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The expansion of West German capital and the founding of Euratom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Christian Deubner
Christian Deubner
Affiliation:
Research Associate at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, West Germany.
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Abstract

In the mid 1950s, West German industry changed from being oriented primarily towards internal and West European reconstruction needs and the supply of coal and steel, to being more oriented towards the international market of finished goods. Whereas prewar and war-time technology had dominated production processes and products up until then, U.S. competition started to force advanced technologies like computers and atomic energy upon industry.

Along with increased instability in the general political and economic situation of West Germany these changes contributed greatly to progressive differentiation within what had been a more homogenous industry structure and within the West German state apparatus.

One important result of these new trends was the genesis of a foreign atomic policy, resulting in the founding of Euratom. Global versus European orientation, traditional versus “modern” industries, traditional liberal versus new interventionalist policies were joined in the issue and produced a highly ambivalent result. In the attempt to explain and interpret the case of Euratom in this context, theories of integration and of state are tested. The greatest explanatory power is conceded to modern Marxist theories which combine the concept of international dependency with a differentiated concept of relations between state and industry.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , Spring 1979 , pp. 203 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1979

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References

This paper is derived from research done for a doctoral dissertation. The researcher had full use of the West German government's official archives which included all ministries engaged in the EEC and Euratom negotiations and decisions. This was the first time which this material had been available. The author also gained access to the files of the ECSC-Secretariat at Luxembourg and the files of numerous West German industrial associations.

The dissertation has been published. Christian Deubner, Die Atompolitik der westdeutschen Industrie und die Griindung von Euratom (Frankfurt-New York: CAMPUS-Verlag, 1977). The Documents cited in this article have been included in an appendix.

1 Haas, E., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Nehrt, L. C., International Marketing of Nuclear Power Plants (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1966)Google Scholar; Scheinman, L., “Euratom, Nuclear Integration in Europe,” International Conciliation 536 (1967)Google Scholar; Nau, H. R., National Politics and International Technology: Nuclear Reactor Development in Western Europe (Baltimore, 1974)Google Scholar.

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3 L. Scheinman, “Euratom”.

4 ibid: 9.

5 Ibid: 10.

6 Calleo, D. P. and Rowland, B. J., America and the World Political Economy (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 79Google Scholar.

7 Ibid., p. 80.

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14 J. Hirsch, op. cit.; N. Poulantzas, op. cit.

15 This account is given by all historians of European Integration. See Uri, Pierre, “La crise de la zonedelibre échange” (Paris, 1959)Google Scholar, L. Scheinman, “Euratom.”

16 These points will be partially dealt with later on.

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18 Cf. among other sources an interview held by the author with West German chief negotiator C. F. Ophüls in 1968, while researching for another study. Ophüls died shortly after.

19 Industriekurier, 7 April 1955, citing E. Faure; cf. also Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung 22 October 1954.

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23 Deubner, Chr., Die Atompolitik, p. 8Google Scholar; in November 1955, the chemical industry's president Menne reported to the Economics Ministry about a visit to Great Britain, where he had been told that Great Britain would only be able to deliver natural uranium and uranium enriched to a very low degree. There was not enough highly enriched uranium to meet only British needs. Cf. document 16.

24 B. Goldschmidt, Les Rivalités Atomiques; L. Scheinman, “Euratom.”

25 Goldschmidt, B., Les Rivalriés Atomiques, p. 191Google Scholar, shows the firmness with which private industry was blocked from gaining any direct influence upon the Commisariat a l‘Energie Atomique as late as 1951.

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28 Goldschmidt, B., Les Rivalités Atomiques, p. 210Google Scholar; Scheinman, L., “Euratom”: 8Google Scholar.

29 Deubner, Chr., Die Atompolitik, pp. 68,104Google Scholar.

30 Prüsz, K., Kernforschungspolitik in der BRD. (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1974)Google Scholar.

31 Cf. document 2, an internal memo in the Economics Ministry of 27 February 1954, concerning future overproduction of coal in West Germany and possible countermeasures.

32 “Woher rührt das atomare Schneckentempo?”. Die demokratische Gemeinde 3, 10 (1958)Google Scholar.

33 The Rheinisch-westfälische Elektrizitätswerke, for example, owned the biggest brown-coal-mines in the Federal Republic; Berndsen, R., Die deutschen Akliengsellschaften. Bilanzanalysen seit 1948 (Hannover, 1965)Google Scholar.

34 Freiberger, H., “Deutsche Elektrizitatswerke ohne Atompsychose,” Atom und Strom (12 1956)Google Scholar.

35 Deubner, Chr., Die Atompolitik, pp. 14 ffGoogle Scholar: the numerous statements of the public utilities show this clearly.

36 Deubner, Chr., Die Atompolitik, pp. 23 ffGoogle Scholar; A tomwirtschaft vols. 1, 10, 1956Google Scholar.

37 There were other industries engaged in the nuclear field as well, for example those for instruments or measurements equipment; however, they did not have a comparable economic relevance.

