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The Use of the Veto

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Norman J. Padelford
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Extract

No feature of United Nations activity has raised more doubts about the ability of international organization to assure peace and security than the recurrent appearance of the veto in the Security Council during the past two years.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 1948 , pp. 227 - 246
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1948

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References

1 Speaking for the Charter in the United States Senate after the close of the San Francisco Conference, Senator Connally, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, affirmed “Our country will have the right to exercise the veto whenever in our opinion it is wise and just to do so.” Senate Document 58, 79th Congress, 1st Session, p. 6.

2 For general background see Lee, Dwight E., “The Genesis of the Veto,” International Organization, I, p. 33–42Google Scholar; Koo, Wellington Jr, Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations (New York, 1947), Ch. IVGoogle Scholar; Goodrich, and Hambro, , Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston, 1946), p. 124–139Google Scholar; Wilcox, Francis O., “The Yalta Voting Formula,” American Political Science Review, XXXIX (10, 1945), p. 943–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Statement of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 7, 1945, UNCIO Document 852, 111/1/37(1).

4 Department of State, Bulletin, X, p. 338Google Scholar.

5 Senate Document 59, 79th Congress, 1st Session, p. 8, 9.

6 Official Records of the Second Tart of the First Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Record, p. 904. In the words of Senator Vandenberg, “It is our defense against what I venture to believe would be bitterly condemned in many quarters as our ‘involuntary servitude’ if our veto power did not exist. It is the complete answer to any rational fears that we may be subordinating our destiny to alien commands.… It guarantees our perpetuated independence of international dictation.” Senate Document, op. cit., p. 10.

7 This is the period covered by the factual summaries in this journal, Vol. I, Nos. 1–3, and Vol. II, No. 1. The record votes have been taken from the Journal of the Security Council up to the 49th meeting, thereafter from the mimeographed provisional records carried under the document listing S/P.V.-.

8 All save 21 of these are record votes taken by a show of hands. The others were taken by the President asking if there was objection and finding none, ruling the matter approved. A survey of the very large number of votes taken by the “no objection” method shows that except for those noted almost no substantive decisions were taken by this method. This has been the commonly applied way of handling most procedural steps. Where record votes have been taken on procedural matters the step involved has tended to be in what may be called the twilight zone of uncertainty whether it is procedural or substantive, or where there is obviously a difference of opinion among the members.

9 These include thirteen “no objection” decisions on parts of the United States draft agreement on trusteeship for the former Japanese mandated islands, and eight on parts of or amendments to the Report of the Military Staff Committee.

10 Security Council Journal, No. 16, p. 347; see also International Organization, I, p. 80. For the convenience of readers of International Organization reference will be made to discussionof veto situations as found in the factual summaries of this journal as well as to the official sources.

11 Security Council Journal, No. 40, p. 795Google Scholar; International Organization, I, p. 83.

12 Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Record, p. 1242.

13 Security Council Journal, No. 42, p. 834Google Scholar; International Organization, I, p. 83. Mr. Gromyko said that he had no objection to that part of there solution which would keep the situation under observation, save that it was “unnecessary.” But he was convinced that it is contrary to the Charter for the General Assembly to make recommendations on a matter relating to a threat to peace while it is still before the Council. Ibid., p. 826.

14 The third Soviet veto will be taken up in connection with category six.

15 Ibid., p. 864; International Organization, I, p. 84.

16 Document S/P.V. 202; International Organization, II, p. 87.

17 It later voted against the procedural resolution to drop the matter from the agenda with the instruction that the Secretary-General place the records at the disposal of the General Assembly. Ibid.

18 Votes will be recorded numerically, the first digit representing affirmative votes, the second negative votes and the third abstentions. Document S/P.V. 70; International Organization, I, p. 88.

19 Document S/P.V. 170; International Organization, I, p. 503.

20 Document S/P.V. 188; International Organization, II, p. 86.

21 Ibid.

22 Document S/P.V. 122; International Organization, I, p. 328.

23 Statement by Mr. Vishinsky in Document A/P.V. 122, p. 76. Sir Alexander Cadogan tartly remarked in a subsequent meeting of the Security Council, “We might remember this example of the exercise of the veto the next time we are told that the principle of unanimity must apply to enforcement action.… This is the case of the violation of an international convention and the violation is protected for the moment by the Soviet veto.” Document S/P.V. 125.

24 Council procedure has not been uniform on putting resolutions as a whole to a vote after passing on the parts. There are at least three instances in which resolutions have been passed in their parts and then put to a vote, one instance in which a measure was defeated throughout on a paragraph-by-paragraph test and then put to a vote as a whole; two instances in which resolutions were defeated in parts and put as a whole; and one instance of a proposal which passed in parts and was not put as a whole. The key seems to lie in the disposition of the President.

