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Whose perception of justice? Real and perceived challenges to military investigations in armed conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2021

Claire Simmons
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Abstract

States must investigate possible violations of international humanitarian law in armed conflict, and many States use military procedures for all or part of the investigation process. Particular tensions can arise with regard to the perception of justice in the context of military judicial procedures, especially surrounding questions of independence and impartiality. This article lays out the international legal framework which should be used to solve these challenges, arguing that a State must address both the specificities of military institutions and the need for a perception of justice by the affected communities in considering the proper administration of justice in armed conflict.

Keywords

military justiceinvestigationsIHL violationsindependence and impartialityperception of justice
Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 102 , Issue 914: Emerging Voices , August 2020 , pp. 807 - 822
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC

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References

1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), Rule 158, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1; Noam Lubell, Jelena Pejic and Claire Simmons, Guidelines on Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Law, Policy, and Good Practice, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, 2019 (Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL), paras 12–17; Turkel Commission, Second Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010: Israel's Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law, Israel, February 2013 (Second Turkel Report), p. 93, para. 37; Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws to Monitor and Assess Any Domestic, Legal or Other Proceedings Undertaken by Both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Side, in the Light of General Assembly Resolution 254/64 Including the Independence, Effectiveness, Genuineness of These Investigations and Their Conformity with International Standards, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/50, 23 September 2010 (Tomuschat Report), para. 30; UNGA Res. 60/147, “UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005 (Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy), para. II(3)(b).

2 Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL, above note 1, para. 32.

3 Second Turkel Report, above note 1, pp. 114–117 and 129, para. 82; Schmitt, Michael N., “Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed Conflict”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2011, p. 55Google Scholar; Tomuschat Report, above note 1.

4 Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL, above note 1, para. 30.

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6 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment, 7 July 2011, para. 164. See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Series C, No. 124, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 15 June 2005, para. 153; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum v. Zimbabwe, Appl. No. 245/02, Decision on Merits, 15 May 2006, para. 154; Tomuschat Report, above note 1, para. 32; Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53, 8 March 2006, para. 36; Francoise J. Hampson, “An Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 46, 2016, p. 19; Alon Margalit, Investigating Civilian Casualties in Time of Armed Conflict and Belligerent Occupation: Manoeuvring between Legal Regimes and Paradigms for the Use of Force, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2018, p. 68.

7 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 30 January 2015, para. 1932; International Criminal Court (ICC), Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016, para. 197; ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 8 June 2018, paras 169–170.

8 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, para. 1389.

9 Bill Boothby, The Law of Targeting, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 173; Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 353; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 1, Rule 15; Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Arts 41(3), 56(2), 57(2)(a), 58, 78(1), 86(2); Protocol (II) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 2 December 1983, Art. 3; Protocol (III) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, 10 October 1980, Art. 1(5).

10 This article focuses on violations committed by a State's own armed forces. Although duties to investigate may arise in other contexts and for other actors, different considerations may apply in such contexts, especially related to the perception of justice.

11 Michael Gibson, “Military Justice in Operational Settings, Peacekeeping Missions and Situations of Transitional Justice”, in Alison Duxbury and Matthew Groves (eds), Military Justice in the Modern Age, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 386; Liivoja, Rain, “Service Jurisdiction under International Law”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2010, pp. 309–310Google Scholar; Rain Liivoja, “Military Justice”, in Markus Dirk Dubber and Tatjana Hornle (eds), Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 347.

12 Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL, above note 1, para. 164; Claire Simmons, “The Scope of Military Jurisdiction for Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 54 No. 1, 2021, p. 13.

13 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 16 November 2005, paras 663–664; ECtHR, Hanan v. Germany, Appl. No. 4871/16, Judgment, 16 February 2021, para. 181.

14 Arne Willy Dahl, “Military Justice and Self-Interest in Accountability”, in Morten Bergsmo and Tianying Song (eds), Military Self-Interest in Accountability for Core International Crimes, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2016, p. 27; Benjamin Heng, Rain Liivoja, Daniel Ng and Bruce Oswald, “Military Justice in Comparative and International Perspective: A View from the Asia Pacific”, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol. 20, No. 1–2, 2016; Victor Hansen, “The Impact of Military Justice Reforms on the Law of Armed Conflict: How to Avoid Unintended Consequences”, in A. Duxbury and M. Groves (eds), above note 11, p. 126; C. Simmons, above note 12, p. 14. For criticisms and limits of some of these reasons, see Pauline Collins, The Military as a Separate Society: Consequences for Discipline in the United States and Australia, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2019, pp. 15–36.

