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Pariah states and nuclear proliferation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert E. Harkavy
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In recent years, a new international actor—the pariah state—has mounted the global stage. Although rough historical precedents may be discerned, the present international system appears to have produced a novel phenomenon, whereby some isolated small states, lacking assured and credible outside security support, find themselves unable to take advantage of traditional balance-of-power mechanisms. Taiwan, South Africa, and Israel fit this description best, South Korea less so; Pakistan and Chile are also candidates.

Insecurities about conventional arms sources and big-power support in crises involving national survival have driven pariahs to consideration of nuclear “equalizers,” notwithstanding dilemmas involving the viability of applicable nuclear strategic doctrines. There are also some indications of nascent interpariah security ties, perhaps nuclear ones. Although there are some prospects for amelioration of the situations of some pariahs—in part because of threats to go nuclear—serious impasses remain for U.S. and other major powers' policies.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , Winter 1981 , pp. 135 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1981

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References

1 George Quester used the term “outlaw states” in discussing pariahs. See his “What's New on Nuclear Non-Proliferation” (Aspen, Colo.: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1975)Google Scholar. Richard Burt refers to them as “outcasts” in “Fear of Nuclear ‘Outcasts’ Intensifies Control Debate,” The New York Times, 28 October 1979, p. 4E.Google Scholar For a discussion amid a more complex typology, see Betts, Richard K., “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation,” Foreign Policy 26 (Spring 1977): 157–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 For a discussion of an asserted analogy between 1938 Czechoslovakia and present Israel, devoid of the term pariah, see Podhoretz, Norman, “The Abandonment of Israel,” Commentary 62, 1 (07 1976): 23–31.Google Scholar

3 For discussion of the implications (for small as well as large states) of the primarily private-controlled pre-World War II arms markets, see Harkavy, Robert E., The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), esp. chapter 2.Google Scholar

4 See Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), pt. 4.Google Scholar Among the myriad other general analyses of the balance of power, see Hartmann, Frederick H., The Relations of Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1973), chaps. 16–19Google Scholar, and Organski, A. F. K., World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1958), chap. 11.Google Scholar For an analysis of the many empirical and normative definitions of “balance of power,” see Haas, Ernst, “The Balance of Power,” World Politics 5, 4 (07 1953), 440–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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8 For a survey of historical changes in the extent and nature of small-power leverage in the arms market, and a discussion of “reluctant” and “willing” arms suppliers, see Harkavy, , The Arms Trade and International Systems, chapter 4.Google Scholar

9 The data on the formal diplomatic relationships of the pariahs were gathered from the resources of the respective desk officers in the U.S. State Department and from the Washington embassies of the four pariah states.

10 For pariah trade data on aggregate, regional, and bilateral bases, see the serial, annual editions of Direction of International Trade, published annually and jointly by the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, New York.

11 On the important matter of the legitimization function of international organizations (i.e. the UN), particularly germane to the situation of pariah states, see Claude, Inis, “Collectivi Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization 20, 3 (Summer 1966): 367–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 One recent exception is Kemp, Geoffrey, “A Nuclear Middle East,” in International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, King, John Kerry, ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1979)Google Scholar, a collection of essays from a colloquium sponsored by the CIA and the Department of Defense. See also Carus, W. Seth, “The Military Balance of Power in the Middle East,” Current History 14, 433 (01 1978): 29–32.Google Scholar

13 Among the numerous works analyzing the military meaning of the October 1973 war and the subsequent evolvement of an Arab-Israeli military balance, see Creveld, Martin van, Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Washington paper no. 24, 1975)Google Scholar; “Both Sides of the Suez,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, special ed., 1975Google Scholar; Tahtinen, Dale R., The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Since October 1973 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, Foreign Affairs Study no. 11, 1974)Google Scholar; The Middle East and the International System: The Impact of the 1973 War (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), Adelphi Paper No. 114; and various articles in Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 March 1975.Google Scholar

