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Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

David A. Baldwin
David A. Baldwin
Affiliation:
An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Eleventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Moscow, U.S.S.R., 12–18 August 1979. The author would like to express his appreciation for the helpful comments provided by Michael Banks, Richard Joseph, Robert O. Keohane, Nancy Marion, Roger Masters, Felix Oppenheim, Robert Packenham, James Rosenau, Bernard Segal, and Oran Young.
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Extract

Priority in the use of a novel meaning of a term is no cause for pride; in fact it betrays a lack of “terminological discipline” and a want of linguistic inventiveness–for when a writer creates or modifies a concept he ought also to coin a new word to denote it, rather than corrupt the language and spread confusion.

Type
Articles
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International Organization , Volume 34 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1980 , pp. 471 - 506
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1980

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References

1 Machlup, Fritz, Essays on Economic Semantics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 12Google Scholar.

2 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “World Politics and the International Economic System,” in The Future of the International Economic System, ed. Bergsten, C. Fred (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 121–25Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 3–19Google Scholar.

3 Lall, Sanjaya, “Is ‘Dependence’ a Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment?” World Development 3 (11 1975): 808.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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6 For discussions primarily concerned with understanding Latin American usage, see Caporaso, pp. 13–43; Duvall, Raymond D., “Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 51–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bath, C. Richard and James, Dilmus D., “Dependency Analysis of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions,” Latin American Research Review 11 (Fall, 1976): 3–54Google Scholar.

7 Oppenheim, Felix E., “The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification,” in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (Reading, Mass.: Addison–Wesley, 1975), vol. 1: Political Science: Scopeand Theory, p. 284. See also Machlup, pp. 3–6.Google Scholar

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9 Machlup, pp. 3–6 et passim.

10 Oppenheim, pp. 283–335.

11 It is a fair inference that Malthus had Adam Smith in mind here. The contemporary relevance is illustrated by Hirschman's, Albert O. contention that “no one has yet given a better picture of ‘dependence on trade’ than Adam Smith.” National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California, 1945), p. 73Google Scholar.

12 All quotes in this paragraph are from Malthus, pp. 1–7. Marshall, Alfred shared Malthus', view that economics should “conform itself to the familiar terms of every-day life, and so far as possible must use them as they are commonly used.” [Principles of Economics, 2 vols., 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1891), 1:103.]Google Scholar

13 Oppenheim, pp. 297–309.

14 In view of recent suggestions by Caporaso and Duvall that a clear distinction be drawn between the concepts of dependence and dependency, it should be noted that such a distinction is not employed in this essay for reasons that will be explained later. Unless otherwise indicated, treatments of dependence, independence, interdependence, autonomy, and dependency are regarded as falling within the same general field of inquiry. As used here, the term “interdependence” always refers to “mutual dependence.”

15 Caporaso, p. 18; Morse, Edward L., “Transnational Economic Processes,” International Organization 25 (Summer 1971): 382CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Faletto, Enzo, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. xii–xiiiGoogle Scholar.

16 Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2 (07 1957): 201–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. p. 214. See also, Oppenheim, pp. 283 ff.

17 The arguments for a contextual approach to power analysis consist largely of spelling out the implications of the absence of a political counterpart to money. See Baldwin, David A., “Money and Power,” Journal of Politics 33 (08 1971): 578–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31 (01 1979): 161–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Duvall, pp. 61–68.

19 Power and Interdependence, p. 8.

20 Caporaso, pp. 18–19, 24. See also, Muir, Ramsay, The Interdependent World and Its Problems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933), p. 1Google Scholar; and Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 143Google Scholar.

21 Duvall, pp. 62–63. Although it is customary to attribute the distinction between “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” interdependence to Keohane and Nye [“World Politics and the International Economic System”] the distinction is also found in an earlier article by Waltz, Kenneth [“The Myth of Interdependence” in The International Corporation, ed. Kindleberger, Charles (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970), p. 210.Google Scholar

22 A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897)Google Scholar. (Also known as the Oxford English Dictionary, and hereafter cited as OED.) Cf. Littré, É., Dictionnaire de la Langue Française (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1883)Google Scholar. Similar dependency terminology exists in English, Italian, French, and Spanish and can be traced back to the same Latin roots. Usage of the term in a political context to refer to relations in which one actor relies upon another for fulfillment of a need, a usage suggesting subjection or subordination, is several centuries old in each of these languages. “Vulnerability dependence” is not new! This concept of dependence seems to be implicit in the writings of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus. [The Discourses and Manual, trans. Matheson, P. E. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916).]Google Scholar

23 This may be an overly cautious statement. Judgments as to what should be classified as “world affairs” may differ, however, and I do not wish to quibble. In my judgment, the OED does not contain a single example of the first meaning in the context of world affairs.

