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Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Stefano Guzzini
Stefano Guzzini
Affiliation:
candidate in Social and Political Science at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
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Abstract

Realism explains the ruling of the international system through the underlying distribution of power among states. Increasingly, analysts have found this power analysis inadequate, and they have developed new concepts, most prominently structural power. The usage of structural power actually entails three different meanings, namely indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and impersonal power. Only the first, however, is compatible with the current neorealist choice-theoretical mode of explanation. This is the basic paradox of recent power approaches: by wanting to retain the central role of power, some international relations and international political economy theory is compelled to expand that concept and to move away from the very theory that claims to be based on power. Neorealism does not take power seriously enough. At the same time, these extensions of the concept are themselves partly fallacious. To account simultaneously for the different meanings of structural power and to avoid a conceptual overload, this article proposes that any power analysis should necessarily include a pair or dyad of concepts of power, linking agent power and impersonal governance. Finally, it sketches some consequences of those concepts for international theory.

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Articles
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International Organization , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , Summer 1993 , pp. 443 - 478
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1993

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References

For helpful comments and suggestions on drafts of this article as early as June 1990, I am indebted to James Coleman, Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Pierre Hassner, Anna Leander, Steven Lukes, Reinhard Meyers, Heikki Patomäki, Susan Strange, Ole Waever, and the editor and two anonymous referees of International Organization. I would also like to thank Peter Taylor and Holly Wyatt who helped me to improve the language.

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13. I use the word “structuralist” in the traditional sense of social theory, where it refers to theories that rely on holistic explanations. Waltz's approach has been, unfortunately for the interdisciplinary debate, sometimes labeled structuralist. I will refer to Waltz as a neorealist.

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24. Krasner, Stephen, Structural Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 14Google Scholar. For a very similar approach, see Nye, Joseph S. Jr, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 153–71, and, in particular, pp. 166–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Above the traditional “command power,” he conceives of a form of power, called “co-optive power” or ”soft power,” which (1) expressed in terms of resources, is derived from intangible resources like the rules in regimes and cultural and/or ideological attraction and (2) expressed in terms of power exercises, consists in structuring the situations in which power relations occur.

25. Krasner's argument was made in the context of the U.S. and the U.K. decisions to “react” against this attempt by quitting the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

26. The best general presentation in political theory of the choice-theoretical approach to power remains Brian Barry's 1975 essay, “Power: An Economic Analysis,” reprinted in Brian Barry, Democracy, Power, and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 222–69. See also Baechler, Jean, Le Pouvoir Pur (Pure power) (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1978)Google Scholar; and Bartlett, Randall, Economics and Power: An Inquiry into Human Relations and Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Additionally, see Dowding, Keith M., Rational Choice and Political Power (Hants, U. K.: Edward Elgar, 1991)Google Scholar, whose distinction between “outcome power” and “social power” reflects exactly Krasner's twofold approach.

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28. The term “fungibility” refers to the idea of movable goods that can be freely placed and replaced by others of the same class. It connotes universal applicability or “convertibility” in contrast to context specificity. For Baldwin, money is defined by its fungibility. He obviously refers to an ideal type of money, i.e., the most liquid part of the various money aggregates, and the fact that the standard-of-value function is fulfilled mainly in developed national economies and only to a limited extent on the international level.

29. Keohane follows this approach when, by arguing for issue- or regime-specific analyses, he specifically criticizes Waltz for this fungibility assumption. See Keohane, Robert O., “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Keohane, , Neorealism and Its Critics, pp.158–203, and especially p. 184Google Scholar.

30. Baldwin, , Paradoxes of Power, pp. 25 and 209Google Scholar. For a similar argument, see Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, Md.:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 106Google Scholar. Aron states that only the characteristics of money allow economists to reduce the multiplicity of individual choices to a single scale of preferences. Since neither power nor “national interest” can play this role, economics cannot be the model for international theory. By criticizing Kaplan, Aron thereby anticipates and rejects Waltz's research program. Waltz explicitly acknowledges Aron's argument. He counters by claiming that the missing standard-of-value characteristics of power is not a problem for theory building but a practical problem that arises during its application. He thereby overlooks Aron's argument that the reason why money is not analogous to power lies in the lack of a theoretical analogy between utility and national interest. For the two arguments, see Aron, , Paix et guerre entre les nations, p. 98Google Scholar; and Waltz, Kenneth, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44 (Summer 1990), pp. 21–38Google Scholar, respectively.

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32. See ibid.; and Baldwin, , Economic Statecraft, p. 285Google Scholar.

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35. The reference definition of hegemonic stability theory has been given by Robert Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977,” in Holsti, Ole R., Siverson, Randolph M., and George, Alexander L., eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131–62Google Scholar. Yet, it seems too much tailored for his regime approach, neglecting the collective-good argument. For a convincing argument, see Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614, and especially p. 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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38. See the following works by Strange, Susan: “What About International Relations?” in Strange, Susan, ed., Paths to International Political Economy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 183–97, and especially pp. 190–91Google Scholar; and States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (London: Frances Pinter, 1988)Google Scholar, where this notion is developed most fully. For the empirical analysis of U.S. nondecisions, see Casino Capitalism (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986)Google Scholar, chap. 2.

39. Strange, Susan, “Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire,” in Czempiel, and Rosenau, , Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, pp. 161–76Google Scholar.

40. With regard to the management of the U.S. dollar, this critique has a longer tradition. For one example, see Aron, Raymond, Les dernières années du siécle (The century's last years) (Paris: Julliard, 1984), p. 44Google Scholar. It is important to note that the power to avoid or to export adjustments can, in the long run, undermine the very base of “national” power. This argument is most thoroughly made in David P. Calleo's work; for example, see The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; and Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987)Google Scholar. See also Senghaas, Dieter, Friedensprojekt Europa (Peace project Europe) (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), p. 55Google Scholar.

41. Riker, William H., “Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power,” in Bell, R., Edwards, D. V., and Wagner, R. H., eds., Political Power A Reader in Theory and Practice (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 116Google Scholar. The recipelike concept is defined as the production of effects through the manipulation of nature.

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44. Ibid., p. 117; emphasis added.

45. Morriss, Peter, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1987), p. 19Google Scholar; emphasis original. On pages 15–18, Morriss criticizes the pluralists for their excessive empiricism in requiring the actual exercise of power as a condition for its existence. He calls this the “event-fallacy.” For a discussion of both fallacies in IR and IPE, see Garst, Daniel, “Thucydides and Neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (03 1989), pp. 3–27, and, in particular, pp. 20–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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47. Ibid., p. 54.

48. Coming to the second side of her power approach, the diffusion not of the effects but of the origins of power, Strange does, however, individualize a privileged actor, the “international business civilization.” In other words, nonintentional power is very unevenly distributed throughout the international power structure. See Strange, Susan, “The Name of the Game,” in Ritopoulos, N., ed., Sea-changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1990), pp. 238–74Google Scholar.

49. Knorr, Klaus, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 77–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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51. Caporaso, James A., “Introduction to the Special Issue on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System,” and “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978), pp. 1–12 and 13–43, respectivelyCrossRefGoogle Scholar. The quotations are from pages 4 and 28 and allude, of course, to Keohane and Nye's Power and Interdependence.

52. Ibid., pp. 2 and 18. This point has been most elegantly made by Sanjaya Lall, “Is ‘Dependence’ a Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment?” World Development 3 (November–December 1975), pp. 799–810.

53. This ambiguity has been largely neglected in the literature. For an exception, see Debnam, Geoffrey, The Analysis of Power: A Realist Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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55. Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System,” p. 33Google Scholar. In more recent writings, Caporaso retreats slightly from this latter position. He retains the basic division between relational (agent-based) and structural power approaches. Yet, together with Stephen Haggard, he now concludes that these forms of power are not necessarily competing categories they both refer to (different kinds) of resources that affect outcomes understood as bargains (see their “Power in the International Political Economy”). For a critique of this argument, see the third part of this article.

