Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T06:54:44.529Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

John R. Redick
John R. Redick
Affiliation:
John R. Redick is the Research Director of The Stanley Foundation, and editor of The Stanley Foundation OccasionalPaper series.
Get access

Extract

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , Spring 1975 , pp. 415 - 445
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For a detailed explanation of the nuclear fuel cycle see Mason, Willrich, Global Politics of Nuclear Energy (New York: Praeger, 1971), chapter 2.Google Scholar

2 United Nations Association, Safeguarding the Atom, A Soviet—American Exchange (New York, UNA—USA Policy Panel Report, 1972), p. 15.Google Scholar

3 United Nations Association, Safeguarding the Atom, A Soviet—American Exchange (New York, UNA—USA Policy Panel Report, 1972), p. 15, p. 37.Google Scholar

4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmaments (New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 296–7.Google Scholar

5 For a more detailed description of Latin American nuclear energy programs see Redick, John R., Military Potential of Latin American Nuclear Energy Programs (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies series, 1972).Google Scholar

6 IAEA Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 6 (1972), p. 8.Google Scholar

7 Bank of London and South American Review, vol. 8 (07 1974), p. 412.Google Scholar

8 Nuclear Industry, 02 1973, p. 52.Google Scholar

9 Veliz, C., “Reactores Nucleares en la America Latina” unpublished paper presented to the 4th UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.September 1971.Google Scholar

10 See Mason, Wilinich and Taylor, Theodore B.Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballenger Publishing Co., 1974).Google Scholar

11 Nuclear Industry, vol. 20, no. 4 (04 1973), p. 49.Google ScholarPubMed

12 New York Times, June 29, 1974.

13 Bank of London and South America Review, vol. 8 (07 1974), p. 420Google Scholar; Embassy of Brazil, Brazil Today, no. 21 (09 28, 1973).Google Scholar

14 Veliz, p. 6.

15 Federative Republic of Brazil, First National Development Plan, 1972/1974 (1971).Google Scholar

16 Energy International, vol. 10, no. 7 (07 1973) p. 32.Google ScholarPubMed

17 Nuclear Engineering International, (03 1974), pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

18 Mason, Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control (Charlottesvile: Michie Publishing Co., 1969) p. 15.Google Scholar

19 The Washington Post, 04 20, 1972.Google Scholar

20 Embassy of Brazil, Brazil Today, 11 30, 1973.Google Scholar

21 See Rosenbaum, H. Jon, “Argentine—Brazilian Relations: A Critical Juncture,” The World Today, 12 1973.Google Scholar

22 The Washington Post, 06 9, 1974.Google Scholar

23 COPREDAL/AR/47 PROV., February 12, 1967, p. 7. (Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America by which the Treaty of Tlatelolco was negotiated.)

24 COPREDAL/AR/41 PROV., February 8, 1967, pp. 5–6.

25 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1967, p. 141.Google Scholar

26 Hispano Americano, (Mexico City), 02 22, 1971.Google ScholarPubMed

27 Nuclear News, vol. 17, no. 10 (08 1974), p. 4.Google Scholar

28 Veliz, p. 7.

29 The full text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco may be found in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 69–83.Google Scholar

30 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, p. 182.Google Scholar

31 For a detailed description of the negotiating process of the Treaty of Tlatelolco see Redick, John R., “The Politics of Denuclearization: A Study of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,” (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Virginia, 1970).Google Scholar

32 The Tlatelolco Treaty's complete ratification procedure is described in Article 28. Under its terms the nuclear free zone is to come into full effect when ratified by all Latin American powers, nuclear weapon states, and those nations having territorial interests in the zone of application. However, all states reserve the right (Article 28, paragraph 2) to waive any or all requirements and thereby allow the Treaty to come into force for their national territory. At this writing eighteen Latin American nations have utilized paragraph 2 and waived the provisions of Article 28.

