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A matter of principle(s): The legal effect of impartiality and neutrality on States as humanitarian actors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2016

Kubo Mačák
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Abstract

This article examines the legal nature of the principles of impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action, focusing on States as humanitarian actors. It argues that international law does not provide a general legal basis for the universal applicability of these principles, contrary to a common interpretation of the International Court of Justice's 1986 judgment in the Nicaragua case. Nevertheless, impartiality and neutrality may have a significant legal effect on the conduct of States. They may be directly binding on States through the operation of Security Council resolutions drafted in mandatory language. In addition, they may have indirect effect due to the States’ obligation to respect humanitarian organizations’ adherence to the principles. On the basis of this argument, the article pleads for increased conceptual clarity and, in turn, effectiveness of humanitarian action.

Keywords

humanitarian actionhumanitarian principlesimpartialityneutralityinternational humanitarian law
Type
Interpreting the principles
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 97 , Issue 897-898: Principles guiding humanitarian action , June 2015 , pp. 157 - 181
Copyright
Copyright © icrc 2016 

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References

1 Peter Walker and Daniel G. Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World, Routledge, New York, 2014, p. 22.

2 Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino, ICRC, Geneva, 1986 (first published 1862).

3 See generally Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1979. See also Thürer, Daniel, “Dunant's Pyramid: Thoughts on the ‘Humanitarian Space’”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, 2007, p. 50CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“It is striking how the story that Dunant tells already contains in embryonic form all those elements that are later to constitute the form and organizational system of the Red Cross and, to some extent, of other humanitarian organizations.”); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, Cornell University Press, New York, 2011, p. 1 (“The Battle of Solferino became to modern humanitarianism what the Treaty of Westphalia was to modern politics.”); but see Ibid., pp. 78–79 (noting that Dunant was not a lone voice at the time and that there had been others before him who had advocated for the improvement of medical relief in wartime).

4 Most attempts to list humanitarian principles contain at least the following four: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. See, e.g., Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), The 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management, 2nd ed., Geneva, 2010 (HAP Standard), p. 8, available at: www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/2010-hap-standard-in-accountability.pdf (all internet references were accessed in July 2015); Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), What are Humanitarian Principles?, June 2012, p. 1, available at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf; HAP International, People in Aid and the Sphere Project, Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, 2014 (CHS), p. 8, available at: www.corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf. These four humanitarian principles are derived from the Fundamental Principles guiding the work of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, proclaimed in 1965 in Vienna. See 20th International Conference of the Red Cross, “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 5, No. 56, 1965, pp. 573–574Google Scholar.

5 For a definition of these principles, see the corresponding text to notes 14–18 below. The principle of neutrality of humanitarian assistance should be distinguished from neutrality as the status of a State which is not participating in an international armed conflict. In the present article, the term “neutrality” is used only in the former sense. For a general overview of the law of neutrality in the latter sense, see, e.g., Michael Bothe, “The Law of Neutrality”, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 549. For the overlaps between neutrality as a humanitarian principle and the law of neutrality, see Plattner, Denise, “ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 36, No. 311, 1996, pp. 163–165CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 References to “humanitarian actors” throughout the text should be read broadly as encompassing all actors involved in the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid, including States, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private entities. In the same vein, see, e.g., Pfanner, Toni, “Humanitarian Actors: Editorial”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, 2007, p. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Multiple humanitarian actors with different objectives, principles and modi operandi intervene in situations of armed conflict and internal violence in order to alleviate the plight of the victims of those situations: governmental and nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, private companies and even the armed forces.”).

7 See, e.g., Harroff-Tavel, Marion, “Neutrality and Impartiality – The Importance of these Principles for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the Difficulties Involved in Applying Them”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273, 1989, p. 550CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Torrelli, Maurice, “From Humanitarian Assistance to ‘Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds’?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 32, No. 288, 1992, p. 239CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bugnion, François, “Red Cross Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 35, No. 308, 1995, p. 507CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chetail, Vincent, “The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 850, 2003, p. 265Google Scholar; Sylvain Beauchamp, Defining the Humanitarian Space through Public International Law, On the Edges of Conflict Working Paper, 2008, p. 14; Bugnion, François, “The International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Challenges, Key Issues and Achievements”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 876, 2009, p. 702CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some of the authors seek this legal basis in the ICJ's judgment on the merits in the Nicaragua case. It will be shown below that this ruling does not provide a satisfactory justification for such a conclusion and amounts to little more than an instance of judicial fiat: see the corresponding text to notes 28–43 below.

8 See further Pfanner, Toni, “Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857, 2005, pp. 149–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See, e.g., Ferris, Elizabeth, “Megatrends and the Future of Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011, pp. 935–936CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See, e.g., Donini, Antonio, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Integration or Independence of Humanitarian Action?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011, pp. 149–151CrossRefGoogle Scholar (describing these so-called “comprehensive” approaches to conflict resolution undertaken by Western forces in Afghanistan after 2002).

11 See also the corresponding text to notes 134–140 below (outlining the nature, aims, and objectives of the so-called “Dunantist” humanitarian agencies).

12 See, e.g., Anderson, Kenneth, “Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 17, 2004, p. 64Google Scholar; Gadler, Alice, “Armed Forces as Carrying both the Stick and the Carrot? Humanitarian Aid in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq”, Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, p. 231Google Scholar; A. Donini, above note 10, pp. 156–157; McGoldrick, Claudia, “The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011, p. 966CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 See, e.g., Cynthia Brassard-Boudreau and Don Hubert, “Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on Security and Access”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 24 November 2010, available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/863.

14 See, e.g., “Neutral”, Thesaurus.com, available at: http://thesaurus.com/browse/neutral (“Definition: impartial, noncommital”; emphasis added); Joseph R. Nolan and Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley (eds), Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., West Publishing, St. Paul, MN, 1990, p. 1042 (defining the term “Neutral” as the state or quality of being “[i]ndifferent; unbiased; impartial”; emphasis added).

15 See further J. Pictet, above note 3, pp. 34–39; Slim, Hugo, “Relief Agencies and Moral Standing in War: Principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity”, Development in Practice, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1997, p. 347CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M. Harroff-Tavel, above note 7, p. 537; K. Anderson, above note 12, p. 56; Stoffels, Ruth Abril, “Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, 2004, pp. 542–544Google Scholar.

16 J. Pictet, above note 3, pp. 24–33. Pictet understood non-discrimination as the avoidance of “distinction or segregation which one makes to the detriment of certain other persons, for the sole reason that they belong to some specific category” (p. 24); proportionality as the endeavour “to relieve the suffering of individuals in proportion to the degree of their suffering and to give priority according to the degree of urgency” (p. 27); and impartiality stricto sensu as the provision of aid “without taking sides, either for reasons of interest or sympathy” (p. 31).

17 Cf. Yves Sandoz, “Foreword”, in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005 (ICRC Customary Law Study), p. xiv (“For the ICRC, impartiality means not only avoiding discrimination between the different victims of a given conflict, but also constantly striving to ensure that all the victims of all the conflicts on the planet are treated equitably, without regional or ethnic preference and independently of the emotions sparked by media-selected images”; emphasis added); see also Dirk Salomons, “The Perils of Dunantism: The Need for a Rights-Based Approach to Humanitarianism”, in Andrej Zwitter, Christopher K. Lamont, Hans-Joachim Heintze and Joost Herman (eds), Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 41 (arguing that true impartiality would “require a methodology whereby we could compare relative needs on a global scale, assessing the relative value of helping flood victims in Pakistan versus providing food aid for the victims of famine in East Africa”).

18 See further J. Pictet, above note 3, pp. 24–33; H. Slim, above note 15, pp. 348–349; M. Harroff-Tavel, above note 7, pp. 537–538; K. Anderson, above note 12, p. 56; R. A. Stoffels, above note 15, pp. 540–541.

19 D. Thürer, above note 3, p. 55.

20 See, e.g., Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p. 818, para. 2803; Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982, p. 486; Kalshoven, Frits, “Impartiality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Law and Practice”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 29, No. 273, 1989, pp. 523–524CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Whether relief provided in relation to the 1999 conflict did in fact comply with all humanitarian principles is a separate question. For criticism of the Western involvement in the conflict from this angle, see, e.g., Toby Porter, “The Partiality of Humanitarian Assistance – Kosovo in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 17 June 2000, available at: https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/150 (arguing that the principle of impartiality “was compromised or even discarded during the Kosovo crisis”).

