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Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Timothy J. McKeown
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Extract

Although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents, current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved. Existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime. As an example, Great Britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century, but Britain's behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability. I advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a “political business cycle.”

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , Winter 1983 , pp. 73 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1983

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References

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