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International Organizations and Political Communication: The Use of UNCTAD by Less Developed Countries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert S. Walters
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Extract

Ten years ago Chadwick F. Alger identified a major problem in international organizations research. He decried the tendency to study international organizations primarily in terms of “their accomplishment of their explicit goals through the explicit mechanisms established for this purpose.” In most cases this meant concentration on the passage or defeat of resolutions in public meetings and on the extent to which the problems addressed in these resolutions have been dealt with efficaciously through United Nations bodies. Alger suggested that “this type of inquiry does not produce the only, nor necessarily the most important, impact that the organization has on relations among members.” Instead, we should devote more attention to an examination of how international organizations “affect the broader international system in which they operate even when problems are not resolved within their walls.”

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , fall 1971 , pp. 818 - 835
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1971

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References

1 Alger, Chadwick F., “Non-resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 06 1961 (Vol. 5, No. 2), p. 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 For information on the creation and operation of UNCTAD see Cordovez, Diego, “The Making of UNCTAD,” Journal of World Trade Law, May–06 1967 (Vol. 1, No. 2), pp. 243–328Google Scholar; Hagras, Kamal M., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: A Case Study in U.N. Diplomacy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965)Google Scholar; Weintraub, Sidney, “After the U.N. Trade Conference: Lessons and Portents,” Foreign Affairs, 10 1964 (Vol. 43, No. 1), pp. 37–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Friedeberg, Alfred S., The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of 1964: The Theory of the Peripheral Economy at the Centre of International Political Discussions (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1969)Google Scholar.

5 See Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March–16 June 1964 (hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Proceedings, 1964), Vol. I: Final Act and Report (United Nations Publication Sales No: 64.II.B.11 [UN Document E/CONF.46/141, Vol. I]) (New York: United Nations, 1964)Google Scholar; and Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session, New Delhi, 1 February–29 March 1968 (hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Proceedings, 1968), Vol. I: Report and Annexes (United Nations Publication Sales No: E.68.II.D.14 [UN Document TD/97, Vol. I]) (New York: United Nations, 1968)Google Scholar.

6 Green, Reginald H., “U.N.C.T.A.D. and After: Anatomy of a Failure,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 09 1967 (Vol. 5, No. 2), p. 244CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For examples of the pessimistic tone in press coverage of UNCTAD see the New York Times, 03 31, 1968, pp. F1, F5Google Scholar, and March 10, 1969, p. 19.

7 Alger, , Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 129Google Scholar.

8 Alger suggests that the most significant aspects of the General Assembly are also neglected by using Congress with its coercive power as the model against which the General Assembly is tested. Ibid., p. 130.

9 On this point see Blair, Patricia W., “The Dimension of Poverty,” International Organization, Summer 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 3), p. 687CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Haas, Ernst B., Tangle of Hopes: American Commitments and World Order (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 252Google Scholar.

10 Asher, Robert E., “International Agencies and Economic Development: An Overview,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), p. 435CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham Jr, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics, Analytic Studies) (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 88Google Scholar.

12 Gregg, Robert and Barkun, Michael, “Articulation and Aggregation of Interests,” in The United Nations System and Its Functions: Selected Readings, comp. Gregg, Robert W. (Van Nostrand Political Science Series) (Princeton, N.J: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1968), p. 12Google Scholar.

13 Quoted by Gardner, Richard N. in “The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), p. 107CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Nye, Joseph S., “UNCTAD: Populist Pressure Group” (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 1971), p. 40Google Scholar. (Mimeographed.) This essay is to appear in a forthcoming book edited by Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson.

15 UN Document TD/B/173, p. 25.

16 Ibid., pp. 25–26.

17 See Nye, pp. 78–79, on this point.

18 UN Document E/CONF. 46/C.5/SR.20, p. 12.

19 UN Document E/CONF. 46/C.5/SR.21, p. 6.

20 See Schattschneider, Elmer E., The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 62–77Google Scholar. Of course this type of behavior is often observable in international organizations. A case in point was United States support for the creation of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA) under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as a response to the LDC demands for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) under the control of the UN General Assembly. The IBRD is a much more comfortable decisionmaking forum for the United States than is the General Assembly on questions of development assistance.

