Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-g4j75 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-12T09:52:43.311Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2003

Virginia Page Fortna

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

In the aftermath of war, what determines whether peace lasts or fighting resumes, and what can be done to foster durable peace? Drawing on theories of cooperation, I argue that belligerents can overcome the obstacles to peace by implementing measures that alter incentives, reduce uncertainty about intentions, and manage accidents. A counterargument suggests that agreements are epiphenomenal, merely reflecting the underlying probability of war resumption. I test hypotheses about the durability of peace using hazard analysis. Controlling for factors (including the decisiveness of victory, the cost of war, relative capabilities, and others) that affect the baseline prospects for peace, I find that stronger agreements enhance the durability of peace. In particular, measures such as the creation of demilitarized zones, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, and joint commissions for dispute resolution affect the duration of peace. Agreements are not merely scraps of paper; rather, their content matters in the construction of peace that lasts.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , Spring 2003 , pp. 337 - 372
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2003

References

Azcárate, Pablo de. 1966. Mission in Palestine, 1948–1952. Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel, Katz, Jonathan N., and Tucker, Richard. 1998. Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. American Journal of Political Science 42 (4): 1260–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott. 1998. Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration. American Journal of Political Science 42 (4):1200–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott, and Stam, Allan C. III. 2000a. EUGene: Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program. Available online at ⟨http://eugenesoftware.org⟩.Google Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott, and Stam, Allan C. III. 2000b. A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War. International Studies Quarterly 44 (3):451–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bercovitch, Jacob, and Jackson, Richard. 1997. International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945–1995. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.Google Scholar
Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Jones, Bradford S.. 1997. Time Is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science. American Journal of Political Science 41 (4):1414–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brecher, Michael, and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1992. International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918–1988. (study no. 9286). Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.Google Scholar
Bremer, Stuart A. 1992. Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (2):309–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brogan, Patrick. 1992. World Conflicts: Why and Where They Are Happening. 2d ed. London: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Brown, Michael E., Lynn-Jones, Sean M., and Miller, Steven E.. 1997. Debating the Democratic Peace, International Security Reader. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Lalman, David. 1992. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Butterworth, Robert Lyle. 1976. Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-1974: Data with Synopses. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University Center for International Studies.Google Scholar
Coase, Ronald H. 1988. The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Diehl, Paul F., Reifschneider, Jennifer, and Hensel, Paul R.. 1996. United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict. International Organization 50 (4):683–700.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., and Barsoom, Peter N.. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? International Organization 50 (3):379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3):379–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1):68–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International Organization 52 (2):269–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fortna, Virginia Page. Forthcoming. Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Gallagher, Nancy W. 1999. The Politics of Verification. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Goertz, Gary, and Diehl, Paul F.. 1992. The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries. International Interactions 18 (2):151–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goertz, Gary, and Diehl, Paul F.. 1993. Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns. International Studies Quarterly 37 (2):147–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goertz, Gary, and Diehl, Paul F.. 1995. The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks. American Journal of Political Science 39 (1):30–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, Erik. 1992. War and Peace Treaties, 1816–1991. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Greene, William H. 1993. Econometric Analysis. 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Hampson, Fen Osler. 1996. Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.Google Scholar
Hartzell, Caroline, Hoddie, Mathew, and Rothchild, Donald. 2001. Research Note: Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables. International Organization 55 (1): 183–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hensel, Paul R. 1994. One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816–1986. Journal of Peace Research 31 (3):281–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hensel, Paul R. 2000. Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict. In What Do We Know About War?, edited by Vasquez, John A., 57–84. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Jaggers, Keith, and Gurr, Ted Robert. 1996. Polity III: Regime Change and Political Authority, 1800–1994. (study no. 6695). Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30 (2):167–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jervis, Robert. 1993. Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War. Political Science Quarterly 108 (2):239–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, Daniel M., Bremer, Stuart A., and Singer, J. David. 1996. Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns. Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (2): 163–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kecskemeti, Paul. 1964. Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. New York: Atheneum.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Khouri, Fred J. 1963. Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian Front. Middle East Journal 17 (1-2): 14–34.Google Scholar
Kinsolving, Lucien Lee. 1967. The Israeli-Syrian Demilitarized Zones: The UN Security Council Record. Unpublished manuscript. American University, Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
Lamb, Alastair. 1991. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846–1990. Hertingfordbury, England: Roxford Books.Google Scholar
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Long, Andrew G., and Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2000. Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (5):686–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Licklider, Roy. 1995. The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993. American Political Science Review 89 (3):681–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mansfield, Edward, and Snyder, Jack. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of War. International Security 20 (1):5–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maoz, Zeev. 1984. Peace by Empire: Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816–1976. Journal of Peace Research 21 (3):227–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maoz, Zeev, and Russett, Bruce. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace: 1946–1986. American Political Science Review 87 (3):624–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, Lisa. 1993. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. World Politics 45 (3):406–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19 (3):5–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J.. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Miall, Hugh. 1992. The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945. New York: St. Martin's Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moe, Terry M. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science 28 (4):739–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oye, Kenneth A., ed. 1986. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1991. Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory. American Political Science Review 85 (4): 1303–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reiter, Dan. 1995. Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen. International Security 20 (2):5–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russett, Bruce M. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C., and Halperin, Morton H.. 1961. Strategy and Arms Control. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.Google Scholar
Signorino, Curt S., and Ritter, Jeffrey M.. 1999. Tau-B or Not Tau-B: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions. International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 115–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Small, Melvin, and Singer, J. David. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.Google Scholar
Smith, Alastair, and Stam, Allan C.. 2001. Issues and the Nature of War. Paper presented at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August–September, San Francisco, Calif.Google Scholar
Stam, Allan C. 1996. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stinnett, Douglas M., and Diehl, Paul F.. 2001. The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development. Journal of Politics 63 (3):717–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tillema, Herbert K. 1991. International Armed Conflict Since 1945: A Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.Google Scholar
United Nations. Security Council Document S/6651, 3 September 1965. Report by the Secretary-General on the Current Situation in Kashmir with Particular Reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease-Fire Line, and the Functioning of UNMOGIP.Google Scholar
United Nations. Security Council Document S/6710 and addenda, various dates 1965-66. Report by the Secretary-General on the Observance of the Cease-Fire Under Security Council Resolution 211 of 20 September 1965.Google Scholar
Walter, Barbara F. 2001. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Werner, Suzanne. 1997. The Possibility of Recurrent Conflict: A Decision to End the Peace. Paper presented at the 93d Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, Washington D.C.Google Scholar
Werner, Suzanne. 1999. The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement and Renegotiating the Terms. American Journal of Political Science 43 (3):912–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Regional Contracting. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar