International Relations (IR) is uneasy about its status as a ‘science’. Throughout a long history of attempts to legitimate the field as ‘scientific’, IR scholars have imported multifarious positions from the Philosophy of Science (PoS) in order to ground IR on an unshakable foundation. Alas, no such unshakable foundation exists. The PoS is itself a contested field of study, in which no consensus exists on the proper foundation for science. By importing foundational divisions into IR, the ‘science’ debate splits the discipline into contending factions and justifies the absence of dialogue between them. As all foundations require a leap of faith, imperial foundational projects are always vulnerable to challenge and therefore unable to resolve the science question in IR. In this article, we seek to dissolve rather than solve the ‘science’ debate in IR and the quest for philosophical foundations. We argue that IR scholars should adopt an ‘attitude towards’ rather than a ‘position in’ the irresolvable foundational debate. Specifically, we advocate an attitude of ‘foundational prudence’ that is open-minded about what the PoS can offer IR, while precluding imperial foundational projects, which attempt to impose a single meta-theoretical framework on the discipline. This requires knowing what PoS arguments can and cannot do. As such, foundational prudence is post-foundational rather than anti-foundational. A prudent attitude towards philosophical foundations encourages theoretical and methodological pluralism, making room for a question-driven IR while de-escalating intra-disciplinary politics.

‘Structure’ in the discipline of International Relations, for all the criticism of Kenneth Waltz’ work, still typically means the Waltzian triad of ordering principles, functional differentiation, and distribution of capabilities. I argue, however, that this triad not only does not in Waltz’ particular presentation but cannot provide an adequate account of political structures. In its place I sketch a five-part framework of the elements of political structures. Three types of structural differentiation are identified: vertical differentiation, which establishes hierarchical ranking; horizontal differentiation, which establishes non-hierarchical segmentation; and unit differentiation, which assigns certain types of actors a privileged status. Two dimensions of structural elaboration are also identified: norms and institutions and technology and geography. This framework highlights the central place of ranking in international political structures, developing a tripartite account of ‘ordering principles’ that identifies autarchic, single-hierarchic, and heterarchic systems. It also draws attention to the diversity of international orders and opens structural analysis to the concerns and contributions of constructivism.

From an international political theory perspective, this paper assesses the justifiability of ascribing human rights obligations, in the form of international or extraterritorial law, onto transnational corporations (TNCs). The major policy prescriptions in favour of extending human rights duties to include TNCs become deeply problematic when considered in light of advocates’ claims that human rights rules, rather than a sovereign’s legal rules, are necessarily the rules that are truly authoritative and/or in line with a ‘global rule of law’. This paper discusses concepts such as authority, human rights and the rule of law, and juxtaposes these concepts: firstly, with one another; secondly, with the legal status quo about jurisdiction over companies; and thirdly, with corporations’ de facto transnationality in the contemporary international system. This paper discusses key similarities and differences between companies, states, and individuals, and highlights the relevance of these distinctions to those agents’ potential human rights duties. This paper concludes by arguing that the ‘TNC and human rights’ project is well worth pursuing, but according to different theoretical foundations than those currently endorsed by legal and policy analysts, and it suggests important directions for future research.

This article considers the question of whether and to what degree citizens are responsible collectively for the actions of their state. In contrast to current accounts of collective responsibility, which focus on causality or affect as means for transmitting responsibility, the article develops an alternative account, the ‘authorized state’ model. This model, drawn from core intuitions of the social contract tradition, sees collective responsibility as being transmitted through the state as the agent or representative of its citizens. Having developed this model as an ideal type, the article then assesses under what circumstances the model is most applicable. The article finally applies the model to the US war in Iraq to assess the collective responsibility of US citizens for the outcomes of that war.

While the strategic objectives of those who organize suicide terrorism may be explained in rationalist terms, the choice of those who volunteer to be candidates for death is far more problematic, given the high premium, at least within international relations theory, on survival as the ultimate rational end. The rational choice model also makes it difficult to take language or emotion into account as factors in constituting the meaning of the act. This article begins with an observation: In Western discourse the acts of human bombs tend to be referred to as ‘suicide terrorism’ or ‘suicide bombings’; by contrast the terminology of ‘martyrdom operations’ is more prevalent in the Arab and Muslim Middle East, or among Islamists in the West. The first section of the paper examines the importance of context for understanding the rationality of an action. The second explores ‘martyrdom’ and ‘suicide’ as two distinct frameworks for giving meaning to an act of voluntary death in the post-9/11 world, and the emotional dynamics that link these two ‘games’ to a larger structural logic. The third section further develops the structural logic that emerges from the interaction of the two. The conclusions analyse the significance of this argument for rethinking both the structural dynamics of this international context, as well as the theoretical model of games.