21 Almond and Powell, p. 86; see pp. 86–87 for a definition of these terms.

22 Ibid., p. 89.

23 Haas, Michael, “A Functional Approach to International Organization,” Journal of Politics, 08 1965 (Vol. 27, No. 3), p. 504CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 The name comes from the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,” UNCTAD Proceedings, 1964, Vol. 1, pp. 66–68Google Scholar. Though new LDC members of UNCTAD have joined this group since 1964, the original name of the group has been retained.

25 Ibid., p. 67. A correspondent of the Observer wrote from Geneva that the cohesion of the LDCs at the 1964 conference “is seen by all the Western delegates here as perhaps the most significant political phenomenon of the last 20 years.” Observer, June 14, 1964, p. 2, cited in Cordovez, , Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 295, footnote 108Google Scholar.

26 See Green, , Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 250–255Google Scholar.

27 For the embodiment of the agreement see the “Charter of Algiers,” UNCTAD Proceedings, 1968, Vol. I, pp. 434, 440Google Scholar; see also Gosovic, Branislav, “UNCTAD: North-South Encounter,” International Conciliation, 05 1968 (No. 568), p. 21, footnote 14Google Scholar.

28 Sunday Times, June 14, 1964, p. 2, cited in Cordovez, , Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 303, footnote 115Google Scholar.

29 For example, the Western states made a joint proposal for a preference scheme through an OECD communication to the New Delhi session of UNCTAD in 1968. (See UN Document TD/56.) In 1964 the Western states had not been able to agree on a common position.

30 Almond and Powell, p. 105.

31 A United States official noted that “when delegations to UNCTAD are staffed primarily by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs instead of the Office of Economic Affairs in State, then you will know that UNCTAD has become like ECOSOC and the pressure is off.” Nye, , p. 35Google Scholar.

32 de Seynes, Philippe, “Developing New Attitudes in International Economic Relations,” in The Quest for Peace: The Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lectures, ed. Cordier, Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 184–185Google Scholar. Italics added.

33 See Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development (United Nations Publication Sales No: 64.II.B.4 [UN Document E/CONF.46/3]) (New York: United Nations, 1964)Google Scholar; Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Towards a Global Strategy of Development (United Nations Publication Sales No: E.68.II.D.6 [UN Document TD/3/Rev.1]) (New York: United Nations, 1968)Google Scholar. Prebisch through UNCTAD and these documents popularized on a global scale the ECLA doctrine which he had previously forged for the Latin American region. See Economic Commission for Latin America, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (United Nations Publication Sales No: 1950.II.G.2 [UN Document E/CN.12/89/Rev.1]) (New York: United Nations, 1950)Google Scholar; Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949 (United Nations Publication Sales No: 1951.II.G.1 [UN Document E/CN.12/164/Rev.1]) (New York: United Nations, 1951), pp. 1–88Google Scholar; and Prebisch, Raúl, “International Trade and Payments in an Era of Coexistence: Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries,” American Economic Review, 05 1959 (Vol. 49, No. 2), pp. 251–273Google Scholar. For an outline of the doctrine in these documents see Hirschman, Albert O., “Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America,” in Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments, ed. Hirschman, Albert O. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 12–36Google Scholar.

34 Some observers of UNCTAD have argued that it could well be a mistake to rationalize demands for international economic reform on the basis of Prebisch's economic theory. His views on international economics are extremely controversial, and many economists feel that some of the central concepts (such as the decline in the terms of trade) around which the specific policy proposals are based simply break down under the strain placed upon them by UNCTAD doctrine. It is argued by these observers that there is a danger in linking all programmatic changes to an economic theory that is so controversial and vulnerable to attack because if the theory is discredited it is likely that the resource transfer programs based upon it will be undermined as well. These critics of UNCTAD suggest that it would have been wiser if UNCTAD had avoided such a dramatic departure from more orthodox international economic theory. See Friedeberg, pp. 33–86.

35 Nowhere is this more clearly evidenced than in UNCTAD's role in preparations for the Second United Nations Development Decade (DDII). Some Western states felt it was usurping the mandate of the Preparatory Committee for the Second United Nations Development Decade under the direction of ECOSOC and the General Assembly.

