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Restructuring the United Nations system: institutional reform efforts in the context of North-South relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Ronald I. Meltzer
Ronald I. Meltzer
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Buffalo
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Abstract

Since 1975, the United Nations has undertaken major deliberations to consider institutional reform of the UN system. Such restructuring activities have sprung from widespread dissatisfaction with the United Nations' capacity to deal with problems of economic development and relations between industrialized and developing countries. UN reform efforts have focused on two broad areas: reshaping the deliberative and policy-making operations of central UN institutions in order to reach more coherent global policies on international economic and social affairs; and reorganizing the planning, coordination, and implementation of UN programs to achieve these policy goals more effectively. In 1977, the General Assembly adopted the report of an intergovernmental Ad Hoc Committee, which provided detailed guidelines for prospective UN restructuring, and assigned its recommendations to relevant units within the UN system for the purpose of implementing these reforms. Major themes emphasized in these guidelines include an increased centralization and integration of the UN system in dealing with international economic and social affairs and improved efficiency and coordination of UN operations and activities in these areas. Fundamental to the course of UN restructuring deliberations—and to the extent and significance of eventual institutional reforms—has been the linkage between UN reorganization and the disposition of substantive North-South issues, as the restructuring exercise remains tied to the pace and direction of negotiations concerning “a new international economic order.”

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Articles
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International Organization , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1978 , pp. 993 - 1018
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1978

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References

1 Bergsten, C. Fred, “Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions,” International Organization 30 (Spring 1976): 361CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 UN Document A/32/PV. 109, p. 6. A corollary mandate for the restructuring process was to make the UN “a more effective instrument for the promotion of international economic and social cooperation and development.” See.A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation: Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, E/AC. 62/9 (New York: United Nations, 1975), p. 1Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as E/AC.62/9. Within the U.S. Government, the term, “a new international economic order” is quite distinct from ”the new international economic order,” a concept that is associated with the specific outcomes of the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly. In this article, the former term will be used, indicating a broad set of goals that is yet to be defined in detail, but which clearly involves a significant reshaping of global economic relations. As will be seen, the restructuring exercise has been viewed with a much different emphasis by Western governments, looking upon UN reform more in terms of creating increased institutional rationalization and more efficient resource management. Despite the fact that UN institutional reform was initiated by the developing countries, this exercise was nonetheless supported by Western governments, as indicated by the unanimous decision to include restructuring on the agenda of the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly. Personal interview, UN official.

3 Jackson, Robert G.A., A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, DP/5 (Geneva: United Nations, 1969), II, p. 6Google Scholar. The institutional proliferation and organizational sprawl characterizing the UN system in recent years also derived from Western efforts to seek favored new programs, e.g., UNEP and The World Food Council. As a UN official noted, “Both developed and developing countries alike have participated in creating the current organizational problems within the UN system.” Personal interview, UN official.

4 See E/AC.62/9, p. 1 and UN Document A/31/315, p. 4.

5 See Gosovic, Branislav and Ruggie, John Gerard, “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly,” International Organization 30 (Spring 1976): 310–19Google Scholar, for an account of the events during this period, from the 1973 Algiers Summit of Non-Aligned Countries to the 1975 seventh special session of the UN General Assembly. See also Hansen, Roger D., “A ‘New International Economic Order’? An Outline for a Constructive U.S. Response,” Development Paper 19 (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 07, 1975), p. 6Google Scholar. The expression of these goals and the overall pattern of conference dynamics reflect a long-term process dating back to UNCTAD I in 1964.

6 See Gosovic, and Ruggie, , “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order,” p. 320Google Scholar. As a U.S. official noted, “We were off-balance and on the defensive with the call for the NIEO (new international economic order) in 1974, and we were eager for a new initiative to get the North-South dialogue on a more reasonable footing.” Personal interview, U.S. State Department official.

7 See Gosovic, and Ruggie, , “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order,” p. 320–2Google Scholar. The other five agenda items were international trade; transfer of real resources and international monetary reform; science and technology; industrialization; and food and agriculture.

