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The International Court of Justice and the development of international humanitarian law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2022

Christopher Greenwood
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Abstract

Both in its advisory and contentious jurisdiction, the International Court of Justice has made considerable contributions to the evolution and interpretation of international humanitarian law (IHL). The judgments and advisory opinions of the Court in various cases have also developed the regulation of armed conflicts by showing the interplay of other bodies of international law and have shaped the development of non-binding IHL norms. The purpose of this short article is to consider the role of the International Court of Justice in the development of IHL.

Keywords

International humanitarian lawInternational Court of Justicejurisdictionlaw of occupationCorfu Channel caseWall OpinionNuclear Weapons OpinionNicaragua caseDemocratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda
Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 104 , Issue 920-921: How International Humanitarian Law Develops , August 2022 , pp. 1840 - 1855
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.

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References

1 For a more detailed treatment of the subject, see Kress, Claus, “The ICJ and International Humanitarian Law”, in Tams, Christian J. and Sloan, James (eds), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 263Google Scholar; Greenwood, Christopher, “The International Court of Justice and International Humanitarian Law”, in Jalloh, Charles Chernor and Elias, Olufemi (eds), Shielding Humanity: Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Abdul G. Koroma, Brill, Leiden, 2015Google Scholar; Biad, Abdelwahab, La Cour internationale de Justice et le droit international humanitaire : Une lex specialis revisitée par le juge, Emile Bruylant, Brussels, 2011Google Scholar; Condorelli, Luigi, “Le droit international humanitaire, ou de l'exploitation par la Cour d'une terra à peu près incognita pour elle”, in de Chazournes, Laurence Boisson and Sands, Philippe, International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999Google Scholar; Raimondo, Fabián, Corte internacional de Justicia, derecho internacional humanitario y crimen internacional de genocidio, Del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2005Google Scholar; and Junior, Talis Prado Pinto and Giannattasio, Arthur Roberto Capella, “O direito internacional humanitário nos pereceres consultivos da Corte Internacional de Justiça: Uma conjugação de perspectivas utópicas e apologéticas”, Revista de Direito Internacional, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2021Google Scholar.

2 For more elaborated assessment, see Weill, Sharon, The Role of National Courts in Applying International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 The Statute of the International Court of Justice (the Statute), which was signed at the same time as the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, is annexed to the Charter. Article 93 of the Charter provides that all States Members of the United Nations are automatically parties to the Statute. See Charter of the United Nations, available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/charter-of-the-united-nations (all internet references were accessed in October 2022).

4 Statute, Art. 34.

5 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment on the Merits, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168 (DRC v. Uganda (Merits)); Judgment on Reparations, 9 February 2022 (DRC v. Uganda (Reparations)).

6 Statute, Art. 36.

7 Article 36(2) of the Statute, the so-called “Optional Clause” also provides for a State to opt in to a system whereby each accepts the jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to disputes between itself and another State which has also made a declaration under the Optional Clause. It was on this basis that the Court had jurisdiction in the DRC v. Uganda case, where both States had made declarations. By contrast, it lacked jurisdiction in the parallel case brought by Uganda against Rwanda, because Rwanda had made no Optional Clause declaration and the Court held that there was no other treaty in force between the two States which could have afforded jurisdiction. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, p. 6. At the time of writing, seventy-three States, out of a total of 193, had made Optional Clause declarations. ICJ, “Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory”, available at: https://icj-cij.org/en/declarations.

8 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015, ICJ Reports 2015, p. 3.

9 Statute, Chapter IV, Art. 65.

10 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Request by the General Assembly), ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226 (Nuclear Weapons Opinion).

11 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 (Wall Opinion).

12 Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment of April 9th, 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22.

13 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, p. 3 (Nicaragua case).

14 The Court was unable to apply the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter for jurisdictional reasons; see Nicaragua case, pp. 92–7.

15 Nicaragua case, p. 112, para. 216.

16 Ibid., p. 114, para. 219.

17 Ibid., p. 114, para. 218. Neither Nicaragua nor the United States were parties to the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

18 Nicaragua case, p. 112, para. 215.

19 The present author was counsel for the United Kingdom in that case. For a collection of different views about what the Court said, see L. Boisson de Chazournes and P. Sands, above note 1.

20 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, p. 228.

21 The Court also referred to the provisions of the United Nations Charter on the legality of recourse to armed force, human rights law and international environmental law.

22 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, p. 266, para. 105(2)(B).

23 Ibid., pp. 249–53, paras 59–63.

24 See, e.g., Singh, Nagendra, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959Google Scholar.

25 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, p. 248, paras 53–7.

