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In conversation with Delphine van Solinge, the ICRC's Protection Advisor on Digital Risks for Populations in Armed Conflict, and Massimo Marelli, Head of the ICRC's Data Protection Office
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 November 2020
In this Q&A, the Review talks to Delphine van Solinge and Massimo Marelli of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Van Solinge is the ICRC's focal point for understanding how digital technologies and the spread of harmful information affect populations living in conflict environments, and what this means for humanitarian action. To this end, her portfolio is focused on exploring, on behalf of the ICRC and through partnerships, how to mitigate the risks that digital technologies bring in humanitarian settings and ensure relevant protection responses in the digital age. Marelli is Head of the ICRC's Data Protection Office (DPO). During his tenure with the ICRC, the organization has chartered new pathways for how it can carry out its operational work, while ensuring that the data of the affected people which it serves, as well those of its employees, are well protected.
During this conversation, van Solinge and Marelli discuss how their areas of work complement and reinforce each other, forming two halves of the same coin with regard to how digital information and data can both be used for positive change and misused in humanitarian settings. Marelli highlights how humanitarian organizations process, protect and use data and digital information. Van Solinge discusses how through misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, information can be manipulated and spread using digital technologies – particularly in the age of the COVID-19, when populations are more reliant on digital communication technologies. Among the issues they discuss are how digital technologies can be used positively, the ethical considerations that humanitarian organizations should take into account, and the possible paths forward for public–private sector collaborations on this theme.
1 For further reading on these terms, see Singer, Peter and Brooking, Emerson T., LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, MA, 2018Google Scholar, available at: www.likewarbook.com; Silverman, Mark, “Book Review: LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 101, No. 910, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/2019-12/irrc_101_910_21.pdf; Mingers, John and Standing, Craig, “What is Information? Toward a Theory of Information as Objective and Veridical”, Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2018CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41265-017-0038-6.
2 Radio Mille Collines, also known as Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, was a Rwandan radio station that spread disinformation and misinformation during its broadcasts between 8 July 1993 and 31 July 1994. The false propaganda that it spread played a dominant role in inciting the 1994 Rwandan Genocide against the Tutsi people in the country. For more information, see Baisley, Elizabeth, “Genocide and Constructions of Hutu and Tutsi in Radio Propaganda”, Race and Class, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2014CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306396813509194.
3 ICRC, The Humanitarian Metadata Problem: “Doing No Harm” in the Digital Era, 2018, available at: www.icrc.org/en/download/file/85089/the_humanitarian_metadata_problem_-_icrc_and_privacy_international.pdf.
4 ICRC, “The ICRC Biometrics Policy”, 16 October 2019, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-biometrics-policy.
5 In those contexts, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have been used to spread misinformation, rumours and hateful speech which have exacerbated tensions and led to acts of violence on the ground.
6 The referenced flash mob dance can be seen at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EYAUazLI9k.
7 ICRC, “Digital Trails Could Endanger People Receiving Humanitarian Aid, ICRC and Privacy International Find”, 7 October 2018, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/digital-trails-could-endanger-people-receiving-humanitarian-aid-icrc-and-privacy.
8 ICRC, Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action, 23 August 2017, available at: www.icrc.org/en/data-protection-humanitarian-action-handbook.
9 For example, see UN Department of Global Communications, “UN Tackles ‘Infodemic’ of Misinformation and Cybercrime in COVID-19 Crisis”, 31 March 2020, available at: www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/un-tackling-‘infodemic’-misinformation-and-cybercrime-covid-19; Farah Lalalni and Juraj Majcin, “Inside the Battle to Counteract the COVID-19 ‘Infodemic’”, World Economic Forum, 9 April 2020, available at: www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/covid-19-inside-the-battle-to-counteract-the-coronavirus-infodemic/.
10 The report of the London Symposium on Digital Risks in Armed Conflicts can be found at: www.icrc.org/fr/publication/4403-symposium-report-digital-risks-armed-conflicts.
11 ICRC, ICRC Rules on Personal Data Protection, 2015, available at: www.icrc.org/en/publication/4261-icrc-rules-on-personal-data-protection.
12 Ibid.; see also ICRC, “Policy on the Processing of Biometric Data by the ICRC”, 28 August 2019, available at: www.icrc.org/en/download/file/106620/icrc_biometrics_policy_adopted_29_august_2019_.pdf
13 ICRC, above note 11.
14 For example, the ICRC and the Brussels Privacy Hub have collaborated together on the Data Protection in Humanitarian Action Project, aimed at the staff of humanitarian organizations involved in processing personal data as part of humanitarian operations, particularly those in charge of advising on and applying data protection standards. Outputs include the Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action, available at: www.icrc.org/en/data-protection-humanitarian-action-handbook. The ICRC has collaborated and/or consulted with experts from numerous organizations in its data protection work, including but not limited to the Brussels Privacy Hub, the Swiss Data Protection Authority, the European Data Protection Supervisor, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Yale University, Privacy International, the French-Speaking Association of Personal Data Protection Authorities, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne, Doctors Without Borders, and the Senegalese Data Protection Authority.
15 For a more detailed analysis of the ICRC's role in safeguarding the “digital humanitarian space”, see Massimo Marelli, “Hacking Humanitarians: Moving Towards a Humanitarian Cybersecurity Strategy”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 16 January 2020, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2020/01/16/hacking-humanitarians-cybersecurity-strategy/.
16 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Family Links Network, Code of Conduct on Data Protection, November 2015, available at: www.icrc.org/en/download/file/18229/rfl-code-of-conduct.pdf.
17 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, “33rd International Conference: At a Glance”, available at: https://rcrcconference.org/about/33rd-international-conference/.
18 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, “Resolution: Restoring Family Links While Respecting Privacy, Including as It Relates to Personal Data Protection”, 33rd International Conference, 9–12 December 2019, available at: https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2019/12/33IC-R4-RFL-_CLEAN_ADOPTED_en.pdf.
19 Shana Lynch, “Artificial Intelligence and COVID-19: How Technology Can Understand, Track and Improve Health Outcomes”, Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence Blog, 1 April 2020, available at: https://hai.stanford.edu/blog/artificial-intelligence-and-covid-19-how-technology-can-understand-track-and-improve-health.
20 ICRC, above note 11.
21 “Technocolonialism”, as defined by Mirca Madianou, refers to “how the convergence of digital developments with humanitarian structures and market forces reinvigorates and reshapes colonial relationships of dependency”. See Madianou, Mirca, “Technocolonialism: Digital Innovation and Data Practices in the Humanitarian Response to Refugee Crises”, Social Media and Society, Vol. 5, No. 3, 26 July 2019Google Scholar, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2056305119863146.
22 For example, Google is removing false or misleading information about COVID-19 from its various platforms and in advertisements; see Sundar Pichai, “COVID-19: How We're Continuing to Help”, Inside Google, 15 March 2020, available at: https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/covid-19-how-were-continuing-to-help/. Twitter now verifies tweets and Twitter accounts for the credibility of information they offer, and has put in place informative #KnowTheFacts search prompts; see “Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter”, Twitter Blog, 3 April 2020, available at: https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html.