8 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 1. This same type of politicizing spin-off from the sixth special session could be seen in the UN Law of the Sea negotiations. See Miles, Edward, “The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Committee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,” International Organization 31 (Spring 1977): 209Google Scholar.

9 For further discussion along these lines, see Kotschnig, Walter, “The United Nations as an Instrument of Economic and Social Development,” in Gardner, Richard N. and Millikan, Max F., eds., The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968)Google Scholar, and U.S. Participation in International Organizations, U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 02, 1977), pp. xi–xiiGoogle Scholar. For an assessment of the Jackson Report of 1969, which focused on these problems, see Cox, Robert W., “The Pearson and Jackson Reports in the Context of Development Ideologies,” The Yearbook of World Affairs 1972, pp. 188–9Google Scholar. As noted, despite their criticisms, Western governments themselves contributed to the institutional sprawl within the UN system.

10 See U.S. Participation in International Organizations, pp. 17–21, for comments on the UNDP. See also UN Document E/1978/10, pp. 72–74, for further discussion of UNDP's terms of reference and operation.

11 See Cleveland, Harlan, “The U.S. vs. the U.N.?” The New York Times Magazine, 4 05 1975, p. 16Google Scholar.

12 See The New York Times, 15 July 1975, p. 4, for excerpts of this 14 July 1975 speech to the Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

13 See The New York Times, 12 October 1975, pp. 1, 16, for American reaction to this event. This sentiment has continued, as evidenced by the dozen or so bills introduced into the U.S. Congress in 1976 to reduce American contributions to the UN system. Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State Official.

14 See E/AC.62/9, p. vii, for the charge to this group, as well as a list of its members. These individuals were nominated by their governments, but were to act in private capacities.

15 See Ibid., pp. 3–4.

16 The publication of this report was greeted with a good deal of fanfare. For example, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim acclaimed its achievement as “a historic moment in the life of the United Nations.” See The New York Times, 21 May 1975, p. 1. Within the U.S. government, officials were “astounded” at its detailed comprehensiveness and “looked forward to pursuing its suggestions.” Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State Official. It is generally acknowledged that the Group's most influential member was Richard N. Gardner, an American participant acting as rapporteur. Developing countries, however, were quite disturbed by the Group's recommendations, viewing the report more as a political package than as an expert document. In addition, there was considerable opposition to the report's proposals regarding UNCTAD. Personal Interview, UN Official.

17 See E/AC.62/9, pp. 12–13.

18 This discussion has drawn substantially from “Restructuring the UN,” Developing Forum III (08–09 1975): 9Google Scholar; and The New York Times, 21 May 1975, pp. 1, 19. See E/AC.62/9, pp. 11–44, for the actual provisions of the Group's report.

19 For reference to such difficulties, see The New York Times, 21 May 1975, p. 19. A key element of any consideration of ECOSOC's revitalization is its relationship to UNCTAD. As will be seen, the Group of 77 looks with great disfavor at any attempt to weaken UNCTAD's role in formulating and negotiating international policy. As a U.S. official noted, “The LDCs tend to look at ECOSOC reforms as an attack on UNCTAD, as a way to grab back what had been given to UNCTAD.” Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State official. For a discussion of UNCTAD and the possible development of a new international trade organization, see E/AC.62/9, p. 53–55. See a later section of this article for further discussion of UN bureaucratic politics and restructuring deliberations.

20 The Group of Experts' report was included in the Ad Hoc Committee's terms of reference, but its perceived “political” character, reflecting the experts' decision “to negotiate a suitable restructuring package among themselves,” offended too many delegations for use within the Committee. However, many of the report's recommendations had already been proposed elsewhere. For example, the idea of a new Director-General post was included in the 1969 Jackson Report. Personal Interview, UN Official.

21 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System, General Assembly Official Records: Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 5 (A/10005) (New York: 1975), p. 5Google Scholar.