26 Ibid., p. 255, para. 73.

27 Ibid., p. 255, para. 73.

28 Ibid., p. 259, paras 85–6.

29 It is noticeable, however, that none of the thirty-three States which participated in the proceedings chose to advance this argument.

30 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, pp. 257–9, paras 78–84.

31 This clause, which first appeared in the Hague Convention II with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899 (entered into force 4 September 1900), takes modern form in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions:

In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilian and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience.

Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I).

32 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, pp. 262–3, para. 95.

33 Ibid., p. 263, para. 97.

34 Ibid., p. 266, para. 105(2)(E).

35 Wall Opinion, above note 11, p. 141.

36 Ibid., p. 167, para. 78.

37 International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, Official Text in the English Language, Vol. 1, pp. 253–4. Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910).

38 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950).

39 See Shamgar, Meir (ed.), Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel, 1967–1980: The Legal Aspects, Hebrew University Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 31 ffGoogle Scholar.

40 See, e.g., Greenwood, Christopher, “The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law”, in Playfair, Emma (ed.), International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992Google Scholar.

41 See, e.g., Dinstein, Yoram, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 20–1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 Wall Opinion, above note 11, pp. 173–7, paras 90–101.

43 See, e.g., Adam Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation”, in E. Playfair, above note 40, pp. 36–9.

44 Wall Opinion, above note 11, p. 185, para. 125.

45 Ibid., pp. 177–81, paras 102–13.

46 Ibid., p. 175, para. 95.

47 Ibid., p. 201, para. 163(3)(A).

48 Ibid., pp. 191–2, para. 134.

49 Ibid., p. 189, para. 132.

50 Ibid., pp. 189–92, paras 133–4.

51 Ibid., p. 197, para. 147 and following paragraphs.

52 Ibid., p. 192, para. 135.

53 Ibid., p. 200, para. 159.

54 DRC v. Uganda (Merits), p. 168; DRC v. Uganda (Reparations).

55 In addition, the principles concerning burden and standard of proof and their implications for the Court's findings of fact were applicable. These principles cannot apply in the same way when the Court exercises its advisory jurisdiction; see Greenwood, Christopher, “Judicial Integrity and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, in Gaja, Giorgio and Stoutenburg, Jenny Grote (eds), Enhancing the Rule of Law through the International Court of Justice, Brill, Leiden, 2014, p. 63Google Scholar.

56 DRC v. Uganda (Merits), pp. 242–4, paras 216–17.

57 Ibid., p. 230, paras 173–4.

58 Ibid., p. 230, para. 173.

59 Ibid., p. 230, para. 174.

60 Ibid., p. 230, para. 176.

61 Ibid., pp. 249–53, paras 237–50.

62 See Hague Convention IV, Art. 3; and AP I, Art. 92; DRC v. Uganda (Merits), p. 242, paras 213–14.

63 DRC v. Uganda (Merits), p. 252, para. 245.

64 Ibid., pp. 239–41, paras 207–11.

65 See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, Art. 3; and the general principle of international law reflected in the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 36.

66 See Murphy, Sean D., Kidane, Won and Snider, Thomas R., Litigating War: Mass Civil Injury and the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013Google Scholar; and the collection of decisions in Vol. 135 of the International Law Reports. The United Nations Compensation Commission established by the United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has also given a number of interesting decisions.

67 DRC v. Uganda (Merits), p. 257, para. 259, and p. 281, para. 345.

68 The dangers of getting that balance wrong have been all too evident since the Treaty of Versailles of 1919.

69 DRC v. Uganda (Reparations), para. 107.

70 Ibid., paras 145–64.

71 Ibid., paras 173–81.

72 Ibid., paras 188–93.

73 Ibid., paras 214–25.

74 Ibid., paras 205–6.

75 Ibid., paras 240–58.

76 Ibid., paras 273–366.

77 Ibid., para. 165.

78 Ibid., paras 381–4.

79 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 20, para. 27.

80 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, pp. 241–2, paras 29–30.

81 Ibid., p. 240, para. 25; Wall Opinion, above note 11, p. 178, para. 106.

82 A good example of the rejection of such a narrow approach to the application of a human rights treaty in armed conflict is the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Hassan v. United Kingdom (2014), International Law Reports, Vol. 161, 2016, which cited both the Opinions.

83 Nuclear Weapons Opinion, p. 255, para. 73.

84 Sir Nicholas Lyell, QC, MP at CR 1995/34, p. 45, responding to the Hon. Gareth Evans QC at CR 1995/22, pp. 38–42.

85 See, in particular, Hague Convention IV, Arts 42 and 43.