Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T13:55:25.785Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Leon N. Lindberg
Leon N. Lindberg
Affiliation:
Leon N. Lindberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of Wisconsin. The author would like to thank the following friends and colleagues for their comments and criticisms: Stuart A. Scheingold, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Jack Dennis, Robert Cohen, Stanley Hoffmann, Ernst B. Haas, and Gianfranco Speranza. The author also benefited from the discussion of an earlier version of the article in a seminar at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Get access

Extract

I intended to assure France primacy in Western Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich …; to cooperate with East and West and, if need be, contract the necessary alliances on one side or the other without accepting any kind of dependency; … to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers and, should it be necessary, as the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , Spring 1966 , pp. 233 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1966

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Haas, Ernst B., “Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe,” in Graubard, Stephen R. (ed.), A New Europe? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 65Google Scholar.

2 Haas, Ernst B., “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International Organization, Summer 1961 (Vol. 15, No.3), p. 372CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Haas, in Graubard, p. 73.

4 Lindberg, Leon N., “Decision Making and Integration in the European Community,” International Organization, Winter 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 1), p. 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 For full discussions see Jensen, Finn B. and Walter, Ingo, The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1965)Google Scholar, and Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961Google Scholar).

6 One can argue, and I think correctly, that the issue had only been ignored, but agreement to ignore does represent a kind of consensus too. Nor was it inevitable that the conflict would take the form that it did for we cannot derive general principles from the behavior of a de Gaulle. See Hoffmann, Stanley, “Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America,” Daedalus, Fall 1964 (Vol. 93, No. 4), pp. 1244–1297Google Scholar.

7 Easton, David, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 82Google Scholar. See also, Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965Google Scholar).

8 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 88.

9 To be presented in a book now in preparation provisionally entitled The European Community as a Political System.

10 Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 124.

11 In systemic terms this would be particularly paradoxical because it would imply that a major stress-regulating mechanism of the system had become itself a source of stress. See Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, Parts IV and V.

12 Le Monde, September 11, 1965. Only when the French finally returned to the Community bargaining table in January of 1966 did they issue a more specific set of demands. See the analysis below.

13 Faure, Maurice, “Le g´n´ral de Gaulle a prononc´ l'oraison funèbre du Marche´ commun,” Le Monde, September 11, 1965Google Scholar. See also, Drouin, Pierre, “Br^ler le trait´ de Rome?,” Le Monde, September 11, 1965Google Scholar.

14 See, for example, the statements of the Conseil national du patronat francais (CNPF), Le Monde, July 2; and F´d´ration nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles (FNSEA), Le Monde, September 11; Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs (CNJA), Le Monde, October 16, 1965. The F´d´ration nationale française des cooperatives agricoles de c´r´ales estimated that French farmers would lose between 2,500–5,000 million new francs per year (Agence Europe, September 1, 1965).

15 “Que perdrait l'´conomic française à la mort lente du March´ commun?,” Le Monde, September 19–20, 1965. Still another study indicated that France along with Italy had gained the most in overall economic benefits from European integration.

16 For an analysis of major decision-making sequences in the early history of the Community, see my The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1963), especially Chapters VI–XIII.

17 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force, and the Atlantic nuclear force, respectively.

18 La Nation, September 15, 1965.

19 “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System,” in The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects, ed. Wilcox, Francis O. and Haviland, H. Field Jr., (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1963), p. 11Google Scholar. See also, Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, p. 293.

20 For a discussion of their predicament see de Virieu, F.-H., “Les organisatins paysannes ne sont pas d'accord sur le sens ´ donner aux paroles du chef del'Etat,” Le Monde, September 11, 1965Google Scholar; and Viansson Pont´, Pierre, “Apràs le conseil des ministres,” Le Monde, September 17, 1965Google Scholar.

21 For exceptions, see the statements by Coudenhove-Kalergi, Count, Agence Europe, September 10, 1965Google Scholar, and Philip, Andr´, Le Monde, September 12–13, 1965Google Scholar.

22 Except for long-time Europeans (Jean Monnet, Maurice Faure, Pierre Uri, Etienne Hirsch, and Robert Lemaignen) or political opponents of the regime (Gaston Defferre, Raymond Cartier, and Ren´ Blondelle).

23 Our analysis is necessarily limited to published sources and hence we cannot say what kinds of pressuring and maneuvering went on behind the scene.