22 See Ibid., p. 8.

23 See UN Document A/AC.179/L.2, p. 2. Throughout the Ad Hoc Committee's deliberations, as will be seen, the effective working unit on restructuring took on different names and shapes to accommodate evolving difficulties. The “informal group” eventually became the “Contact Group,” with a “Friends of the Chairman” group later formed to reach final agreements within the Committee.

24 See Official Records of the General Assembly: Thirty-First Session, Supplement No. 34A, UN Document A/3 l/34Add. 1, p. 73. Hereafter cited as UN Document A/31/34/Add. 1. Some eighty-six speakers participated in this exercise.

25 See UN Document A/AC. 179/4, p. 2. In the third problem area, a great deal of negotiation centered on the question of including GATT in this category. Developing countries desired its inclusion, but Western governments, especially the United States, sought to exclude the trade organization from the restructuring dialogue. After much haggling, GATT was to be considered as a “footnoted entry” in this problem area. Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State Official.

26 See United Nations Press Release GA/Res/31, 4 March 1976, p. 2.

27 These sets of proposals for the working group are contained in Annex III of Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System, General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-First Session, Supplement No. 34, A/31/34, (New York: 1976)Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as UN Document A/31/34. This document is also known as the “interim report” of the Ad Hoc Committee.

28 UN Document A/31/34, p. 42.

29 See Ibid., pp. 46–47; and United Nations Press Release ECOSOC/3873, 13 May 1976, pp. 4–5.

30 UN Document A/31/34, p. 52.

31 Ibid., pp. 42–3 and 47–8.

32 See UN Document A/AC. 179/6, p. 5.

33 See UN Document A/31/34, p. 53. In the Group of 77 much less attention was paid to ECOSOC than to other bodies, largely reflecting its disrepute among developing countries.

34 Ibid., pp. 53–4.

35 For respective U.S. and EEC views, see Ibid., pp. 43–44 and 49. For the Group of 77 comments, see Ibid., p. 55.

36 See Ibid., pp. 44, 45–50.

37 See Ibid., p. 55.

38 For respective U.S., EEC, and Group of 77 viewpoints, see Ibid., pp. 44–5, 50–1, and 56.

39 Ibid., pp. 56–7.

40 Ibid., pp. 45–6, 51.

41 See Ibid., pp. 46, 52. Within the U.S. government, there has been great deal of concern about UN personnel practices. For discussion that reflects American viewpoints in this area, see U.S. Participation in International Organizations, pp. 51–57.

42 See UN Document A/31/34, pp. 57–8.

43 See UN Document OPI/CESI Note/375, 25 September 1976, p. 1.

44 Another factor behind the Committee's willingness to use a chairman's “consolidated text” was the perceived success of this approach at the UN Law of the Sea negotiations. Personal Interview, UN Official. See also UN Document A/31/34, pp. 5–6. See discussion in a later section of this article regarding the role of the chairman and his “consolidated text” in the restructuring deliberations.

45 Personal Interview, UN Official.

46 See UN Document A/31/34Add.2, p. 11.

47 Ibid., pp. 22–3 and Personal Interview, U.S. State Department Official.

48 See UN Document A/31/34/Add.2, p. 23. The chairman cited “pressures of other commitments” and “constraints on the time and resources of delegations'” as the primary causes for this inability to complete the Committee's work. Another reason for seeking an extension of the Committee's work was the “floundering” pace experienced at the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation. Personal Interview, UN Official. See a later section of this study for further discussion of the importance of linkages between UN restructuring and the progress of substantive North-South negotiations.

49 See UN Document A/31/34, p. 2. The General Assembly agreed to this extension on 21 December 1976. See UN Document A/32/34, p. 2.

50 See UN Document A/31/34, p. 23.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Personal Interview, U.S. State Department Official.

53 See UN Document A/31/34, p. 26.

54 See Ibid. Great care was also taken within the Committee to avoid proposing language regarding UNCTAD that would offend that organization and its supporters. Indeed, eventual Committee language was coordinated with UNCTAD's own text on institutional questions, resolution 90IV, formulated at the 1976 Nairobi conference. Personal Interview, UN Official.

