What constitutes “sovereign statehood”? Elaborate answers can be given under international law, under theories of international relations, under jurisprudence, and under general political philosophy. But from the point of view of African countries the empirical answer is perhaps the simplest. These countries know that it was not when they assumed control of their domestic affairs that they ceased to be colonies. As a matter of experience, many of them found that the ultimate expression of sovereignty was not direct rule internally but direct diplomatic relations with other countries abroad. The very process of attaining independence might, in their case, be reduced to a single catch phrase—“from foreign rule to foreign relations.” In other words, an African colony was said to have attained independence when it had moved from the status of being under foreign rule to the status of conducting foreign relations with full authority.

Since January 1963, General de Gaulle's foreign policy has been subject to many contradictory or erroneous interpretations in the United States. It is necessary, therefore, to indicate its foundations, its main lines, some of the expectations and techniques peculiar to the General, and some of the obstacles it encounters. I will concentrate here on his views and policies toward France's Atlantic and European partners.

The effective transfer of skills and resources to less developed countries through multilateral as well as bilateral channels is a central element in the UN Development Decade. But the utility of international institutions in the economic field does not stop there. They are also proving to be indispensable in coping with related challenges to the United States in its trade relations with other nations—challenges posed by a rapidly changing world economy. The first challenge is to reduce the trade barriers which presently mpair the economic efficiency and political unity of the free world, particularly the North Atlantic Community and Japan. The second challenge is to find additional ways to deal with the special problems which affect the trade of the less developed countries. International organizations are now the focus of efforts to cope with both of these challenges.

Article 21 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall elect its President for each session. No other mention of the President of the General Assembly is to be found in the Charter and, as in the British fashion, his role is more a reflection of evolution than definition in the rules of procedure. It is perhaps for this reason that the highest office of the General Assembly has not been described at any length in the literature about the United Nations.

Several categories of suggestions have been put forth in recent years aimed at the relief of the financial problems of the United Nations. Major attention in the United Nations itself and in many writings has focused on modification of budgetary procedures, assessment criteria, and collection administration designed to induce adequate support from Members. Paralleling this, some Members and the Secretary-General as well have called for strict economy, a stabilized level of UN conferences and activities, and even some retrenchment. The principal alternatives proposed seek new sources of UN financing analogous to those open to governmental fiscal policy, including direct or indirect UN levies on the citizens of Member States and further development of UN deficit financing. Others call for intensified exploitation of potential sources of direct “independent” income to the Organization. Aside from the encouragement of gifts from private and public sources and the admittedly limited potential profit from tourism, rentals, and sales at the UN site, proposals for an independent UN income have concentrated on UN exploitation of the “new sources of wealth which are being opened by advances in science and technology, preferably outside the jurisdiction of national states …” in outer space, the poles, and the seas. This study seeks primarily to evaluate this last alternative.

Does the economic integration of a group of nations automatically trigger political unity? Must economic unions be perceived as “successful” in order to lead to political unification? Or are the two processes quite distinct, requiring deliberate political steps because purely economic arrangements are generally inadequate for ushering in political unity?

In the period since the publication of the special number of this journal devoted to Africa and international organization, one development of potentially considerable importance in this connection has transpired within Africa. This is the launching of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its embarcation on the task of forging a measure of peaceful collaboration out of the multitude of mixed aspirations and competing, indeed conflicting, interests of the African states.

In comparing Soviet and American policies we find a paradox: The Soviets, though ideologically antagonistic to international organizations, are pressed politically to at least minimal participation by a concern for influence-building among neutralist countries; whereas the United States, which is ideologically attached to the principle of strengthening international organizations, deems t i necessary for political reasons to limit its commitments to the fulfillment of the UN's economic and social goals. Hence, from their competitive global struggle, their evaluations of trends in underdeveloped areas, and their domestic influences, derive a number of important similarities in Soviet and American behavior.

First, both are opposed to any significant expansion of large-scale operational responsibilities by international organizations. This is clear from their reluctance to channel more than a minimal fraction of their total foreign aid expenditure through international organizations.

Moscow's support of UN economic programs is a necessary act of political accommodation. Its contributions are minimal and inappropriate to its great-power status, its level of industry and resources. It has never accompanied its vocal support for an increase in the activity of a commission or agency, or even its advocacy of SUNFED, by a concrete or generous offer of financial assistance. The Soviet Union favors keeping programs for underdeveloped countries financially marginal because it is ideologically opposed to the expansion of UN activities. Moreover, foreign aid is an integral adjunct of Soviet diplomacy, and Moscow has no desire to see international organizations pre-empt or challenge the attraction of Soviet bilateral aid.

On May 22, 1958, the Lebanese representative at the United Nations presented a letter to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider a

complaint by Lebanon in respect to a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger themaintenance of international peace and security.

UNTEA served the important function of buffer between contending forces and in general accomplished a remarkably smooth transfer. In this regard the United Nations operation was a major success. The smooth transfer was achieved, however, at the cost of rights specifically guaranteed in the agreement—the rights of free speech and assembly. Furthermore, the United Nations preparatory task and responsibility in the future “act of self-determination” was minimized.

