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Nuclear arsenals: Current developments, trends and capabilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2016

Hans M. Kristensen  and
Matthew G. McKinzie
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Abstract

In this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.

Keywords

nuclear weaponsnuclear warnuclear arms control and disarmament
Type
The Current State of Disarmament
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 97 , Issue 899: The human cost of nuclear weapons , September 2015 , pp. 563 - 599
Copyright
Copyright © icrc 2016 

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References

1 Chinese military officials have reportedly recommended increasing the readiness of Chinese nuclear forces, and India is developing a “canistered” launcher for its long-range nuclear missiles to increase their responsiveness. For reports about these developments, see Gregory Kulacki, China's Military Calls for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert, Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2016, available at: www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/02/China-Hair-Trigger-full-report.pdf (all internet references were accessed in March 2016); Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), “DRDO Test-Fires Canisterised Agni 5 ICBM”, DRDO Newsletter, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2015Google Scholar, available at: http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/newsletter/2015/Mar_15.pdf.

2 Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5, 2013, p. 76Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/5/75.full.pdf+html.

3 For an overview and additional documentation on the status of global and national nuclear arsenals, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, FAS, 26 May 2016, available at: http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.

4 Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change, NRDC, June 2001, available at: www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/us-nuclear-war-plan-report.pdf.

5 Matthew G. McKinzie, Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar and M. V. Ramana, “The Risk and Consequences of Nuclear War in South Asia”, in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (eds), Out of the Nuclear Shadow, Rainbow Publishers, New Delhi, 2001.

6 Matthew G. McKinzie, The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan, NRDC, 2003.

7 Ira Helfand, Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk? Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition, 2nd ed., IPPNW and Physicians for Social Responsibility, November 2013, available at: www.ippnw.org/pdf/nuclear-famine-two-billion-at-risk-2013.pdf.

8 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, United Nations, 2000, available at: www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.

9 See, for example, Robert A. Wood, Ambassador, “Statement by the United States to the NPT Review Conference Main Committee I”, US Department of State, 1 May 2015, available at: www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2015/241401.htm.

10 Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie, Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2012, available at: www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/reducing-alert-rates-of-nuclear-weapons-400.pdf.

11 For strategic nuclear forces loadings, see NRDC, “Table of US Strategic Offensive Force Loadings”, 25 November 2002, available at: www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab1.asp; and “Table of USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Force Loadings”, 25 November 2002.

12 The estimate of 3,440 warheads deployed on ballistic missiles assumes roughly 1,670 warheads on Russian missiles, approximately 1,410 warheads on US missiles, about 240 warheads on French missiles, and 120 warheads on British missiles. More than 1,500 weapons could be loaded on bombers within days.

13 For overviews of the arsenals of the different nuclear-armed States, see the FAS Nuclear Notebook series published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/cgi/collection/nuclearnotebook.

14 Warhead yield estimates are derived from the FAS Nuclear Notebook series, ibid. For a chronology of nuclear weapon tests, see Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, “Nuclear Testing 1945–Today”, available at: www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/nuclear-testing-1945-today/.

15 Ibid.

16 For a review of nuclear alert postures, see H. M. Kristensen and M. G. McKinzie, above note 10.

17 G. P. Nanos, Rear Admiral, US Navy, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, “Strategic Systems Update”, The Submarine Review, Naval Submarines League, April 1997, available at: https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/W76nanos.pdf.

18 Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1984, p. 177.

19 For overviews of the arsenals of the different nuclear-armed States, see the FAS Nuclear Notebook series, above note 13.

20 US Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, “China's Nuclear Weapons Testing: Facing Prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban”, Intelligence Memorandum, 93-20044C M, 30 September 1993, p. 5, available at: www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000996367.pdf.

21 See, for example, Aaron Mehta, “Former SecDef Perry: US on ‘Brink’ of New Nuclear Arms Race”, Defense News, 3 December 2015, available at: www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/2015/12/03/former-secdef-perry-us-brink-new-nuclear-arms-race/76721640/.