15 P. Collins, above note 14, p. 32; B. Heng et al., above note 14, p. 135.

16 The matter of non-criminal offences is often not considered, although such offences can also have serious implications. A. Margalit, above note 6, pp. 158–160.

17 ECtHR, Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey, Appl. No. 24014/05, Judgment, 14 April 2015, paras 222, 249; ECtHR, Hanan, above note 13, para. 209; IACHR, Favela Novela Brasilia v. Brasil, Series C, No. 333, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 16 February 2017, para. 189.

18 ECtHR, Tunç, above note 17, para. 223; IACtHR, Favela Nova Brasilia, above note 17, para. 189; ACHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan, Case No. 279/03-296/05, Decision, 27 May 2009, para. 150.

19 AP I, Art. 86; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 1, Rule 153.

20 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber II), 31 January 2005, para. 376; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 26 February 2001, para. 446; Guénaël Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 233; Sepinwall, Amy J., “Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2009, p. 256Google Scholar.

21 Second Turkel Report, above note 1, p. 118, paras 66–67; ECtHR, Tunç, above note 17, paras 219–223.

22 A. Margalit, above note 6, p. 69.

23 See ibid., pp. 153–183.

24 Ibid., p. 65.

25 Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL, above note 1, Guideline 2; A. Margalit, above note 6, p. 188.

26 David M. O'Brien and Yasou Ohkhosi, “Shifting Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary”, in Peter H. Russell and David M. O'Brien (eds), Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 2001, p. 37.

27 See, for example, the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service, the Canadian Forces Military Police and National Investigative Service, the Military Police Criminal Investigation Department in Israel, the Royal Military Constabulary in the Netherlands, the Special Investigations Branch of the Royal Military Police in the UK, and the Military Criminal Investigation Organizations in the US Army, Navy and Air Force.

28 It is suggested that the standards of independence and impartiality in such cases also need to respond to the effectiveness of the investigation as a whole. In some cases, this may mean that it is perfectly acceptable for the commander of a unit implicated in an incident to investigate. Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL, above note 1, para. 16; A. Margalit, above note 6, pp. 70–72.

29 See, for example, the arguments put forward in IACHR, Rodríguez Vera et al. (the Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia, Series C, No. 287, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 14 November 2014, para. 447, citing the expert opinion of Federico Andreu Guzmán.

30 Peter Rowe, “How Well Do International Human Rights Bodies Understand Military Courts?”, in A. Duxbury and M. Groves (eds), above note 11, p. 28.

31 The effects of in-group loyalty on cover-up attempts are not unique to armed forces, and have been observed, for example, within private companies (Kundro, Timothy G. and Nurmohamed, Samir, “Understanding When and Why Coverups Are Punished Less Severely”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 64, No. 2, 2021CrossRefGoogle Scholar). The phenomenon is, however, particularly problematic in contexts involving potential use of State-sanctioned lethal force such as police and military personnel (Ouellet, Marie, Hashimi, Sadaf, Gravel, Jason and Papachristos, Andrew V., “Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the Social Transmission of Police Misconduct”, Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019, p. 679CrossRefGoogle Scholar). For an example of how toxic loyalty has impeded military investigations, see Philip McCormack, “Case Study 1: Levels of Loyalty: Country, Service, Mission, Troops”, in Michael Skerker, David Whetham and Don Carrick (eds), Military Values, Howgate Publishing, Havant, 2019.

32 David Whetham, “Special Operations Command: Leadership and Ethics Review”, in Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, 2020 (Brereton Report), Annex A to Chap. 3.03, p. 504; P. Collins, above note 14, p. 6; P. McCormack, above note 31, p. 88. See also Daniel Muñoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Frésard, The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations, ICRC, Geneva, October 2004, p. 6.

33 This closing of ranks has been observed in various cases, such as the Baha Mousa scandal involving the British Armed Forces (P. McCormack, above note 31, p. 88) and the war crimes allegedly committed in Afghanistan by the Australian Defence Force, as detailed in the Brereton Report (D. Whetham, above note 32, p. 504).

