The supporters of the Nazi party prior to 1933 can be divided into two groups. Much the larger of these were the millions of voters who, beginning in the summer of 1930, cast their ballots for Hitler and his party. The second group, whose adherence to the Nazi movement included but also went beyond voting for its candidates in elections, were the formal members of the NSDAP. Between February 1930 and May 1932, they increased in number from approximately 170–180,000 to some 850–900,000.

The historian who studies the history of the Comintern has to rely mainly on printed sources. For this purpose the published minutes and reports of the seven Congresses of the Comintern (1919–35) and the thirteen plenary sessions of its Executive Committee (1922–33) are of particular interest.

Rural areas have generally been ignored in recent studies of the General Strike of 3–12 May 1926 on the implicit assumption that its impact in such areas would be negligible. To see if this assumption is correct this article examines the course of the strike in Devon and reaction to it. The likelihood of militant action in Devon in part depended upon the structure of the occupied population. In 1921 16 per cent of the occupied population of Devon County and the County Boroughs was in agriculture, and this rises to 25 per cent if we take the administrative county alone. In Exeter 49 per cent of the occupied population was in commerce, the professions, public administration, defence and personal service; in Plymouth the percentage for this group was 52 per cent. Consequently even the industrial areas were likely to be relatively weakly organised. Once out of the County Boroughs the industrial population, apart from a concentration of railwaymen at Newton Abbot, was so scattered as to make organisation and co-ordination difficult. There was no tradition of militancy in the county.

Edmund Dene Morel was born in Paris in 1873, the son of a French civil servant father and an English mother. Modestly educated in England, he emerged at age thirty from the obscurity of a clerkship in a Liverpool commercial firm to launch a journalistic crusade against the murderous exploitation of blacks on the rubber plantations of the Congo Free State. Largely as a result of this effort he became critical of what he considered the deviousness of the British Foreign Office, and by 1911 he was questioning the extent of the commitment to France in the Entente Cordiale. He was pro-German only in the sense that he opposed the prevalent anti-German hysteria and believed that an Anglo-German confrontation would be catastrophic for both countries. Morel was one of a number of free-trade, anti-imperialist, foreign- and imperial-affairs specialists associated with the pre-war Liberal Party; J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford and E. G. Browne were others. But it was the war which made him the butt of nationalist fury and the victim of government prosecution for his advocacy of a negotiated peace and for his infuriating insistence that Germany's share of the blame for the war's origin was much less than that of Tsarist Russia or even of Britain's Liberal government.

British coal miners immigrated to the United States in increasing numbers during the Civil War decade. Their movement from the collieries gathered momentum in the early war years and reached its peak in 1869. In 1862, almost all of the immigrants entering the United States who listed their occupation as “miner” were from Britain. As shown in the table, such men accounted for more than 73% of all immigrant miners in each of the following years of the decade for which data are available, with the exception of 1864. In 1870, the 57,214 British immigrant miners listed in the United States Census represented more than 60% of all foreign-born miners (94,719) in the country. The movement from Britain had already slowed when news of the American economic depression that began in 1873 reached the collieries in Britain, where an extraordinary demand for iron in the early 1870's had hiked coal miners' wages far above normal levels. However, when employment in the American coalfields was readily available in the 1860's and early 1870's, the risk involved in spending hard-won savings on the journey, which cost approximately £5 and took ten days by steamer, appeared reasonable. In comparison with other wage earners coal miners in Britain were relatively well-paid. They could, therefore, accumulate the cost of the trans-Atlantic passage during “good-times” at home.

Although identified above all with the French Confédération Général du Travail prior to the First World War, revolutionary syndicalism had become an international movement by 1914, when various labour organizations in Europe, North and South America, and Australasia espoused its doctrines or the kindred doctrines of industrial unionism. The desire to establish durable international bonds between these revolutionary organizations had grown steadily, especially in Europe, where by 1912 organized syndicalist bodies existed in France, Holland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, Belgium, Spain and Italy. The congress held in London in the autumn of 1913 represented the first effort to create a vehicle of syndicalist internationalism. But the congress and the debate surrounding it demonstrated not only that syndicalists were not in accord on international tactics, nor on national tactics, but also that the deepest cleavage on the question of international strategy was that dividing the CGT from most syndicalist organizations in other countries.

In this century British socialism has rarely engaged in serious internal debate about the fundamental concepts of its political vocabulary. In this respect, as in others, British socialism has been true to the wider traditions of British political life. There has, of course, been much vigorous controversy on policy and programme, but also a remarkable absence of genuine doctrinal debate, certainly as compared with continental socialisms. A major exception to this, however, is to be found in the decade which has the First World War at its centre. Indeed, this may be regarded as the most creative period in British socialist thought in the twentieth century (notwithstanding the superficially more turbulent 1930's); and it is a period which ends, interestingly, in the early 1920's, when Labour becomes securely established in the world of parliamentary politics.

Maurice Milne's article restricts its discussion of press treatment of industrial disputes in this period to an analysis of coverage of three strikes in three Newcastle upon Tyne papers. He passes from this review to the following conclusion:

The facile assumption that radical political beliefs would predispose their holder to espouse the cause of organised labour will not stand up to close scrutiny, at least where one important industrial region and its newspapers are concerned.

Arthur Henderson was the only member of the industrial working classes to lead a British political party. He was the only trade unionist to lead the Labour Party, and, as well, one of only two active Christians to do so. In the history of the Labour Party's first thirty years he seems to have a centrality shared by no other man. But what constitutes his centrality is a genuine problem, and both his contemporaries and his colleagues were aware of it. J. R. Clynes once wrote: “I would not class Mr. Henderson as a type, but as one quite unlike any other of his colleagues.” In this article I would like to test this judgement, to examine both Henderson's “typicality” as a historical figure in the labour movement, and the significance of his career as a labour leader.

