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Technological self-reliance for Latin America: the OAS contribution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Ernst B. Haas
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Making technology autonomous from the influence of investors and proprietors in developed countries has emerged as one of the core themes in the doctrine of dependence. Technology is not only machinery; it is “a major resource for creating new wealth; it is an instrument allowing its owners to exercise social control in various forms; it decisively affects modes of decision making.…” It is seen as the key to achieving “integral development,” free from the abuses associated with the past patterns of technology transfer which were largely mediated by multinational corportions: excessive foreign exchange costs, rise in unnecessary imports, production of luxury goods, neglect of employment objectives, stagnation of the agricultural sector, excessive urbanization, insufficient use of local professionals, environmental degradation, and lack of sensitivity to local cultures. In Marxist versions of dependence-thinking the older pattern of technology transfer strengthened the enclave economy and its comprador bourgeoisie, rather than aiding the development of a national bourgeoisie and of a modern working class.

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1980 , pp. 541 - 570
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1980

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References

1 Goulet, Denis, The Uncertain Promise (New York: IDOC/North America, 1977), p. 7Google Scholar.

2 Sábato, Jorge A. and Botana, N., “La ciencia y la tecnologia en el desarrollo futuro de América Latina,” Revista de la Integración (11 1968)Google Scholar.

3 Art. 13 of the text of the inter-American Convention on Integral Development, adopted 10 November 1976, but not in force. OAS Chronicle (December 1976); 4–6.

4 OAS Resolution AG/RES. 349 (VIII–0/78), 1 07 1978, Proceedings of the 8th Regular Session, Vol. 1, pp. 45–52Google Scholar.

5 Winner, Langdon, “Do Artifacts have Politics?”, Daedalus (Winter 1980), pp. 121 ff.Google Scholar

6 Thus, the Report of the Secretary-General for 1976–78 (Vol. II, p. 15)Google Scholar indicates that 30 percent was devoted to basic and applied sciences, 11 percent to scientific and technological policy/planning, and 59 percent to technological development and technological change projects. A further category of “special projects” makes it difficult to determine the distinctions between applied science and technological development, and between technological planning and technological change. One reason for the confusion is the budgetary principle of counting as a “special project” anything funded by the Mar del Plata Fund (post-CACTAL) while considering projects funded from the earlier sources as “ordinary projects” irrespective of substantive content or focus.

Elsewhere these breakdowns are given:

aReport of the Secretary-General, 1977, pp. 41–42.

Ibid., 1974–75.

7 See Un Ejemplo.…, cited in Table 1, pp. 58–59.

8 See Doc. OEA/Ser. T/I/TECH/doc. 8 (3 March 1977), especially pp. 12–15.

9 See Doc. OEA/Ser. T/I/TECH/doc. 4 (25 February 1977). Most of the “special projects” fit into this discussion. They are analyzed in CEPCIECC, “Proyecto de Informe Anual del CIECC a la Asemblea General, 1978,” OEA/Ser.J/IX, CEPCIECC/doc. 553, 9 May 1979, pp. 75–93. Participation in these applied projects, whether concerned with end-use technology or intermediate technological skills, involves OAS support for existing national research centers; in some instances these centers work out a division of labor among themselves but the sharing of findings is less than universal and automatic. National participation was as follows:

1. Ecology of Tropical Forests: Brazil, Colombia, Trinidad, Venezuela;

2. Coal Cokification/Gasification: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela;

3. Biopharmaceutical Evaluation: Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama;

4. Sugarcane Utilization: Barbados, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Dominican Republic;

5. Bituminous Shale: Uruguay, Brazil;

6. Cattle Genetics: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela;

7. Food Technology: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela;

8. Low-Cost Housing: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua;

9. Solar Energy: Argentina, Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad;

10. Arid Zone Development: Argentina, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Haiti;

11. Computer Technology: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina;

12. Polymerization of Lubricants: Ecuador, Venezuela;

13. Industrial Information Services: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Dominican Republic, Venezuela;

14. Wool Technology: Argentina;

15. Marine Resources: Costa Rica, Mexico, Dominican Republic;

16. Metrology: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay;

17. Industrial Metallurgy: Ecuador, Mexico;

18. Citogenetics: Argentina, Chile, Uruguay;

19. Seismic Risk Evaluation: Mexico, Venezuela;

20. Andean Fiber Resources: Chile;

21. Activation Analysis (nuclear): Uruguay;

22. Quality Control: Argentina;

23. Andean Seismic Protection: Argentina;

24. Metal Technologies: Argentina, Peru

No information was given on the status of the remaining special projects listed in Un Ejemplo, op. cit., p. 26; these appear to be inactive.

10 See Informe del Grupo de Expertos en de Gestión Tecnológica, Materias, “Bases para un programa de fortalecimiento de la gestidn tecnológica en la empresa,” OAS mimeo, 19 03 1978Google Scholar; “Report on Technical Information and Assistance Services to Business,” Doc. OEA/Ser.T/I/TECH/doc. 2 (23 February 1977).

11 Summaries and descriptions of the projects stress the role of meetings, the installation of new equipment, and the topics informing research; they contain almost no information on how the research is applied to economic and social development. If we were to assume that larger budgets.

12 Some uncertainty about relative benefits remains. PRDCYT special projects are disproportionately directed toward the most industrialized states and make important contributions to national institutional development; Mexico participates in thirteen, Argentina in eleven and Brazil in eight. See Un Ejemplo, op. cit., p. 40. Cultural self-reliance cannot be said to be significantly enhanced because the main principles of planning science and technology are imported from the U.S. and the experience of the OECD.

13 For fully elaborated definitions of regimes see the articles by Young, Oran and Haas, Ernst B. in World Politics (04 1980)Google Scholar. The present analysis is based entirely on the concepts and arguments developed in the article by Haas.

14 As quoted by Naraine, Mahindra, “Science for Progress,” Nature, 26 05 1977, p. 298Google Scholar.

15 For the texts see Comercio Exterior (June 1969), pp. 422–27; (July 1969), pp. 494–95; (February 1970), p. 88.

16 See Programa Regional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnólogico, OEA, Visión Latinoaméricana sobre Ciencia y Tecnologla en el Desarrollo (Bogotá: Fondo Colombiano Investigaciones Cientificas, 1972, 2 vols.)Google Scholar. The papers contained in these volumes constitute appeals on the part of ḼAS staff members and their consultants, including Ignacy Sachs. The use of the systems terminology is ideological camouflage to invest the appeal in the aura of “science.” The demonstrations presented on the basis of the methodọlogy amount to little more than checklists, inventories, and rules of procedure designed to teach people how to do a market survey or examine the adequacy of a production schedule. Macro-level “systems” and “models” are intuitive diagrams allegedly showing the links among the components of society; they are not empirically validated abstractions of interactions based on dynamic modeling. For an exception see the study of technological innovation in the Argentine dairy industry done by the Instituto Di Telia.

17 Texts summarized in Ingerson, Earl and Bragg, Wayne C., eds., Science, Government and Industry for Development (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, 1975), pp. 330–37Google Scholar.

18 See footnote 9 for the list of the special projects.

19 Our description is based on the evaluation and final report of this project, Doc. SG/P.l/PPTT/34/35 (June 1975).

20 PPTT/34/35, op. cit., p. A120. Our account relies especially on ibid., pp. A4–7, A27 ff. The final report urges that PPTT be continued by incorporating its technique into the operations associated with PRDCYT's Special Projects. For a summary of the evolution of thinking within the OAS Secretariat, which involved a continuous descent from the heights of systems analysis, see ibid., p. A6.

21 Framinan, G., Gonod, P., and Vidal, C. Martinez, “Información para la transferencia de tecnologia como proceso que estimula el desarrollo tecnológico,” Comercio Exterior (10 1976), pp. 1199 ff.Google Scholar The authors urge that mere information is inadequate and that what they term “información elaborada” is needed. This combines information on technical processes with the type of questions we normally associate with technology assessment exercises. It has the purpose of exposing and debunking the claims of the suppliers of technology.

22 All monographs appeared in “Studies on Scientific and Technological Development,” PRDCYT, General Secretariat of OAS, 1971Google Scholar. The theoretical argument is contained in Nos. 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 28. The authors include persons very prominent in the advocacy of Latin American technological self-reliance though they are not necessarily committed to strategies of regional as opposed to global and national development. Among the authors are Jorge Sábato, Francisco Sagasti, Alberto Aráoz, and Maximo Halty-Carrère.

23 Un Ejemplo, op. cit., pp. 19, 21, 32, 40–43. Also see “Report of the Group of Experts in Science and Techology to the Inter-American Cultural Council on the Regional Program of Scientific and Technological Development (Maracay, 02 1968)Google Scholar, and “Final Report of the Specialized Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to Latin American Development (Brasilia, 05 1972)Google Scholar. Both are reprinted in Doc. OEA/Ser.T/I/TECH/doc. 11 (March 1977).