33 For the complete verbatim account of speeches, communiques, and press interviews during President Echeverria's seven nation Latin American tour see Hispano Americano July 22, July 29, and August 5, 1974.

34 Hispano Americano, August 5, 1974, p. 10.

35 COPREDAL/AR/46 PROV., February 11, 1967, pp. 14–15.

36 COPREDAL/AR/47 PROV., February 12, 1967, p. 13.

37 New York Times, 07 13, 1974.Google Scholar

38 UN Document A/c. 1/PV 1508, October 26, 1967, p. 8.

39 Message from the President of the United States transmitting Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, US Senate, 91St Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C., 1970.Google Scholar

40 Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Additional Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1971.Google Scholar

41 Additional Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Washington, D.C., 1971, pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

42 Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the United States has agreed to neither give nor assist non-nuclear weapon states in developing nuclear weapons. However, the NPT does not prohibit the United States from deploying nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapon states—so long as control is retained. Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States has renounced its right to deploy nuclear weapons within, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against, Latin American contracting powers. It is notable that the Tlatelolco model of a non-use pledge by the nuclear weapon states has been supported as one way to strengthen the NPT. Such a pledge by nuclear weapon states to NPT parties would involve “only an extension of their commitments under the Treaty of Tlatelolco.” See Arms Control Association, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, The Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Preview of the NPT Treaty Review Conference of 1975, Report of the Conference, September 9–11, Divonne, France, pp. 11–12.

43 Hispano Americano, April 16, April 23, 1973.

44 COPREDAL/S/INF 35, April 25, 1966.

45 COPREDAL/CN/2, August 29, 1966.

46 UN Document A/c. 1/1028, November 15, 1972.

47 Hispano Americano, April 30, 1973, p. 17.

48 UN Document A/c. 1/PV 1321, October 30, 1963.

49 For a complete explanation of the Soviet views of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Mexican response see the addresses by Ambassadors Roshchin (USSR) and Garcia Robles (Mexico) before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD 1358, March 2, 1972 and CCD/PV. 553, March 28, 1972).

50 New York Times, 11 18, 1970.Google Scholar

51 The relationship and importance of this latter issue is made particularly clear by the Address of the Secretary-General of OPANAL to the Special Meeting of the UN Security Council in Panama in 1973.

52 OPANAL 22, September 1970.

53 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, AEC Authorizing Legislation, Fiscal Year 1975, 93rd Congress, pp. 1077–1100.Google Scholar

54 See Emelyanov, V. S., “On The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Nuclear Proliferation Problems (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974).Google Scholar

55 In addition, the United States (and Great Britain and the Soviet Union) have agreed in principle to supply enriched uranium to the IAEA which acts as a broker for countries desiring fuel. To this date nations have preferred bilateral channels and all IAEA sponsored transactions have been limited to small research reactors. Mexico and Yugoslavia are the only nations currently seeking to utilize the IAEA for fuel for a power reactor.

56 There may also be some merit for consideration of a cooperative relationship between OPANAL and the newly created Latin American Energy Organization (LAEO). Analogous to OPANAL in that it is an indigenous Latin American—rather than inter-American—effort, LAEO was designed as a defensive measure to protect natural resources and promote a cooperative unified Latin American energy policy. Technical and scientific cooperation between OPANAL and CIEN would seem logical and in the interest of Latin American nations. See International Legal Materials, vol. 13, no. 2 (03 1974), pp. 377–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57 Ciencia Inter-Americana (Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., 05–12 1973) p. 1.Google Scholar

58 COPREDAL/Gt/I/1, April 30, 1966, p. 8.

59 For discussion on this topic see The Stanley Foundation, “The Inter-American System and World Order,” A Vantage Conference,September, 1974.Google Scholar

60 New York Times, 07 13, October 6, 1974.Google Scholar

61 Alva, Myrdal “The International Control of Disarmament,” Scientific American, vol. 231, no. 4 (10 1974) p. 28.Google Scholar