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The UN and Disarmament
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Extract
In 1964 Secretary-General U Thant asserted that more significant progress in achieving some measures of disarmament has taken place since the summer of 1963 than in all the years since the founding of the United Nations.
The evidence cited included five achievements: 1) the coming into force in October 1963 of the Moscow Treaty, a partial test-ban treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water to which more than 100 states had subscribed by 1965; 2) the establishment of the direct communications link between Moscow and Washington; 3) the resolution of the General Assembly to ban nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from outer space; 4) the unilateral reductions of the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the United States; and 5) the mutual cutbacks in production of fissionable material for military purposes by these two countries and the United Kingdom.
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- II. Cooperation and Conflict
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- Copyright © The IO Foundation 1965
References
1 “Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” UN Monthly Chronicle, 12 1964 (Vol. 1, No. 7), p. 44Google Scholar.
2 General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII), December 13, 1963. Also see General Assembly Resolution 1963 (XVIII), December 13, 1963.
3 Department of State Bulletin, 02 8, 1965 (Vol. 52, No. 1337), p. 187Google Scholar.
4 See, for example, the summary of the general debate of the nineteenth General Assembly in UN Monthly Chronicle, 01 1965 (Vol. 2, No. 1), pp. 37–104Google Scholar. Admittedly, statements for the record of this sort do not provide a precise measurement either of governmental concern or of UN influence in disarmament.
5 Article 26 of the UN Charter.
6 Article 47, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter. Italics added.
7 Acknowledgment is made to the following major sources: The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy (Department of State Publication 2702) (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946)Google Scholar; Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1961)Google Scholar; Finkelstein, Lawrence S., “The United Nations and Organizations for the Control of Armaments,” International Organization, Winter 1962 (Vol. 16, No. 1), pp. 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; andBloomfield, Lincoln P., The Politics of Arms Control: Troika, Veto and International Institutions (Special Study Group, Memorandum No. 3) (Washington, D.C., 10 6, 1961)Google Scholar.
8 General Assembly Resolution 41 (I), December 14, 1946.
9 Bechhocfer, p. 209. The resolution in question is General Assembly Resolution 715 (VIII), November 28, 1953.
10 Finkelstein, , International Organization, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 7Google Scholar.
11 Department of State Bulletin, 03 7, 1960 (Vol. 42, No. 1080), pp. 354–357Google Scholar.
12 General Assembly Official Records (14th session), pp. 36–37Google Scholar. The specific proposals are in UN Document A/4219.
13 Department of State Bulletin, 10 9, 1961 (Vol. 45, No. 1163), p. 589Google Scholar.
14 Department of State Bulletin, 10 16, 1961 (Vol. 45, No. 1164), p. 654Google Scholar.
15 Current Disarmament Proposals as of March 1, 1964 (New York: World Law Fund, 1964)Google Scholar.
16 For a stronger indictment see Goodrich, Leland M., “The UN Security Council,” International Organization, Summer 1958 (Vol. 12, No. 3), pp. 280–281CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Bechhoefer, p. 457.
18 The New York Times, November 11, 1964, p. 1.
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