38 AEG-Telefunken annual report 1974, preface, for example. On the U.S.–German competitive position cf. also Epstein, B., Politics of Trade in Power Plant (London, 1971), pp. 32 ffGoogle Scholar.

39 One review of the relevant business news of 1955/56 in West Germany demonstrates this state of affairs.

40 Chemische Industrie, 12 (1955)Google Scholar.

41 Hull, J. E., “The Impact of Atomic Energy on the Chemical Industry,” Commercial and Financial Chronicle 183, 5524 (12 04 1956)Google Scholar.

42 Krengel, Grünig/, Die Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948 bis 1954 (Berlin (W): Deutsches Institut for Wirtschaftsforschung, 1955)Google Scholar.

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44 E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe.

45 Cf. the discussion in the mining industries' review Glückauf, 1 January 1955 and 26 February 1955, and in the Consultative Council of ECSC, where the representatives of the coal- and steel industries of the six ECSC-member countries counseled the High Authority, also cf. document 4.

46 Cf. Memorandum of the Coal Mining Association (Wirtschaftsvereinigung Bergbau) for the Economics Ministry of 14 February 1956, document 20.

47 There was a storm of electric utilities' protests in fall 1954 to all levels of West German Government. The coordinated effort behind it becomes very clear in document 3, a circular of the utilities' association of 26 October 1954 to its members.

48 Cf. the travels of industry spokesman A. W. Menne and his numerous contacts with and communications to Adenauer, Erhard and Strauss. Cf. documents 12,16,18, to name only a few.

49 By 1956 a whole number of bilateral agreements of technical cooperation, taking different legal forms, had been established between West German and U.S. firms in the electrical, engineering, and boiler industries. Besides those there were no other published international cooperation ventures of West German firms in the nuclear field. Electrical Industry: Westinghouse-Siemens, General Electric-AEG, Babcock & Wilcox-BBC; Engineering and Boiler Industry: Atomics International-DEMAG, AMF Atomics-MAN, US Foster Wheeler Corp.-Vereinigte Kesselwerke. Sources: Atominformationen, Atomwirtschaft, P. P. Pressedienst. It would be interesting to show how in these bilateral agreements West German firms became more or less directly engaged in the bitter competitive struggle of their opposing U.S. partners. The conflict between Siemens and AEG, reproducing that.between Westinghouse and General Electric, became notorious in the fifties and sixties before they merged in the KWU, cf. Atomwirtschaft 12, 1974: 585Google Scholar. And as was true in the U.S., machine and boiler builders led a long and bitter fight against the electrical industry (witness the conflict over the organic moderated AMF-reactor sponsored by DEMAG in 1959/1960, cf. Archive of Atomic Minister S. Balke, against Siemens competition) over the mastery of their old market of the steam-generating component of the new power plant, before they lost out to the electrical giants. This too is a highly relevant aspect of the internationalization processes in which the very internal structures and conflicts of the dominating industry are reproduced in the dominated national economy. Cf. Poulantzas, “Internationalization of Capitalist Relations.”

50 Deubner, Chr., Die Atompolitik, p. 105Google Scholar; there are numerous documents for these attempts in Canada, in South Africa, in the Belgian Congo, in Spain and in Scandinavia. Cf. documents 24, 25, 26, 28.

51 One example was the early project of enrichment cooperation with Brazil; Gall, N., “Atoms for Brazil, dangers for all,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (06 1976): 5, 43Google Scholar.

52 Cf. “The Report of the Committee of Experts set up by the Conference of Messina,” 5 November 1955, document 15.

53 This intention was brought into the official discussion first by its mention in the first Monnet-Action-Committee-Memorandum, 19 January 1956.

54 Cf. the detailed exposition in K. Knorr, “Euratom and American policy.”

55 Goldschmidt, B., Les Rivalités Atomiques, 231Google Scholar.

56 There were numerous U.S. State Department visits with the Ministry of Atomic Affairs in Bonn, to remove its industry-inspired resistance against atomic integration plans.

A whole row of documents testifies to the intensity of this direct foreign intervention into the decision-making process. This official U.S. strategy was well known to industrial representatives abroad and at home where U.S. officials appeared even at the level of individual firms in order to dissuade industry from its position.

There is no information as to how far this opinion-making campaign had been coordinated with the Chancellor, or whether American diplomats actually felt free enough in West Germany at that time, to act like that on their own. Compare for example documents 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 30, 19, 27, 29,31,18.

57 Cf. the travel-report of an industrial delegation to the U.S.A.E.C. and the State Department in October 1955 to minister Strauss on 28 December 1955 seems to show that clearly.