24 See Le Monde, September 30, 1965, October 1, 2, 1965. The clause about the EEC and the dangers of interruption was adopted by a vote of 136 to 14, with 34 abstentions.

25 See the interview with G´rard de Caffarelli, President of the FNSEA, in Le Monde, September 30, 1965, and the position of the young farmers' organization, the CNJA, in Le Monde, October 16, 1965.

26 See Le Monde, October 23, 1965, for a discussion and for the text of the resolution. For Couve de Murville's speech, see Le Monde, October 22, 1965.

27 “Decision Making and Integration in the European Community,” International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 70–75.

28 See, for example, a public opinion poll taken in July reporting on attitudes toward Gaulle's, de policies, “Ce que pensent les Français,” L'Express, August 2–8, 1965, pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

29 See “L'Opinion publique et l'Europe des Six,” Sondages, 1963 (No. 1), pp. 46, 50–53.

30 See Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, passim, and Lindberg, “Decision Making and Integration in the European Community,” International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 56–80.

31 Agence Europe, September 14, 1965.

32 Agence Europe, October 4, 1965.

33 Agence Europe, September 24, 1965.

34 Agence Europe, October 4, 1965.

35 Agence Europe, October 7, 1965. National business reactions have also been strong. See, for example, the statement of the Federation of Belgian Industries (FIB):

The continued buildup and completion of this venture … is vital for our economy. The fundamental decisions and the main options as to our country's economic policy have and will hinge to a very large extent on the outlook for European integration.

(Agence Europe, September 22, 1965.)

36 Agence Europe, October 13, 15, 1965.

37 Among economic groups only the trade unions make unambiguous and strong statements about the institutional system.

38 The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, pp. 108–109, 289–290.

39 He has heaped scorn upon the Commission on many occasions: “These bodies have their technical value but have not, and cannot have, any political authority or consequently be effective.” And “… arbitrary outside tyrannies like the so-called supra-national institutions. …” See France and the European Community, Occasional Paper No. 11 (London: Political and Economic Planning, January 30, 1961).

40 See “The Hour of Truth,” Common Market, August 1965 (Vol. 5), p. 155.

41 See, for example, the articles by Lemaignen, Robert, “La France manoeuvre pour vider le March´ commun de tout contenu politique,” Les Echos, August 4, 1965Google Scholar; and Mayer, Ren´, “Vingt ans apràs,” Le Monde, September 17, 1965Google Scholar.

42 The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), respectively.

43 This interpretation is strongly supported by the French insistence when it came back to the Council in January 1966 that the merger of the executives be carried out as rapidly as possible, hinting that if that were not done, it would resume the boycott.

44 “Vingt ans apràs” Le Monde, September 17, 1965.

45 Actually, for our interpretation it makes little difference whether de Gaulle ever intended the June negotiations to succeed or whether, as we have suggested, he made up his mind in the last few days to make his move at that time. One way of reconciling all the diverse evidence is to suggest (and this is plausible to me) that de Gaulle was really carrying on a twin deception: vis-´-vis his partners in the Community and vis-´-vis his own ministers, advisers, and civil servants, most of whom I am convinced were genuinely committed to the Community and to its operational rules. Support for this hypothesis comes from reports that almost all senior French delegates in Brussels were genuinely shocked at de Gaulle's action.

46 See Le Monde, July 7, 8, 9–10, 1965.

47 See Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Chapters VII–XII.

48 Common Market, September 1965 (Vol. 5), p. 190.

49 According to one estimate of the agricultural budget, France would have paid 18 percent against West Germany's 39 percent. (Le Monde, April 14, 1965.) French farmers would furthermore have received at least 50 percent of the total expenditures.

50 A figure used by de Gaulle in his press conference.

51 To the French President EEC is no more than a special kind of international co-operation in technical-economic fields. As far as decisions to be taken within EEC have any political implications, or concern vital interests of internal or external policy, they can only be taken if there is agreement between all six governments, for only in that case can the existence and the functioning of EEC be reconciled with the retention of political sovereignty. In other words, the French accept the supranational methods only in the field of technical economics. In politics they reject every application of this method of co-operation as being irreconcilable with national political sovereignty. Here there can only be room for the classic intergovernmental cooperation between countries.

(Common Market, September 1965 [Vol. 5], p. 183.)