56. See in particular two works by Gill, Stephen and Law, David: The Global Political Economy (New York: Harvester, 1988)Google Scholar; and “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (12 1989), pp. 475–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57. For a similar account, based on Steven Lukes's three dimensions, see Krause, Keith, “Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (09 1991), pp. 313–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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62. On the first point, see Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1947), pp. 342ffGoogle Scholar; and on the second, see Kenneth Waltz, “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power,” reprinted in James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 304–14, at p. 309. Note in this context Antonio Gramsci's interest in the Italian Realist tradition (Niccolò Machiavelli, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto) in Gramsci, Antonio, Noterelle sulla politico del Machiavelli: Quaderno 13 (Notes on Machiavelli's politics: Notebook 13) (Turin: Einaudi, 1981)Google Scholar.

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66. For the stress on Herrschaft, see Albrecht, Ulrich, Internationale Politik: Einführung in das System internationaler Herrschaft (International politics: Introduction into the system of international rule) (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986)Google Scholar. For the Gramscian wording, see Klein, Bradley S., “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Policies,” Review of International Studies 14 (04 1988), pp. 133–48, and, in particular, p. 134CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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73. See Waltz's, Kenneth works, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar; and especially “A Response to My Critics,” in Keohane, , Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 322–45Google Scholar. In the latter work, Waltz does not respond to the move to the metatheoretical level on which Ashley's critique is pitched.

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76. One of the reasons for the reluctance to incorporate nonintentional power is the relationship between the concepts of power and responsibility in agent-oriented theories. It seems, however, to be going too far to conclude that since it is difficult to assess responsibility in cases where unintended effects have been produced, such effects must necessarily be excluded from power analyses. The extent of responsibility must be judged case by case. For both the intended and unintended consequences of action, the capacity to effect an outcome (i.e., power) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an actor's responsibility.

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78. Morriss, , Power: A Philosophical Analysis, p. 100Google Scholar. In both quotations the emphasis is original.

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83. The French language distinguishes between puissance (Latin potentia) and pouvoir (Latin potestas), where the first term refers to a potential or ability and the second, to an act. Moreover, a third term, Pouvoir, is used to denote centralized power or government. Foucault's insistence on the diffusion of power is explicable as a countermove to a traditional conception of sovereign (i.e., centralized) power.

84. See especially Lukes, Steven, “Power and Authority,” in Bottomore, T. and Nisbet, R., eds., A History of Sociological Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 633–76Google Scholar.

85. For a recent and similar definition of power, see Heikki Patomäki, “Concepts of ‘Action,’ ‘Structure,’ and ‘Power’ in ‘Critical Social Realism’: A Positive and Reconstructive Critique,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 21, no. 2, 1991, pp. 221–50, at p. 234CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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88. For a critique of this unwelcome “interference of conspiracy theory,” see Wasver, Ole, “Tradition and Transgression in International Relations: A Post-Ashleyan Position, Working paper no. 24/1989 (Copenhagen: Center for Conflict and Peace Research, 1989), p. 23Google Scholar.

89. Dowding, , Rational Choice and Political Power, p. 137Google Scholar.

90. Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Rabinow, Paul, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 187Google Scholar.

91. Strange, Susan, “The Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 551–74. The quotation is from p. 565CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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95. For a thorough appraisal of the concept of sovereignty, see the writings of R. B. J. Walker; for example, “State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time,” Millennium 20 (Autumn 1991), pp. 445–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

96. See Buzan, Barry, Jones, Charles, and Little, Richard, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)Google Scholar.

97. For a convincing account of the dynamics of power positions that accounts for Caporaso's and Krasner's frameworks as different stages of power institutionalizations and struggles, see Gaventa, John, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 21Google Scholar.