55 See Ibid., p. 16 and UN Document A/32/34, pp. 5–6.

56 Personal Interview, UN Official. See also UN Document A/32/34, pp. 6–7.

57 Ibid. The schedule of deliberation changed at the beginning of the sixth session. The Group began by reading through earlier sections of the text, since revised versions were not completed for V and VIII. As will be seen, such a reading resulted in unexpected difficulties within the Group's deliberations.

58 Personal Interview, UN Official.

59 The smaller “Friends of the Chairman” group consisted of representatives from Canada, Jamaica, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within this group, it was also expected that members would meet among themselves to adopt more common positions prior to the.“Friends” deliberations. The focus on “major issues” was intended to differentiate key concerns from those which were thought to comprise questions of “procedural rationalization.”

60 Other questions about ECOSOC also remained unclear, in particular whether or not to expand the membership of ECOSOC, as desired by the Group of 77. Personal Interview, UN Official. See UN Document A/32/34, pp. 8–9. See also Statement made by the Chairman at the 38th meeting of the Committee on 30 September 1977, unnumbered UN Document, 3 October 1977, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Chairman's Statement.

61 Earlier difficulties concerning the consolidated fund notion related to the Group of 77's misgivings about the trend towards “basic needs” found within current funding of development programs. It was thought that if funds were so “integrated,” then this trend could become more emphasized. Personal Interview, UN Official. See also Chairman's Statement, p. 1.

62 See Chairman's Statement, p. 2. It was thought that this post would be critical to advancing the implementation of “a new international economic order.” See UN Document A/32/34, pp. 43–44. During the extended discussions on the creation of this post, the Group of 77 members became less enthusiastic about the Director-General position, but it attracted growing support within the West. Personal Interview, UN Official.

63 This approach regarding the reorganization of the Secretariat was suggested by the EEC representative. Personal Interview, UN Official. See UN Document A/32/34, pp. 23–5 for the Committee's final recommendations along these lines.

64 See UN Document A/32/34, pp. 9–10. For the text of the final report, see Ibid., pp. 11–26. Not all questions were “finalized” when the Committee's report was submitted to the Assembly. Still incomplete, as will be seen, were recommendations regarding the Director-General's post. The Committee wound up its work in a crisis atmosphere, wherein as late as November 1977 it appeared that there would be no completed report to submit to the Assembly, prompting discussion of extending the Committee's mandate for yet another year. Such delays and disagreements within the Committee had at least one important consequence for prospective UN restructuring. The Second Committee in effect “pre-empted” the Ad Hoc Committee by creating a Committee of the Whole within the Assembly, the terms of reference of which are almost exactly those prescribed for ECOSOC. Personal Interview, UN Official.

65 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 10. A major factor behind this problem was the timetable for the preparation of the Secretary-General's statement, as this document was submitted before the Ad Hoc Committee agreed upon final language concerning the Director-General post. Personal Interview, UN Official. See also The New York Times, 14 December 1977, p. 12; 3 February 1978, p. A10, for reports on the controversy about this post. The Group of 77 wanted the Director-General to be second in rank only to the Secretary-General, possessing widespread powers regarding UN development concerns. EEC members objected to this status, fearing that it would dilute the authority of the Secretary-General. See UN Document A/C.5/32/86, p. 24, for the Secretary-General's statement that the Director General should be at the level of an Under-Secretary-General.

66 See UN Document A/C.5/32/86/Amend. 2, p. 1. See also UN Document A/32/485/Add. 1, for the report of the Fifth Committee and UN Document A/32/480/Add. 1, p. 9 for the recommendation of the Second Committee to have the Secretary-General appoint a Director-General. Agreement on this post was eventually based on the designation that the Director-General should occupy a “staff position applying equally to all UN bodies and services, rather than a “line” approach with specific functions and powers. Personal Interview, UN Official. See UN Document A/32/34, p. 26, footnote 22.

67 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 40.