22 See, e.g., D. Salomons, above note 17, p. 43 (criticizing humanitarian assistance disbursed to persons in Darfur at the expense of those living in other parts of the Republic of Sudan); Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2013, pp. 74–75 (criticizing assistance provided by the United States during the Afghan conflict in the 1980s as being aimed at the strengthening of the resistance forces and even specific commanders).

23 See, e.g., S. MacFarlane, Neil, “Humanitarian Action and Conflict”, International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1999, pp. 543–544CrossRefGoogle Scholar (criticizing the majority of humanitarian assistance provided during the Spanish Civil War as one-sided and thus decidedly “non-neutral” due to the politicization of many contemporary humanitarian actors).

24 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann, above note 20, p. 818, para. 2803.

25 Ibid.

26 D. Thürer, above note 3, p. 55; see also the corresponding text to note 19 above.

27 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14.

28 See Ibid., para. 20.

29 Ibid., para. 242. The present name of the conference is the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. It brings together governments, policy-makers and the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. See further ICRC, “International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent”, 27 September 2014, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/international-conference-red-cross-and-red-crescent.

30 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 243.

31 Ibid., paras 246 and 292(3).

32 See F. Kalshoven, above note 20, pp. 517–519. This is also how the ruling has been interpreted by a number of commentators: see notes 41–43 below.

33 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 242.

34 See also D. Plattner, above note 5, p. 176 (viewing this passage in the judgment as confirming an aspect of the principle of neutrality).

35 See the corresponding text to note 15 above.

36 See “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, above note 4.

37 Cf. ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 242.

38 For Jean Pictet's classification of the three subprinciples of the principle of impartiality, see note 16 above.

39 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 243.

40 Ibid.

41 V. Chetail, above note 7, p. 265 (“the Court not only confirms the customary character of the fundamental principles of the Red Cross, but considers that these principles have to be respected with regard to any kind of humanitarian assistance, whether it is provided by the Red Cross, or through the United Nations or by States individually”).

42 M. Torrelli, above note 7, p. 239 (emphasis added).

43 F. Bugnion, “The International Conference”, above note 7, p. 702 (“The International Court of Justice thus clearly recognized the mandatory force of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross; they not only oblige states to allow Red Cross and Red Crescent bodies to abide by them, but they are also a source of obligations for states themselves, if the latter claim to be engaged in humanitarian activity.”).

44 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC I); Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC II); Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC III); Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (GC IV).

45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP II).

46 Common Art. 2; AP I, Art. 1(3).

47 Common Art. 3; AP II, Art. 1(1).

48 See, in particular, common Art. 3(2); common Art. 9/9/9/10; GC IV, Arts 59(2), 61(1); AP I, Art. 70(1); AP II, Art. 18(2).

49 Common Art. 3(2); common Art. 9/9/9/10; GC IV, Arts 59(2), 61(1).

50 GC IV, Art. 59(2) (emphasis added).

51 Jean Pictet (ed.), Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: Commentary, ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p. 321.

52 GC IV, Art. 59(3); see also J. Pictet, above note 51, pp. 321–322.

53 AP I, Art. 70(1); AP II, Art. 18(2); see also Harvard School of Public Health, HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, Bern, 2009, Rule 100(a).

54 See common Art. 3; GC III, Art. 16; GC IV, Art. 13; AP I, Art. 75(1); AP II, Art. 4(1); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17, p. 308, Rule 88.

55 See the corresponding text to notes 16–18 above, and particularly note 16 above (detailing Pictet's classification of the subprinciples of the principle of impartiality).

56 AP I, Art. 70(1).

57 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, above note 20, p. 486.

58 Cf. AP II, Art. 18.

59 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann, above note 20, p. 1479, paras. 4882–4883.

60 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, above note 20, pp. 800–801; see also Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann, above note 20, p. 1479, para. 4885 (the refusal of humanitarian and impartial relief without good grounds may amount to a violation of the prohibition against the use of starvation as a method of combat); International Institute of Humanitarian Law, The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, San Remo, 2006, available at: www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf, p. 61, para. 5.1.4 (measures taken by the conflict party in control of an area should not unduly impede or delay the provision of humanitarian assistance); ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17, p. 193, Rule 55 (“parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control”).

61 Kate Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian Action in International Humanitarian Law, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Report No. 5, Overseas Development Institute, London, March 2000, p. 8. For the difference and overlaps between these two meanings of “neutrality”, see further note 5 above and the references cited therein.

