In Jerusalem, Ireland, Kosovo, and Kashmir, indivisible territory
underlies much of international conflict. I argue whether or not territory
appears indivisible depends on how actors legitimate their claims to
territory during negotiations. Although actors choose their legitimations
strategically, in order to gain a political advantage at the bargaining
table, legitimation strategies have unintended structural consequences: by
resonating with some actors and not others, legitimations either build
ties between coalitions and allow each side to recognize the legitimacy of
each other's claims, or else lock actors into bargaining positions
where they are unable to recognize the legitimacy of their opponent's
demands. When the latter happens, actors come to negotiations with
incompatible claims, constructing the territory as indivisible. I apply
this legitimation theory to Ulster, arguing this territory's
indivisibility was not inevitable, but a product of actors'
legitimation strategies as they battled for support over the issue of
Ireland's right to self-rule.For
comments on this article, I thank Fiona Adamson, Tim Crawford, Consuelo
Cruz, Ron Hassner, Jeff Herbst, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, Ron Krebs,
Paul MacDonald, Daniel Nexon, John Padgett, Dan Reiter, Jack Snyder,
Monica Toft, two anonymous reviewers, as well as participants in a seminar
at the John M. Olin Institute at Harvard University. In addition, the John
M. Olin Institute, the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and
the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern
California all provided support for this project.