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Public Opinion on Unites States-Canadian Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

John H. Sigler  and
Dennis Goresky
John H. Sigler
Affiliation:
Members of the Department of Political Science at Carleton University in Ottawa.
Dennis Goresky
Affiliation:
Members of the Department of Political Science at Carleton University in Ottawa.
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Extract

Primary attention has been paid in much of the writing on public attitudes on foreign affairs to opinions about official interstate relations and foreign policy. One of the merits of the transnational politics paradigm is that it calls attention to the possibility that intersocietal relations may condition or influence the climate as well as the agenda of interstate relations. For the public opinion analyst, the paradigm invites attention to the relative degree of importance assigned by publics to intersocietal as contrasted to interstate relations and how changes in attitudes toward one sector may influence the climate in which relations in the other sector are conducted.

Type
Part II. National Attitudes
Information
International Organization , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1974 , pp. 637 - 668
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1974

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References

1 We wish to express our gratitude to the Social Science Data Archive at Carleton University, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, and the American Institute of Public Opinion for making available much of the data used in this study. Wherever available, we have used the data cards for our own secondary analysis. Where cards were not available, we relied on press releases from the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion and summaries of open-ended responses available in the Carleton archive. The responsibility for errors in tabulation and analysis remains entirely our own.

2 The coefficient of imbalance, often used in content analysis, was devised by Janis, Irving L. and Fadner, Raymond, “The Coefficient of Imbalance,” in Lasswell, Harold D. et al., Language of Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 153–71,Google Scholarin order to measure bias in communications. The formula is: Cf=(f2–fu)/rt, where f>u; and Cu=(fu–2)/rt, where f<u. In the formula, f refers to favourable units of content, u refers to unfavourable units of content, r to relevant units of content, and t to total units of content. For standardized data presented in percentage terms, we have treated r as 100 and squared it, making the divisor in all instances 10,000. By this device, the effect of “don't knows” is taken into account; the more “don't knows,” the closer the coefficient toward zero. Simple ratios obscure the importance of “don't knows.”

3 Gallup, George H., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–71, vol. 3: 1959–1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 2104.Google Scholar The Stapel scalometer test consists of ten boxes, numbered from +5 to -5. The person being tested is given a card showing the ten boxes and is told that the top box represents the highest degree of liking, and the lowest box, the lowest degree. He is then asked how far up the scale or how far down the scale he would place each nation.

4 Tai, Chong-Soo, Peterson, Erick J., and Gurr, Ted Robert, “Internal Versus External Sources of Anti-Americanism: Two Comparative Studlies,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (September 1973): 455–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Canada, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957); also referred to as the Gordon report.

6 Canada, Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968); also referred to as the Watkins report.

7 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Report No. 33, 28th Parl., 2d sess., 1969–70; also referred to as the Wahn report.

8 Canada, Force, Gray Task, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972);Google Scholar also referred to as the Gray report.

9 Ibid., pp. 17, 21.

10 Murray, J. Alex and Kubota, A., “What Canadians Think of U.S. Investment,” The International Review, 12 February 1973, pp. 35–41.Google Scholar

11 Stevenson, Garth, “Foreign Direct Investment and the Provinces: A Study of Elite Attitudes,” Carleton University, Department of Political Science, 1973.Google Scholar (Mimeographed.)

12 The use of expert in the opening phrase may be expected to prejudice opinion to be on the side of the experts. Big reduction may also be expected to prejudice responses, although the two terms work in contrary directions.

13 Murray, J. Alex and Gerace, Mary C., “Canadian Attitudes toward the US Presence,” Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (Fall 1972): 396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Murray, J. Alex, “An Analysis of Public Attitudes on the Question of US Investment in Canada,” University of Windsor, International Business Research Unit, 1973.Google Scholar (Mimeographed.)

15 Lea, Sperry, A Canada-US Free Trade Arrangement (Montreal: Canadian-American Committee, 1963);Google ScholarWonnacott, Ronald J. and Wonnacott, Paul, Free Trade Between the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967);Google Scholar and Lyon, Peyton V., “Canada-US Free Trade (CUFTA) and Canadian Independence,” Carleton University, School of International Affairs, 1973Google Scholar(Mimeographed).

16 Even in this context, Canadians were most apt in 1961 to cite American control of Canadian industry as the reason for their concern. In adding the open ended responses, however, we find 54 percent of the responses can be related to cultural matters while 42 percent are related to economic issues. Way of life therefore contains both cultural and economic dimensions.

17 Domination is used here in the sense of a psychological relationship that depends less on the intention of the dominator than the awareness of the dominator's presence and perception of weakness by the dominated. High attention and a perception of relative inferiority of Canadian television provide the basic ingredients for a relationship of domination.

18 Rosenberg, Milton J., Verba, Sidney, and Converse, Philip E., Vietnam, and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 58.Google Scholar

19 Scanlon, Joseph, “Canada Sees the World through U.S. Eyes: One Case Study in Cultural Domination,” Carleton University, School of Journalism, 1973. (Mimeographed.)Google Scholar

20 In the summer of 1973, 89 percent of Canadians versus 96 percent of Americans had heard or read of Watergate; 55 percent versus 45 percent, respectively, believed President Nixon knew in advance of the bugging (CIPO 360).

21 Respondents were asked simply if they regarded Canadian nationalism as a “good thing.” Positive reactions were as follows: Atlantic—40 percent; Quebec—47 percent; Prairies and British Columbia—58 percent; Ontario—72 percent; professionals—65 percent; NDP followers—69 percent; Liberal followers—62 percent; and Progressive Conservative followers—58 percent.

22 Persons who view their own nation and their own lives in a favorable light tend to see other nations in the same manner, and those who are pessimistic about their own lives and their own nations are pessimistic about others as well (see Scott, William A., “Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images,” in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior [New York:Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965], pp. 87–89).Google Scholar Consistently throughout this decade we found that Quebeckers were much more likely than other Canadians to see relations between the English and the French in Canada to be improving. From this we infer a growing self-confidence and optimism in Quebec culture, identity, and outlook. This interpretation is of course at variance with much that is written on Quebec separatism. In the polls we examined, only a minority of Quebeckers favored separation from the rest of Canada. Even on the question of the likelihood of separation, only 25 percent of Quebeckers (1973) thought separation likely in the next five years.