62 GC I, Art. 44(2); GC IV, Art. 63(1)(a); AP I, Art. 81(2)–(3).

63 See Board of Governors, XIXth Session, Oxford, 1946, Resolution 12, and Board of Governors, XXth Session, Stockholm, 1948, Resolution 7, reproduced in ICRC, Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 14th ed., ICRC, Geneva, 2008, pp. 723–724.

64 In 1979, this body was replaced by the General Assembly of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

65 Board of Governors, XXVth Session, Athens, 1959, Resolution 16, reproduced in ICRC, above note 63, pp. 724–725 (“it is essential for the Red Cross to observe strict neutrality in political spheres”).

66 “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, above note 4, pp. 573–574. The text was further revised in 1986 in order to replace references to “Red Cross” with “Movement”. For this final version, see ICRC, “The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement”, 31 October 1986, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/red-cross-crescent-movement/fundamental-principles-movement-1986-10-31.htm.

67 AP I, Art. 81(2).

68 AP I, Art. 81(3).

69 Cf. AP I, Art. 81(1).

70 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann, above note 20, pp. 941–942, para. 3322.

71 AP I, Art. 81(4).

72 The article reads as follows (emphasis added): “The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.”

73 Cf. M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and W. A. Solf, above note 20, p. 563.

74 In the same vein, see, e.g., ICRC, “Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations”, statement by the ICRC to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), New York, 12 December 2013, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/united-nations-humanitarian-coordination-2013-12-12.htm (“a State may refuse access to relief only for valid reasons, such as … if the relief being offered is not considered to be humanitarian or impartial”).

75 Cf. V. Chetail, above note 7, p. 265; A. Gadler, above note 12, p. 228.

76 See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 94.

77 International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, London, 2000, p. 11.

78 Fitzmaurice, Gerald, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law”, Recueil des cours, Vol. 92, 1952, p. 7Google Scholar. But see, e.g., Michael Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 29 (arguing that the terms “norms”, “principles” and “rules” of customary law may be used interchangeably as normative equivalents).

79 H. Thirlway, above note 76, p. 94. The two traditional constituent elements of custom are (1) sufficient State practice backed by (2) evidence of the view that such practice is required by law (i.e. opinio juris). See further, e.g., James Crawford (ed.), Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 23–27; H. Thirlway, above note 76, pp. 56–79; ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17, pp. xxxvii–li.

80 UNGA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991, Annex, para. 2.

81 See, e.g., UNGA Res. 51/194, 10 February 1997, preambular para. 12; UNGA Res. 58/114, 17 December 2003, preambular para. 4; UNGA Res. 60/124, 8 March 2006, preambular para. 4; UNGA Res. 61/134, 1 March 2007, preambular para. 4; UNGA Res. 62/94, 25 January 2008, preambular para. 3; UNGA Res. 63/139, 5 March 2009, preambular para. 3; UNGA Res. 66/119, 7 March 2012, preambular para. 3; UNGA Res. 69/243, 23 December 2014, preambular para. 2.

82 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010–2015, September 2009, pp. 10–11, available at: http://um.dk/en/danida-en/activities/strategic/stab-protec/hum-ass/; Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Field Manual—Version 1.0, 2011, section 3.2, available at: www.cdint.org/documents/PAIV_111118_Humanitarian%20Access_Field%20Manual_mit_Inhalt.pdf, UK Department for International Development, Saving Lives, Preventing Suffering and Building Resilience: The UK Government's Humanitarian Policy, 2011, p. 6, available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-governments-humanitarian-policy-september-2011-final; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Humanitarian Strategy, 6 July 2012, p. 14, available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Strategie_Humanitaire_ANGlais_2012_cle89af5f.pdf; Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Strategy of the Federal Foreign Office for Humanitarian Assistance Abroad, November 2012, p. 8, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/634144/publicationFile/177866/121115_AA-Strategie_humanitaere_hilfe.pdf; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Finland's Humanitarian Policy, 14 June 2013, p. 11, available at: http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=101288.

83 Cf. ILA, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, London, 2000, p. 32, para. 16 (a belief on the part of the generality of States is sufficient to prove the existence of a customary rule).