68 See Ibid., pp. 42–44. The socialist states were at odds with the Group of 77 views in a number of areas. Key to their perspective on restructuring was the notion that institutional reform should not entail any budgetary increases, nor any revisions in the UN Charter. See Ibid., pp. 45–46.

69 See Ibid., pp. 49–50.

70 See UN Document A/32/PV.109, p. 6.

71 Throughout all the statements in UN Document A/32/34, pp. 40–50, passim, this type of sentiment was expressed. See a later section of this article for further discussion of prospective interpretation and implementation efforts.

72 See Haas, Ernst B., “Is There a Hole in the Whole?: Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975): 835CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for discussion on the importance of designers' goals in creating new international regimes.

73 See Bergsten, C. Fred, Berthoin, Georges, and Mushakoji, Kinhide, The Reform of International Institutions (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1976), pp. 6–7Google Scholar, and Krause, Lawrence B. and Nye, Joseph S., “Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organizations,” International Organization 29 (Winter 1975): £336–337CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 11, for the text of the Committee's report on this matter. See also Ibid., pp. 42–43, 49–50, for respective Group of 77 and U.S. views.

75 See, for example, the remarks of the Sri Lankan representative to the seventh special session of the General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meetings, UN Document A/PV.2336, p. 14. See also UN Document A/32/34, p. 11. Reflecting this concern, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 32/174 on 19 December 1977, which created a “Committee of the Whole” to assist the General Assembly in overseeing and facilitating negotiations “on the establishment of the new international economic order.…” See General Assembly Resolution 32/174.

76 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meetings, UN Document A/PV.2333, p. 8, for a statement by the Peruvian representative warning that the pursuit of concrete gains should not be made “at the risk of depoliticizing the United Nations organs Today, more than ever, we need debate and polemics to find new structures in which the new international economic order will function.…” See also UN Document A/32/PV.109, p. 8, for the Secretary General's statement that “The Assembly has a special responsibility to ensure that the principles and objectives of the new international economic order gain increasing acceptance in the general thinking and practice of governments and in public opinion throughout the world.”

77 For discussion of “optimism” towards this end felt by participants after the seventh special session, see Gosovic, and Ruggie, , “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order,” p. 327Google Scholar. Interviews with U.S. officials also indicated a substantially positive view of the seventh special session, especially in comparison to the sixth session.

78 Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State Official.

79 Ibid.

80 For an example of developing countries' views about “consensus” procedures, see the statement by the Venezuelan representative to the seventh special session of the General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meetings, UN Document A/PV.2327, p. 23.

81 Personal Interview, UN Official. There is a widespread view within the UN that consultative groups need to evolve naturally. Once they become formalized, a whole range of problematic issues is raised, e.g., membership, terms of reference, procedures, etc. Indeed, a trend found within current UN proceedings is the creation of open-ended bodies without membership restrictions so as to avoid claims of political exclusion and non-representation. See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 32/174 regarding the creation of the Committee of the Whole.

82 Hoffmann, Stanley, “No Choices, No Illusions,” Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1076–1077): 123Google Scholar.

83 Personal Interview, UN Official. See also UN Document A/32/34, p. 43, for the Group of 77 statement noting that increases in resources for operational activities should accompany any reforms in this area.

84 See statement by the Pakistani representative to ECOSOC, United Nations Press Release ECOSOC/ 3873, 13 May, 1976, p. 7.

85 This conceptual question is generally problematic for individual member states concerning their participation with the UN system. For example, in a recent congressional study, it was noted that “Overall there needs to be greater conceptualization of the role various types of international organizations should play in our foreign and domestic policy.” See U.S. Participation in International Organizations, p. XII.

86 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 42. The Group of 77 spokesman also noted that “it would be foolish to pretend that progress in the latter exercise (NEO) has equalled that made on the United Nations restructuring front.…” Ibid. See also Chairman's Statement, p. 3, for views along these lines.

87 Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State Official.

88 UN Document A/31/34/Add.2, p. 23.

89 See statement by the Secretary-General referring to this basic dynamic, UN Document A/32/PV. 109, p. 6. See also Gosovic, and Ruggie, , “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order,” pp. 343–4Google Scholar, for discussion of the need to accommodate evolving institutional reform with a changing international development strategy being considered within the UN.