22 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “New START”, available at: www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm.

23 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered”, 5 April 2009, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

24 US Department of State, above note 22.

25 For an overview of the US modernization programme and weapon details, see Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “US Nuclear Forces, 2015”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2015Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.full.pdf+html.

26 For public statements on the 2013 nuclear weapons employment strategy, see The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States”, 19 June 2013, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states; US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C., 12 June 2013, available at: www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf.

27 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University”, 26 March 2012, p. 3, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university.

28 For analysis of the Obama administration's nuclear weapons employment strategy, see Hans M. Kristensen, “New Nuclear Weapons Employment Guidance Puts Obama's Fingerprint on Nuclear Weapons Policy and Strategy”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 20 June 2013, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/06/nukeguidance/.

29 US Department of Defense, above note 26, p. 6.

30 For analysis of the Obama administration's performance on nuclear warhead reductions, see Hans M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear Stockpile Numbers Published Enroute to Hiroshima”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 26 May 2016, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/05/hiroshima-stockpile/; William Broad, “Reduction of Nuclear Arsenal Has Slowed under Obama, Report Finds”, New York Times, 27 May 2016, available at: www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/science/nuclear-weapons-obama-united-states.html.

31 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release of Nuclear Posture Review”, 6 April 2010, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-barack-obama-release-nuclear-posture-review.

32 For an analysis of the capability of the new B61-12 guided nuclear bomb, see Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie, “Video Shows Earth-Penetrating Capability of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 14 January 2016, available at: https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/01/b61-12_earth-penetration/; Hans M. Kristensen, “B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 15 June 2010, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/06/b61-12/.

33 For documentation on this development, see Theodore A. Postol, Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie, “How Nuclear Force Modernization is Undermining Strategic Stability”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, forthcoming 2016; Theodore A. Postol, “How the Obama Administration Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”, The Nation, 10 December 2014, available at: www.thenation.com/print/article/192633/how-obama-administration-learned-stop-worrying-and-love-bomb; Hans M. Kristensen, “Small Fuze – Big Effect”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 14 March 2007, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2007/03/small_fuze_-_big_effect/.

34 US Department of Energy, NNSA, Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship Management Program, March 2015, pp. 1-2–1-4, available at: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/FY16SSMP_FINAL%203_16_2015_reducedsize.pdf.

35 US Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, “Underwater Wonder, Submarines: A Powerful Deterrent”, Warfighter Solutions, Autumn 2008, p. 14; Draper Laboratory, “Keeping Trident Ever Ready”, Explorations, Spring 2006, p. 8.

36 Stephen Young, “Commentary: The US Is More Secure without New, Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missile”, Defense News, 13 January 2016, available at: www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2016/01/13/why-is-the-obama-administration-promoting-the-the-long-range-standoff-weapon/78693312/.

37 Kris Osborn, “Ohio Replacement Subs to Shift to Electric Drive”, DefenseTech, 27 September 2013, available at: www.defensetech.org/2013/09/27/ohio-class-subs-to-shift-to-electric-drive/.

38 US Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015–2024, 22 January 2015, p. 4, available at: www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49870-NuclearForces.pdf.

39 James Miller, statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 4 May 2011, p. 5, available at: www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/testMiller05042011.pdf.

40 Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis and Marc Quint, The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Modernization over the Next Thirty Years, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014, p. 11, available at: http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.pdf.

41 US Department of Defense, above note 26, p. 4.

42 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia”, Russiiskaya Gazeta, 20 February 2012, English translation available at: http://rt.com/politics/official-word/strong-putin-military-russia-711.

43 Vladimir Putin, remarks at the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, 19 December 2014, available at: http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23410.

44 “Relocation of Russian Strategic Missile Troops Academy Explained”, Interfax-AVN, 16 December 2015, translated from Russian by BBC Monitoring.

45 For further details of the Russian ICBM modernization programme and missile types, see Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 3, 2016Google Scholar, available at: www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359.