58 Deubner, Chr., Die Atompolitik, p. 30Google Scholar; cf. Atomwirtschaft 1 (1956): 34Google Scholar.

59 It was only in 1959 that atomic legislation could finally be carried through in the Federal Republic; Prüsz, , Kernforschungspolitik, p. 300Google Scholar.

60 Cf. the relevant correspondence between Adenauer and Erhard in 1953; document 1.

61 Cf. the list of members of the intergovernmental Committee of Experts set up by the Conference of Messina of 26 July 1955, document 10.

62 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 35Google Scholar on the correspondence between utilities and the Ministry, illustrating the mutual understanding. Cf. for example document 8.

63 Erhard was well known for these dislikes.

64 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 67Google Scholar; for an interesting document showing the Economic Ministry's position look at documents 5 and 9, which are the internal position papers of spring and summer 1955.

65 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, 85Google Scholar; these points were made in the long teletype of 24 October 1955 by industry spokesman Menne, in which he warned the newly installed Minister of Atomic Affairs Franz Josef Strauss against agreeing to the program of the experts' committee. Cf. document 12.

66 Men like Walter Hallstein, Carl F. Ophüls, Franz Etzel, Hans von der Groeben, and later von Brentano were most intimately involved in Adenauer's European strategies.

67 Böhme, H., Prolegomena zu einer Soziol- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1969)Google Scholar.

68 On the constant and close liaison between the West German Chancellor and the High Authority of the ECSC there are comments by the former Economics Ministry official responsible for ECSC-affairs, von der Groeben (cf. interview with v.d. Groeben in 1974) and by the former cabinet-chief of Chancellor-intimate and High-Authority-member Franz Etzel (cf. correspondence in 1974).

69 There is the well-known account byUri, P. in La France devant I'Europe, la Polilique Européenne de la IVéme République, Bjol, E., ed. (Copenhagen: 1966), AppendixGoogle Scholar.

70 Scheinman, L., “Euratom”: 8Google Scholar.

71 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 69Google Scholar; cf. document 6, pertaining to a preparatory interministerial meeting before the visit of Pinay, for the Chancellor and Foreign Office views.

72 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 70Google Scholar; cf. document 17, testifying to the Foreign Office's opinion, that the supranational organization of Euratom would provide an especially propitious opportunity to create a firm community of the six ECSC-members. It was this aspect which the Foreign Office “because of political considerations, found the decisive one,” as its representatives said in the interministerial meeting with the Atomic Ministry on 2 December 1955.

73 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 69Google Scholar.

74 Cf. the correspondence between Erhard and Adenauer in the second half of 1955, document 11; cf.Deubner, , Atompolitik, p. 72Google Scholar.

75 There is no document directly proving this interpretation. It may be deduced from the empirical and theoretical analysis;Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 71Google Scholar.

76 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 75Google Scholar; Ambassador Krekeler from Washington reported this, cf. Document 7.

77 Cf. correspondences in the files of the Economics Ministry.Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 78Google Scholar.

78 Strauss was officially designated on 21 October 1955; Menne sent him a long teletype on the 24th.

79 The first broad interministerial meeting with the Foreign Office and the Economics Ministry initiated by the Atomics Ministry took place on 2 November 1955. Cf. the protocol in document 14.

80 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 104Google Scholar.

81 The Foreign Office's timetable for concluding the experts' talks was presented in the meeting of 2 November 1955. On November 4th the German representative in the experts' committee had to declare Bonn's refusal to accede to the experts' report. Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 113Google Scholar.

82 A detailed reasoning on this point is given inDeubner, Chr., Atompolitik, pp. 71–79Google Scholar.

83 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 110Google Scholar, on the mechanism of governmental decision-making.

84 Cf. footnote 59.

85 Cf. footnote 56.

86 Numerous documents show these attempts of Strauss and the atomic industry, and demonstrate their futility in the face of international and national restrictions. Cf. the Strauss-brief for Adenauer before Adenauer's U.S.-visit in 1956, document 23.

87 For an interpretation of the Euratom-treaty seeMoore, B. T., Euratom. The American Interest in the European Atomic Energy Community (New York, 1958)Google Scholar; L. Scheinman, “Euratom.”

88 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 2Google Scholar.

89 Mintzel, A., “Die CSU in Bayern,” in Parteiensystem in der Legitimationskrise, Ebghausen, Dittberner, eds. (Köln, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1974)Google Scholar.

90 Deubner, Chr., Atompolitik, p. 27Google Scholar.

91 Ziebura, G., “Sozialökonomische Grundfragen des deutschen Imperialismus vor 1914,” in Sozialgeschichte Heute, Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag, Wehler, H. U., ed., (Göttingen, 1974)Google Scholar.

92 N. Poulantzas, “Internationalization of Capitalist Relations.”

93 Calleo, D. P. and Rowland, B. M., America and the World Political Economy; Mandel, E., “Die KonkurrenzEuropa-Amerika,” (Frankfurt/M., 1968)Google Scholar.