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Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international law — A few thoughts on its strengths and weaknesses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2010

Manfred Mohr
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Extract

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice finally rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The procedure had been dragging on since the start of the public sittings on 30 October 1995. Several deadlines set by the Court for reaching a decision came and went, ultimately giving rise to the fear that there would be no decisive majority to affirm the basic unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. This would have been a bitter setback for the initiators of the Advisory Opinion proceeding and for the development of international law.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997) , Volume 37 , Special Issue 316: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law , February 1997 , pp. 92 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 1997

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References

1 See in this regard Mohr, M., “Das World Court Project — vom Erfolg einer NGO-Kampagne”,Humanitäres Völkerrecht. Informationsschriften, 8 (1995) 3, pp. 146 ff.Google Scholar

2 See for example, Mohr, M., in Cohen, M., Gouin, M. (eds), Lawyers and the nuclear debate, Ottawa, 1988, pp. 85 ff.Google Scholar

3 See International Court of Justice, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 07 1996 Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as “Opinion”), Dissenting Opinion of Oda, para. 8.

4 As regards this development as a whole, see Mohr, M., “Das humanitäre Völkerrecht 1945–1995. 50 Jahre Entwicklung”, Bochumer Schriften zur Friedenssicherung und zum Humanitären Völkerrecht, Vol. 31, Bochum, 1996.Google Scholar

5 See for example IPB News, 12 1995, pp. 3 ff.Google Scholar

6 From the abundant literature available, we can only cite a few particularly outstanding works, namely:

Singh, N., McWhinney, E., Nuclear weapons and contemporary international law, Leiden, 1988 Google Scholar;

Cohen, M., Gouin, M.E. (eds), Lawyers and the nuclear debate, Ottawa, 1988 Google Scholar;

B. Graefrath, “Zum Anwendungsbereich der Ergänzungsprotokolle zu den Genfer Abkommen vom 12. August 1949”, Staat und Recht, 29/1980, pp. 133 ff.;

Fischer, H., Der Einsatz der Nuklearwaffen nach Art. 51 des I. Zusatzprotokolls zu den Genfer Konventionen von 1949, Berlin, 1985 Google Scholar;

Ney, M.C., Der Einsatz von Atomwaffen im Lichte des Völkerrechts, Frankfurt a. M., 1985 Google Scholar;

Falk, R., Meyrowitz, E., Anderson, J., Nuclear weapons and international law, Princeton, 1981 Google Scholar;

Empell, H.-M., Nuklearwaffeneinsätze und humanitäres Völkerrecht, Heidelberg, 1993.Google Scholar

7 See Opinion, paras. 24 and 25.

8 For further evidence, see Nowak, M., CCPR Commentary, Kehl et al., 1993, pp. 108 ff.Google Scholar

9 See Opinion, paras. 26 ff.

10 In lieu of several sources, see Weiss, P., Weston, B., Falk, R., Mendlowitz, S., “Draft Memorial in support of the application by the World Health Organization for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international law”, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 4 (1994) 2, pp. 24 ff.Google Scholar

11 See Opinion, paras. 35 ff.

12 In this connection, see for example Mohr, , op. cit. (note 1 above), p. 150 Google Scholar. Schwebel, in his Dissenting Opinion (p. 7), makes similar comments regarding “tactical nuclear weapons” and the use of nuclear weapons “in a desert”.

13 See Opinion, para. 34 and paras. 37 ff.

14 Ibid., para. 48. See also Mohr, M., “Völkerrecht kontra nukleare Abschreckungsdoktrin: einige wesentliche und bleibende Einwände”, Demokratie und Rechte, 19 (1991) 1, pp. 47 ffGoogle Scholar. In his Declaration, Judge Shi unequivocally describes “nuclear deterrence” as a practice that should be an object of regulation by law.

15 Ibid., para. 52 and paras. 53 ff.

16 Hence one might well question the effectiveness and sense of the so-called “security assurances” extended by the nuclear powers; for example, those assurances entail the duty to provide humanitarian assistance for victims of nuclear weapons (!). Schwebel (Dissenting Opinion, pp. 1 ff.) goes too far, however, when he interprets the existence of such assurances — together with the NPT — as overall recognition of the legality of nuclear weapons, against the background of “fifty years of the practice of States”.

17 Opinion, paras. 98 ff.

18 For instance, an NGO Abolition Caucus has now been formed; see Mohr, , op. cit. (note 1 above), p. 152.Google Scholar

19 Malaysia has in the meantime launched an initiative for a UN General Assembly resolution which welcomes the Opinion of the Court and calls upon States to start negotiations in 1997 on a convention comprehensively banning nuclear weapons.

20 See Opinion, paras. 64 ff.

21 Thus Judge Shi, in his Declaration, points out that the international community after all comprises 185 States and its structure is built on the principle of sovereign equality.

22 Ibid., paras. 74 ff.

23 According to which the (new) rules established in Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions apply only to conventional weapons, without prejudice to other rules applicable to other types of weapons; in this regard, see mainly Fischer (note 6 above).

24 See, respectively, Dissenting Opinion of Koroma, inter alia pp. 4 and 18; Dissenting Opinion of Higgins, para. 41; Separate Opinion of Fleischhauer, para. 5.

25 See Dissenting Opinion of Schwebel, pp. 8 ff.

26 See War & Peace Digest, 4 (1996) 3, p. 2.Google Scholar

27 For instance the Advisory Opinions on the reservations to the Genocide Convention (1951), “Certain Expenses of the United Nations” (1962), and on Namibia (1971).