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The political economy of nontariff barriers: a cross-national analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Edward D. Mansfield  and
Marc L. Busch
Edward D. Mansfield
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, New York.
Marc L. Busch
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Government and Social Studies at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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Abstract

Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1995 , pp. 723 - 749
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1995

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30. For example, it is well-known that the United States' geographically based, winner-take-all electoral system limits both the ability of parties to control the votes of legislators and their insulation from constituent pressures for protection. In this respect, the United States stands in contrast to PR systems, among other types of regimes. For examinations of these and other variations that are likely to influence trade policy, see Destler, American Trade Politics; and Rogowski, “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions.”

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46. Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as a single state for the purposes of this analysis because the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Unit stipulates that the two states maintain parity between their currencies, share in integrated foreign trade and balance of payment policies, and maintain a joint central bank. On this point, see TheEconomist Intelligence Unit, Belgium, Luxembourg Country Profile 1992–93 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992)Google Scholar.

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56. These data are taken from Summers and Heston, “The Penn World Table (Mark 5).”

57. Our analysis of this issue was conducted too recently to include these results in Table 1. The results are available upon request from the authors. We are grateful to Robert O. Keohane for suggesting that we conduct these tests related to the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.

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60. Destler, and Henning, , Dollar Politics, p. 119Google Scholar. See also Destler, , American Trade Politics, p. 123Google Scholar.

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71. See, for example, Katzenstein, “Conclusion”; Krasner, Defending the National Interest; and Krasner, “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy.”

72. See Calder, Kent E., “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40 (07 1988), pp. 515–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cowhey, Peter F., “Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States,” International Organization 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 299–326CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Curtis, Gerald L., The Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Kernell, Samuel, “The Primacy of Politics in Economic Policy,” in Kernell, Samuel, ed., Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 325–78Google Scholar; Ramseyer, J. Mark and Rosenbluth, Frances McCall, Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; and Uriu, Robert M., Troubled Industries: The Political Economy of Industrial Adjustment in Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

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74. Ibid., pp. 528–32.

75. Kernell, “The Primacy of Politics in Economic Policy.”

76. See, for example, Bhagwati, Protectionism; Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times; Krasner, Defending the National Interest; Krasner, “United States Commercial and Monetary Policy”; Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade; Milner, Resisting Protectionism; and Nelson, “Endogenous Tariff Theory.”

77. See, for example, Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times; Gowa, “Public Goods and Political Institutions”; Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno, “Introduction”; Katzenstein, “Conclusion”; Krasner, Defending the National Interest; and Milner, Resisting Protectionism.

78. As noted throughout, our focus has been on explaining the incidence on NTBs. Other studies have focused on the level of NTBs and argued that NTBs and tariffs are complements. It is clear that our results and those based on the level of NTBs need not be incompatible. For one leading attempt to assess the relationship between tariffs and NTB levels, see Magee, , Brock, , and Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, pp. 236–41Google Scholar.

79. For two perspectives on this possibility, see Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos F., Trade, Development and the World Economy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988; ed., Velasco, Andres)Google Scholar, chap. 14; and Findlay, Ronald, “Trade, Development, and the State,” in Ranis, Gustav and Schultz, T. Paul, eds., The State of Development Economics: Progress and Perspectives (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 78–95Google Scholar. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to our attention.