14 For recent analyses of impending Egyptian arms acquisitions, see, inter alia, “Egypt Reported to Say U.S. Will Sell It Any Arms,” The New York Times, 22 02 1980, p. A8Google Scholar and “Egypt: Maintaining an Arsenal of Soviet Equipment,” Middle-East Intelligence Survey 7, 10 (16–31 08 1979).Google Scholar

15 For a hint of the implications of forthcoming Syrian acquisition of Soviet T-72 tanks, see “Role of Tanks Clouded by New Arms,” The New York Times, 27 03 1980, p. A6, wherein details are conveyed of the ongoing technological race pitting new tank armor versus new antitank technology featuring the “millimeter wave detection” system.Google Scholar

16 All the arms-trade data here and in subsequent pages come from the various publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). In particular, I have relied on the arms-trade registers in the IISS's annual Military Balance; SIPRI's annual yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament; and SIPRI's Arms Trade Registers. The last-mentioned chronologically lists, by major weapon categories, all global arms transfers in the postwar period up to 1973.

17 See “South Africa Reviews Defenses as Rhodesia Votes,” The New York Times, 3 03 1980, p. A4. The article's tone is pessimistic on behalf of South Africa's indigenous defense capabilities, at some variance with standard, recent analyses which may, in particular, have ignored the parallel with the PRC's position after 1961 once cut off from a major power's transfer of licenses.Google Scholar

18 For a good review of current small nations' indigenous arms development efforts and associated barriers to same, see Moodie, M., “Defense Industries in the Third World: Problems and Promises,” in Arms Transfers in the Modern World, Neuman, S. and Harkavy, R., eds. (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 294–312.Google Scholar See also Copley, G., Moodie, M., and Harvey, D., “Third World Arms Production,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest, 09 1978, pp. lOffGoogle Scholar; Prospects for Multilateral Arms Export Restraint, U.S., Congress, Senate, 96th Congress, 1st session, April 1979, p. 34Google Scholar; and Neuman, Stephanie, “Into the Crystal Ball: Indigenous Defense Production and the Future of the International Arms Trade,” paper delivered at meeting of International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 19–22 March 1980.Google Scholar

19 For a general discussion of the U.S.-Israel leverage relationship with respect to arms transfers and military and economic aid (and the withholding of them), see Wheelock, Thomas R., “Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage,” International Security 3, 2 (Fall 1978): 123–37.CrossRefGoogle ScholarOn Matmon C and related matters, see Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1979: Economic and Military Aid Programs in Europe and the Middle East, U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 199–269.Google Scholar

20 For earlier information on Israel's weapons-development programs, see World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook, 1975 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), p. 236Google Scholar; SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975), pp. 768–78Google Scholar; The New York Times for 23 April, 15 September and 19 September, 1971Google Scholar; and “Israel Revisited, ”Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 03 1975, pp. 9–22.Google Scholar See also “Israeli Arms Industry Has Grown Fivefold Since '73,” The New York Times, 15 01, 1977, p. 3Google Scholar; Kraar, Louis, “Israel's Own Military Industrial Complex,” Fortune, 13 03 1978, pp. 2ff.Google Scholar

21 Israel's Kfir aircraft and Merkava tanks rely on U.S. engines, its naval craft primarily on West German engines. The new fighter aircraft it plans for the 1980s, the “Lavie,” may possibly be built around the General Electric F-404 engine, as reported in “Israel Unveils Plans to Build New Fighter-Bomber,” Jerusalem Post Weekly, 2–8 03 1980, p. 3.Google Scholar

22 See “Nationalists Update Fighter Force,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 29 05 1978, pp. 14–16Google Scholar; and “Taiwan Center Designs Two Aircraft,” ibid., pp. 14–16.