84 See, e.g., United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7244, 19 August 2014, p. 14 (China) (“United Nations humanitarian agencies and relief organizations … should … uphold the principles of humanitarianism, namely neutrality, impartiality and independence”), p. 20 (Jordan) (“We must also ensure that humanitarian workers are committed to upholding the basic humanitarian principles related to neutrality, impartiality and independence”).

85 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/47, 9 May 2008, Art. 214(2).

86 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, above note 82, p. 14.

87 Cf. ICJ, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 43; ICJ, Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, para. 46; International Law Commission (ILC), Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, UN Doc. A/61/10, 9 September 2006, Principle 1.

88 See sources cited in note 82 above.

89 Terry, Fiona, “The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, 2011, p. 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 Mikolajuk, Christine, “Thanks, But No Thanks: The Other Face of International Humanitarian Aid”, Harvard International Review, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2005, pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

91 Ibid., p. 33.

92 See, e.g., Jonathan R. W. Temple, “Aid Conditionality”, in Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter, The Companion to Development Studies, 3rd ed., Routledge, New York, 2014, pp. 547–551.

93 But see K. Mackintosh, above note 61, p. 11 (arguing that limited forms of human rights conditionality may be in conformity with IHL, as long as the aim of such measures is “genuinely … to improve the condition of individuals”).

94 See further Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Politics and Humanitarianism: Coherence in Crisis, February 2003, pp. 9–12, available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2356D2703EB313DE85257138007053DF-politics%20and%20humanitarianism.pdf.

95 Ibid., p. 10.

96 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

97 Cf. ICJ, Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1960, p. 40.

98 F. Kalshoven, above note 20, pp. 518–519.

99 Ibid., p. 519.

100 United States, Remarks of Secretary Colin Powell to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations, 26 October 2001, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/powell_brief31.asp.

101 See Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, “London 11” Friends of Syria Core Group Ministerial Communiqué, London, 15 May 2014, available at: www.gov.uk/government/news/london-11-friends-of-syria-core-group-ministerial-communique (concerning Friends of Syria); Steven L. Myers, “$1 Billion Is Pledged to Support Libya Rebels”, New York Times, 9 June 2011, available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/africa/10diplo.html?_r=0 (concerning the Libyan contact group).

102 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement on the Start of the Delivery of Humanitarian Relief Aid to Southeastern Ukraine, 22 August 2014, available at: www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/8CBBD5BFE558C6E344257D3C003D4DF0.

103 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 186.

104 See, e.g., UNSC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7253, 28 August 2014, p. 15 (Ukraine); UNSC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7289, 28 October 2014, p. 83 (Ukraine).

105 See, e.g., UNSC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7253, 28 August 2014, p. 3 (Lithuania), p. 7 (Australia); UNSC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7269, 19 September 2014, p. 14 (Lithuania).

106 NATO, “NATO Secretary General Condemns Entry of Russian Convoy into Ukraine”, 22 August 2014, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112112.htm (condemning the “disregard of international humanitarian principles” by Russia).

107 See, e.g., UNSC, Meeting Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7253, 28 August 2014, p. 3 (Lithuania), p. 5 (Luxembourg), p. 13 (United Kingdom).

108 See, e.g., European Union (EU), EU Statement on the Violation of OSCE Principles and Commitments by the Russian Federation and the Situation in Ukraine, 28 August 2014, p. 1, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna/documents/eu_osce/permanent_council/2014/pc_1014_eu_on_ukraine.pdf (“we deeply regret that a Russian convoy of 227 vehicles entered Ukrainian territory without the consent of the Ukrainian authorities and in violation of previous understandings and the involvement of the ICRC”). See also European Union External Action, Statement by the Spokesperson on the Second Russian “Humanitarian Convoy” Dispatched to Eastern Ukraine, Brussels, 15 September 2014, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140915_02_en.pdf.

109 Cf. ICRC Customary Law Study, above note 17. This comprehensive study of existing customary IHL has equally not included impartiality and neutrality among the customary rules it has identified. See also Ibid., p. 193, Rule 55, stipulating a specific duty to “allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction” (emphasis added).

110 See, e.g., Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 4; Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 187.