24 “Costs” in this essay always refer to “opportunity costs.” Although dependency may be defined in terms of the costs of “breaking” a relationship, it can also refer to alterations in the relationship short of total severance. This point is of little consequence for the argument in this essay, however; and the terms “breaking,” “altering,” “severing,” and “foregoing” will be used interchangeably.

25 Cooper, Richard N., “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” World Politics 24 (01 1972): 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26 Tollison, Robert D. and Willett, Thomas D., “International Integration and the Interdependence of Economic Variables,” International Organization 21 (Spring 1973): 259Google Scholar. This article not only asserts a view of “normal usage” that differs from Cooper's view of “normal usage,” it even cites Cooper's article in support of this contention.

27 Whitman, Marina v. N., Reflections of Interdependence: Issues for Economic Theory and U.S. Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p. 265Google Scholar. Also in 1979, Kenneth Waltz concluded that “sensitivity interdependence” was “essentially an economist's definition.” [Theory of International Politics, p. 139.]

28 Cf. Sloan, Harold S. and Zurcher, Arnold J., A Dictionary of Economics, 4th ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961)Google Scholar; and The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Modern Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965)Google Scholar.

29 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), reprint ed. (New York: Modern Library, 1937), pp. 13–16. To say that specialization and exchange create dependency is not to say that each trading partner incurs an equal amount of dependency, nor does it imply dependency on each trading partner. A country that increases its economic well-being through trade becomes dependent on trade but not necessarily on any particular product or trading partner.

30 Muir, p. 18.

31 Hirschman, p. 73.

32 Ibid., p. 18. Hirschman notes that the “gain from trade” refers to “that part of a country's well-being which it is in the power of its trading partners to take away” (p. 19). Thus, vulnerability is necessarily implied by this type of dependency. Ernst B. Haas overlooks this point when he introduces “vulnerability interdependence” and “opportunity cost interdependence” as two separate concepts. They are simply different labels for the same basic concept. [“Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975): 861–864.]Google Scholar

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34 Cf. Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: John Wiley, 1964)Google Scholar; andEmerson, Richard M., “Power-Dependence Relations,” American Sociological Review 27 (02 1962): 31–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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36 Machlup, , Essays, pp. 13–23Google Scholar; History of Thought on Economic Integration, pp. 15, 19–20, 29, 53, and 81.

37 Aliber, Robert Z., ed., National Monetary Policies and the International Finance System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

38 On this point, see Tollison and Willett, pp. 255, 259–260, 267; Whitman, Marina v. N., “Economic Openness and International Financial Flows,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1 (11 1969): 727–28, 745CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cooper, , “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy,” pp. 159–60Google Scholar.

39 Wallich, Henry C., “Money and Growth,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1 (05 1969): 281CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Whitman, , “Economic Openness,” p. 727Google Scholar.

40 Machlup, , History of Thought on Economic Integration, p. 18.Google Scholar

41 Keohane, and Nye, , “International Interdependence and Integration,” pp. 363–414Google Scholar. Morse, Edward C. has suggested that “the analysis of interstate interdependence begins with a central political problem that arose in international economic interchange after World War II” [Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 117]Google Scholar; but he modified this statement to apply only to “recent writings” in a later publication. [“Interdependence in World Affairs,” World Politics: An Introduction, eds. Rosenau, James N., Thompson, Kenneth W., and Boyd, Gavin (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 663.]Google Scholar

42 Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, trans. Atkinson, James B. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), pp. 68–69Google Scholar, 149, 163, 171, 203, 359. Although first published in 1532, The Prince was written about 1514.

43 Silberner, , La Guerre Dans la Pensée Économique, pp. 7–122Google Scholar; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The First and Second Discourses (1750, 1755), trans. Masters, Roger D. and Masters, Judith R. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 36nGoogle Scholar; On the Social Contract (1762), trans. Masters, Judith R.Google Scholar; ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 74n; and de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, De l'Espirit des Lois (1748)Google Scholar, Book XX, Chap. II, cited by Hirschman, p. 10n.