It may be argued that UNTEA policy in West Irian merely reflects the weakness of the United Nations in a nation-state world. Lack of UNTEA power certainly was an important aspect. The explanation, however, is more complex. It is significant to recall that the United Nations assumed its task under severe handicaps: It was given no time for adequate recruitment and preparation; from the start it was confronted with the legitimized presence of Indonesian troops; the status of the “Papuan flag” was never mentioned in the agreement; and general Papuan primitivity along with political naïveté and schisms among the small and newly created Papuan élite influenced UNTEA's approach.

UNTEA also met continuous Indonesian pressure aimed at shortening the period of its administration and weakening its authority in general. Statements by Indonesian officials cast doubt on Indonesia's willingness to adhere to the wording of the agreement. In trying to interpret Indonesian feelings it might be conceded that most Dutch-Indonesian agreements have imposed conditions which could be considered obnoxious to Indonesia. The rights of self-determination for the Papuan inhabitants—stipulated in the August 15 agreement—fall into this category.

The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion is now almost universally considered to be “one of those rare politico-military events—a perfect failure.” One of the conclusions usually derived from that affair is the general inadvisability of direct United States intervention in the internal affairs of other nations to bring about desired changes in their domestic political structures. Almost simultaneously, however, the United States was doing just that in the Dominican Republic with a considerable degree of success, indicating that the lessons of the Cuban experience should not be overdrawn.

Recent schemes for international currency reform are unrealistic to the extent that they are derived as optimum solutions to economic problems alone. International currency arrangements are instances of international organization generally, and consequently fall within the scope of political sociology as much as—if not more than—of pure economics. Political complications must therefore not only be acknowledged, as they usually are, but analyzed as well, as they often are not. This essay represents an inquiry in that direction.

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), signed in Rome on November 4, 1950 entered into force on September 3, 1953. It provides in Article 19 for the establishment of two organs whose task it is “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken” in the Convention by the contracting parties: a European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) and a European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Court).

The universal and regional international organizations that are part of the twentieth century political scene confront one basic question: how to move successfully from international recommendation to national action. Mechanisms that offer at least a partial answer to this problem are of interest; and one such approach is the official pressure group of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, its Permanent Working Party on Parliamentary and Public Relations.

In the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the steadily growing feeling generated by the frustrating confusion of the interwar period that the world needed some kind of orderly institutionalization of international payments relations at last found a formal expression. As early as 1930 John Maynard Keynes suggested “the management of the value of gold by a Supernational Authority, with a number of national monetary systems clustering round it.…” Keynes was fully aware of the political implications of this suggestion. He realized the significance for international cooperation of “a cabinet of Central Banks who would hold the sovereign power.” The timid attempts toward establishing in the monetary sphere effective international collaboration in the interwar period were frustrated by political considerations.

The United Nations Special Fund was the result of a compromise between two proposals which were debated at nineteen meetings of the Second (Economic and Financial) Committee during the twelfth session of the General Assembly. The first of these proposals was an eleven-power draft resolution, based on the recommendations of the Scheyven Committee, to establish a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The second was a United States proposal to ncrease the financial resources of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) and to establish within it a Speical projects Fund Which would be used to widen the scope of EPTA7's activities.

Federation of Malaysia: On August 5, 1963, the governments of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines requested the Secretary-General, U Thant, to ascertain by a fresh approach, prior to the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak concerning their future political status. His survey was to be conducted within the context of principle 9 of the annex to General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960. More specifically the Secretary-General was asked to consider whether in the recent elections in Sabah and Sarawak: 1) Malaysia had been a major issue if not the major issue; 2) electoral registers had been properly compiled; 3) elections had been free and there had been no coercion; and 4) votes had been properly polled and counted. In addition, he was to take into account the wishes of those who would have exercised their right of self-determination in the recent elections had they not been detained for political activities, imprisoned for political offenses, or absent from the country. Responding to this request and with the consent of the government of the United Kingdom, the Secretary-General set up two working teams under the supervision of his personal representative, which were to work in Sarawak and Sabah. The mission, consisting of nine individuals, held hearings and considered written communications.

This article seeks to list and briefly analyze the different ways and forms whereby contemporary international organizations participate in the making of new rules of public international law.

The Security Council met once again on March 17, 1964, to consider the India-Pakistan question which had initially been brought to the attention of the Council in letters addressed to the President of the Security Council from Pakistan's Minister of External Affairs and India's permanent representative. The Council considered the question during its 1104th and 1105th meetings, held on March 17 and 20, 1964, and again during its 1112th–1117th meetings, May 5–18, 1964. At the invitation of the President, the representative of India, Mr. Chakravarty, and Pakistan's Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Bhutto, took places at the Security Council table. The President indicated that the present meeting had been convened upon the request of the Pakistani representative, although the Indian representative had expressed his objection to the request for an early meeting.