23 The perhaps crucial U.S. denial to Taiwan of advanced fighter aircraft such as the F-4 or F-18 and of the Harpoon ship-to-ship missile is cited in “U.S. to Sell Taiwan Defense Missile,” The New York Times, 4 01 1980, p. A4. Therein, the Carter administration is said to have turned down the requests for the F-4 and F-18 “because providing them would have violated the President's arms transfer policy.”Google Scholar

24 For one noting of Israeli arms supplies to Taiwan, see “Taiwan Forces Reportedly Buy Israeli Missiles,” The New York Times, 6 04 1977, p. 1Google Scholar; and “Taiwan Looks Beyond U.S. for Arms,” The New York Times, 20 06 1977, p. 17.Google Scholar

25 These data and information on the ROK's “Force Improvement Program” are drawn from the State Department's annual unclassified report, “Report on Korea,” provided the author by State's South Korea desk.

26 “Korea Asks $1.5 Billion in U.S. Loans for Arms,” Washington Post, 29 12 1975, p. A2.Google Scholar See also “Schlesinger Minimizes Seoul Peril,” Washington Post, 28 08 1975, p. A25.Google Scholar

27 For information on ROK indigenous weapons programs, see Smith, Bruce A., “Koreans Seek New Military Air Capability,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 10 1979, pp. 62–63, wherein its intentions to coproduce or coassemble Hughes helicopters and F-5 aircraft are dis cussed along with modifications to the Nike-Hercules SAM. It is noted that the ROK has also recently launched its first destroyer.Google Scholar

28 See “Official Hints South Korea Might Build Atom Bomb,” The New York Times, 27 05 1977, p. 3Google Scholar, based on a statement by Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin; and “Glenn Asks Probe of Korea Arms Plan,” Washington Post, 4 11 1978, p. 16.Google Scholar

29 Among the numerous publications on the Israeli nuclear weapons program, see Jabber, Fuad, Israel and Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971)Google Scholar; Pranger, Robert J. and Tahtinen, Dale R., Nuclear Threat in the Middle East (Washington: D.C. American Enterprise Institute, Foreign Affairs Study no. 23, 1975)Google Scholar; “How Israel Got the Bomb,” Time, 12 04 1976Google Scholar; Tucker, Robert, “Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?,” Commentary (11 1975): 29–43Google Scholar; Harkavy, Robert E., Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1977)Google Scholar; and Aronson, S., “Nuclearization of the Middle East,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 2 (Winter 1977): 27–44.Google Scholar

30 See, among other press reports, “Israel Reported Behind A-Blast Off South Africa,” Washington Post, 22 02 1980, p. A6Google Scholar; and “Neutron Bomb Suspected in Africa Blast,” Washington Post, 9 03 1980, p. A7.Google Scholar

31 In the Washington Post article cited in footnote 28 above, it is claimed that the ROK em barked on a weapons program in the early 1970s under President Park, but which was halted or delayed after the French cancellation of the reprocessing plant venture in 1976 and under pressure from the U.S. Park was quoted, however, as saying that “if the U.S. nuclear umbrella were removed, we have to start developing our own nuclear weapons capability.” See also, “Official Hints South Korea Might Build Atom Bomb,” The New York Times, 1 07 1977, p. 4.Google Scholar

32 See “Taiwanese Program at MIT Ended,” Washington Post, 16 07 1976, p. A5.Google Scholar

33 For analyses of the Taiwanese nuclear capability, see “Taiwan Develops Nuclear Industry, Weapons Capacity,” Washington Post, 27 02 1977, p. 21Google Scholar; and “Taiwan's Nuclear Plans Concern U.S. Officials,” Washington Post, 20 12 1978, p. 21.Google Scholar