52 Le Monde, September 11, 1965.

53 Ibid.

54 See Scheingold, Stuart A., “De Gaulle v. Hallstein: Europe Picks Up the Pieces,” forthcoming in The American Scholar, Summer 1966Google Scholar.

55 For the text of what came to be known as the “decalogue,” see Agence Europe, January 18, 1966.

56 Le Monde, January 19, 1966.

57 Lindberg, “Decision Making and Integration in the European Community,” International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 65.

58 Ibid. p. 68.

59 For discussions of de Gaulle's style, especially his dislike of a bargaining of overt mutual exchanges and concessions, see Grosser, Alfred, “Le G´n´ral et le secret,” Le Monde, September 14, 1965Google Scholar; Läthy, Herbert, “De Gaulle: Pose and Policy,” Foreign Affairs, July 1965 (Vol. 43, No. 4), pp. 561–573CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hoffmann, Stanley, “De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance,” International Organization, Winter 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 1), pp. 1–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60 Charles Ikl´, Fred, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 62–63Google Scholar.

61 Agence Europe, Supplement, September 15, 1965.

62 Le Monde, September 18, 1965.

63 Agence Europe, September 21, 1965.

64 Le Monde, September 30, 1965.

65 Agence Europe, Supplement, October 15, 1965.

66 Agence Europe, Supplement, September 28, 1965. For the full texts see Agence Europe, Document Nos. 338, 339, 340, September 30, 1965.

67 The truth of the matter is that De Gaulle never wanted to keep Britain out of Europe: he wanted to prevent her (and succeeded) from taking part in the construction of a Europe he himself rejects, i.e., a Europe moving towards federal structures, which would be one of the pillars of the Atlantic Alliance. From the point of view of the Gaullist conception this is natural and reasonable, as clearly once Britain decided to join a “Community” and to accept integration, nothing would any more stand in the way of the fulfillment of this “dream” based on “false counsel.” What General De Gaulle wants, however, is a Britain playing her part in an alliance between states. …

(Agence Europe, Comment, September 14, 1965.)

68 See “De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance,” International Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1. pp. 1–28.

69 Ikl´, How Nations Negotiate, p. 63.

70 Agence Europe, October 6, 1965.

71 The firmness with which the Five resisted the French demands in this regard at the January 1966 Council sessions seems to me more attributable to fears, fed by the way in which de Gaulle acted in the crisis, that the French would use the veto to block decisions of interest to others. Thus, they refused to accept any formal or informal provision that majority voting would not be resorted to when a member's vital interests were involved.

72 De Gaulle could have achieved this purpose much more economically, merely by making a few strong statements with some veiled threats. He has not been the only one to complain about those “technocrats in Brussels”; for example, see Erhard, Ludwig, “Was wird aus Europa” Handelsblatt, December 23–24, 1960Google Scholar. It is interesting in this context to recall that the major reproach directed to the Commission from the onset of the EEC has been that it was too consistently pro-French!

73 Implicit in what I have already said about outputs is the idea that, in part, support for any of the political objects will, in the long run, depend upon the members being persuaded that outputs are in fact meeting their demands or that they can be expected to do so within some reasonable time. Output failure can be said to occur when members feel that outputs are not likely to do so.

(Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 267.)

74 Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, p. 76.

75 Jean-Charles Snoy as cited in Agence Europe, September 11, 1965.

76 Ibid.

77 It is interesting to note that the surprisingly strong opposition to de Gaulle in the December elections apparently further reduced the incentives to go it alone without France.

78 Agence Europe, January 31, 1966.

79 Agence Europe, February 1, 1966.

80 Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 561.

81 For details see Agence Europe, January 29, 31, and February 1, 1966.

82 See above, p. 250.

83 For example, it is “desirable for the Commission to get into touch in an appropriate way” with the governments before making a proposal, rather than “the Commission should consult. …”

84 It would make sense for a de Gaulle desirous of maintaining the system to settle for this, considering that he had made his point, that any Commission would be more cautious in the future, and that the frontal attack on the institutions and the atmosphere of crisis were only forcing the Five into a doctrinal defense, and trusting that the onslaught could be carried on in a more piecemeal fashion in specific policy contexts. Furthermore, much might be eroded away during the three-year bargaining process over merging the three Treaties which would follow the merger of the executives.

85 See the discussion below of alternative strategies for reducing the chances for blackmail.

86 “Minimizing commitments” as such a strategy in itself has already been discussed.