The Independent Labour Party was formed early in 1893, at a time when its founders hoped that reformist, undogmatic Socialism would soon attract the support of large numbers of working men. This was a hope shared by others committed to a more rigorous Socialist ideology. Even Friedrich Engels, convinced that the formation of a political party sustained by the working class was the task of greatest importance, hailed the ILP as the body desired by the old members of the International of the 1860's. But the early hopes were short-lived. Everyone of its twenty-eight candidates was defeated at the General Election of 1895, even Keir Hardie, the party's leader, who had been elected at West Ham without Liberal opposition in 1892. Many of the candidates polled well, but the overall result was a deep disappointment. In four subsequent by-elections between May 1896 and October 1897, ILP candidates of proven ability, while finding considerable support among the electorate, finished last on each occasion, and the trend of election results grew worse rather than better. The ILP polled thousands of votes rather than the few hundreds of the Marxist body, the Social Democratic Federation, but this was small consolation. In terms of membership and general party activity the years after 1895 also marked a regression. Gradually Hardie and his colleages became convinced that winning the workers to Socialism by means of the ILP alone was not a feasible strategy. There was no way, in the short term, to further the cause of independent labour without the adhesion of the non-Socialist trade unions. This inevitably meant the soft-pedalling of Socialism. Defeated as a separate force, the ILP was forced to accept the idea of an alliance with the trade unions, in the hope that any form of labour party would first become independent of the Liberals and eventually Socialist. The first assumption proved correct, the second on the whole incorrect, but it is difficult to see what other course could have been pursued at the time. Thus the years between 1895 and 1900, the vital pre-history of the Labour Party, were years which were to stamp it at its birth in 1900 as a party of practical trade unionists, fighting for limited aims, with a smattering of Socialists whose influence failed to dominate the party programme or strategy.

The engineers' lock-out of 1852 is just one of those historical events which, while receiving extensive coverage and being long pondered over, remain to this day a bone of contention. In terms of scale and in the sophistication of the tactics employed, it “was the first of a new class of strikes or lock-outs”. It aroused more sustained interest than any previous industrial dispute. It stimulated “a discussion of the strike by the press, so comprehensive and exhaustive that a reproduction of the newspaper articles would fill volumes”. At this time, the only other trade unions of any appreciable size were still less than half the strength of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. Some earlier combinations had been larger, but they had been formed solely in relation to specific strikes and, as such, were ephemeral in character. The mass movements of 1830–34 generally rested upon the precarious financial foundations of irregular levies. The Webbs concluded that a “trade society which […] could count on a regular income of £500 a week was without precedent.”

For most of the present century economic and social historians have intermittently debated the question of the standard of living during the first phase of the Industrial Revolution, 1780–1830. As both the “pessimists” and the “optimists” acknowledge, too much emphasis can easily be placed on wage levels and the more easily measured aspects of the question, to the neglect of the quality of life and its non-quantifiable aspects. Insufficient explicit attention has also been paid to the divergent experience of different occupations and different districts of the country.

While much has been heard in recent times of the evils attaching to “the principles of 1834”, other important aspects of the New Poor Law have been seriously neglected. The laws of settlement and removal were unjust and inhumane, and the system of parochial rating was anomalous, uneven and, indeed, thoroughly iniquitous. One of the main features of the Poor Law Amendment Act had been the grouping of the parishes of England and Wales into unions of parishes. Those of a medium-sized town usually constituted one union, while in the countryside the typical union tended to comprise all the parishes within a radius of up to about ten miles of a country town, its centre. Under the Act, the administration of the Poor Law was based on the union and not, as heretofore, on the parish; yet the latter remained the financial unit, each parish being chargeable for its own Poor Law expenditure. This uneven arrangement prevented the effective operation of the Act, and, as will be shown, had unhappy consequences. Attempts at reform in these matters were strenuously opposed in Parliament between 1845 and 1865, and only in the latter year was the Union Chargeability Act passed.

The history of Irish republicanism has always suffered from an excessive concentration on its later phases. But much light can be thrown on its essential characteristics by a closer examination of its origins. A full understanding of such a contradictory movement would require an investigation of the mutations in public consciousness during the last three centuries. But most historians agree in tracing its origins to the United Irish Society of the 1790's, when the attitudes and conditions which were to dictate the future course of republicanism and loyalism were crystallised. In the light of recent events in Ireland interest in the United Irishmen has revived. However, even recent research has failed to explain satisfactorily the swift transformation of the United Irishmen's secular republicanism by the traditional fears and aspirations of the Catholic population. Nor has anyone attempted to answer the very basic question of how large sections of a non-political and essentially loyal peasantry could in the short period of the 1790's have acquired many of the fundamental traits of later separatist movements. Already by the turn of the century popular oral culture, latterly dominated by themes taken from Gaelic mythology, speaks instead of dead rebel heroes, of the English oppressor and the Protestant enemy. This new anti-English flavour in popular culture is particularly significant; English rule in Ireland had not been seriously questioned since the twelfth century, and the failure of the Bruce invasion in the fourteenth century was an indication of general Irish indifference to the nature of central government, provided life's daily routine remained undisturbed. This attitude characterised Irish thinking for the next four centuries, and like peasant communities elsewhere, the Irish remained essentially apolitical and parochial in outlook. They were scarcely the material from which a movement of national liberation could be fashioned.