90 UN Document A/32/PV. 109, p. 13.

91 Personal Interviews with UN officials emphasized the prospective importance of this shift back to the UN. CIEC in effect suspended negotiations within the UN, and with its perceived breakdown, it was expected that the basic format for North-South deliberations would become special sessions of the UN General Assembly. See UN Document A/32/PV. 109, p. 11, for expression of Group of 77 disappointment with CIEC. See also UN Document A/C.2/32/L.44, p. 2, for the Group of 77 resolution for the convening of a 1980 special session devoted to assessing “the progress… in the establishment of the New International Economic Order.…”

92 Personal Interview, UN Official.

93 Ibid. See also The New York Times, 3 February 1978, p. 10, for comments along these same lines by a “high-ranking United States official.”

94 Personal Interview, UN Official. See also UN Document A/32/34, p. 7, for reference to the comments by several Directors-General of specialized agencies forwarded to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and UN Document A/AC. 179/16 for those comments themselves.

95 Personal Interviews, UN Official and U.S. State Department Official. See UN Document A/ C.5/32/86, pp. 14–24, for various references to prospective “redeployment” of ESA functions and staff within reorganized Secretariat units made by the Secretary-General in assessing the administrative and financial implications of the Ad Hoc Committee's report. I am also indebted to an anonymous International Organization referee for the observation that the types of UN bureaucratic politics noted above become more protracted as the consideration of substantive issues within the restructuring exercise remained unresolved.

96 See earlier discussion in this study for reference to the difficulties encountered as a result of the recommendation to create a new Director-General post. See also UN Document A/32/34, pp. 25–26, for the text of the Committee's report regarding this position.

97 Personal Interview, U.S. Department of State Official. The type of role played by the committee chairman and his negotiating text has been similarly important in the UN Law of the Sea deliberations. See Miles, , “The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Committee and the Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the Sea,” pp. 185–6Google Scholar and 214–5. On 15 March 1978, Secretary-General Waldheim appointed Kenneth Dadzie as United Nations Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation. This appointment of the former chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee should provide added support for preserving and realizing UN reforms. See Development Forum VI (03 1978): 2Google Scholar.

98 Personal Interview, U.S. State Department Official.

99 Ibid.

100 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 40.

101 Ibid., p. 50.

102 See UN Document A/32/PV. 109, p. 16. See next section of this study for further discussion of the implementation process.

103 See UN Document A/32/34, p. 49 and Personal Interview, UN Official. Even before the Committee finished its work, many of the institutional trends embodied in its report were already being adopted within the UN system. A key example was in the institutional arrangements decided upon for the UN Water Conference. See UN Document A/32/34, p. 7.

104 It should be noted that whereas overall centralization represents the main thrust of reforms concerning the United Nations per se, provisions allow for more reliance upon the technical expertise of specialized agencies, which are to have much greater access to central organs of the UN. Also, the restructuring guidelines call for more “leadership” roles and responsibilities entrusted to regional commissions. Personal Interview, UN Official. See also UN Document A/32/34, pp. 15–17.

105 UN Document A/32/PV.109, p. 14.

106 See UN Document A/32/480/Add. 1, p. 10. Before these reports would be submitted to the General Assembly, ECOSOC was to consider the progress made within the context of the restructuring guidelines. Thus, although no specific monitoring mechanism was set up to supervise the implementation of the restructuring guidelines, arrangements have been made for ECOSOC and the Assembly to review this process of enactment. Personal Interview, UN Official. The net additional cost of implementing these reforms was estimated at $1,480,000. See UN Document A/32/485/Add.l, p. 2.

107 Personal Interview, UN Official. See UN Document A/32/34, p. 15, for the Committee's guidelines as to UNCTAD's role.

108 Personal Interview, U.S. State Department Official.

109 See UN Document A/32/34, pp. 40–50, passim, for many references by the major delegations to this effect.