34 For earlier analyses of South Africa's nuclear prospects, see Bustin, Edouard, “South Africa's Foreign Policy Alternatives and Deterrence Needs,” in Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, Marwah, O. and Schulz, A., eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 205–26Google Scholar; and Spence, J. E., “The Republic of South Africa: Proliferation and the Politics of Outward Movement,” in Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II, Lawrence, R. and Larus, J., eds. (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1974).Google Scholar Among numerous items discussing the South African U-235 nozzle facility at Pelindaba, see “South Africa's Secret Atom Plant Suspected of Working on a Bomb,” The New York Times, 30 04 1977, p. 1Google Scholar, and also Jaster, Robert S., South Africa's Narrowing Security Options (London: IISS, 1980), Adelphi Paper No. 159, pp. 44–48.Google Scholar

35 On the Kalahari Desert episode, see, inter alia, “France Says Data Show South Africa Plans Atomic Test,” The New York Times, 23 08 1977, p. 1.Google Scholar

36 For a good review of nuclear weapons doctrines potentially applicable to new or small nuclear powers, see Dunn, Lewis A. and Kahn, Herman, Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975–1995 (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, 1975).Google Scholar

37 I have coined the term “triangular second-strike capability,” referring here to the three-way relationship among Israel, the USSR, and the Arab states, since no suitable phrase exists in the strategic literature. Basically, the following questions are involved for Israel: could it absorb a Soviet first-strike and still carry out a countercities strike against the Arabs sufficient to cause “unacceptable” losses? and would the Israeli ability to do so be perceived, beforehand, by the Soviets and the Arabs? If a phased-array radar capability could be developed, launch-on-warning might provide such a deterrent, albeit with the cost of greatly increasing structural instability and the chances for accidental nuclear war. See Harkavy, , Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust, esp. pp. 59–64.Google Scholar

38 On the matter of the Pakistani centrifuge installation, see, inter alia, “Zia Denies Pakistan Builds Nuclear Bomb and Urges U.S. to Resume Aid,” The New York Times, 23 09 1979, p. 14Google Scholar; and “Pakistan is Offered a Choice on A-Arms,” ibid., 17 04 1979, p. A3. On the Iraqi nuclear program, see “Iraq Said to Get A-Bomb Ability With Italy's Aid,” The New York Times, 18 03 1980, p. 1Google Scholar; and “Magazine Reports Israeli Agents Sabotaged Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,” Oakland Tribune, 15 03 1980, p. A12.Google Scholar

39 For a synopsis and analysis of recent U.S. nonproliferation legislation, particularly as pertains to sanctions, see Donnelly, W. and Kramer, D., “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Legislation for Policy and Other Measures,” Issue Brief No. IB77011, The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 1978.Google Scholar

40 The impact of the recent gold price increase on the South African economy (hence, also, perhaps its political leverage), is noted in “South Africa Cuts Income Taxes Because of Rise in Price of Gold,” The New York Times, 27 03 1980, p. A22Google Scholar. See also “Gold's New Turbulent Role,” The New York Times, 28 03 1980, p. Dl.Google Scholar

41 See Pollack, Jonathan D., “The People's Republic of China in a Proliferated World,” in op. cit., King, John Kerry, ed. pp. 132–33.Google Scholar

42 It should be noted, however, that on several occasions, Taiwanese leaders have said they would never develop nuclear weapons because the idea of unleashing them against “Chinese com patriots on the mainland” was unthinkable. See “Taiwan Develops Nuclear Industry, Weaponry Capacity,” op. cit.

43 See Rothstein, Robert, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

44 On the Israel-South Africa arms link, see, inter alia, “South Africa Gains Arms and Trade as Israel Link Hardens,” The New York Times, 21 05 1977, p. 6Google Scholar; and “South African Jews: Cautious, Vulnerable,” Washington Post, 15 02 1977, p. 9.Google Scholar

45 This author was recently informed by a (not to be named nongovernmental) source that South Africa has recently improved the avionics for its Mirage fighters, and that the improved technology may also have been transferred to Israel. See also, inter alia, “Israeli Tours South Africa as Arms-Trade Furor Grows,” The New York Times, 10 02 1978, p. 2.Google Scholar

