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Dirty Pool

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2003

Donald P. Green ,
Soo Yeon Kim  and
David H. Yoon
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Abstract

International relations scholars make frequent use of pooled cross-sectional regression in which N dyads over T time points are combined to create NT observations. Unless special conditions are met, these regressions produce biased estimates of regression coefficients and their standard errors. A survey of recent publications in international relations shows little attention to this issue. Using data from the period 1951–92, we examine the consequences of pooling for models of militarized disputes and bilateral trade. When pooled models are reestimated to allow for stable but unobserved differences among dyads, the results are altered in fundamental ways.

Type
Symposium
Information
International Organization , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , Spring 2001 , pp. 441 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2001

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