111 ICJ, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4.

112 Interestingly, the International Law Commission has recently faced the same issue in the context of its work on the protection of persons in the event of disasters. However, its brief treatment of the matter can at best be described as avoiding the question. In fact, the ILC's commentary to the Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters expressly declined to determine whether these principles also qualify as general principles of international law. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN Doc. A/69/10, 2014, Chapter V, p. 103, para. 1: (“the principles [of humanity, neutrality and impartiality] are considered by the Commission to constitute humanitarian principles that underlie disaster relief and assistance. On this basis the Commission did not find it necessary to determine whether these principles are also general principles of international law”).

113 H. Thirlway, above note 76, p. 95, relying on Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1927. See also, e.g., American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 1986, paras 102(1)(c), 102(4) (referring to “general principles common to the major legal systems”; emphasis added).

114 See generally Blondel, Jean-Luc, “The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Their Origin and Development”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 31, No. 283, 1991, pp. 349–357CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

115 See notes 81–82 above.

116 See, e.g., Global Humanitarian Assistance, Global Humanitarian Report 2013, pp. 20–27, available at: www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/GHA-Report-2013.pdf (reporting official humanitarian assistance as coming from a total of seventy-seven governments).

117 See note 110 above.

118 See, e.g., Brian D. Lepard, Customary International Law: A New Theory with Practical Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 146 (“the Court's precise reasoning is ambiguous … [it] implies that ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ may, because of their moral character, be a basis for recognizing a customary legal obligation”); Tomuschat, Christian, “General Course on Public International Law”, Recueil des cours, Vol. 281, 1999, p. 355Google Scholar (arguing that the ICJ had in fact derived binding legal precepts from “the constitution of the international community”).

119 ICJ, Corfu Channel, above note 111, p. 146.

120 ICJ, South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 34, para. 49.

121 ICJ, Nicaragua, above note 27, para. 218.

122 See section on “Treaties”, above.

123 See the corresponding text to notes 41–43 above.

124 See, e.g., UNSC Res. 2060, 25 July 2012, op. para. 6; UNSC Res. 2093, 6 March 2013, op. para. 21 (regarding the UN Mission to Somalia); UNSC Res. 1341, 22 February 2001, op. para. 12; UNSC Res. 2109, 11 July 2013, op. para. 2 (regarding the UN Missions in Sudan).

125 UNSC Res. 1341, 22 February 2001, op. para. 12.

126 ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Order, Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1992, para. 39; ICJ, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Order, Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1992, para. 42.

127 See, e.g., UNSC Res. 2113, 30 July 2013, op. para. 16; UNSC Res. 2134, 28 January 2014, op. para. 26; UNSC Res. 2228, 29 June 2015, op. para. 17.

128 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, paras 113–114: “Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to ‘the decisions of the Security Council’ adopted in accordance with the Charter. … The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.”

129 For an early commentary, see, e.g., Marie Jacobsson, “A Snapshot of a Legal Time-Frame: The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) and the OPCW Executive Council Decision”, in Jonas Ebbesson et al., International Law and Changing Perceptions of Security: Liber Amicorum Said Mahmoudi, Brill, Leiden, 2014, pp. 142–146.

130 UNSC Res. 2118, 27 September 2013, preambular para. 14; UNSC Res. 2165, 14 July 2014, preambular para. 19.

131 See, e.g., UNSC Res. 2102, 2 May 2013, op. para. 7 (regarding UNSOM).

132 See, e.g., UNSC Res. 1296, 19 April 2000, op. para. 11; UNSC Res. 1502, 26 August 2003, preambular para. 4; UNSC Res. 2147, 28 March 2014, preambular para. 17; UNSC Res. 2175, 29 August 2014, op. para. 5.

133 See, e.g., UNSC Res. 1674, 28 April 2006, op. para. 21; UNSC Res. 1814, 15 May 2008, preambular para. 17; UNSC Res. 1894, 11 November 2009, op. para. 13; UNSC Res. 1972, 17 March 2011, preambular para. 6; UNSC Res. 2041, 22 March 2012, preambular para. 28; UNSC Res. 2063, 31 July 2012, op. para. 14; UNSC Res. 2096, 19 March 2013, preambular para. 27; UNSC Res. 2098, 28 March 2013, preambular para. 15; UNSC Res. 2100, 25 April 2013, preambular para. 8; UNSC Res. 2127, 5 December 2013, preambular para. 19; UNSC Res. 2145, 17 March 2014, preambular para. 27; UNSC Res. 2200, 12 February 2015, preambular para. 5; UNSC Res. 2210, 16 March 2015, preambular para. 23; UNSC Res. 2227, 29 June 2015, preambular para. 23.