46 See the Johannesburg Star around 15–17 April 1976Google Scholar; also, “South Africa Link to Israel Grows,” The New York Times, 18 08 1976, p. 9.Google Scholar

47 See “Taiwan Using Unofficial Diplomatic Ties to Avoid Becoming an Outcast,” The New York Times, 17 09 1977, p. 2Google Scholar; “Taiwan Rejects Israeli Plane Offer,” The New York Times, 7 07 1978, p. 3Google Scholar; and “U.S. Decides to Permit Israeli Sale of 50 to 60 Jet Fighters to Taiwan.” The New York Times, 5 07 1978, p. 1.Google Scholar

48 See Direction of Trade: Annual 1970–1974 (Washington, D.C.: IMF/IRBD, 1975) for full data on trade involving the pariahs, by exports and imports, regions and individual countries.Google Scholar On Israeli-South African economic relations, see “South Africa Gains Arms and Trade as Israel Link Hardens,” The New York Times, 21 05 1977, p. 6, wherein Israel's exports of chemicals, textiles, and electronics is said matched by South Africa's exports to it of sugar, coal and steel.Google Scholar

49 See “Visit By Taiwan Leader to Saudis Underlines Bond Between Nations,” The New York Times, 11 07 1977, p. 35Google Scholar; and “Taiwan Using Unofficial Diplomatic Ties to Avoid Becoming Outcast,” The New York Times, 9 09 1977, p. 2.Google Scholar

50 The data derived from conversation with State Department's South Korea desk officer.

51 See “Israel Says It Will Close Embassy in South Korea,” The New York Times, 16 02 1977, p. 7, wherein it is said that the ROK was taking an increasingly pro-Arab position, to win friends in the Third World and to further its economic penetration of the Middle East.Google Scholar

52 “Attack on South African Oil Plants Expected to Bring Stiff Retaliation,” The New York Times, 3 06 1980, p. 1.Google Scholar

53 See “Taiwan Prosperity Unmatched in Asia,” The New York Times, 28 03 1980, p. A6.Google Scholar

54 One recent report of undetermined accuracy does report on South African sales of armored cars to Morocco for use against the Polisario. See Africa Confidential, 9 04 1980, p. 8.Google Scholar

55 Regarding Nasser's preventive war threats in response to Israeli nuclear developments, see the following New York Times 1966 articles: “Warning on Bomb Given by Nasser,” 2 February, p. 8Google Scholar; “Nasser Assails U.S. and Britain,” 23 February, p. 2Google Scholar; “Nasser Threatens War on a Nuclear-Armed Israel,” 18 April, p. 6Google Scholar; and “Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms,” 9 May, p. 8.Google Scholar On the 1969–1970 preventive war possibility, see Haselkorn, Avigdor, “Israel: From An Option to a Bomb in the Basement?” in Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II, Lawrence, R. M. and Larus, J., eds. (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1974).Google Scholar

56 This matter is elaborated upon in Harkavy, R. E., “Arms Re-Supply During Conflict and the Carter Administration's Arms Control Policies,” paper delivered at the International Studies Assoc. meeting, Los Angeles, 19–22 March 1980.Google Scholar

57 See the Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 282–85.Google Scholar

58 For a discussion of this point, see Kemp, Geoffrey, “The New Strategic Map,” Survival 19, 2 (03/04 1977): 50–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59 Luttwak, Edward, U.S. Foreign Policy in a Proliferating World (Santa Monica, Calif.: 1975), California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Discussion Paper No. 68, p. 14.Google Scholar

60 This idea was earlier bruited by Bader, William in The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968), pp. 109–10.Google Scholar

61 See, for instance, Garwin, Richard, “Declaratory Posture for the Second Nuclear Regime,” in Nuclear Weapons and World Politics, Gompert, David C. et al. , eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), pp. 130–31.Google Scholar