25 Document S/P.V. 194; International Organization, II, p. 83.

26 These three states were each vetoed twice by the USSR on August 29, 1946 (Document S/P.V. 57; International Organization, I, p. 92) and August 18, 1947 (Document S/P.V. 186; International Organization, II, p. 92). Mr. Gromyko also argued that Trans-Jordan's independence was specious, being a unilateral act by Britain. Mr. Vishinsky speaking in the General Assembly later said “We object to the admission of such states for reasons which are, of course, not equivalent in all cases.… We say… they do not meet the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter.” (Document A/P.V. 122, p. 66) Mr. Johnson (United States) and others attacked the Soviet reasons as not being any reasons based on, the Charter. It may be noted that in the 1946 voting on membership the votes on Albania and Mongolia were both 5–3–3 with the United States, United Kingdom and the Netherlands voting “no.” In 1947 the vote on these two states was 3–4–4 (Albania) and 3–3–5 (Mongolia), in the latter case the United States, China and the United Kingdom voting “no.”

27 See Byrnes, James F., Speaking Frankly, (New York, 1947), p. 40–41, on deal regarding multiple representationGoogle Scholar.

28 Vetoes on Italy and Finland, Documents S/P.V. 205 and S/P.V. 206; International Organization, II, p. 94. Attention may be drawn to the request for an advisory opinion which the General Assembly in 1947 addressed to the International Court of Justice on whether a member may make its approval of admission dependent on conditions other than those specified in Article 4 of the Charter, and whether it may legitimately make its agreement to admitting one applicant conditional upon the agreement of others to accept other applying states. Document A/P.V. 118.

29 See Goodrich, and Hambro, , Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, p. 134Google Scholar.

30 The President replied that the Council had “approved” the resolution but as it appeared to be a matter of substance it had not been “accepted but vetoed.” Mr. Gromyko proposed separating what he regarded as the procedural (keeping the situation under observation) from the non-procedural (reference to the rights of the Assembly) parts of the resolution and voting on them again. Senñor Nájera refused, saying he could not put the same motion to a vote a second time. Thereupon the Soviet delegate demanded a test of the nature of the first one be voted on. Security Council Journal, No. 42, p. 834–840Google Scholar.

31 Ibid., p. 841–835, 845. Mr. Evatt complained bitterly, noting that as a result of this ruling a permanent member can say “not only ‘I can veto the decision of the Council’, but ‘I can determine the question which I will veto’” Mr. Evatt asserted that the San Francisco statement had no binding effect upon the Council as such, nor upon the non-permanent members. Mr. Gromyko remarked on September 15, 1947 in the second case “this agreement is not binding upon the non-permanent members of the Security Council.” Document S/P.V. 202.

32 Document S/P.V. 202; International Organization, II, p. 87. Prior to these two votes Mr. Gromyko had ruled that as there was a difference of opinion over the nature of the American resolution, the “preliminary question” (San Francisco Statement final paragraph) of nature had to be voted on before and not after the vote on the resolution itself. When he was voted down on this ruling 2–8—1 he charged the other great powers with acting contrary to the San Francisco agreement. The British delegate pointed out that in the Spanish question the test vote had been taken after the vote on the main resolution and denied departing from the San Francisco agreement.

33 The United States in its Proposals to the Interim Committee on the Problem of Voting in the Security Council, March 10, 1948, suggested that decisions as to whether a matter is procedural within the meaning of Article 27 (2) should be decided by a vote of any seven members. It did not, however, state that it regarded this decision as a procedural one. Nor did it affirm its readiness to regard the 1945 Statement as being no longer binding. For text of United States proposals, see this issue, p. 402–4.

34 UNCIO Document 956, 111/1/47, June 13, 1945, p. 8.

35 Non-permanent members of the Council are not in a very good position to invoke the San Francisco Statement affirmation against the Soviet Union since some of their numbers have expressly declared that it “does not bind the United Nations”; Colonel Hodgson (Australia) September 15, 1947. Document S/P.V. 202, p. 171. The Canadian delegate at the San Francisco Conference expressly asked that Committee III/l not be requested to vote on the interpretive Statement. UNCIO Document 897. 111/1/42, June 10, 1945, p. 8; also UNCIO Document 922, III/1/44, June 12, 1945, p. 6.

36 The first time this occurred was on April 29, 1946 in connection with the Spanish question. Security Council Journal No. 32, p. 638Google Scholar.

37 Document S/P.V. 232.

38 The United States Department of State pamphlet entitled Aspects of Current American Foreign Policy, 10 20, 1947 (Washington 1947)statesGoogle Scholar: “By informal agreement a permanent member may abstain from voting without having such abstention counted as a veto.”, p.15—16. This has wider implications than practice indicates. A survey of Council voting shows that no less than 29 substantive motions which failed to obtain approval would have passed if the great power or powers abstaining together with other members likewise abstaining on the same vote, had voted affirmatively.