Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
In an earlier article published in this journal Ernst Haas and this author suggested a set of strategic “background conditions,” “conditions at the time of initiation,” and “process conditions” intended (hypothetically) to assess the political consequences of an initial agreement to lower or remove mutual barriers to the movement of productive factors.
1 Haas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, Philippe C., “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” International Organization, Autumn 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 4), pp. 705–737Google Scholar. This article has been reprinted in International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 259–300Google Scholar.
2 SeeHaas, and Schmitter, in International Political Communities, p. 264Google Scholar.
3 One, as yet unresolved, issue is the significance of different “mixes” of variables and their changing relevance. This has, so far, led to an inductive search for “structural equivalents” or conditions which might compensate for “low” scores in different settings. For instance, in the LAFTA monograph Ernst Haas and this author suggested that complementarity of values among strategic elites, especially among economic administrators (técnicos), might provide at least a partial “compensation” for the lower levels of internal pluralism and mutual transaction in lesser developed settings. Further empirical work may lead to the specification of more such “equivalents” or to appropriate “weighting procedures.” On this point see also the critique byNye, Joseph S. Jr, “Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration,” International Organization, Autumn 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 4), pp. 870–884Google Scholar.