34 D. Whetham, above note 32, p. 512; P. Collins, above note 14, p. 6.

35 P. McCormack, above note 31, p. 92.

36 P. McCormack, above note 31, p. 90; D. Muñoz-Rojas and J.-J. Frésard, above note 32, p. 15.

37 See C. Simmons, above note 12, pp. 20–21; ECtHR, Tunç, above note 17, paras 219–225.

38 Meron, Theodor, “Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 2, 2005, p. 359CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Brett Kyle and Andrew Reiter, Military Courts, Civil-Military Relations, and the Legal Battle for Democracy: The Politics of Military Justice, Taylor & Francis, London, 2021, p. 7; Pasquino, Pasquale, “Prolegomena to a Theory of Judicial Power: The Concept of Judicial Independence in Theory and History”, Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2014, pp. 22–25Google Scholar; Kiyoshi Shimokawa, “Locke's Conception of Justice”, in Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, Routledge, London, 2003, pp. 66–67.

40 T. Meron, above note 38, p. 359; Peter H. Russell, “Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence”, in P. H. Russell and D. M. O'Brien (eds), above note 26, p. 9.

41 ECtHR, Piersack v. Belgium, Appl. No. 8692/79, Judgment, 1 October 1982, para. 30; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, “Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, para. 21.

42 Shimon Shetreet, “Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges”, in Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschênes (eds), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1985.

43 M. Ouellet et al., above note 31, p. 676.

44 Reichman, Amnon, “Judicial Independence in Times of War: Prolonged Armed Conflict and Judicial Review of Military Actions in Israel”, Utah Law Review, Vol. 2011, No. 1, 2011, p. 63Google Scholar; Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2005, p. 100.

45 Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 83.

46 ECtHR, Piersack, above note 41, para. 30.

47 ECtHR, Hauschildt v. Denmark, Appl. No. 10486/83, Judgment, 24 May 1989, para. 48. Although the function of investigations is not the same as that of trials, these considerations are still useful in informing the standards applicable to investigations as one element of the administration of justice by a State.

48 A. W. Dahl, above note 14, p. 21; B. Heng et al., above note 14, pp. 136–137.

49 B. Kyle and A. Reiter, above note 39, p. 6.

50 C. Simmons, above note 12, p. 23.

51 Second Turkel Report, above note 1, p. 114, para. 63, and pp. 145–146, paras 106–107; Lieblich, Eliav, “Show Us the Films: Transparency, National Security and Disclosure of Information Collected by Advanced Weapon Systems under International Law”, Israel Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2012Google Scholar; Open Society Foundations and Open Society Justice Initiative, The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane Principles), New York, 12 June 2013.

52 Guidelines on Investigating Violations of IHL, above note 1, para. 147.

53 Ibid., para. 153.

54 Wong, Sylvaine, “Investigating Civilian Casualties in Armed Conflict: Comparing U.S. Military Investigations with Alternatives under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law”, Naval Law Review, Vol. 64, 2015, pp. 138–150Google Scholar; Boutruche, Theo, “Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of International Humanitarian Law: Challenges in Theory and Practice”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krebs, Shiri, “The Legalization of Truth in International Fact-Finding”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2017Google Scholar.

55 This is evident through the subsidiary and complementary nature of most international mechanisms, such as regional human rights courts and the ICC. It is also observable through mechanisms set up by different UN bodies, often in response to “gross and systematic” violations at the domestic level. See, for example, Cecilia Medina Quiroga, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1988, p. 7; Lori F. Damrosch, “Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations”, in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, paras 1–9.

56 Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy, above note 1, para. 22(b); Yasmin Naqvi, “The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 862, 2006; Christine Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, p. 51; Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 225; Szoke-Burke, Sam, “Searching for the Right to Truth: The Impact of International Human Rights Law on National Transitional Justice Policies”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2015, pp. 532–535Google Scholar; Mac-Gregor, Eduardo Ferrer, “The Right to Truth as an Autonomous Right under the Inter-American Human Rights System”, Mexican Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2016, pp. 122–126Google Scholar; Sweeney, James A., “The Elusive Right to Truth in Transitional Human Rights Jurisprudence”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2018, p. 383CrossRefGoogle Scholar.