134 See, e.g., Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends, HPG Briefing Paper No. 12, London, July 2003, p. 2, available at: www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/349.pdf; Michael Barnett, The International Humanitarian Order, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 181–182; A. Donini, above note 10, p. 146; Brauman, Rony, “Médecins Sans Frontières and the ICRC: Matters of Principle”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 888, 2012, p. 1527CrossRefGoogle Scholar, fn. 10. By contrast, organizations which are willing to abandon strict neutrality and impartiality and promote instead transformative policies in line with specific political and ideological aims are described by these authors as “Wilsonian”. Notably, the classification of some organizations may pose problems; for example, while the HPG Briefing Paper cited above considers Save the Children to be an example of a Dunantist organization, Barnett calls it one “of the most famous members of [the Wilsonian] camp”. See A. Stoddard, Ibid., p. 2; M. Barnett, Ibid., p. 181.

135 “Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross”, above note 4, pp. 573–574; MSF, MSF Charter and Principles, 2015, available at: www.msf.org/msf-charter-and-principles.

136 International Office for Migration (IOM), Res. 1243 (CI), IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework, 27 November 2012, pp. 12–14, available at: www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/1243_-_IOM_Migration_Crisis_Operational_Framework_0.pdf.

137 International Rescue Committee, “IRC, Fellow Humanitarian Agencies Express Concern Regarding an Upsurge in Fighting in Somalia”, 17 July 2011, available at: www.rescue.org/news/irc-fellow-humanitarian-agencies-express-concern-regarding-upsurge-fighting-somalia-6928.

138 World Food Programme, Consolidated Framework of WFP Policies, Rome, October 2008, p. 16, available at: www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/wfp187807~1.pdf.

139 See further Weller, Marc, “The Relativity of Humanitarian Neutrality and Impartiality”, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (Americal Society of International Law), Vol. 91, 1997, pp. 445–446Google Scholar.

140 HAP Standard, above note 4, p. 8; CHS, above note 4, p. 8.

141 Art. 2(4) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, October 1986, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 27, No. 256, 1987Google Scholar, pp. 25 ff.

142 See F. Bugnion, “Red Cross Law”, above note 7, pp. 501–502.

143 See section on “Treaties”, above.

144 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić et al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the Prosecution Motion under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness (Trial Chamber II), 27 July 1999, para. 73.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid., part IV (Disposition).

147 S. Beauchamp, above note 7, p. 14 (emphasis added).

148 J. Pictet, above note 3, p. 5 (noting that the Commentary answers a call “for a simple and modern commentary which would make these principles understandable to everyone, and especially to the young people, who represent the future”).

149 Ibid., p. 6 (emphasis added).

150 MSF, “Our Purpose is to Limit the Devastations of War: Speech by Christophe Fournier”, 8 December 2009, available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/speechopen-letter/our-purpose-limit-devastations-war.

151 Ibid.

152 See, e.g., ICRC, “An ICRC Perspective on Integrated Missions: Speech by ICRC's Vice-President Jacques Forstier”, Oslo, 31 May 2005, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/6dcgrn.htm (“armed and police forces … should not claim that humanitarian action will “win the war” – by winning hearts and minds … the military, when they engage in activities of a humanitarian nature, should clearly identify themselves as military”); ICRC, “Humanitarian Principles – The Importance of Their Preservation During Humanitarian Crises: Speech by ICRC's Director-General Angelo Gnaedinger”, Lisbon, 12 October 2007, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/humanitarian-principles-statement-121007.htm (“Armed forces also have a very important military role to play in providing security. They should devote their efforts to these key responsibilities and avoid blurring the line between military, political, and humanitarian action by labelling all of them as humanitarian”; emphasis in original); ICRC, “World Humanitarian Day – Protection of Humanitarian Workers: Statement by ICRC's President Peter Maurer to the United Nations Security Council”, Geneva, 19 August 2014, available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2014/08-19-world-humanitarian-day-protection.htm (“The Security Council should not be – and should not be expected to behave as if it were – a humanitarian actor, for that risks blurring further the distinction between political and humanitarian functions.”).