36 Gardner, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 124Google Scholar.

37 See Evans, John W., “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 84–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 Gardner, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 109Google Scholar; and Bernstein, Edward, “The International Monetary Fund,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), p. 141CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for the Fiscal Year Ended April 30, 1969 (Washington, n.d.), p. 38Google Scholar.

40 See UN Document TD/56. For an analysis of the OECD's response to UNCTAD see Ohlin, Goran, “The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 239–242CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41 New York Times, October 13, 1970, p. 1, and October 19, 1970, p. 61.

42 Gardner, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 109Google Scholar; and Blough, Roy, “The World Bank Group,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 159–160CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

43 See statement by Eugene V. Rostow, “From Aid to Cooperation: Development Strategy for the Next Decade,” reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1968 (Vol. 58, No. 1498), pp. 359–368. For a discussion of United States and Soviet responses to various demands raised in UNCTAD see Walters, Robert S., American & Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 180–196Google Scholar.

44 See the statement made by Deputy Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Samuels at the OECD ministerial meeting on May 22, 1970, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1970 (Vol. 62, No. 1618), pp. 811–814.

45 Partners in Development, Report of the Commission on International Development, Pearson, Lester B., chairman, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969)Google Scholar.

46 David H. Pollock has prepared an interesting, detailed comparison of the Pearson commission report and UNCTAD documents pointing out these similarities even to the point of the wording employed. See Pollock, David H., “Pearson and UNCTAD: A Comparison,” International Development Review, 1970 (Vol. 12, No. 4), pp. 14–20Google Scholar.

47 Several international organization and United States government officials interviewed by this author have identified the Pearson report as the most important accomplishment of UNCTAD on the basis of the legitimacy or respectability it gave to demands of UNCTAD which as late as the mid-1960s were viewed by many in the West as being heretical.

48 A Soviet delegate to UNCTAD seemed to view the situation in like manner. He warned that productive work within UNCTAD was all the more urgent because a number of Western states were seeking to diminish the functions and responsibilities of UNCTAD by infusing new energy into the activities of GATT and other organizations which they controlled. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Official Records … Trade and Development Board (2nd session), 31st meeting, August 31, 1965, p. 37.

49 UN Document TD/B/175, p. 14.

50 For an excellent discussion of the group system see Gosovic, , International Conciliation, No. 568Google Scholar.

51 Ibid., p. 30; and Nye, p. 30. See also, “Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly,” International Conciliation, 09 1968 (No. 569), p. 151Google Scholar, for an example of consensus at the highest common denominator on the question of product coverage in the LDC proposal for a general preference scheme.

52 Gosovic, , International Conciliation, No. 568, pp. 25 and 30Google Scholar.

53 Ibid., pp. 69–70.

54 For example, the United States would probably have liked to use the UNCTAD demand for a general preference scheme to reduce French influence in Africa, but the group system in UNCTAD of necessity led to an agreement between the Western states not to embarrass each other and contribute to a split within that group. The group system's hold on LDCs and advanced states in UNCTAD precluded the forging of an explicit alliance between non-EEC associates among the LDCs and the United States on this issue. See ibid., p. 72, footnote 77.

55 Prebisch was well aware of this problem, and it is interesting to note that his successor as secretary-general of UNCTAD, Manuel Perez-Guerrero, is much more given to the low key, mediating stance. See Nye, pp. 77–79. There is also some evidence in the case of the 1968 sugar conference and the evolution since 1964 of the UNCTAD secretariat's treatment of the preference issue that the secretariat has dropped its role as a partisan of the LDCs and has adopted a more neutral stance conducive to forging concrete agreements. See Nye, p. 77; and Gosovic, , International Conciliation, No. 568, pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

56 This problem of maintaining a set of priorities is discussed by Nye, pp. 29–31. See also Gosovic, , International Conciliation, No. 568, pp. 34–36Google Scholar. For an excellent summary of UNCTAD's awareness of its institutional problems see the report of the secretary-general on improvements of UNCTAD machinery, UN Document TD/B/173.

57 Chapter XI is entitled “Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories.”

58 For a view that this could result in less chance for major reforms see Young, Oran R., “The United Nations and the International System,” International Organization, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), p. 917CrossRefGoogle Scholar.