46 Olga Bozhyev, “Источники: Россия успешно испытала новое ракетное супероружие” (“Sources: Russia Successfully Tested a New Missile Superweapon”), MKRU, 20 April 2016, available at: www.mk.ru/print/article/1426570/.

47 For an overview of Russian nuclear forces, see Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 3, 2015Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0096340215581363.full.pdf+html.

48 The increased warhead capacity of the Borei SSBN force also raises another issue: although the future ICBM force will probably carry fewer warheads than today (approximately 750), increasing the warhead load on the SSBNs to maximum would, by the early 2020s, bring Russia into conflict with the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Therefore, it is likely that Russia plans to create a hedge of non-deployed warheads, similar to the US practice of keeping most of its strategic warheads in non-deployed storage (and thus non-accountable under the terms of the New START Treaty). For an overview of Russian nuclear forces, see H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, above note 45.

49 For an overview of Russian nuclear forces, see ibid.

50 “Russia's New Generation Strategic Bomber to Make First Flight in 2019 – Air Force”, ISAR-TASS, 13 February 2015, available at: http://tass.ru/en/russia/777542.

51 For an overview of Russian and US non-strategic nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, FAS Special Report No. 3, May 2012, available at: http://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.

52 For an overview of the status and trend of Russian non-strategic nuclear forces, see H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, above note 45; H. M. Kristensen, above note 51.

53 For reviews of non-strategic nuclear weapons, see Amy Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, 23 February 2015, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf; Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 2012”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68, No. 5, 2012Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/5/96.full.pdf+html.

54 “Russian Forces ‘Capable of Being Nuclear’ Moving to Crimea, NATO Chief Aays”, CBS News, 11 November 2014, available at: www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-forces-capable-of-being-nuclear-moving-to-crimea-nato-chief-says/, cited in Hans M. Kristensen, “Rumors about Nuclear Weapons in Crimea”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 18 December 2014, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/12/crimea/.

55 See Scramble Intelligence Service, SIS-Summary, Vol. 16, No. 735, 22 May 2016Google Scholar; Piti Spotter Club Verona, “Fabrizio Berni @ Steadfast Noon 2014 – Ghedi AB”, November 2014, available at: www.pitispotterclub.it/foto-manifestazioni-e-trasferte/2014/2014-steadfast-noon-2014-ghedi/, cited in Hans M. Kristensen, “Polish F-16s NATO Nuclear Exercise in Italy”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 27 October 2014, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/10/steadfastnoon/.

56 “Russia Expresses Concern over NATO Expanded Nuclear-Capable Pilot Training”, Sputnik, 24 December 2014, available at: http://sputniknews.com/military/20141224/1016203427.html.

57 For an overview of Chinese nuclear forces, see Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2015Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf+html.

58 For a review of Chinese nuclear and military strategy, see Gregory Kulacki, The Chinese Military Updates China's Nuclear Strategy, Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2015, available at: www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/chinese-nuclear-strategy-full-report.pdf.

59 See, for example, Gregory Kulacki, China's Military Calls for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert, Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2016, available at: www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/02/China-Hair-Trigger-full-report.pdf.

60 US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016, Annual Report to Congress, May 2016, p. 109, available at: www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf.

61 Hans M. Kristensen, “Pentagon Report: China Deploys MIRV Missile”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 11 May 2015, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/05/china-mirv/.

62 For a description of the Chinese SSBN force, see H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, above note 57.

63 Hans M. Kristensen, private conversation with Chinese officials.

64 Hans M. Kristensen, “China's Noisy Nuclear Submarines”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 21 November 2009, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2009/11/subnoise/.

65 For a copy of the Air Force Global Strike Command briefing, see Hans M. Kristensen, “Air Force Briefing Shows Nuclear Modernizations but Ignores US and UK Programs”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 29 May 2013, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/05/afgsc-brief2013/.

66 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic Missile and Cruise Missile Threat, June 2013, p. 29.