44 SirAngell, Norman, The Foundations of International Polity (London: William Heinemann, 1914)Google Scholar; Delaisi, Francis, Political Myths and Economic Realities (London: Noel Douglas, 1925)Google Scholar; and Muir, The Interdependent World and Its Problems.

45 Morse, Edward L., Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 51Google Scholar; Morse, , “Interdependence in World Affairs,” pp. 662–63Google Scholar; Keohane, and Nye, , “Interdependence and Integration,” pp. 363, 365, 368, 376–77Google Scholar; and Rosecrance, et al. , “Whither Interdependence?” p. 426Google Scholar.

46 “Interdependence and Integration,” p. 367. See also a similar argument in Power and Interdependence, pp. 9–10.

47 Power and Interdependence, p. 9. Even states at war may be described as interdependent if each would prefer to continue the war relationship rather than incur the costs of ending that relationship, e.g., surrender, defeat, or mutual annihilation.

Robert W. Tucker's distinction between “positive interdependence,” in which the interests of the parties vary directly, and “negative interdependence,” in which the interests of the parties vary inversely, obscures the essential characteristic of all interdependent relations—the existence of a shared interest in maintaining the relationship. [The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 97Google Scholar. Cf. Rosecrance and Stein, pp. 2–3.] Poker may be a zero-sum game, but getting enough players together to have a game is not. The players' common interest in playing poker underlies the zero-sum game they play, just as the common interest in preserving a habitable planet underlies seemingly zero-sum conflicts between states. For more on conceptualization of benefits, see Baldwin, David A., “The Power of Positive Sanctions1,” World Politics 24 (10 1971): 23–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 “Interdependence in World Affairs,” pp. 662–63.

49 “Whither Interdependence?” pp. 426–27.

50 On the nature of normative inquiry and concepts, see Oppenheim, pp. 314–28.

51 Foundations of International Polity, p. 17.

52 Morse attributes to Muir the view that the growth of interdependence is a “requisite for the abolition of interstate conflict.” [Foreign Policy and Interdependence, p. 51, and “Interdependence in World Affairs,” pp. 662–63.] Actually, Muir's argument is that the abolition of war is a requisite for survival in an interdependent world in the sense that an interdependent world will be very unpleasant unless war is abolished.

53 Neither the naivete nor the falsity of this line of argument is as obvious to this writer as it appears to some.

54 “International Interdependence and Integration,” pp. 366–67, 370. They cite Young, Oran R. as an example of this “normal” usage. [“Interdependencies in World Politics,” International Journal 24 (Autumn 1969): 726–50.]CrossRefGoogle ScholarWaltz, apparently agrees that this represents “common” usage. [Theory of International Politics, p. 139.]Google Scholar

55 Duvall, pp. 62–63.

56 Moon, Parker Thomas, Imperialism and World Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 542–58Google Scholar; Simonds, Frank H. and Emeny, Brooks, The Great Powers in World Politics: International Relations and Economic Nationalism (New York: American Book Co., 1935), pp. 63–94Google Scholar; Spykman, Nicholas John, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), pp. 35, 270, 292–317Google Scholar; Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 319, 367Google Scholar; The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), pp. 250, 598Google Scholar; Eagleton, Clyde, International Government, rev. ed. (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), pp. 8–14Google Scholar; and Hoag, Malcolm W., “What Interdependence for NATO?” World Politics 12 (04 1960): 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Dunner, Joseph, ed., Dictionary of Political Science (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964), pp. 260–61Google Scholar.

57 Rappard, William E., United Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 261.Google Scholar

58 Deutsch, Karl W., Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), p. 37Google Scholar.

59 Deutsch was familiar with the work of Delaisi, Hirschman, and Sir Norman Angell, and even cited their work in a later article. Although he criticized their empirical observations on interdependence, there was no indication of conceptual disagreement. [Deutsch, Karl W. and Eckstein, Alexander, “National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959,” World Politics 13 (01 1961): 267–69.]CrossRefGoogle Scholar

60 Deutsch, Karl W., “Power and Communication in International Society,” in Conflict in Society, ed. de Reuck, Anthony (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 300–1Google Scholar. This definition is also found in Deutsch, Karl W., The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 255Google Scholar.

61 Katzenstein, , “International Relations and Domestic Structures,” p. 9n.Google Scholar

62 Ruggie, John Gerard, “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration,” American Political Science Review 66 (09 1972): 875nCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Whitman, , Reflections of Interdependence, p. 161Google Scholar; Morse, , “Interdependence in World Affairs,” p. 663Google Scholar; and Modernization and the Transformation of Society, p. 117.

