: identifying the nature and extent of the burdens that need to be borne; identifying the type of agent that should be allocated these burdens; and distributing amongst the particular ‘tokens’ of the relevant ‘agent type’ climatic burdens according to principles that none could reasonably reject. The article defends a key role in climatic burden-sharing policy for the principle that states benefiting most from activities that cause climate change should bear the greatest burden in terms of the costs of preventing dangerous climate change. I outline two versions of this ‘beneficiary pays’ principle; examine the strengths and weakness of each version; and explore how the most plausible version (which I call the ‘unjust enrichment’ principle) could be operationalized in the context of global climate governance.