24 A large number of true multinational or international research centers exists, a few of them located in the western hemisphere; they are concerned primarily with applied research on food, agriculture, energy, and rural development. They depend on the United Nations and bilateral aid agencies and cater to a worldwide clientele, though the Inter-American Development Bank contributes to centers located in the western hemisphere. The numerous institutions in the western hemisphere labelled “Inter-American center” are almost entirely devoted to teaching, not research. They are funded from various OAS sources. The only true multinational research center is ICAITI in Guatemala, which was founded long before PRDCYT and is largely funded from non-OAS sources.

25 Resolution AG/RES.233 (VI-O/76), “Technological Development,” in Report of the Working Group of Government Experts on Technology Development, OEA/SER.T/1, TECH/doc. 34 (22–25 May 1979), pp. 98–99. This document is the basis of our discussion of the current controversy over PRDCYT. The final proposal submitted to the General Assembly is entitled “Elements for an Inter-American Program of Cooperation for the Creation, Adaptation, and Transfer of Technology,” pp. 10–18, dated 1979Google Scholar. It is followed by a document similarly entitled but omitting the phrase “elements for,” and proposing the creation of the Inter-American Technological Development Program to take the place of PRDCYT, pp. 20–42, dated 1977. The 1977 report is the more sweeping of the two, but apparently less official than the 1979 report.

26 Ibid., p. 23.

27 Ibid., p. 10. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Ecuador complained that the 1977 report had given insufficient attention to the least developed countries. Argentina objected that national selfreliance was not sufficiently stressed, while Trinidad wanted subregional collective measures to be emphasized. Venezuela, in its separate submission, castigated the final report for over-reliance on compensatory redistribution and argued for a larger role to be accorded to SELA as an appropriate forum of collective self-reliance. Ibid., p. 19.

28 See Doc. OAS/Ser.T/I/TECH/doc. 10 (4 March 1977), especially pp. 29 ff. and 37–39.

29 Un Ejemplo.… op. cit., pp. 55–56.

30 Doc. OEA/SER.T/I, TECH/doc. 34, op. cit., pp. 17–18; 33–35. The OAS Secretariat's contribution to the report spelled out the preferred rules with explicit references to the desirability of continuing the Pilot Project for Technology Transfer, the basic studies on planning, and new regional programs for creating a systematic knowledge base permitting self-reliant planning. Information-sharing among existing R & D centers was also suggested as an activity to be supported.

31 This phase of PRDCYT's science and technology planning program was institutionalized in the “Science and Technology Policy Instruments” project, funded jointly by OAS and the Canadian International Development Research Center. It ran from 1971 until 1978 and combined country-level research projects with a central design elaborated mainly by Sagasti and Araoz. Research institutes or academic units in these countries participated: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Egypt, India, South Korea, Yugoslavia. For the concept and methodology see International Development Research Center, Science and Technology Policy Implementation in Less-Developed Countries: Methodological Guidelines for the STPI Project (Ottawa: IRDC, 1976Google Scholar; doc. IRDC–067e); cited hereafter as IDRC–1. For the results of the project see Sagasti, Francisco, Science and Technology for Development: Main Comparative Report on the STPI Project (Ottawa: IDRC, 1978Google Scholar; doc. IDRC–109e); hereafter cited as IDRC–2.

32 IDRC–1, p. 13, emphasis ours. It is very unfortunate that this definition is made ambiguous by the discussion of the “structure” of policy instruments. It then turns out that the structure and trie instrument are the same thing, and both are identical with what others call the “process of decision-making” in a multiorganizational setting. Is the “instrument,” then, a collection of means to achieve a goal (as the definition urges), a goal, a process, or what? Ibid., pp. 16–19.

33 IDRC–1, p. 7.

34 IDRC–1, pp. 34–35, 43.

35 IDRC–2, pp. 8–16, 20–23.

36 Ibid., p. 23. This does not prevent Sagasti from also claiming the existence of “key paths or sequences that link macroeconomic conditions and variables with technological decisions within each firm” (p. 20). No such paths or sequences are described in the report as having emerged empirically, just asserted in doctrine.

37 Doc. OEA/SER.T/I, TECH/doc. 34, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

38 Ibid., pp. 37–38.

39 Ibid., pp. 39–41. The Secretariat suggested that this plan be financed through an OAS contribution of $2.9 million during the first four years, and at $1 million per year thereafter, with the remaining funds coming from the sources mentioned in the report. The emphasis on centralized informatics was strongly endorsed by the United States, which proposed the creation of an Inter-American Center for Technology Information. Mexico, Trinidad, and the Dominican Republic submitted a proposal stressing regional self-reliance. Ibid., pp. 53–58, 75–78.