64 This point is noted by Keohane, and Nye, , “International Interdependence and Integration,” pp. 401–02Google Scholar.

65 Economics of Interdependence, p. 4.

66 National Power and Foreign Trade, p. 18.

67 Economics of Interdependence, p. 22.

68 “The Myth of National Interdependence.” Shortly after the publication of this article, Morse criticized it for failure to provide an explicit definition of interdependence and depicted Waltz as opposed to “conceptualizing international politics in terms of notions of interdependence.” [Morse, Edward L., “Transnational Economic Processes,” pp. 380–81Google Scholar.] These are puzzling charges. Waltz's concept of interdependence as relations that would be mutually costly to break is simple, straightforward, and clear; it is even contained in a section subtitled “The Meaning of Interdependence.” The observation that Waltz objects to analyzing international politics in terms of interdependence is even more baffling. Waltz objects to the “rhetoric of interdependence” and to certain generalizations about the magnitude and implications of interdependence in today's world; but he does not deny the utility of the concept in analyzing world politics.

69 Tollison and Willett, p. 259n.

70 Ibid., p. 255.

71 Holsti, Kal J., “A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence,” International Organization 32 (Spring 1978): 518CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Rosecrance and Stein (p. 2) say the concept “comes from” Waltz.

72 Theory of International Politics, p. 139. In fairness to Waltz, it should be noted that he explicitly points to the correspondence between his concept of “interdependence as mutual vulnerability” and “everyday usage” (p. 143).

73 Ruggie, pp. 874–75.

74 Ibid., p. 875.

75 Ibid.

76 The best source for broadening one's view of “exchange relations” is Blau's Exchange and Power in Social Life. Trade is only one of many forms of exchange among countries.

77 “World Politics and the International Economic System,” pp. 121–25. In previous writings I have characterized this as a “useful distinction,” although I have disputed some of the empirical generalizations about the relationship between power and the two types of interdependence put forward by Keohane, and Nye, . [“Power Analysis and World Politics,” pp. 175–179Google Scholar.] What follows constitutes a change in my position regarding the value of this conceptual distinction or at least the labeling of the distinction. It also constitutes a modification of the view of “interdependence” presented in Baldwin, David A., ed., America in an Interdependent World (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1976), p. 13Google Scholar.

78 On this point, see Cooper, , “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy,” pp. 178–179Google Scholar; and Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 142Google Scholar.

79 Duvall, pp. 62–63.

80 These “forms of interdependence” are identified by Morse, , “Interdependence in World Affairs,” 666–71Google Scholar.

81 Caporaso, pp. 18–19,24; Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, p. 143Google Scholar; Muir, p. 1.

82 Power and Interdependence, p. 8.

83 Those who would like to submit this proposition about the views of the mass public to empirical testing might frame questions along the following lines: “If you lived within easy walking distance of ten drugstores, would you feel dependent on any one of them?” “If there were only one drugstore within fifty miles of your home, would you feel dependent on it?” The “man in the street” may not speak in terms of “the opportunity costs of foregoing a relationship,” but he has a firm grasp of the underlying concept.

84 “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy,” pp. 178–79.

85 Duvall, p. 63.

86 “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy,” p. 159.

87 Caporaso, pp. 18–20 et passim; and Duvall, pp. 52–68 passim.

88 Caporaso, James A., “Introduction to the Special Issue of International Organization on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89 Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” pp. 19, 31Google Scholar.

90 Ibid.

91 Duvall, pp. 51–61. It is not clear who gets to claim the dubious distinction of being committed to “lax empirical social science.” Duvall names only himself, Bruce Russett, and Caporaso as representatives of the “rigorous empirical” tradition.

92 Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” p. 19Google Scholar. The title of the special issue of International Organization on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System can easily mislead one as to the contents. With a few notable exceptions, this volume is definitely slanted toward Latin America. As Richard Fagen points out, “despite the efforts of the editor to cast the theoretical net as widely as possible … the bulk of the writings in this volume respond in some fashion to … ‘the [Latin American] dependency way of framing the question of development and underdevelopment.’ It could hardly be otherwise, for the majority of authors represented here have had their primary research experience in or on Latin America.” [“A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: Thoughts on Extending Dependency Ideas,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 287.]CrossRefGoogle Scholar

93 Caporaso, , “Dependence and Dependency,” pp. 19–20.Google Scholar

94 Ibid., pp. 18–19, 24. It should be noted that the divergence from common usage involved here is not confined to English, but also applies to Italian, French, and Spanish.