67 US Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, “China's Nuclear Weapons Testing: Facing Prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban”, Intelligence Memorandum, 93-20044C M, 30 September 1993, p. 5, available at: www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000996367.pdf.

68 The Chinese minimum deterrence strategy contrasts with the mutual assured destruction strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as well as the flexible response strategy that has guided US nuclear planning since the 1960s. For a description of China's current military strategy, see G. Kulacki, above note 58.

69 For an overview of French nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen, “France”, in Assuring Destruction Forever: 2015 Edition, Reaching Critical Will, 2015, available at: http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2015_France_AssuringDestructionForever_ReachingCriticalWill.pdf.

70 Ibid.

71 For an overview of British nuclear forces, see Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M., “The British Nuclear Stockpile, 1953–2013”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2013Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/4/69.full.pdf+html.

72 Hans M. Kristensen, “British Submarines to Receive Upgraded US Nuclear Warhead”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 1 April 2011, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/04/britishw76-1/.

73 For an overview of Indian nuclear forces, see Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2015”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 5, 2015Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/5/77.full.pdf+html.

74 Hans M. Kristensen, “India's Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 4 October 2013, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/10/indianmirv/.

75 For an overview of Pakistani nuclear forces, see Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S., “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 6, 2015Google Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/10/06/0096340215611090.full.pdf+html.

76 Pakistani Ministry of Defence, Inter Services Public Relations, Press Release No. PR378/2015-ISPR, 11 December 2015, available at: www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/12/11.

77 Hans M. Kristensen, “Pakistan's ‘Shoot and Scoot’ Nukes: FAS Nukes in Newsweek”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 17 May 2011, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/05/pakistan/.

78 For a groundbreaking study of Israel's nuclear weapons policy, see Avner Cohen and William Burr, Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, description and supporting documents available at: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/israel/; this and other declassified record collections are available in the National Security Archive Nuclear Vault at: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb/index.htm.

79 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2014”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 2014, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/6/97.full.pdf+html.

80 For an overview of North Korean nuclear capabilities, see US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Report to Congress, January 2015, available at: www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF.

81 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2010, available at: www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf; NATO, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, 12 May 2012, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm.

82 Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M., “US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011”, FAS Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2011CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf+html.

83 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, above note 25.

84 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161, 1 July 1968 (entered into force 5 March 1970), Art. 1, available at: www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf.

85 The White House, above note 31.

86 NATO, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, above note 81, para. 8. The extension and modernization of the US nuclear deployment in Europe also competes with scarce resources needed for more important conventional forces and operations that would be much more credible than tactical nuclear weapons in providing security assurance to Eastern NATO allies. But the crisis fuelled by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has stalled ideas about reducing or withdrawing US non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe for now.

87 For reviews of US strategic nuclear planning, see Hans M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear War Plan Updated Amidst Nuclear Policy Review”, FAS Strategic Security Blog, 4 April 2013, available at: http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/oplan8010-12/; Hans M. Kristensen, Obama and the Nuclear War Plan, FAS, February 2010, available at: http://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/WarPlanIssueBrief2010.pdf.

88 Ibid.

89 General Philip Breedlove, Commander, US Forces Europe, prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 2015, p. 24, available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20150225/103011/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-BreedloveUSAFP-20150225.pdf.

90 Ibid.

91 “POLAR GROWL Strengthens Allied Interoperability, Essential Bomber Navigation Skills”, US Strategic Command Public Affairs, 1 April 2015, available at: www.afgsc.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/2612/Article/629284/polar-growl-strengthens-allied-interoperability-essential-bomber-navigation-ski.aspx.

92 Hans M. Kristensen, personal communication with US military officials.

93 “U.S. Strategic Command Concludes Command, Control Exercise”, US Strategic Command Public Affairs, 27 March 2015.

94 Carla Pampe, “Exercise Tests Command's Deterrent Capabilities”, Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs, 13 May 2015, available at: www.afgsc.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/2612/Article/629252/exercise-tests-commands-deterrent-capabilities.aspx.