95 Ibid., p. 22; Duvall, p. 63. Bath and James have suggested that “it might be better to change the name from ‘dependency theory’ to ‘linkage politics.’ ” (p. 33.)

96 Oppenheim, pp. 303–304.

97 For documentation and further references regarding these points, see especially the incisive and telling critique by Packenham, Robert A., “The New Utopianism: Political Development Ideas in the Dependency Literature,” Working Paper No. 19, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 1978Google Scholar. See also,Packenham, Robert A., “Latin American Dependency Theories: Strengths and Weaknesses,” paper presented before the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Seminar on Political Development, Cambridge, Mass., 02 6, 1974Google Scholar; Lall, pp. 799–810; Duvall, pp. 52–57; 68n; Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” pp. 22–24, 43Google Scholar; Cardoso and Faletto, pp. vii–xiv; Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, “The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States,” Latin American Research Review 12 (Fall 1977): 7–24Google Scholar, esp. pp. 15–16; and Smith, Tony, “The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory,” World Politics 31 (01 1979): 247–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 Fagen, p. 288; Packenham, Robert A., “Trends in Brazilian National Dependency since 1964,” in Rvett, Riordan, ed., Brazil in the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), p. 91Google Scholar; T. Smith, pp. 249, 251, 282–83, 288 and Galtung, Johan, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 2 (1971): 81–117CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

99 Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” pp. 28–29Google Scholar; Duvall, pp. 60–61, 65.

100 Smith, p. 251.

101 Hirschman, Albert O., “Beyond Asymmetry: Critical Notes on Myself as a Young Man and on Some Other Old Friends,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 For references to the social power literature, seeBaldwin, , “Power Analysis and World Politics,” p. 161nGoogle Scholar; and “Power and Social Exchange,” American Political Science Review 72 (12 1978): 1233n, 1241–42Google Scholar.

103 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S., “Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework,” American Political Science Review 57 (09 1963): 632–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” pp. 27–31Google Scholar.

104 Packenham, , “Trends in Brazilian National Dependency,” p. 91.Google Scholar

105 The term “actor” can refer to groups as well as individuals. The actor doing the influencing is usually called “A,” while the actor being influenced is usually called “B.” On the relational definition of power, see Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950)Google Scholar; Simon, Herbert A., “Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power,” Journal of Politics 15 (11 1953): 500–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar;Dahl, , “The Concept of Power,” pp. 201–15Google Scholar;Cartwright, Dorwin, “Influence, Leadership, Control,” in March, James, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 1–47Google Scholar; andRosenau, James N., “Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World,” International Security 1 (Fall 1976): 32–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 Cf.Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” p. 29Google Scholar.

107 Lasswell and Kaplan, pp. 75–76;Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 29–33Google Scholar; andNagel, Jack H., The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 14Google Scholar.

108 Baldwin, , “Power Analysis and World Politics,” pp. 162–75.Google Scholar

109 Modern Political Analysis, p. 33.

110 Power relations can also affect B's attitudes, beliefs, or policies as well as his behavior. I am using the term “behavior” loosely to refer to all such outcomes. Cf. Nagel, p. 29.

111 Modern Political Analysis, p. 26.

112 Cf. Lall, p. 803.

113 Cardoso and Faletto (p. xii) argue that there is “little sense in attempting to measure ‘degrees of dependence.’ ” Duvall (p. 56) implies that if dependency is conceived of as a “situation,” it cannot be a matter of degree. This seems contrary to common usage, however, since we often refer to “situations” as “good or bad,” “pleasant or unpleasant,” “political or nonpolitical,” “dangerous or safe,” and so on, all of which are matters of degree.

114 Nagel, pp. 172–74; and Cartwright, pp. 7–8.

115 “Beyond Asymmetry,” pp. 47–48.

116 Holsti, p. 520. Italics mine.

117 Cartwright, pp. 10–11; Nagel, pp. 12–34;Wrong, Dennis H., “Some Problems in Defining Social Power,” American Journal of Sociology 73 (05 1968): 676–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; andOppenheim, Felix E., “‘Power’ Revisited,” Journal of Politics 40 (08 1978): 597–601CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

118 In The Social Contract Rousseau explicitly pointed out the disadvantages of dominance: “If one of two neighboring peoples could not do without the other, the situation would be very hard for the former and very dangerous for the latter. In such a case, any wise nation will very quickly try to relieve the other of its dependency” (p. 74n).

119 Nagel, p. 16. There is a rich scholarly literature treating “anticipated reactions,” which could be useful to students of dependency. For a thorough discussion and bibliography, see Nagel.

120 Emerson, , “Power-Dependence Relations,” p. 32Google Scholar, paraphrased in Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” p. 21Google Scholar. Caporaso and Emerson use “A” to refer to the dependent actor and “B” to refer to the dominant one. In the quote I have reversed this usage in order to maintain congruence with the more common practice in the social power literature.

121 Emerson (p. 32) notes the similarity between opportunity costs and the possibility of alternative relations but does not recognize that B's motivational investment is also subsumed by the concept of opportunity costs. The magnitude of the opportunity costs to B of breaking a relationship with A varies directly with the magnitude of B's desire for the good or service involved. Thus, “cornering the market” for brussels sprouts is not likely to be a very effective way to make others dependent on you.

122 Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), p. 98Google Scholar.

123 See Baldwin, , “Power Analysis and World Politics,” pp. 163–75Google Scholar.

124 Cf. Dahl, , Modern Political Analysis, p. 37Google Scholar.

125 I refer to “most” rather than “all” such statements because some avoid tautology in a technical sense by excluding one or two items—usually “skill” or “bargaining ability”—from the list of power resources. Skill is similar to other power resources in that it may not be used in some situations. Parents who play games with their children, for example, rarely use all the skill they possess. Since skill is obviously one of the means by which an actor can influence the behavior of other actors, its arbitrary omission from the power resource category should at least be explained. Dahl admits that skill could be treated as a power resource, but his only explanation for not treating it as such is that “it is generally thought to be of critical importance in explaining differences in the power of different leaders.” The same could be said, of course, for a number of other power resources. [Dahl, Robert A., “Power,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12 (New York: Free Press, 1968), 409.]Google Scholar

126 “World Politics and the International Economic System,” pp. 122–23. Italics added.

127 “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” p. 28.

128 Ibid.; andKeohane, and Nye, , “World Politics and the International Economic System,” pp. 122–23Google Scholar.

129 Lasswell and Kaplan (p. 84) define a “form of influence” as a “kind of influence relationship specified as to base value and scope.” (It should be noted that in this essay I am using the terms “influence” and “power” interchangeably.)

130 A table in which Lasswell and Kaplan (p. 87) portrayed various forms of power is often criticized for listing power as a power resource (base value). This is a misinterpretation of the table. The point that Lasswell and Kaplan were making is that “power over some values often constitutes the condition for influence or power over other values” (p. 86).

131 Baldwin, , “Power Analysis and World Politics,” pp. 163–75Google Scholar; “Money and Power”; andDahl, , Modern Political Analysis, pp. 32–35Google Scholar.

132 “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” p. 20.

133 Ibid., p. 22.

134 Catlin, G. E. G., The Science and Method of Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 251Google Scholar (italics mine). Blau (pp. 94–95) points out that “in contrast to economic commodities, the benefits involved in social exchange do not have an exact price in terms of a single quantitative medium of exchange.…It is essential to realize that this is a substantive fact, not simply a methodological problem.” For detailed discussions of the implications for political analysis of the absence of a political counterpart to money, see Baldwin, “Money and Power”; “Power and Social Exchange”; and “Power Analysis and World Politics.”

135 Caporaso, , “Dependence, Dependency, and Power,” p. 31.Google Scholar

136 Modern Political Analysis, p. 34.

137 For discussion and further references on this point, see Baldwin, “Power and Social Exchange.”

138 Wrong, pp. 673–74.

139 “The Concept of Power,” pp. 202, 214.

140 Caporaso's admission that with only one exception “a serious explanation of counterfactuals was not taken up” by the contributors to the special issue of International Organization is, in effect, admitting that the heart of the matter was virtually ignored. [“Introduction,” p. 11.]

141 Oppenheim, , “The Language of Political Inquiry,” p. 305Google Scholar.

142 The weakness of the position of Cardoso and Faletto is that their approach precludes empirical investigation of certain dimensions of dependency (pp. viii–ix). Cf. Nagel, pp. 5–6,177.

143 The concept of interdependence used by Karl Marx seems to correspond with that used by Adam Smith, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Cf. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (1848), reprint ed. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954), p. 14;Clemens, Walter C. Jr, The U.S.S.R. and Global Interdependence (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 1Google Scholar; andBerki, R. N., “On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations,” World Politics 24 (10 1971): 101–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.