95 Robert Work, Assistant Secretary of Defence, speech to 60th annual fleet ballistic missile program anniversary, 14 January 2016, available at: www.defense.gov/Video?videoid=426449#.VhUh8O2nVGo.facebook; Michael Melia, “Port Visits Resume for Nuclear-Armed Navy Subs”, Associated Press, 21 December 2015, available at: http://news.yahoo.com/apnewsbreak-port-visits-resume-nuclear-armed-navy-subs-135612125.html; “SSBN Arrives at Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde for Port Visit”, US Strategic Command Public Affairs, 19 September 2015, available at: www.stratcom.mil/news/2015/577/SSBN_Arrives_at_Her_Majestys_Naval_Base_Clyde_for_Port_Visit/.

96 For an example of a multi-service exercise, see “Russia Holds Military Drills to Repel Nuclear Strike”, Russia Today, 8 May 2014, available at: www.rt.com/news/157644-putin-drills-rocket-launch/.

97 “Russia Holding Major ICBM Exercise”, Interfax-AVN, 12 February 2015, translated from Russian by BBC Monitoring.

98 “Russian Strategic Missile Troops General's TV Talk: Arms, Training, Structure”, Russia 24, 2 November 2012, translated from Russian by Open Source Center via World News Organization.

99 For an overview of US and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, see H. M. Kristensen, above note 51.

100 For reports of Russian officials referring to hypothetical nuclear weapons use, see “Russia Delivers Nuclear Threat to Denmark”, The Local (Denmark), 2 April 2015, available at: www.thelocal.dk/20150321/russia-threatens-denmark-with-nuclear-attack; Ian Johnston, “Russia Threatens to Use ‘Nuclear Force’ over Crimea and the Baltic States”, The Independent, 2 April 2015, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-threatens-to-use-nuclear-force-over-crimea-and-the-baltic-states-10150565.html; Thomas Grove, “Putin Says Russia Was Ready for Nuclear Confrontation Over Crimea”, Reuters, 15 March 2015, available at: www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0MB0GV20150315; Harry de Quetteville and Andrew Pierce, “Russia Threatens Nuclear Attack on Poland over US Missile Deal”, The Telegraph, 15 August 2008, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-threatens-nuclear-attack-on-Poland-over-US-missile-shield-deal.html.

101 NATO, The General Secretary's Annual Report 2015, January 2016, p. 19, available at: www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf.

102 For a report on a French nuclear strike exercise, see French Ministry of Defence, “Démonstration réussie pour les Forces aériennes stratégiques” (“Successful Demonstration of the Strategic Air Forces”), 11 June 2015, available at: www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/ministere/demonstration-reussie-pour-les-forces-aeriennes-strategiques.

103 For a report on a Chinese nuclear missile exercise in February 2016, see “China – Rocket Force/Spring Festival”, CCTV+, 6 February 2016, available at: http://news.cctvplus.tv/NewJsp/news.jsp?fileId=340436

104 For an overview of Pakistan's nuclear forces, see H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, above note 75.

105 For survivor accounts, see the testimony featured in the “Voices and Perspectives” section of this issue of the Review.

106 For descriptions of US nuclear war planning, see M. G. McKinzie, T. B. Cochran, R. S. Norris and W. M. Arkin, above note 4.

107 Matthew G. McKinzie, Erwin Polriech, Dèlia Arnold, Christian Maurer and Gerhard Wotawa, “Calculating the Effects of a Nuclear Explosion at a European Military Base”, presentation made to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 8 December 2014, available at: www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Presentations/HINW14_S1_Presentation_NRDC_ZAMG.pdf.

108 Ibid., pp. 113–128.

109 For studies on the climatic effects of nuclear war, see I. Helfand, above note 7; Robock, Alan, Oman, Luke, Stenchikov, Georgiy L., Toon, Owen B., Bardeen, Charles and Turco, Richard P., “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007Google Scholar, available at: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf.

110 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, above note 3; H. M. Kristensen and M. G. McKinzie, above note 10.